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ABSTRACT 
This study takes a step forward to explore the dynamic relationship between cultural 
values and stock market development in the United Kingdom, during the period 1991- 
2004. Cultural values are represented by the cultural model of Hofstede (1980) which 
consists of five dimensions, which are: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, masculinity and time horizon. Stock market development is represented by 
four indicators, which are: stock market activity, size, liquidity and concentration. 
Empirical results, using structural equation modelling (SEM), show that some cultural 
values have significant relationships with stock market development indicators. Power 
distance has a significant negative relationship with stock market size, while individuality 
has a significant positive relationship with stock market activity at the 0.90 confidence 
level. Furthermore, since good corporate governance systems are considered as an 
important component of stock market development, this study has been extended to 
explore the impact of cultural values on corporate governance systems across twenty four 
countries in Western Europe, North America and Asia Pacific. Corporate governance 
systems are represented by 6ght aspects, which are: board size, separation of chair and 
CEO, independence per board, independent audit committee, remuneration disclosure, 
women on board, code of ethics and ethics systems. The regression analysis results show 
that cultural values have a significant impact on several corporate governance systems 
across countries. Individuality has significant positive relationships with three corporate 
governance systems, which are: independence per board, audit committee, and ethics 
systems. Power distance has a significant positive relationship with separation of chair 
and CEO. The interaction term, uncertainty avoidance/masculinity, has significant 
negative relationships with three corporate governance systems, which are: independence 
per board, remuneration disclosure, and code of ethics. Moreover, the interaction term 
power distance/masculinity has a significant negative impact on women on board. This 
study concludes that several cultural values play an important role in the formation and 
behaviour of stock market development over time, and on corporate governance systems 
across countries. These results have important consequences at both firm and country 
levels and in terms of stock market integration across the globe. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade global stock markets have experienced huge developments in terms 
of market capitalization and activity. The importance of stock market development 
stems from their potential impact on economic growth and prosperity. However, 
there is evidence that the trend of stock market development varies across countries. 
In general, three approaches have been introduced to explain these differences across 
countries, which include: legal, political and cultural approaches. Among these 
approaches the cultural aspects are receiving more attention nowadays as they may 
provide a more comprehensive view for stock market performance than other 
approaches. Consequently, this study proposes that cultural values may have an 
influence on stock market development in a nation over time. 
Furthermore, previous empirical research highlighted the importance of corporate 
governance systems on stock market development, as good corporate governance 
systems may increase investors' confidence and reduce investment risk. Although, 
there is a tendency towards internationally accepted good corporate governance 
practices, still there is significant evidence of corporate governance differences across 
countries. As a result, this study is extended to explore the potential reasons of these 
differences across countries. These notable additions to existing literature may 
provide ftuther insights into the stock market development mechanism, and the 
origins of corporate governance systems across countries. Further details of the 
research process unfold as follows. 
I 
(1/1) Study problem 
The study problem can be formulated in the following two questions: 
(1) What is the impact of cultural values on the stock market development in the 
United Kingdom? 
(2) What is the impact of cultural values on corporate governance systems across 
countries? 
(1/2) Motivation 
The main motivation for this study stems from the deep desire to explore new 
underlying fundamental aspects, which may have significant influence on stock 
market development mechanisms. Cultural values have been spotted as a potential 
underlying major player in this context. Obviously, extensive literature review shows 
that there is a lack of a comprehensive framework for the dynamic relationships 
between cultural values and stock market, development in one country across time. 
Moreover, since corporate governance systems represent an important aspect of stock 
market development worldwide, the study is directed to explore the potential origins 
of corporate governance across countries. These aspects have important institutional 
and individual consequences which are laid down in the next section 
(1/3) Study importance 
This study makes several additions to existing theoretical and empirical researches. 
First, it provides a wider perspective of the mechanisms of stock market development 
in the United Kingdom, which can help investors understand stock market behaviour 
more effectively. Second, it provides a new path in the search for a small group of 
variables that affect stock market development across time. Third, it can help to 
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introduce more effective stock market develoPment programs, which is considered as 
an important issue towards more global stock market integration and greater 
international capital flows. Finally, it sheds some light on the origins of corporate 
governance systems across countries, which may improve international investors' 
decision-making process and corporate governance development programs across the 
globe. 
(1/4) Study aim 
The main aim of this study is to explore new dimensions of the stock market 
development in the United Kingdom and corporate governance differences across 
countries. 
(115) Study purpose 
Consequently, the purpose of this study is to move towards a more comprehensive 
framework that makes up the development process of the stock market in the United 
Kingdom, as well as to explore the potential origins of corporate governance systems 
across countries. 
(1/6) Study objectives 
The main study objectives focus on smart targets to highlight the relationships 
between cultural values, stock market development and corporate governance, as 
detailed below: 
a) to identify the most important factors that determine cultural values in the 
United Kingdom, 
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b) to identify the most important factors which determine stock market 
development in the United Kingdom, 
c) to investigate the impact of cultural values on stock market development in the 
United Kingdom, and 
d) to exarnine the relationship between cultural values and corporate governance 
systems across countries. 
(1/7) Study hypotheses 
In order to test the potential relationships between cultural values (independent 
variables), stock market development indicators and corporate governance systems 
(dependent variables), the following null hypotheses are formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: "Power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individuality, 
masculinity, and time horizon do not provide distinct dimensions of culture 
values in the United Kingdom 11. 
Hypothesis 2: "Activity, size, liquidity and concentration do not provide 
distinct dimensions of stock market development in the United Kingdom ". 
Hypothesis 3: "There is no relationship between cultural values and stock 
market development indicators in the United Kingdom". 
Hypothesis 4: "There is no relationship between cultural values and 
corporate governance systems across countries". 
The third null hypothesis has been reformulated into thirteen sub alternative 
hypotheses, while the fourth null hypothesis has been sub-divided into eight 
alternative hypotheses to cover the range of relationships between the study variables. 
More details on hypothesis formulation are presented in chapter three: Methodology. 
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(1/8) Data and methodology 
To achieve the study objectives the following procedures have been implemented 
concerning data sources and statistical analysis techniques. 
(1/8/1) Data sources 
Data have been collected from several secondary sources to satisfy the statistical 
analysis requirements. 
a) Annual, quarterly and monthly proxy variables for cultural values, as 
suggested by Hofstede's cultural model (1980,1983), are collected using 
several published secondary data sources such as the DataStream database, as 
well as other private and government sources such as the Office for National 
Statistics for the period 1990-2004. 
b) Annual, quarterly and monthly data on the stock market development 
indicators in the U. K., in the light of previous empirical research, have been 
collected using several published secondary data sources, such as the 
DataStrearn database, as well as other private and govenunent sources, such as 
the London Stock Exchange for the period 1990-2004. 
c) Corporate governance indices are collected from the Ethical Investment 
Research Service (EIRIS) Ltd, for twenty four countries in Western Europe, 
North America and Asia Pacific. 
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(1/8/2) Statistical analysis techniques 
This study depends on a variety of statistical analysis techniques and methods to 
achieve the study objectives. 
a) The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is used to identify the most suitable 
cultural model, as suggested by Hofstede (1980,1982), using the LISREL 
software package (Version 8.72) 
b) The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is used to identify the most suitable 
stock market development model, in the light of the work by Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (1995), using the LISREL software package (Version 8.72). 
c) The structural equation niodels (SEM) are used to construct suitable causal 
models that link cultural values and stock market development indicators, 
using the LISREL software package (Vers ion 8.72). 
d) Multiple, stepwise and weighted regression analyses are used to explore the 
relationship between cultural values and corporate governance across 
countries, using SPSS (Version 14.00) and E-views software packages 
(Version 3.1). 
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(1/9) Study plan 
The study plan maps on to seven chapters, providing a detailed presentation of the 
research undertaken, as follows (See Figures: 1.1 and 1.2): 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter presents the study problem, motivation, importance, objectives, 
hypotheses and methodology for the whole study. 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
This chapter includes a critical review over previous theoretical and empirical 
research concerning cultural values, stock market development and corporate 
govemance as well as related topics. 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter includes the methodology implemented to achieve the study 
objectives; it outlines the data-sources, detailed research hypotheses, measurement 
of variables, and statistical analytical techniques. 
Chapter 4: Data analysis and results for cultural values and stock market 
development 
This chapter includes the core details of the statistical analysis process and results 
pertaining to the relationship between cultural values and stock market 
development in the United Kingdom. 
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Chapter 5: Data analysis and results for cultural values and corporate 
governance 
This chapter includes the core details of the statistical analysis process and results 
ascribing to the relationship between cultural values and corporate governance 
systems across countries. 
Chapter 6: Discussion 
This chapter includes a brief discussion of the results and findings of this study, 
the detailed critical comparisons with previous empirical research, and the most 
notable contributions of this study. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This chapter presents the summary of the results and findings, the scope and 
limitations of this study, and finally future recommended research. 
8 
Figure 1.1: The flow chart for the relationship between cultural values and stock market 
development in the United Kingdom 
Figure 1.2: The flow chart for the relationship between cultural values and corporate governance 
systems across countries 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The aim of this chapter is to present a review of previous theoretical and empirical 
literature concerning culture, stock market development and corporate governance. 
Consequently, this chapter is divided into six sections. The first section presents 
cultural value dimensions, whilst the second section lays out the most important 
research on stock market development indicators. The third section presents the 
relationship between culture and stock market development. The fourth section 
presents corporate governance systems. The fifth section deals with corporate 
governance systems across countries. Finally, this chapter concludes with a summary 
and conclusions. 
(2/1) Cultural value dimensions 
The literature review shows that there are several definitions of culture which 
describes different meanings and scopes from different view points. Kroeber and 
Kluckholhn (1952) have defined culture as: 
"Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior 
acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive 
achievements of human groups, 
'including 
their embodiment in artifacts, 
the essential core of culture consists of traditional ideas and especially 
their attached values". 
They have suggested that a large culture exists in a society and it may comprise other 
smaller sub-cultures. They have pointed out that culture is shared distinctive values of 
a human group and these values are usually expressed in their behavior and artifacts. 
Another common definition of culture is introduced by Hofstede (1983) which states 
that: 
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"It is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members 
of one human group from another". 
However, Hofstede (1980) has reclaimed that humans are not programmed like 
computers; they have an ability to diverge from their societal collective program. 
Though, the cultural collective program means that certain behavior is more expected 
to happen in one country compared to others. It seems that culture may have an 
impact on the preferences of a society; these preferences influence the people, 
organizations and the whole economy. Hofstede (1980) has argued that: "Much as a 
computer operating system (e. g. MS-DOS) contains a set of rules that act as a 
reference point and set of constraints to higher level programs (i. e. Excel), so culture 
includes a set of societal values that drive institutional forms and practice" (Salter and 
Niswander, 1994). These societal values can be defined as (Hofstede, 1991): 
"The broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others" 
These values are reflected in the societal norms and behaviour of people living in the 
same society, leading to a sequence of reactions to daily life-events and situations, 
whether personal, organizational or even economic as a whole (Hofstede, 199 1). 
Hofstede (1991) has suggested that culture is similar to an onion that can be peeled 
layer by layer to reach the core content. The outer skin layer of culture represents 
Symbols such as words, colors and any other behavior/artifacts which may have a 
special meaning. The second layer consists of Heroes who are for example admired 
persons who represent a model for behavior. The third layer consists of rituals which 
include for example ways of respect and greetings between people. The final core 
level consists of the social values. It can be noticed that as we move down towards 
the core of the onion-like shape of culture the attributes become more invisible. 
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Symbols are the most visible attributes of culture; they form the outer skin of the 
onion, whereas values are more invisible and form the deep core level, which are 
more difficult to change. These invisible core values are acquired unconsciously at an 
early stage of human life (Hassan and Ditsa, 1999), and they can easily observed by 
watching the visible behavior outcomes of the cultural system in a society (Dahl, 
2004). 
Hofstede (1980) has asserted that societal norms may be determined by some 
ecological influences such as economic, historical and technological aspects (Figure 
2.1). At the same time, these social norms show themselves in the form of 
institutional consequences, such as family patterns, capital markets, and 
legislation. In this context, it can be asserted that the behaviour of stock market 
stakeholders, i. e. owners, new investors, customers, suppliers, brokers, dealers and 
government, may be influenced by the deep societal values in a given society. 
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Figure 2.1: Culture/societal values and institutional consequences. 
Source: Hofstede (1984) 
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In addition, Hofstede (1980) has suggested that there is a feedback loop between 
culture and its institutional consequences. 17his means that there are two ways 
causation between cultural values and stock market development in a society. North 
(1990) has mentioned that institutions can be defined as: 
"The rules of the game in society, or more formally, the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or 
economic". 
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He has added that there are two tyýes of institutions in a society. The formal 
institutions which include written rules and legislations, and the informal institutions 
which include unwritten rules of conduct (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
Furthermore, Hofstede (1980) has introduced the "culture in the individual" concept 
which suggests that culture is situated between the human nature and the individuals! 
personality. This means that common culture does not necessarily imply that all 
members of a society share exactly the same underlying values to the same degree. 
However, the concept means that members of a society will be more likely to share 
common values that are expressed both individually and/or collectively (Dahl, 2004). 
Ultimately, the culture concept describes both the underlying values as well as the 
manifested visible behavior. These values are transferred from one generation to 
another based on the society perception of the surrounding social environment and on 
past experience (Triandis, 1972). 
Spencer-Oatey (2000) has provided another useful definition of culture which entails: 
"Culture is a fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, behavioral norms, and basic 
assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people, and that 
influence each member's behavior and his/her interpretations of the 
"meaning" of other people's behavior". 
She has suggested that basic assumptions and values encompass the inner core of the 
culture onion. This inner core is followed by a level of beliefs, attitudes and 
conventions. Then, the third level consists of "systems and institutions", which is 
followed by an outer layer of culture. This cultural model has made two significant 
contributions: First, it has highlighted the functions of culture in addition to the values 
and behavioral outcomes. Second, it has suggested the existence of two core levels of 
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culture with a fuzzy boundary; the new core component contains attitudes, beliefs and 
behavioral conventions (Dahl, 2004). 
At this point it may be useful to highlight the relationship between the national culture 
and both the organizational culture and investor culture. On the one hand, the 
organizational culture phenomenon is quite different from the national culture. The 
nature of an organizational culture as a social system is quiet different in many 
respects from a national culture. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) have defined I 
organizational culture as the "The collective programming of the mind that 
distinguished the members of one organization from another", also they have added 
that it is "Perceived common practices: symbols, heroes, and rituals". This means that 
organizational cultures can be meaningfully described by a number of practice 
dimensions; these collective practices depend on the organizational characteristics, 
such as structures and systems. Organizational cultures are mainly expressed not in 
members' values but in more superficial manifestations such as common symbols, 
heroes and rituals. This has two important consequences: First, organizational 
practices can be easily influenced by changing these organizational characteristics, 
compared to collective values. of people which are extremely difficult to change. 
Second, there is no one cultural model for all organizations because different 
organizations may have different organizational practices and characteristics. 
Another difference between national and organizational culture seems to be based on 
their different mix of values and practices. Hofstede and other researchers have 
conducted research between "1985-1987", under the auspices of the Institute for 
Research on Intercultural Cooperation (IRIC), on several companies in Denmark and 
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Netherlands. They have found that the roles of values versus practices at the 
organizational level to be exactly the opposite of their roles at the national level. 
There were considerable differences in practices but much smaller differences in 
values between similar people in different organizations (Figure 2.2) (Hofstede and 
Hofstede, 2005). 
Figure 2.2: The balance of values and practices for various levels of culture. 
Source: Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
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They have added that national cultures are part of the mental software we acquired 
during the first ten years of our lives, and they contain most of our basic values. While 
organizational cultures are acquired when we enter an organization, with our values in 
place, and they consist of mainly of the organization! s superficial practices. 
On the other hand, it can be suggested that national cultural values may have an 
impact, to some extent, on the behaviour of both individual and institutional investors. 
De-Jong and Semenov (2002) have argued that the mental programming of investors 
influence their choices of the way they are conducting business, and the aggregate of 
these choices will shape the financial system in a nation. Indeed, the investors' 
decisions to invest, for example in shares, will depend to a great extent on their 
attractiveness compared to other investment opportunities such as deposits or bonds, 
which in turn are determined by a trade-off process between the return-risk of each 
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investment. That is, the attractiveness of buying shares will be influenced by the 
attitude of investors towards uncertainty (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). Different 
countries have different cultural values concerning uncertainty avoidance, thus 
investors in different countries may differ in the degree of their uncertainty avoidance. 
Therefore, it can be asserted that different national cultures concerning uncertainty 
avoidance may place some general boundaries on the mental programming of 
investors to behave in a certain way. In this context, Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
have suggested that societies, organizations and individuals represent the gardens, 
bouquets and flowers of social science. They have concluded that the three are related 
and part of the same social reality. The three levels should be taken into account to 
better understand our social environrnent. 
Previous empirical research shows that researchers have presented several cultural 
value dimensions models. One of the most important researches on culture was 
presented by Hofstede in 1980. He has performed a survey of work-related values 
around 1968 and 1973. About 120,000 employees of IBM subsidiaries participated in 
a questionnaire across 66 countries; employees represented 38 occupations and 20 
languages. Factor analysis was implemented on more than 100 standardized questions 
to explore culture differences across countries.. Hofstede (1980) has successfully 
managed to identify some structural elements of culture which may affect human 
behavior in work situations. Four main culture dimensions were identified, which are: 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity. 
Later on, Hofstede (1991) has introduced a fifth cultural dimension, called the time 
orientation, based on the Chinese culture connection study (1987). The long term time 
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orientation represents people preference to persistence, ordering relationships by 
status and monitor, thrift, and having a sense of shame. While, short-term orientation 
shows preference to personal steadiness and stability, protecting your face, respect for 
tradition and reciprocation of greetings, favors and gifts (Dahl, 2004, Smith et al., 
1996). 
Furthermore, Hofstede (1980) has provided an explanation for the consequences of 
each cultural value dimension for family life, organization, and government. In 
addition, he has successfully presented an explanation of the origins of each cultural 
dimension, which may help to identify measurable observable variables for each of 
them. In addition, empirical results have shown that some relationships between 
cultural value dimensions and other ecological factors do exist. For example: he has 
found positive relationship between power distance and country size. Also, he has 
found that power distance and masculinity are significantly related to the geographic 
location and historic background of the countries. More recently, Hofstede (2001) has 
shown that cultural value dimensions (except individualism) are persistent across 
time. The five culture value dimensions of Hofstede (1980) are described in detail as 
follows: 
The first cultural value dimension is power distance, which refers to the extent a 
society can accept an unequal distribution of power among its members. It describes 
the degree of interpersonal dependence between superiors and subordinates in a 
society. Hofstede (1983) has defined power distance as: 
"The power distance between a boss (B) and a subordinate (S) in a 
hierarchy is the difference between the extent to which B can determine 
the behavior of S, and the extent to which S can determine the behavior of 
B". 
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People in large power-distance societies; accept the existence of a hierarchy of 
inequality that is perceived to provide the best protection for everyone (De Jong and 
Semenov, 2002). As a result, co-operation among people is difficult to maintain, as 
everyone perceives the other as a potential threat to his/her power. Also, this implies 
an automatic or paternalistic relationship between subordinates and superiors, 
whereby the latter is usually dependent on the former, and they seldom contradicts 
each other and neither would a subordinate normally approaches the superior directly 
(Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
On the other hand, people in small power-distance societies believe in an equal 
distribution of power. They feel that inequality among them should be justified 
(Amat et al., 1996). People feel less threatened, trust each other and feel more at ease 
to cooperate with others (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). The relationship between 
superiors and subordinates is characterized by less interdependence, and a 
consultative communication-mode, whereby subordinates feel free to approach and 
contradict superiors (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
The cultural value dimensions by Hofstede (1980) has shown that the United 
Kingdom is characterized by a low power-distance score (Table 2.1). A low power- 
distance society may be characterized by the following (Gray, 1988): first, low 
concentration of economic power, high independence in decision-making and high 
self-regulation, which may encourage competition among members of the society. 
The low preference for concentration of power may force the regulatory system to 
provide more favourable conditions that facilitate competition, such as to increase 
minority shareholder's rights (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). Second, low level of 
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conservatism and secrecy, which may enhance disclosure of information about 
companies' performance. Third, high self-regulation, flexibility and decentralization, 
which may force effective regulation in favour of the stock market development. 
Therefore, low power distance cultural value dimension is expected to support more 
stock market development. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of countries' scores according to the cultural value model of 
Hofstede (1980). N/A = not available. 
Country Power 
Distance 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Individualism Masculinity Time 
Horizon 
Austria 11 70 55 79 N/A 
Belgium 65 94 75 54 N/A 
Denmark 18 23 74 18 N/A 
Finland 33 59 63 26 N/A 
France 68 86 71 43 N/A 
Germany 35 65 67 67 31 
Greece 60 112 57 35 N/A 
Italy 50 75 76 70 N/A 
Netherlands 38 53 80 14 44 
Norway 31 50 69 8 N/A 
Portugal 63 104 31 27 N/A 
Spain 57 86 51 42 N/A 
Sweden 31 29 71 5 33 
Switzerland 34 58 68 70 N/A 
United Kingdom 35 35 89 66 25 
United States 40 46 91 62 29 
The second cultural value dimension is the uncertainty avoidance, which refers to the 
extent that people can tolerate the anxiety emerging from unknown or ambitious 
situations in daily life. People usually try to avoid and/or reduce these situations by 
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using technology, rules and rituals. High uncertainty-avoidance societies feel that 
uncertainty inherent in life is a continuous threat that must be fought. These societies 
are motivated by security-preference, which is considered as an achievement in itself 
People tend to reduce ambiguity, conflict and competition. By contrast, low 
uncertainty-avoidance -societies are more at ease and relax within an ambiguous 
situation. Motivation is perceived as recognition by others rather than security. 
People focus more on practice rather than principles in life. They can accept more 
deviance, conflict and competition and use it to the benefit of their society (De Jong 
and Semenov, 2002). 
The cultural value dimensions by Hofstede (1980) shows that the United Kingdom is 
characterized by low-uncertainty-avoidance score (Table 2.1). A low uncertainty 
avoidance society may be characterized by the following (Gray, 1988): First, high 
independence among people and managers in a society, which may result in more 
competition between members of the nation. Second, high -self-regulation, flexibility 
and decentralization, which may result in flexible legislations that foster stock market 
development. Therefore, it can be predicted that low uncertainty-avoidance may result 
in more support for stock market development. 
The third cultural value dimension is individualism, which reflects the extent people 
prefer personal freedom and free choice. It can be defined as (Salter and Niswander, 
1994): 
"A high degree of independence a society maintains among individuals" 
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In an individualistic society, people are considered to be responsible only for 
themselves and their immediate family. They usually prefer loose social ties in the 
society. On the other hand, collectivist societies can be defined as (Amat et al., 1996): 
"A high degree a society accepts responsibility for family, tribal or in- 
groups in exchange for loyalty". 
People in collectivist societies have a "we" consciousness versus an "I" consciousness 
in individualist societies (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
The cultural value dimensions by Hofstede (1980) show that the United Kingdom is 
characterized by high individualism score (Table 2.1). A high individualism society 
may be characterized by (Gray, 1988): First, high tendencies towards self- 
independence in decision-making, which may result in more competition. As 
competition is more favourable to an individualistic society that prefers limited 
government-intervention and dispersed concentration of power (De-Jong and 
Semenov, 2002). Second, low conservatism and secrecy in financial reporting 
practices may increase the disclosure of financial information. Third, high self- 
regulation, flexibility and decentralization of regulations, which may result in flexible 
legislations to improve stock market development. Tberefore, it can be predicted that 
high individualism may result in more stock market development. 
The fourth cultural value dimension is the masculinity, which can be defined as 
(Hofstede, 1980): 
"It is the level of distinction of social gender roles in a society" 
People in a masculine society emphasize material achievement, assertiveness, and 
competition. They feel that the strong should be supported, conflicts are resolved by 
fighting them out, and managers prefer to have more independence in decision- 
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making. On the other hand, a feminine society usually tends to focus on feminine 
nurturance, care for others, a living environment and the quality of life. As more 
preference is given to modest behaviour, stress equality and solidarity against 
competition, and managers usually look for consensus-decisions (De Jong and 
Semenov, 2002). 
The cultural value dimensions by Hofstede (1980) shows that the United Kingdom is 
characterized by medium masculinity score (Table 2.1). A high masculinity society 
may be characterized by (Gray, 1988): First, high preference for independence in 
decision-making among members of the society, which may result in more 
competition nation-wide. Second, high self-regulation, regulation flexibility and 
decentralization, which may lead to positive legislations towards stock market 
development. Some intermediary channels may support these relationships through 
managers' high independence (arm's length relationships with stakeholders); dominate 
private pension funds, and low preference for ownership concentration (De Jong and 
Semenov, 2002). Third, low conservatism and secrecy in financial reporting practices, 
which may increase the information content of company reports. Therefore, it can be 
predicted that a high masculinity may result in more stock market development. Some 
intermediary channels may support these relationships, for example, in a high 
masculinity-enviroriment; society usually fosters competition through manager's high 
independence (arms' length relationships with stakeholders), dominant private pension 
funds, and a low preference for ownership-concentration (De-Jong and Semenov, 
2002). 
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The fifth cultural value dimension is time horizon, which has been added after the 
Chinese culture connection survey was conducted in 1987. This survey has shown a 
significant positive relationship between the long-term horizon of people in some 
countries, i. e. China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and Confucianism. This religion 
encourages self-discipline, and restrained and conservative behaviour. A Confucian 
society is expected to have more economic growth, because it focuses on long-term 
rather than short-term outcomes. Long-term horizon societies are characterized by 
their ability to focus on the whole rather than the parts in a persistent and flexible 
way. They slowly construct a process from parts in an ascending order to build the 
whole. On the other hand, short-tenn horizon societies prefer to sub-divide the whole 
into several parts, they expect quick results because they have confidence that they are 
doing things correctly (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
Previous empirical research has shown that the time horizon of investment varies 
significantly across countries. The shares of some companies are held by stable long- 
term shareholders, in contrast to other companies, which have short-term oriented 
investors (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). The cultural value dimensions by Hofstede 
(1980) have shown that the United Kingdom is characterized by a short term time 
horizon (Table 2.1). However, it is still difficult to draw clear relationships between 
this dimension and stock market development, except that long-term horizon societies 
may experience higher economic growth rates than short-term oriented societies, due 
to their tendency to invest more in human capital and long-term investment projects 
(De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
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In general, the cultural model of Hofstede (1980) has provided a useful framework of 
cultural values, which relatively reduces the complexity of the culture concept into 
five easily understood dimensions. In addition, the model is easy to apply using 
measurable variables for empirical testing and hypothesis (Dahl, 2004). However, 
researchers have argued that there are several drawbacks of this cultural model that 
should be taken into consideration. First, Hofstede (1980) survey is criticized for 
being not representative of the whole societies in each county, since it was conducted 
only on IBM employees. Hence, the study results may not be generalized to the whole 
society. Hofstede himself has noted that: "IBMers are very special people, not at all 
representative for our country". However, he has argued that the perfect match of his 
samples across countries is more important than the problem of sample representation 
(Licht et al., 2004). Second, the model does not address the interrelationships among 
the cultural dimensions. For example a change in uncertainty avoidance may be due to 
a change in power distance rather than a change in the enviromnent, an increase in the 
education levels may decrease power distance and simultaneously allow people to be 
more confident and perhaps less anxious about the uncertainty of future outcomes 
(Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
Third, the model may suffer from a defect in the survey measurement instrument. 
Hofstede has classified cultural diffusion by nationality, and he has asserted that 
shared values represent the basis for national existence. However, cultural diffusion 
may not follow the boarder of nations. For example the Indonesian population 
comprises several different ethnic groups with different languages, religions, and 
customs. Therefore, the focus on national culture may not be suitable to capture the 
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different cultures of different ethnic groups in one country (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 
1996). 
Fourth, other researchers have argued that people-preferences do not necessarily 
represent the deeply rooted values in a society. That is, what people should do may 
diverge from what they are actually doing. This divergence problem has been 
resolved, at least partly, by Hofstede (1980,1991) when he has introduced two types 
of values: the desirable and desired values. Desirable values represent what people 
think how they should do, whilst desired values represent how people actually behave. 
It has been asserted that changes in organizational culture are due to differences in 
behaviour and practice rather than different values. The interaction between national 
cultures and organizational cultures are not expected to occur in the deep-rooted 
desirable values, because they are very difficult to change. Instead, these interactions 
usually take place in the outer layers of culture-values which represent the desired 
values. These values are more flexible, and can be adjusted according to the situation, 
via symbols, heroes and rituals (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
Fifth, Holden (2002) has criticized the cultural value model by Hofstede (1980) on the 
basis that the survey data has been collected a long time ago, which may not be valid 
to represent culture values prevailing in societies in more recent years (Dahl, 2004). 
However, De Jong and Semenov (2002) has argued that there is considerable evidence 
that these culture dimensions are deeply rooted values in societies that have been 
stable over time, and they are less likely to shift suddenly in the short-run. 
Furthermore, Punnett and Withane (1990) have conducted a theoretical review of the 
previous literature on Hofstede's cultural model. They have shown that there is no 
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agreement among researchers about the validity of such a model to explain cross- 
country differences in all situations. They have recommended that further analysis is 
needed in order to have deeper insights into this issue. 
Consequently, several empirical studies have been conducted to assess the validity of 
the cultural value model by Hofstede (1980) and/or to present new cultural models 
form different perspectives. In this context, a land-mark study called the "Chinese 
culture connection" (1987) confinned the existence of Hofstede's four cultural 
dimensions. In addition, it has introduced a new fifth culture dimension called the 
"Time Horizon" as mentioned earlier. Two core cultural norms were identified which 
include: a Pragmatic long-term orientation and a Conventional short-term orientation. 
This new dimension of time ý implies that the greater the tendency a society has 
towards a pragmatic future-oriented attitude, the more likely it will exhibit economic 
growth and vice versa. 
Hall and Hall (1990) have presented another cultural value model which consists of 
two dimensions, which are: context and Monochromy/Polychromy value dimensions. 
The context value dimension describes the amount of information that surrounds an 
event. It deals with language which is located at the outer skin of the cultural onion as 
described by Hofstede (1980). A high context culture show a pre-programmed 
infonnation which is in the receiver and the settings surrounding an event, while only 
very little information in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of any communication 
message. In contrast, a low context culture allows the mass of information to be 
transmitted in the explicit codes of the messages (Hassan and Ditsa, 2004). 
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The second cultural dimension is the Monochrony/polychrony. The Monochrony 
culture focuses on one issue at a time with special emphasis on schedules and 
procedures for task completion. Whereas, Polychrony culture focus on multiple tasks 
at one time and focus more on task completion than following procedures (Hassan 
and Ditsa, 2004). Overall, these concepts seem to be useful and easy to understand. 
However, they suffer from some drawbacks which include: First, there is a lack of 
statistical data to test the model empirically. Second, there is a difficulty to use these 
concepts in a more analytical approach to compare culturally close countries. Third, 
the concepts are limited to only one aspect of culturally based behavior rather than a 
wide explanation of underlying values which limit a broader research (Dahl, 2004). 
Later on, Trompenaar and Turner (1997) have presented a wide scope of cultural- 
values in a swnple of 12 countries which include: USA, UK, Sweden, Netherlands, 
Germany, France and Japan. They have expanded the core level of the basic four- 
layered onion shape cultural model by Hofstede (1980). A survey study was 
conducted using questionnaires on a large number of business executives from 
different organizations. They have suggested that there is a strong relationship 
between cultural values in those societies and the work related organizational 
behavior to create wealth. And they have identified respondents' preferred behavior in 
a number of work and leisure situations. As a result, seven value orientations were 
identified, which are: universalism/particularism, communitarianisni/individualism, 
neutral/emotional, defuse/specific, achievement/ascription, human-time, and human- 
nature. 
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A comparison between the Trompenaar and Turner (1997) and Hofstede (1980) 
cultural value dimensions shows that some of these values are identical. First, the 
communitarianism/individualism may be identical to the collectivism/individualism 
value dimension by Hofstede (1980). Second, the achievement/ascription seems to be 
linked to the power distance cultural value by Hofstede (1980), although the latter 
does not take into consideration the degree of inequality acceptance among members 
of a society. Finally, the universalism/particularism may be related to some extent to 
both uncertainty avoidance and collectivism/individualism cultural values (Dahl, 
2004). 
More recently, a radical improvement to culture studies was presented by Schwartz 
(1999). He has used a value survey on more than 60 000 respondents from more than 
63 countries. Respondents were asked to rank fifty six cultural values as guiding 
principles in their life. Multidimensional scaling analysis is used for each value in 
each country. Then, the similarity structure analysis (SSA) is used to distinguish the 
differences across countries. 
He has conducted two separate analyses on the individual and on the cultural levels. 
At the individual-level analysis he has derived ten distinct value types, which are: 
power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self direction, universalism, benevolence, 
tradition, confirmatory and security. These values are further ordered into four higher 
order value types which are: openness to change, self-enhancement, conservatism, and 
self transcendence. Then, these high order value types are positioned in two opposing 
bipolar conceptual dimensions which consist of. openness to change and self- 
enhancement against conservation and self-transcendence. In contrast, at the cultural- 
31 
level analysis he has derived seven value types, which can be summarized into three 
bipolar cultural value dimensions, as follows: embedded-ness versus autonomy, 
hierarchy versus egalitarianism, mastery and harmony (Licht, 2001, Dahl, 2004). 
The cultural value dimensions model by Schwartz (1999) has the following 
advantages compared to other models: First, the measurement instrument used in the 
surveys depends on the preferred values rather than status or behavior, which can 
eliminate the impact of situational variables on respondents. However, other 
researchers have argued that using values as a measurement instrument may increase 
response bias, as respondents may prefer to choose ideal values that may not represent 
their actual behavior in real life situations. Second, the model provides clear 
distinction between levels of culture (Dahl, 2004). 
A detailed comparison between Schwartz (1999) and Hofstede (1980) cultural value 
models show that: First, the individualism cultural value dimension by Hofstede 
(1980) is similar to the autonomy/embeddedness value dimension by Schwartz 
(1999). Second, the power distance cultural value dimension by Hofstede (1980), 
which means acceptance of social equality/inequality among members of a society, is 
similar to the Egalitarinism/Herarchy value dimension by Schwartz (1999). Third, 
although Schwartz's (1999) value dimensions model do not provide an identical 
dimension to the uncertainty avoidance cultural value by Hofstede (1980), However, 
some scholars has argued that Mastery/Harmony value dimension by Schwartz is 
close to it, since it deals with an attitude of submission and fitting with the real world 
contingences (Licht, 2001, Dahl, 2004). 
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Overall, there seems to be an association between cultural value dimensions in 
different models. Licht (2001) has mentioned that: "[A] close positive association 
between basic dimensions [is] identified in different ways by different authors". 
However, despite the obvious similarity among cultural value models, there seems to 
be no consensus among researchers on a single concept of culture or culture 
dimensions. Dahl (2004) has presented a review for the main concepts and theories of 
intercultural and cross cultural communications. He has concluded that: "Despite all 
efforts there is no commonly acknowledge correct concept of culture or cultural 
dimensions as yet". Further, he has noted that the suggested cultural values 
dimensions, such as those in Hofstede (1980), and Trompenaars and Turner (1997), 
are frequently based on very little data, or derived from a limited number of questions, 
which may disturb the derived value predictions, and it may hide certain dimensions 
or values which may be wrongly derived because of certain situations influence on 
respondents. Also, he has pointed out that despite the increasing importance of 
intercultural studies, few researchers depend on the empirical evidence from cross- 
cultural and intercultural research to explain their findings. 
Nevertheless, it may be useful to note that some'empincal studies in finance have 
shown that some managers reflect on their working envi ronment in decision-making 
processes. Barker (1999) has investigated the valuation models used in practice using 
a sample of 42 analysts in the United Kingdom. He has found that analysts' 
preferences between stock valuation models vary systematically according to stock 
market sector. Price-earnings ratio is preferred when analyzing the service, industrials 
and consumer goods sectors. VAiile, the dividend yield is predominant in the financial 
and utilities sectors. He has concluded that value may depend on the type of activity 
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due to issues concerning the predictability of cash flow generation or information 
asymmetry or a long operation cycle, or it may depend on investors' preference on 
how they would like to receive their outcome from investment. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) have surveyed Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the 
U. S. A. about their practices in a broad range of areas, which included capital 
budgeting, cost of capital and capital structure. They have conducted an analysis of 
the survey-responses conditional on each separate firm-characteristic. They have used 
a list of risk factors that corporations may account for, when determining the cash 
flow and/or discount rate inputs for project valuation. This list included: the 
fimdamcntal factors in Fama and Frcnch (1992), momcntum as dcfincd in Jegadccsh 
and Titman (1993), as well as macroeconomic factors in Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) 
and Freson and Harvey (1991). They have asserted that there is a possibility that their 
findings are impounded into stock prices and audit ratings, and so CEOs react to them 
indirectly. 
Their results have shown that executives use the mainline techniques to evaluate 
projects and to estimate the cost of equity. The CAPM is by far the most popular 
method of estimating the cost of equity capital, followed by the average stock returns 
and a multi-beta CAPM. Few firms actually used a dividend discount model to 
estimate the cost of equity. However, they have found that the CAPM may not be 
applied properly in practice. It was found that more than half of the respondents use 
their firm! s overall discount rate to evaluate a project in an overseas market, even 
though the project is likely to have different risk factors from the overall firm. 
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They have found that the most important additional risk factors other than market risk 
are: interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, business cycle risk and inflation risk. CFOs 
paid very little attention to risk factors based on momentum and book to market value. 
As for the calculation of discount rates, the most important factors are: interest rate 
risk, size, inflation risk and foreign exchange rate risk, while for the calculation of 
cash flows, many CFOs incorporated the effects of commodity prices, GDP growth, 
inflation and foreign exchange risk. 
However, they have found that executives are much less likely to determine capital 
structure decisions according to academic factors and theories. According to their 
survey, the most important factors that affect capital structure decisions are: credit 
ratings, EPS dilution, and financial flexibility, recent changes in stock price, maturity 
matching, hedging foreign operations and practical cash management. They have 
indicated that firm size significantly affect the practice of corporate finance. There are 
fundamental differences between small and large firms. For example, large firms are 
significantly more likely to use NPV and CAPM techniques than are small firms, 
which are more likely to use less sophisticated methods in evaluating risky projects 
such as the payback method. 
More recently, Elkelish and Marshal (2006) have shown that managers in the United 
Arab Emirates emerging market tend to prefer the behavioural/ managerial approach 
in determining financial structure choice. Furthermore, survey evidence has 
highlighted the impact of some personal and firm characteristics on managers' choice. 
35 
(2/2)Stock market development indicators 
In recent years, the large expansions of international stock markets have attracted the 
attention of many researchers to investigate stock market development and its impact 
on firm and economic performance. Though, it may not be surprising to find some 
countries pursuing structural reformation of their stock markets to increase economic 
growth and to attract more international investment funds. Unfortunately, literature 
review shows that the debate among researchers on the expected benefits of well 
developed stock markets is far form being settled. 
A growing theoretical evidence suggest that developed stock markets may increase 
risk diversification, liquidity, information processing and capital mobilization, which 
in turn may foster long term economic growth (Levine, 1991, Greenwood and Smith, 
1994, Obstfeld, 1994, mentioned in Demirguc-kunt and Levine, 1995). Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2000) have emphasized that developed stock markets can play a crucial role 
in the economy, as they provide a possible exit mechanism for investors, allow 
transfer surplus from short to long term capital markets, provide information that 
improves efficiency of financial intermediaries (De-Jong, and Semenov, 2002).. 
Furthermore, stock markets may provide investors with better opportunities to 
diversify risks which lower the risk prernia charged for funding new projects (Morck 
and Nakamura, 1999), facilitate the efficiency of investment decisions and discipline 
managers (Paul, 1992, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993), and facilitate the operation of 
the market for corporate control (Jensen, 1992) (Mentioned in De-Jong and Semenov, 
2002). 
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By contrast, De-Jong and Semenov (2002) have argued that there is no overwhelming 
empirical evidence that stock market development will always result in greater 
economic growth and prosperity. They have pointed out that, despite the previous 
benefits of stock market development, stock miss-pricing may result in inefficient 
investment decisions, therefore, linking managerial compensation to stock prices 
which may lead to suboptimal decisions, and hostile takeovers based on this price will 
decrease efficiency (Shleifer and Vishny 1988). Furthermore; the stock market does 
not aggregate all public and private knowledge (Seyhun 1986, Malkiel 1992), or even 
public information, at least in the relatively short-term (Scheren 1988, Shefrin and 
Statman 1994, Debondt and Thaler 1995, Allen and Gale, 2000) (Mentioned in De- 
Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
In this context, there seems to be no agreement among researchers on a single concept 
or measure for stock market development worldwide. Demirguc-kunt and Levine 
(1995) have noted that: 
"Stock market development is a complex and multi-faceted concept and 
no single measure will capture all aspects of stock market 
development. " 
To overcome this problem Demirguc-kunt and Levine (1995) have presented several 
indicators of stock market development using data on 41 countries during the period 
1986 to 1993. Their main aim was to provide a variety of indicators for stock market 
development to facilitate empirical research in the relationship between a stock 
market, economic development and corporate financing decisions. They have found 
high cross-country variations in stock market development. For instance, countries 
with effective information-disclosure regulations, internationally accepted accounting 
standards, and unrestricted international capital flows are more likely to have larger 
37 
and more liquid markets. High ownership concentration stock markets are more 
likely to have smaller, less liquid and less internationally integrated markets. 
They also have found a significant positive relationship between stock market 
development and the development of financial intermediaries, such as banks, private 
non-banks, private insurance companies and pension funds. Empirical results show 
that big markets are more likely to be less volatile, more liquid, and less concentrated. 
Institutionally developed markets are more likely to be large and liquid. The stock 
market indicators implemented by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1995) include: stock 
market capitalization, liquidity, concentration and volatility (Table 2.2). These are 
detailed as follows: 
First, the stock market capitalization ratio is usually used to represent market size. The 
growth rate of the market capitalization ratio is often used by some practitioners as an 
indicative indicator of rapid stock market development. It is measured here by the 
value of listed shares on the stock market divided by gross domestic production 
(GDP). The importance of this indicator stems from the assumption that stock market 
size is more likely to correlate positively with the ability to diversify risk and to 
mobilize capital (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1995). 
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Table 2.2: Summary of some variables used in previous empirical research to 
proxy for stock market development. 
Stock market development variables Source 
(dependent) 
Market Activity 
Value of Trade Omran and Pointon (200 1) 
Volume of Trade Omran and Pointon (2001) 
Number of Transactions Omran and Pointon (200 1) 
Value of new issues including capital gains as % Omran, M. M. A. (1999) 
of Trading value 
Value of new issues including capital gains as % Omran, M. M. A. (l 999) 
of GDP 
Market Size 
Market Capitalization Omran, M. M. A. (1999) 
Market capitalization as a% of GDP Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1995), Omran, M. M. A. (I 999) 
Volume of shares listed Omran, M. M. A. ( 1999) 
Number of listed companies Omran, M. M. A. ( 1999) 
Market Liquidity 
Total value traded to market capitalization Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1995), Omran, M. M-A-(I 999) 
Total value traded to GDP Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1995), Omran, M. M. A. (1999) 
Volume of share traded as a% of volume of shares Omran, M. M. A. (1999) 
listed * 
Market concentration 
% of biggest companies' shares in market Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
capitalization (1995), Omran, M. M. A. (1999) 
% of biggest companies' shares in value traded Omran, M. M. A. (1999) 
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Second, the stock market liquidity is defined as (Demirguc-kunt and Levine, 1995): 
"The ability to easily buy and sell securities" 
The liquidity ratio and turnover ratio are frequently used to measure stock market 
liquidity. There are two types of stock market liquidity. The liquidity ratio equals the 
total value of shares traded on the stock market divided by gross domestic production 
(total value traded /GDP). This variable is expected to correlate positively with 
liquidity for the whole economy of a country, since it reflects the organized trading of 
shares in the market as a percentage of national production. On the other hand, the 
turnover ratio is used to reflect the trading volume in a stock market. It is equal to the 
value of total shares traded in the market divided by market capitalization. The 
turnover ratio usually correlates negatively with transaction costs, and hence stock 
market development. This variable focuses on the cost of transactions and measures 
the stock market trading relative to the size of the market (Demirguc-kunt and Levine, 
1995). 
Third, the stock market concentration is defined as (Demirguc-kunt and Levine, 
1995): 
"The degree few companies dominate the stock market in a country" 
This indicator is measured by the share (%) of market capitalization accounted for by 
the biggest 10 stocks. This indicator may reflect the degree of preference of some 
cultural values such as: inequality among members of a society. The United Kingdom 
is characterized by low concentration of ownership as compared to other international 
countries (Table 2.3). Previous empirical research has shown that developed stock 
markets usually have dispersed concentration of ownership, which may help to 
increase the volume of trade, to reduce volatility and to provide more information 
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about listed companies (Pagano, 1989a, 1989b, Allen and Gale, 1994, Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1993, mentioned in De-Jong and Semenov, 2002,2000). By contrast, more 
concentrated ownership may be expected in societies, which are characterized by a 
low protection of minority shareholder's rights, under-developed stock markets, high 
uncertainty, a low case for independence, and closer relationships between managers 
and stockholders (De-Jong and Semenov, 2000). 
Fourth, the stock market volatility is measured using a twelve-month rolling standard 
deviation estimate based on market returns. Note that there are other indicators 
calculated by Demirguc-kunt and Levine (1995), such as asset pricing efficiency, 
regulatory and institutional development and conglomerate indices of all previous 
indices, which are intended to measure capital markets integration across countries. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of previous empirical research on ownership concentration 
percentages across countries. Values represent percentages of companies with an 
owner holding at least 20% of voting rights. Source: De-jong and Semenov 
(2000). N/A= not available. 
Country 
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United Kingdom 22 0 40 37 Low 
France 73 29 100 85 High 
Germany 86 33 88 89 High 
Italy 100 100 100 86 High 
Belgium 87 95 71 80 High 
Finland 80 46 75 66 High 
Denmark 80 50 63 N/A High 
Portugal N/A 100 100 77 High 
Greece N/A 100 100 N/A High 
Netherlands 50 68 89 N/A High 
Spain 83 50 100 72 High 
United States N/A 0 10 N/A Low 
Ireland N/A 35 38 37 Low 
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In addition, an overview of the stock market indicators used by international 
economic organizations such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Organization 
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) shows that there are a variety of 
indicators used for different purposes. The Financial Market Update Bulletin, issued 
by the International Monetary Fund, which covers the developments in both mature 
and emerging markets, shows a number of indicators such as equity market index, 
market capitalization and price to earnings ratio (P/E). Other stock market 
development indicators applied by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) include a variety of indicators such as: market price index, 
volatility and earnings per share (Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4: Stock market development indicators applied by some international 
economic organizations. Source: Financial Market Update Bulletin, IMF, June, 
2006, Financial Market Trends Bulletin, OECD, 2006. *Capital market 
development program in India, Asian Development Bank, 2004 
Stock market indicator Calculation Source 
Equity market index Price index i. e. Topix, IMF 
Eurofirst3OO, S&P 500 
Price earnings ratio Share price to earnings per share, IMF 
12 month forward earnings 
Market volatility 30-day rolling historical volatility, IMF 
in%, 
Market capitalization to Value of all shares listed on the IMF 
GDP market to gross domestic product 
Historic and Implied Historic volatilities are monthly OECD 
volatility volatilities calculated from daily 
data. Standard deviation estimate 
based on market returns. Implied 
volatility is future volatility derived 
from at-the-money call option 
prices (interpolated) using the 
Black-Scholes formula. 
Earnings per share For U. K. the earnings are OECD 
calculated by a rolling 12 months 
method of analysis based on 
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interim, final and annual accounts 
Price earnings ratio Price to eamings per share 
Market Capitalization to Value of all shares listed on the 
GDP market to gross domestic product 
Market capitalization Value of all shares listed on the 
Stock market to Banking 
system 
Stock market orientation 
relative to economic 
development 
Trades of domestic equities 
to claims of deposit 
Domestic listed firms to 
population 
Number of 1POS to 
population 
Annual turnover 
market to gross domestic product 
Stock market capitalization to 
domestic assets of deposit money 
at banks 
(M/B)/(GDP per capita/1000) 
M=stock market capitalization 
B=domestic assets of deposit 
money at banks 
GDP=gross domestic product 
Value of the trades of domestic 
equities on domestic exchanges to 
claims of deposit money banks on 
private sector 
Value of domestic listed firm to 
population (in millions) 
IPO=initial public offerings 
Total value of transactions of 
securities in all market segments 
OECD 
OECD* 
OECD* 
OECD* 
OECD* 
OECD* 
OECD* 
OECD* 
OECD* 
Average daily volume Number of shares OECD* 
Number of listed Number of listed companies on OECD* 
companies stock market 
Initial public offerings Number of stocks; Amount of IPO; OECD* 
Amount of Subscriptions 
Transaction costs Commission percentage on trading, OECD* 
clearing and settlement values. 
Value traded to GDP Total value traded to gross OECD* 
domestic product 
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(2/3)The relationship between cultural values and stock market development 
In recent years, the impact of culture-valu'es have received a wide attention in varies 
fields of study such as psychology, anthropology, organization theory, management 
and even information technology. In particular, some empirical research 
investigations can be found in the accounting literature across countries, such as: 
accounting practice (Gray, 1988, and Willet, 1996), management accounting (Chow et 
al. 2001), auditing (Wingate, 1997), financial accounting and accounting standards 
(Noravesh, 2003). In addition, other empirical studies have shown the impact of 
culture on accounting practice in one country, such as, Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
in Indonesia, Amat et al. (1996) in Spain, and Noravesh et al. (2005) in Iran. 
An important piece of theoretical research by Gray (1988) has investigated the impact 
of culture on accounting values and practice. He was the first to introduce a 
comprehensive theoretical model for the influence of cultural values on the 
development of accounting systems, the regulations of the accounting profession and 
attitudes towards management and disclosure. He has extended the cultural model of 
Hofstede (1980) by proposing a sub-link between societal norms and the accounting 
sub-culture. He has predicted that the value systems or attitudes of accountants are 
related to and derived from societal work-related values. These accounting values will 
in turn influence the accounting systems. He has derived four bipolar accounting 
value dimensions that exist at the level of the accounting subculture, which are: 
professionalism versus statutory control, uniformity versus flexibility, conservatism 
versus optimism, secrecy versus transparency. A summary of the predicted 
relationships between cultural values and accounting sub-cultures are indicated in 
table 2.5. A review of these relationships shows that uncertainty avoidance and 
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individuality may have more impact on accounting practice than power distance and 
masculinity. This is detailed as follows: 
Table 2.5: Summary of theoretical evidence on the impact of cultural dimensions 
of Hofstede (1980) on accounting values. Source: Gray, 1988. 
Cultural values Power Uncertainty Individualism Masculinity 
Regulation/control Distance Avoidance 
Self regulation + N/A 
Uniformity ++ N/A 
Conservatism N/A + 
Secrecy 
Gray (1988) has proposed four hypotheses on the relationship between cultural values 
and accounting values, which entails: first, there is a significant association between 
self regulation and cultural value dimensions. He has predicted a negative 
relationship, although less strong, between self regulation and power distance. He has 
explained that self regulation is likely to be accepted in a small power distance society 
where there is more concern for equality, people at various power levels are less 
threatened and more prepared to trust each other, people belief in the need to justify 
the imposition of laws and codes. In addition, he has predicted that a preference for 
independent self regulation and judgment is usually associated with low uncertainty 
avoidance, whereby, there is a belief in fair play with few rules as possible and 
professional judgment is widely accepted. Further, he has asserted a significant 
positive relationship between self regulation/professionalism and individualism. It 
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seems that a tendency towards loosely knit social framework with more emphasis on 
independence, respect for individual decisions and endeavor is usually associated with 
a preference for independent self regulation and judgment. By contrast, he has 
predicted no relationship with masculinity cultural value. 
Second, there is a significant association between uniformity and cultural value 
dimensions. He has predicted a significant positive relationship between uniformity 
and power distance, although with less strength. Uniformity is more preferred in a 
large power distance society, where the imposition of more laws and codes of a 
uniform character are more likely to be accepted. In addition, he has predicted that 
high uniformity accounting values are associated with a preference for high 
uncertainty avoidance. A high uncertainty avoidance society tend to prefer law and 
order and rigid codes of conduct, more written rules and regulations, more respect for 
conformity and continuous search for ultimate, obsolete truths and values. Further, a 
significant negative relationship is predicted for the relationship between uniformity 
and individualism. Since, uniformity is usually preferred in a society with tight knit 
social framework, a belief in organization and order, and more respect for group 
norms rather than individual norms. By contrast, no relationship is predicted with 
masculinity cultural value 
Third, there is a significant relationship between conservatism and cultural value 
dimensions. He has predicted that there is no relationship predicted between 
conservatism and power distance. He has asserted that there may be. a. significant 
positive relationship between conservatism and uncertainty avoidance. He has 
explained that more conservative measure of profits is preferred in societies with 
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more concern with security and more cautious approach to ftiture uncertainty. Further, 
Gray (1988) has predicted that there is a significant negative relationship, although 
with less strength, between conservatism and both individualism and masculinity 
cultural values. He has explained that more emphasis on individual achievement and 
performance is likely to foster a less conservative approach to measurement of 
performance. 
Fourth, there is a significant association between secrecy of infortnation and cultural 
value dimensions. He has predicted that high power distance is usually associated 
with more limitations on information disclosures to secure power inequalities in the 
society. In addition, Gray (1988) has predicted a significant positive relationship 
between secrecy of information disclosure and uncertainty avoidance. Since high 
secrecy of information is usually associated with a need to limit information 
disclosure to avoid conflict and competition and to preserve security. Further, secrecy 
is negatively associated with individualism. As high secrecy is usually dominate in a 
collectivism society with less concern about firm outside stakeholders. He has 
predicted a significant negative relationship between secrecy and masculinity, 
although with less strength, since more feminine society's emphasis quality of life, 
people and environment and more transparent for information. 
These interesting predictions by Gray (1988) have been tested empirically by some 
researchers to assess their validity in practice. Salter and Niswander (1994) have 
tested the impact of cultural values on accounting values and practice using Gray's 
(1988) four hypothesis model. They have found that Gray's model significantly 
explain the actual financial reporting practices across twenty nine countries. 
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However, the model has failed to explain extant professional and regulatory structure 
in a cultural context (Licht, 2001). 
Margerison and Moizer (1996) have examined the relationship between the ways in 
which auditors are licensed in eleven European Union countries and the cultures of 
those countries using Gray's (1988) model. Empirical results show that culture could 
be associated with the different ways of licensing auditors across countries. William 
and Tower (1998) have employed the theoretical framework of Gray (1988) to link 
Hofstede's (1980) cultural values to two key issues of differential reporting, the 
preferred level of disclosure and perceived balance of costs relative to benefits of 
compliance. Survey findings indicated that the perceptions of small business 
managers in Singapore and Australia were consistent with prior literature. Uncertainty 
avoidance and to some extent power distance were found to have significant effect on 
small business managers' perceptions. They have pointed out that the current 
association between cultural values, accounting sub-cultural dimensions and 
accounting practice as depicted by Gray (198 8) may have to be rearranged. 
Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) have presented one of few studies which have 
examined the longitudinal relationship between cultural values, as depicted by 
Hofstede (1980), and Gray's (1988) four hypotheses model. Linear structure relations 
analysis (LISREL) was implemented during the period 1981 and 1992. They have 
found that power distance, uncertainty avoidance and individualism have significant 
relationships with one or more accounting values in Indonesia. These results may 
suggest that the development of accounting standards and disclosure practices are 
influenced by the change of cultural norms. However, they have suggested some 
49 
useful recommendations for future research such as to apply several transformations 
on the study variables to make the results more reliable, to explore the 
interrelationships among the cultural dimensions, and finally to use a longer study 
period to allow the culture changes to express their impact more clearly on 
institutional consequences. Similarly, Noravesh et al. (2005) have implemented a 
quiet identical approach to investigate the impact of cultural values on the accounting 
values and practice in Iran. A summary of the proxy variables used in previous 
empirical studies to represent cultural values are mentioned below in detail (Table 2.6, 
a, b). 
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Table 2.6a: Summary of proxy variables for cultural value dimensions model by 
Hofstede (1980). Source: Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996, and Noravesh et al., 2005. 
Proxy variables Source 
Power distance 
Number of telephone lines 
Ratio of number of telephone lines per 100 population 
Ratio of non-agriculture sector to gross domestic product 
Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996), and 
Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996), and 
Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Total students enrolment Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
Ratio of total number of students enrolment to total population Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
Urbanization rate Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Literacy rate Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Number of economic deregulation policy packages Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
Number of economic sectors being deregulated Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
Volume of transactions on stock market Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Fluctuations of foreign currency rate Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Individualism 
Urbanization rate Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
Income per capita Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
Rate of divorce Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Ratio of population who never get married to total adult people Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Average number of children per family Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Gross national product per capita Noravesh et al. (2005) 
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Table 2.6b: Summary of proxy variables for cultural value dimensions model by 
Hofstede (1980). Source: Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996, and Noravesh et al., 2005. 
Proxy variables Source 
Masculinity 
Ratio of male employment to total employment Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
Ratio of male students to female students in elementary schools Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
Ratio of male students to female students in secondary schools Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
Ratio of male students to female students in higher schools Stidarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
Literacy rate Noravesh et al. (2005) , 
Ratio of social budget to total budget Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Ratio of national defensive budget to total budget Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Ratio of budget for protecting living enviromnent to total budget Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Time Horizon 
Ratio of total spending on education to total budget 
Ratio of total gross fixed investment to GDP 
Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) and 
Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Suclarwan and Fogarty (1996) and 
Noravesh et al. (2005) 
Chanchani and Willett (2004) have conducted an accounting values survey (AVS) 
administered to a sample of users and preparers of financial statements in New 
Zealand and India. The results provide some support for the usefulness of Gray's 
accounting values as empirically based classificatory constructs. However, they have 
questioned the possibility of existence of other unrecognized accounting value 
constructs. They have recommended further quantitative survey research to 
investigate the relevance of cultural factors in understanding international accounting 
practices. 
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More -recently, Askary (2006) has examined the effects of culture on accounting 
professionalism in 12 developing countries during the period 1996 to 2000, using 
Gray's (1988) model and Hofstede's (1980) cultural dimension model. Results show 
that Gray's hypothesis of statutory control is positively confirmed for Iran, and 
moderately for Bangladesh, Jordan, Oman, and Qatar. However, this hypothesis is 
negatively rejected for Pakistan, Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia. These findings shed 
some light on the accounting authority in those developing countries and are useful in 
the context of the harmonization process of the international accounting practices. 
Tsakumis (2007) has examined the influence of national culture on the accountants' 
application of accounting rules in Greece, based on a refinement of Gray's (1988) 
framework. Results show that Greek accountants are less likely to disclose 
information than U. S. accountants. There is no significant difference between Greek 
and U. S. accountants' recognition decisions involving both contingent assets and 
liabilities. However, additional analysis shows that U. S. accountants are more 
conservative than Greek accountants. 
I 
On another aspect, Sekely and Collins (1988) have investigated the impact of culture 
on international capital structures across countries. They have utilized a methodology, 
developed by Broek and Webb (1973) and James (1976), for classifying countries into 
homogeneous groupings known as the "Cultural realms". These are groupings that 
have "fundamental unity of composition, arrangement, and integration of significant 
traits which distinguish them from other realms" (Broek and Webb, 1973). These 
cultural realms and countries grouped in each one are in Table 2.7 as follows: 
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Table 2.7: The cultural realms and countries grouped in each one. 
Source: Sekely and Collins, 1988 
Cultural realms Countries 
Anglo-American Australia, Canada, South Africa, 
United Kingdom, and United 
States 
Latin American Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico 
Western Central Europe Benelux, Switzerland, and West 
Germany 
Mediterranean Europe France, Italy, and Spain 
Scandinavia Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden 
Indian Peninsula India and Pakistan 
Southeast Asia Malaysia and Singapore 
In general, empirical results tend to confirm that cultural differences contribute to 
significant country and minimal industry influences. The examination of the ranks of 
the debt ratios, using the Kruskal Wallis test statistic, shows distinct groups of , 
countries with respect to country median rank. Low debt ratios are found in the 
Southeast Asian group, the Latin American group, and the Anglo-American of 
countries, and Indian Peninsula. The West Central European countries appear in the 
middle of the rankings. However, they have claimed that while these groupings do not 
conclusively prove the cultural impact on financial structure, they do give clear 
indication of the influence in that direction. They have pointed out that these results 
show that there are country effects on capital structure and that these results stem, in 
part, from cultural influence. They have added that these inter-country differences 
appear to be caused by underlying cultural patterns among groups of countries; these 
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cultural patterns may influence the development of financial institutions, attitudes 
towards risk, and/or attitudes towards debt. It seems that these groups of countries 
with similar cultural attributes help explain some of the differences in capital structure 
between multinational companies headquartered in different parts of the world. 
Furthermore, they have noted that most other areas of research recognize the 
significant role of cultural factors in multinational business. Unfortunately, this is not 
the case in the finance discipline which tends to undervalue the importance of cultural 
differences, and "this may be a serious mistake". Ball and McCulloch (1982) have 
pointed out that "the study of foreign cultures is of primary importance to those in 
international business because cultural differences exert a pervasive influence on all 
of the business functions". Finally, they have recommended that future research on 
international capital structure can be enhanced by including variables such as the 
social and legal structures of countries in addition to the more traditional economic 
variables in an attempt to better explain capital structure differences across countries. 
Multinational mangers will be better armed to make efficient international financial 
structure decisions and financial planning across countries., 
Moreover, the cultural value model by Hofstede (1980) has been implemented in 
other fields of study such as information technology (IT). Hassan and Ditsa (2006) 
have conducted a study on the impact of national cultures on the adoption of 
computer-based information systems in organizations across six countries, which are: 
Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Ghana and Australia. The study depended on qualitative data 
from semi-structured interviews with information technology staff at both managerial 
and operational levels. This is followed by an interpretive comparative analysis to 
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derive the results. They have found that managers in high power distance societies 
tend to worry much about any challenge of their authqrity. Modem technical 
communications and the internet are viewed as a threat to the authoritarian structure 
of their society. They have noted that those managers are often fearful of the open 
nature of modem information technology environment. This environment reduce 
powcr distancc by dcvcloping a flattcr managcmcnt structurcs that distributcs 
information more efficiently, increase awareness, and forcing managers to take advice 
from their information technology subordinates staff. 
Mani and Romijn (1999) have analyzed a small sample of existing previous 
interview-based data to explore the main reasons behind the successful development 
of the information and communication technology industry in India. He has asserted 
that culture plays an important role in the success of Indians in the international 
information technology industry. He has found that the success of this industry in the 
south India seems to be due to several factors which include: the availability of human 
capital base and geo-physical. circumstances, stimulating government policies, and the 
involvement of non-resident Indians. Overall, he has asserted that the software 
industry success may be due to the existence of favorable attitude towards education 
and learning in south India, and the availability of an infrastructure in higher 
education. However, he has pointed out that culture is only a complementary variable 
to other explanatory variables of the success of the Indian information technology 
industry. 
Other researchers have focused on the impact of cultural-values on the economic 
performance, and more particularly, the stock market development. De-Jong and 
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Semenov (2000) have provided theoretical and empirical evidence on the influence of 
cultural values, as depicted by Hofstede's model (1980), on ownership patterns. They 
have asserted that the choice of stock market development may depend upon society- 
preferences. These preferences are shaped by deeply rooted cultural-values in a 
society. A number of intermediary factors, that may affect these relationships, are 
presented, which are: regulatory environment, level of stock market development, and 
propensity of stakeholders to enter into implicit contracts. 
Their empirical results have shown that cultural-values have an influence on the 
degree of ownership-concentration as well as some intermediating variables, such as 
the level of protection of minority shareholders, the role of the state in pension 
provision, and propensity to invest in shares. They have found a significant negative 
relationship between concentration of ownership and masculinity. By contrast, they 
have found a significant positive relationship between concentration of ownership and 
uncertainly avoidance. This means that high ownership concentration is expected in 
high uncertainty avoidance and low masculinity societies. Finally, they have further 
found a negative relationship between market capitalization and ownership 
concentration at the 0.99 confidence level. They have asserted that power distance and 
individualism may also have an effect, but they did not manage to predict the type of 
relationship due to their inability to isolate unambiguous relationships. 
Later on, De-Jong and Semenov (2002) have extended their work by presenting an 
excellent theoretical and empirical work on culture-values and stock market 
development in 17 OECD countries. Stock market capitalization to GDP was found to 
be relatively higher, in low uncertainly avoidance and high masculinity societies. In 
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addition, they have uncovered the existence of some intermediating variables in this 
relationship. For example, a negative relationship has been detected between 
uncertainty avoidance and protection of minority shareholders rights. Also, a positive 
relationship has been detected between uncertainty avoidance. and public pension at 
the 0.99 significance level. This means that the government usually plays a big role in 
the provision of public pensions in countries with high uncertainty-avoidance. 
By contrast, their empirical results have shown low uncertainty avoidance society is 
more likely to have large private pension funds. The existence of large private pension 
funds usually fosters competition in the financial system, increases investments in the 
stock market and hence develops the stock market more efficiently (De-Jong and 
Semenov, 2002). A low uncertainty avoidance society usually has a preference for 
more competition. While, high uncertainty avoidance societies usually prefer group 
decisions and consultative management against competition. 
In addition, some important theoretical prediction was presented by De-Jong and 
Semenov (2002) concerning the relationships between culture dimensions and stock 
market development, although they did not manage to provide any empirical evidence 
for it. They have predicted a significant negative relationship between power distance 
and concentration of ownership. Further, they have asserted that high power distance 
societies are more reluctant to give up independence and to enter into a long-term 
relationship with other stakeholders. This implies that the score on the power distance 
dimension has a negative impact on stock market development. In general, De Jong 
and Semenov (2002) have predicted that stock markets would be more developed in 
societies with low uncertainty avoidance. The low protection of minority 
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shareholders' rights should result in more concentration of ownership. A greater role 
ý4ý 
of government pension may hinder competition in the financial sector, while close 
relations with stakeholders would limit managers' independence and hence decrease 
competition. It is time now to turn to the next section which presents an overview of 
existing theoretical and empirical research on corporate governance system which is 
considered to be an important perquisite of developed stock markets. 
(2/4)Corporate governance systems 
Modem corporate governance systems have emerged after some western business 
scandals that have resulted in loss of investors' confidence in financial markets and 
fall in market value. Consequently, some national governments have introduced new 
legislations to protect shareholders and investor, and to restore their confidence in 
financial markets (Stephanie, 2005). For example: In the late 1980s, the collapse of 
the Bank of credit and commerce (BCCI) in the United Kingdom has initiated the 
government to support the Cadbury committee report (1992). The report and 
associated code of best practice made recommendations to improve financial 
reporting, accountability and board of directors' oversight. Later on, a combined code 
on corporate governance was adopted in 2003 and it is now a securities listing 
requirement on the London Stock Exchange. Similarly, recent financial scandals in 
the U. S., such as Enron and WorldCom, have uncovered the failure of corporate 
governance systems and initiated the need for more efforts to restore investors trust in 
the financial system. As a result, the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) was initiated in 2002 
to provide'a broad set of structural and procedural reforms designed to strengthen the 
govemance system of U. S. public firms (Michaud and Magaram, 2006). 
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The review of previous theoretical and empirical studies shows that there is no 
generally accepted definition of corporate governance worldwide. There is a broad 
spectrum of definitions that exist in the literature, ranging from a narrow, agency 
theoretic definitions to broader, stakeholder definitions. The narrowest approach 
describes the basic role of corporate governance, such as the Cadbury report (2002), 
which states that "Corporate governance is the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled". Corporate governance in this definition is restricted to the 
relationship between a company and its shareholders. This is the traditional finance 
scheme as reflected in Agency theory. Another definition of corporate governance, 
which falls in the middle of the definitions spectrum, is represented by Parkinson 
(1994), which states that "Corporate governance is the process of supervision and 
control intended to ensure that the company's management acts in accordance with the 
interests of shareholders". This definition represent a solely finance prospective to 
corporate governance involving only shareholders and company management 
(Solomon and Solomon, 2004). 
At the other end of the spectrum the definition of corporate governance is extended to 
broader definitions that encompass corporate accountability to a wide range of 
stakeholders and society at large. Tricker (1984) -has presented one of these 
definitions, which states that "The governance role is not concerned with the running 
of the business of the company per se, but with giving overall direction to the 
enterprise, with overseeing and controlling the executive actions of management and 
with satisfying legitimate expectations of accountability and regulation of interests 
beyond the corporate boundaries". In this case, corporate governance is viewed as a 
web of relationships between a company and a broad range of stakeholders such as 
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shareholders, employees, management, customers, and suppliers. This view is 
compatible with the stakeholder theory and is gradually attracting greater attention in 
the business practice due to the increasing public awareness of issues like 
accountability and corporate social responsibility (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). 
However, a closer look at these definitions of corpprate governance reveals that they 
share certain common characteristics such as the issue of accountability. Narrow 
definitions of corporate governance focus on corporate accountability to only 
shareholders, while broader definitions emphasis accountability to shareholders as 
well as other stakeholders. Furthermore, Solomon, J. (2007) has argued that even the 
narrow shareholders approach is compatible with the theoretical framework of the 
stakeholder accountability approach. She has stressed that shareholders' interests can 
only be fulfilled by taking account of stakeholder interests, and that companies can be 
more successful over the long run if they are accountable to all their stakeholders. 
This means that companies can maximize value creation over the long run, by 
extending their accountability to all their stakeholders and by improving their system 
of corporate governance (Solomon, J., 2007). 
There are two types of corporate govemance systems: intemal and extemal. The 
intemal corporate govemance systems deal with the board of directors and equity 
ownership structure. While, the external corporate governance systems focus on the 
external market for corporate control (takeover market) and the legal/regulatory 
system. The primary board-related issues are board composition and executive 
remuneration (Michaud and Magaram, 2006). The ownership structure is divided into 
the dispersed ownership system (outside system) and the concentrated ownership 
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structure (insider system). Note that the ownership structure can be defined as: "The 
identities of a firm's equity holders and the sizes of their positions" (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003). In addition, another classification of previous empirical evidence 
has shown two components of corporate governance: structural and behavioral 
aspects. The structural component includes issues such as the separation roles of 
chairman and CEO, number of independent directors on the board. By contrast, the 
behavioral aspects include issues such as board meetings attendance directors, 
remuneration disclosure, and remuneration policy (Stephanie, 2005). 
The role of the board of directors varies across countries. According to the western- 
style model, the board of directors represents the interests of shareholders. The board 
main responsibilities are to hire, fire, and monitor and compensate management with 
the main objective to maximize shareholders wealth (Denis and McConnell, 2003). In 
the U. S, U. K., Swiss and Belgian board of directors' focus on maximizing 
shareholders wealth, while in other countries such as Germany and Austria, the role is 
to maximize all stakeholders' wealth. Most of the European countries have a unitary 
board of directors like the U. S.; however, others have two-tiered board. This type is 
mandatory in some countries such as Germany and Austria, or optional in others such 
as in France and Finland. The two-tiered boards of directors consist of a managing 
board which is composed of executives of the firm, and a supervisory board (Denis 
and McConnell, 2003). As mentioned earlier, the board composition usually deals 
with issues such as board size, board independence, and remuneration disclosure. 
Several empirical studies have been conducted worldwide to highlight the importance 
of corporate governance systems on both firm and economic performance. Some of 
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these studies have examined the impact of individual corporate governance factors (or 
sets of factors) such as board composition and equity ownership (Michaud and 
Magaram, 2006). Alonso et al. (2002) have found a negative relationship between 
board size and company value in the OECD countries (Stephanie, 2005). By contrast, 
Caroline et al. (2002) have found a negative relationship between board size and 
operating performance improvements after company mergers in the United Kingdom. 
In addition, Eisenberg et al. (1998) have found a negative impact of board size on 
profitability for small and medium size companies in Finland (Denis and McConnell, 
2003). Further, Beiner et al. (2004) have examined the relationship between board 
size and firm performance as measured by Tobin's Q across 167 Swiss firms. They 
have mentioned that: "Any changes in board size leave firm valuation unaffected at 
best, but more probably lead to a decrease in Tobires Q". They have found that the 
performance of the firm may be a function of previous board actions that subsequently 
influences the board's subsequent choices for directors (Michaud and MagaranI, 
2006). 
On another aspect, there seems to be relatively limited evidence on whether the 
separation of chair and CEO influence corporate governance effectiveness. For 
example Brickley et al. (1997) have found that the separation of chair and CEO has no 
significant effect on firm performance or in better decision making in the US (Denis 
and McConnell, 2003). 
Denis and McConnell (2003) have conducted a review of previous theoretical and 
empirical research on corporate governance. He has found that the international 
empirical evidence on board structure and executive compensation is similar to the 
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U. S. evidence. Empirical results have shown that small boards of directors are 
associated with better firm perfonnance. The presence of outsiders on boards of 
directors does not affect the ongoing performance of the firm, on average, but does 
sometimes affect decisions about important issues. New codes of best practice in 
many countries around the world generally tend to increasd representation by outside 
directors. Finally, the effects of compliance with these codes alter board decisions 
within some, but not all, countries. 
Hcrmalin and Weishbach (2001) havc found no significant rclationship bctwccn 
higher proportions of outside directors and firm performance. They have found a 
significant positive relationship between higher percentages of outside directors and 
better acquisition, executive compensation and CEO turnover decisions. Also, they 
have found a negative relationship between board size and firm perfonnance and the 
quality of decision making in the U. S. A. (Denis and McConnell, 2003). Jensen et al. 
(2004) have shown that independent boards of directors provide stronger oversight 
with respective firms enjoying fewer instances of financial fraud (Michaud and 
Magaram, 2006). 
Similarly, Santalo and Diestre (2006) has shown a positive correlation between 
outside directors and corporate performance, when the level of corporate anti-takeover 
protection is low. They have suggested that the threat of takeovers provide an 
adequate incentive for outside directors to undertake their supervisory role more 
efficiently. By contrast, they have found that outside directors' ownership do not 
seem to improve the quality of their performance (Michaud and Magaram, 2006). 
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Crespi et al. (2002) have found some evidence of a positive relationship between pay 
and industry adjusted stock prices perfonnance for finns with strong block holders in 
Spain (Denis and McConnell, 2003). Rodriguez and Anson (2001) have shown that 
there is a positive relationship between firms' announcements of compliance with the 
Spanish code of good corporate governance practice and stock prices, when such 
announcements imply a major restructuring of the board of directors. Further, they 
have noted that this impact is stronger for poorly performing firms (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003). 
Mapper and Love (2002) has found that good corporate governance is significantly 
positively associated with operating performance and market valuation. Firm level- 
corporate governance provisions are more important in countries with weak legal 
environment. He has found that firm-level corporate governance practices and 
performance is lower in countries with weak legal environment. He has argued that 
improving the legal system should remain a priority and that firms can partially 
overcome the defects in laws and degree of enforcement by establishing good 
corporate governance practices (Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
Some researchers argue that cultural values have an impact on economic and 
corporate performance. Durnev and Kim (2002) have found that great variations in the 
quality of governance systems such as board structure, ownership structure, disclosure 
and accountability within countries. Firms with better investment opportunities and 
firms that rely more on external finance have better governance system and are more 
valued in the market (Denis and McConnell, 2003). By contrast, Chui et al. (2002) 
have argued that national cultural values have influence corporate capital structure. 
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They have found that countries with high score on "conservatism" and "Mastery" 
cultural values tend to have lower corporate debt ratios (Gorga, 2003). 
(2/5) Corporate governance systems across countries 
During the past decade, comparative corporate governance studies have received more 
attention due to the increase in international foreign investment and globalization. 
The growing interest on comparative corporate governance is motivated by a desire to 
locate good legal governance practices and to try transplanting them in other'countries 
to develop good governance system across the world (Hill, 2004). In general, the 
literature review shows that there are strong differences in corporate governance 
systems across countries. These cross-country differences have been widely claimed 
to be due to three aspects: legal, political and cultural. These are as follows: 
(2/5/1) Corporate governance and legal aspects 
Some empirical studies have focused on the impact of different legal systems on the 
structure and effectiveness of corporate governance across countries. In this context, 
La Porta et al. (1997,1998) have highlighted the impact of legal systems on corporate 
governance systems. They have initially constructed a measure for the degree of 
protection of outside investors against insiders across 49 countries. They have 
measured two indices of national laws which are: anti-directors rights and creditors' 
rights. They have found a variation among these indices across countries (Licht et al., 
2004). 
Moreover, La Porta et al. (1997,1998) were the first to introduce a framework for law 
and finance. They have extended their analysis by investigating the relationship 
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between investors' legal rights and the structure of capital markets and corporate 
finance across countries (Mintz, 2005). They have found a significant positive 
relationship between several measures of stock market development, such as breadth 
of the equity market, and measures of companies' access to external finance, and 
shareholders protection indices (Pagano and VoPlin, 2005). They have pointed out 
that the aggregate measures of the use of external finance are highest in common law 
countries, where investors' protection is greatest, in contrast to civil law countries, 
where investors' protection is weakest (Denis and McConnell 2003, Licht et al., 
2004). 
Later on, La Porta et al. (1998) have shown that the degree of shareholders protection 
differs systematically across legal system across countries. They have found that 
common law counties provide more protection for shareholders in contrast to civil law 
countnes agano and Voplin, 2005, Denis and McConnell, 2003). Common law 
societies usually have better legislative protection for investors and more developed 
stock markets than civil law societies. In fact there are two types of enforcement laws: 
The civil and common law. Civil law emphasizes duties, authorities and orders; it is 
more paternalistic and tries to protect citizens against themselves (Chloros, 1978). On 
the other hand, common law emphasizes rights, emancipations and responsibilities. 
More recently, La Porta et al. (2000) have introduced the "Legal approach" which 
explains the cross-country difference in corporate governance systems by legal origin 
rather than particular index scores (Licht et al., 2004). They have argued that 
minority shareholders protection laws and the degree of their enforcement are key 
determinants of capital markets, and hence they have argued that the tradition of law 
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plays an important role in the financial market development. In addition, they have 
investigated the impact of investor protection on dividends payouts. They have found 
a positive relationship between investor protection and dividends payouts when firm 
reinvestment opportunities are poor and vice versa (Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
Furthermore, La Porta et al. (2002) have investigated the impact of investors' legal 
protection on firm value. They have found that firms with better shareholders - 
protection are associated with positive relationship with Tobin's Q ratios (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003). 
De-Jong and Semenov (2002) have predicted that demand for shares will be higher in 
societies with lower uncertainty avoidance and a favorable regulatory enviromnent 
towards the stock market. They have added that countries with low investors' 
protection are generally characterized by high concentration of equity ownership 
within companies and a lack of significant public equity markets. They have 
concluded that the legal system i. e. investors' rights and degree of enforcement of law, 
are the most fundamental determinants of corporate finance and corporate governance 
systems across countries (Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
Moreover, Demirguc-kunt and Maksimoveic (2002) have found a positive significant 
relationship between the development of national legal systems and firm's access to 
external finance in 40 countries (Denis and McConnell, 2003). John and Kedia 
(2002) have added that there is a degree of association between optimal governance 
systems and the development of financial markets. They have argued that low 
investor protection may encourage companies to develop their own governance 
system to increase their chances to attract external finance, whereas Denis and 
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McConnell (2003) have shown that previous empirical studies indicate that investor's 
legal protection and their degree of enforcement affect the size and the extent of 
financial markets and, with them, the level of economic growth. 
However, the alleged legal approach has not always been successful in explaining the 
differences in corporate governance across countries. During the 1990s, some 
counties have implemented several legal reforms to improve corporate governance 
practices. However, some of these reforms were not quiet successful. Licht et al. 
(2004) have mentioned that: "At the turn of the millennium, commentators came to 
share the view that simply writing investors rights into the law is not enough, more 
fundamental issues must be confronted". It seems that passing new laws to enhance 
investor protection do not guarantee by itself corporate governance improvement. 
Unfortunately, researchers usually refer to the Russian economic reform program as 
an example of the failure to transplant the Western style market economy model in 
other countries. Hill (2004) has shown that the mass economic and legislative reforms 
imposed in Russia since the early 1990s have failed to achieve their main objectives. 
She has argued that the main reasons for this failure reside in both insufficient 
economic reform program and regulatory system. She has concluded that historical, 
cultural and social norms in the Russian society have represented an obstacle to 
effective implementation of the economic reform program. These issues highlight the 
importance of the path dependence and operation effects in comparative corporate 
governance systems. 
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Another example in this context is the Brazilian corporate law reforms. Gorga (2003) 
has examined the impact of economic incentives on the Brazilian corporate law 
reforms. He has shown that the Brazilian corporate law (2001) was aimed to provide 
efficient corporate governance practices to stimulate market development. However, 
some crucial aspects were dismissed from the initial legal reforms during the 
legislative process due to pressures from rent-seeking groups. He has argued that the 
Brazilian culture provide support for the interests of these rent seeking groups, which 
facilitates a path dependence towards a less efficient reforms. He has noted that: 
"Subjective perceptions reflected in culture and informal constraints, play a major role 
in shaping patterns of finn governance, rather than just a residual influence as 
typically assumed". 
Other researchers questioned the alleged superiority of the common law over civil law 
countries. Lomareaux and Rosental (2004) have shown that common law has not been 
always superior to civil law in terms of business and economic development. They 
have shown that the French commercial civil law "Code de Commerce" and legal 
practice offer more sophisticated and flexible solutions to organize businesses more 
than the Anglo American law (Pagano and Voplin, 2005) (see also Licht et al., 2004). 
Coffee (2001 a) has pointed out that the Scandinavian countries have a strong common 
law system, in contrast to the U. S. A. which has a civil law system. However, he has 
noted that these two countries have low expropriation of minority investors. He has 
noticed that the Scandinavian countries have a very low crime rate in comparison to 
the U. S. Consequently, he has concluded that dominate social norms in a society play 
a key role in the social behavior and that the enforcement of law rather than the law in 
the books alone (Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
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Moreover, some empirical evidence shows that law enforcement is more important 
than law in the books in the development of financial markets. Shleifer (2002) has 
argued that the enforcement of law and the structure of the society rather than the law 
in the books are important to effective investors' protection. He has suggested that 
legal rules are just a reflection of a broader societal stance (Licht et al., 2004). 
Ultimately, the impact of regulatory environment seems to depend on the type and 
effective implementation of legislation in place. For example, flexible mandatory 
disclosure rules may discourage investors to buy shares due to insufficient 
information about the companies, and vice versa (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
Gorga (2003) has added that studies which emphasis the impact of law on the 
development of financial markets and corporate governance across counties, ignore 
other important variables such as informal norms (social norms and cultural beliefs) 
and the political environment. 
Consequently, a debate has emerged among researchers on the best way legal change 
can be advanced across countries. Some researchers argue that there is a swift 
tendency towards convergence towards an internationally accepted good corporate 
governance practices. O'Sullivan (2003) has argued that there is indeed a significant 
change has occurred in the governance systems in France and Germany. However, she 
has pointed out that current theories have failed to explain the political economy of 
these changes. Finally, she has asserted that these changes are likely to continue to 
evolve in the direction towards the shareholder value model, similar to the U. S. 
By contrast, other researchers believe that difference in corporate governance systems 
is likely to continue. Bebehuk and Roe (1999) have criticized the idea of smooth and 
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rapid convergence towards a unified corporate governance system. They have 
asserted that political and economic forces influence corporate governance systems 
across countries, which creates a path dependence that can slow the convergence or 
even stop it (As mentioned in Pagano and Voplin, 2000,2005). Shlefier and Vishny 
(1997) have suggested that there is an acceptable level of variation of legal protection 
across countries. However, they have noted that many countries do not have the 
minimum reservation legal protection level to develop good governance system and 
geater economic development. 
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Pistor et al. (2000) has argued that the divergence of corporate governance systems is 
likely to persist on the basis that legal rules are shaped by a path dependence towards 
preexisting political and social forces (As mentioned in Hill, 2004). Similarly, Palepu 
et al. (2002) have examined the relationshiP between globalization and the 
convergence towards a common set of good governance practices across 37 countries. 
They found no evidence of convergence in practice. They have found evidence for 
convergence in law at the country level. They have found convergence between 
various pairs of economically interdependent countries rather than towards any single 
system. They have concluded that globalization has indeed foster common corporate 
governance practices across countries, however, their implementation are not yet 
clear. 
Gillan and Starks (2003) have examined the relationship between corporate 
governance and ownership structure, focusing on the role of institutional investors. 
They have examined cross-country differences in ownership structures and the 
implications of these differences for institutional investor involvement in corporate 
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governance. The have mentioned that although there may be some convergence in 
governance practices across countries over time, the endogenous nature of the 
interrelation among governance factors suggests that variation in governance 
structures will persist. 
Davis and Marquis (2005) have examined the governance practices, ownership 
structures and analyst followings of US listed companies from six countries. They 
have found little evidence of convergence towards a US model of corporate 
governance. The US listed firms have more favorable board size, proportion of inside 
directors, and the propensity to separate CEO and chairman roles than domestic 
companies. They have found that new firms outside the US which anticipate listing in 
the US may adopt the American-style governance practices, by contrast existing 
firms are unlikely to do so even after a US listing. I 
(2/5/2)Co rpo rate governance and political aspects 
Other researchers have provided an alternative explanation for the differences 
incorporate governance systems across countries. They have argued that these 
differences may be due to the political processes in these countries. Roe (1999) has 
presented a political theory, based on ideology, to explain corporate governance 
structure across countries. For example, he has mentioned that common ideology in 
the U. S. influence politicians to pass legal rules that prevent concentration of 
ownership, in order to reduce the power of banks and pension funds. He has argued 
that the existence of different corporate laws across countries can not explain in its 
own differences of corporate governance systems across countries. For example, 
some countries such as the Scandinavian countries have high protection for 
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shareholders Protection and at the same time they have high ownership concentration. 
He has noted that laws arc able to provide control on some types of behavior such as 
self-dealing or insider trading but they can not provide protection against 
mismanagement. He has concluded that there must be other factors that are in place 
other than the law that support the separation of ownership and control (Gorga, 2003). 
In addition, Roe (1999) has presented the "path dependence" phenomenon which 
indicates that differences in corporate governance structures across countries are due 
to differences in historical and social underpinnings of jurisdictions. He has argued 
that these differences in shareholders rights compared to other stakeholders are due to 
ideological factors rather than economic factors. For example, he has noted that the 
differences between the U. S. and continental Europe social democracies are due to 
divergent ideology (Pagano and Voplin, 2005). De-Jong and Semenov (2002) have 
pointed out that although cultural variables can not provide an explanation for each 
particular political change, they can provide indications about the direction of these 
changes and that state interventions will be largely determined by cultural values. 
Rajan and Zingales (2000) have added that changes in a political coalition can 
influence changes in the financial development. They have claimed that if some 
political groups gain unjustified power, due to increased competition and lack of 
insurance by social and economic bodies, the political system may weaken the 
development of financial markets. However, they did not show systematically why 
this suppression differs across countries. In addition they used different arguments to 
justify stock market development across countries. For example: they used political 
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and cultural factors for USA, while in U. K. they used economic factors (De-Jong and 
Semenov, 2002). 
Pagano and Voplin (2000) have supported the political process model to explain 
corporate governance systems across countries. However, they have argued that 
public policies and regulations are determined by the political interplay of economic 
constituencies. They have explained that the political decisions behind passing legal 
codes are based on economic principles rather than ideology. They have considered 
the state as an agent for the political forces rather than an independent player, the state 
intervention view as the result of a political agreement rather than as its cause. 
They have proposed a stylized political economy model to explain the determinants of 
the degree of investor protection. The model suggests that a political agreement 
between entrepreneurs and employees to preserve their benefits, may cause low 
shareholders protection. The model shows a negative relationship between 
employment and investors protection across countries. They also have found that the 
frequency of mergers and acquisition (control changes) is negatively correlated with 
employment protection. However, the model may be criticized for providing no 
explanation for the persistent differences in corporate governance systems or political 
processes across countries (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
Pagano and Voplin (2005) have extended their previous analysis to find a significant 
positive relationship between investors' protection and some measures of stock market 
development such as equity issuance, initial public offerings and market 
capitalization, using a panel data for 47 countries over 1993-2002. They have referred 
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to investors' protection as the set of laws protecting the rights of non-controlling 
shareholders. They have found a tendency by countries with low shareholders 
protection to converge towards good corporate governance practices. The speed of 
convergence is determined by the number of domestic companies acquired by cross- 
boarder mergers and acquisition, which increase political support for greater domestic 
shareholder protection. They have documented an international convergence in 
shareholder protection to best-practice, and show that it is correlated with cross- 
boarder mergers and acquisition. 
(2/5/3)Corporate governance and culture 
There are an increasing number of researchers who believe that informal constraints 
or social norms are the main reason for differences in corporate governance across 
countries. North (1990) has argupd that an economic model that does not include a 
cultural component do not provide enough information about historical changes in the 
past. He has explained that the core cultural values and basic assumptions influence 
the scope of institutional change through their impact on social norms and outcome 
behavior in a society. North (1990) has added that the institutional structure in a 
country may foster or hinder future choices, and its historical circumstances are 
additional factors that affect create path dependence to the development of financial 
markets. He has concluded that culture may have a persistent influence that may 
hinder or stimulate certain changes to formal and informal institutions and to create a 
state of stable equilibriwn in the society (Gorga, 2003). 
Casson (1991) has asserted that cultural values have an impact on transaction costs 
and entrepreneurs' decision making. On one hand, he has argued that effective cultural 
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values in a society can increase moral and level of trust in the overall economy. He 
has mentioned that morality has the advantage of providing an informal means of 
monitoring compliance with contracts in addition to formal procedures, which can 
reduce transactions costs and hence improve overall economic performance. He has 
concluded that the quality of dominate culture values in a society is an important 
determinate of economic success. On the other hand, he has argued that the 
personality of the entrepreneurs is strongly influenced by their own cultural 
envirorunent and they can exert a cultural influence in their organizations. He has 
concluded by saying that: "The economic analysis of culture should therefore be able 
to shed light on a wide variety of contemporary social and business problems" (Gorga, 
2003). 
Grief (1994) has conducted a comparative study on the business organization of two 
societies: Maghribis and the Genoese. He has found that although these two groups 
work under the same technology and enviromnental conditions, they have developed 
different patterns of business conduct. He has noted that the Genoese individualistic 
cultural value may be more efficient than the Maghribis collectivism values in the 
long run. He has explained that the Genoese formal enforcement institutions may have 
provided more support for anonymous exchange which is useful for the economic 
development. He has concluded that cultural values influence coordination processes 
which create different paths of development (Gorga, 2003). 
Gorga (2003) have conducted a review for previous empirical evidence. He has 
argued that culture may influence corporate governance systems by determining the 
ultimate goals and objectives of national organizations. For example in some 
77 
countries the ultimate goal of organizations is to maximize shareholders wealth i. e. 
U. S., while in other countries the goal is to maximize all stakeholders interests 
including employees and community. The German organizations usually prefer 
consensus decision making processes which are supported by collective cultural 
values. Consequently, Gennan organizations usually have a two-tier board of 
directors' governance system which consists of a management board and a 
supervisory board with employee participations (Mintz, 2005). 
He has added that human preference is important in determining change and 
development in institutions and economic development in a society. He has 
mentioned that: "The traditional economic model considers preferences as 
exogenously determined. Though culture is a necessary variable to explain 
endogenous preferences and change in tastes". He has explained that culture and 
ideology are common values and belief systems that may have an impact on social 
norms and interactions in a society, and hence may have an important impact on the 
decision making process of the stakeholders. This concept of culture is different from I 
the concept of "corporate culture" which implies business values of certain 
organizations. Hofstede (1980) has explained that corporate culture is quiet 
distinguished because it can overcome national cultural differences to develop new 
rules of conduct (Gorga, 2003). 
He has suggested that culture is a powerful tool to explain differences of corporate 
governance systems across countries. For example he has mentioned that culture can 
limit rent-seeking interests and can support institutional changes that are not 
explained by the traditional economic model. In contrast, culture can make interest 
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groups more powerful and impede institutional change. He has added that social 
norms and law may have reciprocal relationships that influence human behavior. This 
relationship may be more important in exclusion and enforcement of law. As informal 
work rules may have the upper hand in comparison to legal rules of conduct. These 
values also may have an impact on the relationship between private businesses and the 
government. Further, he has explained that the existence of inefficient weak legal 
rules of property rights may be due to the culture and ideology of a particular 
stakeholder. He has concluded that the introduction of culture may shed some light on 
corporate governance systems across countries. The core cultural values and basic 
assumptions of certain stakeholders may have an impact on the relationships between 
the CEO, directors, officers and employees, press and public opinion. (Gorga, 2003). 
Furthermore, Gorga (2003) has suggested that culture can influence the press and 
public opinion perceptions to constrain institutional change. He has added that culture 
and ideology can explain the existence of inefficient laws and inadequate enforcement 
of laws in many countries. He has shown that culture can reinforce or prevent 
implementation of more efficient legal reforms. That is, culture can explain the 
divergent outcomes of implementing similar legal reforms across countries. 
Consequently, he has concluded that a strong ideology or belief system should be in 
place to build trust and good governance practices in the capital markets across 
countries. 
Some empirical studies have highlighted the relationship between culture and firm 
financial structure. Andy et al. (2002) have argued that national cultural values have 
an impact on corporate capital structure. They have found that countries with high 
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score on "conservatism" and "mastery" cultural values tend to have lower corporate 
debt ratios (Gorga, 2003). By contrast, Mintz (2005) has explored the impact of 
cultural variables and different methods of financing business operations. He has 
found that corporate governance systems in the U. S., U. K. and Germany has 
developed -as a result of the underlying cultural values, legal structures and different 
forms of financing business. He has suggested that these aspects are deeply rooted 
across countries and he has noted that any attempt to impose a "one size fits all" 
model is likely to be unsuccessful. 
Other empirical studies have shown that culture has a strong impact on the 
formulation and enforcement of laws across countries. Licht (2001) introduced a 
theoretical framework of cultural value dimensions (CVD) to measure the impact of 
culture on corporate governance systems across countries. He has argued that national 
cultures can be perceived as the mother of all path dependencies. He has explained 
that national cultures may have an impact on both the origin and development of 
corporate governance systems in these countries. This means that the influence of 
culture may be more persistent than other variables such as legal or political variables. 
Corporate governance systems in his study are defined as "The legal and factual 
enviromnent in which publicly held business corporations operate". 
Coffee (2001b) has further argued that social norms concerning the behavior of 
controlling shareholders differ significantly across jurisdictions. He has mentioned 
that: "Compliance with non-legally enforceable social norms can significantly affect 
market value". He has suggested a relationship between private benefits of 
controlling shareholders and social variables such as the level of crime and the law 
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compliance within jurisdictions across countries. For example he has noted that the 
Scandinavian legal system seems to outperform countries with common or civil law 
systems in terms of reducing private benefits of control. He has argued that since the 
Scandinavian countries have a common law system, therefore the common claim that 
common law countries usually provide superior shareholding protection may not be 
the case. He has suggested that the high social cohesion in the Scandinavian countries 
produce greater confirmatory with social norms. This means that law provide only 
part of the explanation of cross coýntry difference in corporate governance systems 
and that social norms may be the underlying forces behind the scene (Gorga, 2003). 
Stutz and Williamson (2001) have focused on the influence of culture on corporate 
governance systems. They have found a relationship between religion and language as 
proxies of national culture and creditors' rights. By contrast, the have found no 
relationship between religion and language with shareholders' rights. However, they 
did not provide any theoretical justification of their analysis and they have depended 
on a sole indicator for national culture (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
Later on, Licht et al. (2004) have examined empirically the cultural value dimensions 
framework (CVD) to highlight the importance of the underlying cultural dimensions 
of the laws across countries. They have investigated how the laws on the books reflect 
national cultural values across countries. some testable hypothesis have been derived 
to show that the degree of investors protection through legal rights depend o the 
practice of justice in the court system, which in turn depend on the cultural values. 
Cultural values have been represented in this study by Schwartz (1999) and Hofstede 
(1980) cultural values models. 
81 
Empirical results show that there is a significant relationship between cultural value 
dimensions and shareholding voting rights and creditors' rights. They have found a 
positive significant relationship between individualism and anti-director rights across 
countries. They have explained that in more individualistic countries the individual 
shareholder is expected to have more power against the management and/or major 
block holders of organizations. They have found a significant negative relationship 
between uncertainty avoidance and anti-director rights. This means that the more 
rights increase uncertainty in the business enviromnent across countries. They have 
found a significant negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance and creditors" 
protection rights across countries. This means that the increase in creditors' protection 
rights, especially during restructure or bankruptcy, can create more uncertainty in the 
business enviromnent (Mintz, 2005). 
More interestingly, Licht et al. (2004) have extended their analysis to examine the 
relationship between cultural regions and legal regimes across countries. They have 
found more anti-directors rights in common law countries than civil law countries. 
However, they have found no significant difference in creditors' protection among 
cultural regions (Mintz, 2005). Consequently, they have pointed out that this finding 
draw some doubts about the alleged superiority of common law countries to protect 
investors, as they provide no better protection to creditors than in other regions. They 
have concluded that the "legal approach" can not provide adequate explanation of 
corporate governance differences across countries. 
Furthermore, they have found that these relationships hold regardless of the other 
major characteristics of the country. The relationship is also persistent against formal 
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legal reforms. Therefore, they have concluded that national cultures may impede legal 
reforms and may induce path dependence in corporate governance systems. They also 
have found no reverse causal impact of law on culture values. However, they have 
found that these relationships may explain, in part, the British rule history across 
countrie§. As a result, they have recommended further studies for both culture and 
legal history to better understand corporate governance systems across countries 
(Gorga, 2003). 
Other researchers have tried to capture possible transmission mechanisms between 
cultural values, corporate governance and stock market performance. De-Jong and 
Semenov (2002) have highlighted possible channels by which cross country 
differences in cultural preferences influence institutions, and hence the performance 
of stock markets. These channels are: the regulatory environment, the role of the state 
in provision of pensions, the attractiveness of buying shares, and the attractiveness of 
issuing shares. They have suggested that these intermediating channels are related to 
agents' preferences, particularly the attitude towards uncertainty and instability. Since 
culture influences the preference of several economic agents, such as politicians, 
regulators, and investors, these preferences may shape the behaviour of the agents and 
can motivate them to enforce a wide array of transmission mechanisms towards stock 
market development. Politicians can pursue programs that aim to develop the stock 
market, regulators can work on several statutes and enforcement procedures that 
strengthen the stock market and economic performance in general, while the investors 
will demand more stocks and will be ready to accept more uncertainty. These 
transmission mechanisms represent an important source of information about the 
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underlying framework of stock market development and are wide open for more 
empirical research. 
(2/6) Summary and conclusions 
The main aim of this chapter is to present a review of previous theoretical and 
empirical literature concerning culture, stock market development and corporate 
governance. The literature review shows that there are several definitions of culture 
which describes different meanings and scopes from different view points. A 
common definition of culture has been introduced by Hofstede (1983) which states 
that: "It is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members 
of one human group from another". Similarly, previous empirical research shows that 
researchers have presented several cultural value dimensions models. Licht (2001) has 
mentioned that: "[A] close positive association between basic dimensions [is] 
identified in different ways by different authors". However, despite the similarity 
among cultural value models, there seems to be no consensus among researchers on a 
single concept of culture or culture dimensions. 
One of the most important cultural value models have been presented by Hofstede 
(1980). This model includes five cultural value dimensions, namely: power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity and time horizon. In general, this 
model has provided a useful framework of cultural values, which relatively reduces 
the complexity of the culture concept into five easily understood dimensions. In 
addition, the model is easy to apply using measurable variables for empirical testing 
and hypotheses (Dahl, 2004). 
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In the last decade, the large expansions of international stock markets have attracted 
the attention of many researchers to investigate stock market development and its 
impact on firrn and economic performance. Though, it may not be surprising to find 
many countries pursuing structural reformation of their stock markets to increase 
economic growth and to attract more international investment funds. Unfortunately, 
literature review shows that the debate among researchers on the expected benefits of 
well developed stock markets is far form being settled. 
Some theoretical evidence has suggested that developed stock markets may increase 
risk diversification, liquidity, information processing and capital mobilization, which 
in turn may accelerate long term economic growth. By contrast, other researchers 
have argued that stock market development will not always result in greater economic 
growth and prosperity (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). In this context, there seems to 
be no agreement among researchers on a single concept or measure for stock market 
development worldwide. To overcome this problem Demirguc-kunt and Levine 
(1995) have presented several indicators of stock market development using data on 
41 countries during period 1986 to 1993. They have implemented several stock 
market development indicators, which include: stock market capitalization, liquidity, 
concentration and volatility. 
In recent years, the impact of culture has received a wide attention in varies fields of 
study such as psychology, anthropolog3(, organization theory, management and even 
information technology. In particular, some empirical research investigations can be 
found in the accounting literature across countries. An important theoretical research 
by Gray (1988) has investigated the impact of culture on accounting values and 
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practice. He has derived four bipolar accounting value dimensions that exist at the 
level of the accounting subculture, which are: professionalism versus, statutory 
control, uniformity versus flexibility, conservatism versus optimism, secrecy versus 
transparency. A review of these relationships shows that uncertainty avoidance and 
individuality may have more impact on accounting practice than power distance and 
masculinity. Other researchers have focused on the longitudinal relationship between 
cultural values and accounting values and practice such as Sudarwan and Fogarty 
(1996), and Noravesh et al. (2005). 
On another aspect, literature review shows that modem corporate governance systems 
have emerged after some western business scandals that have resulted in loss of 
investors' confidence in financial markets and fall in market value. Consequently, 
national govenunents have introduced new legislations to protect shareholders and 
investor, and to restore their confidence in financial markets (Stephanie, 2005). 
Unfortunately, there seems to be no generally accepted definition of corporate 
governance worldwide. There is a broad spectrum of definitions that exist in the 
literature, ranging from a narrow, agency theoretic definitions to broader, stakeholder 
definitions. 
Literature review shows that there are two types of corporate govemance systems: 
intemal and extemal. The intemal corporate govemance systems deal with the board 
of directors and equity ownership structure. VvUle, the external corporate governance 
systems focus on the external market for corporate control (takeover market) and the 
legal/regulatory system. Several empirical studies have found strong relationships 
between individual corporate governance factors (or sets of factors) on firm and 
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economic performance (Michaud and Magaram, 2006). Other researchers have 
focused their attention on comparative corporate governance studies across countries. 
The growing interest on comparative corporate governance is motivated by a desire to 
locate good legal governance practices and to try transplanting them in other countries 
to develop good governance system across the world (Hill, 2004). Empirical evidence 
has shown that there are strong differences in corporate governance systems across 
countries. These cross-country differences have been widely claimed to be due to 
three aspects: legal, political and cultural. 
In this context, La Porta et al. (1997,1998,1999, and 2000) have presented several 
empirical studies to highlight the impact of different legal. systems on the structure 
and effectiveness of corporate governance across countries. They have introduced the 
"legal approach" which states that differences in shareholders' rights can provide an 
explanation of corporate governance systems across countries. However, this 
approach has not always been successful in explaining the differences in corporate 
governance across countries. Unfortunately, researchers usually refer to the Russian 
economic reform program and the Brazilian corporate law reforms as examples of the 
failure to transplant the Western style market economy model in other countries. 
Consequently, other researchers have provided an alternative explanation which states 
that these differences may be due to some political processes in these countries. Most 
notably, Roe (1999) has presented a political theory, based on ideology, to explain 
corporate governance structure across countries. Pagano and Voplin (2000) have 
proposed a stylized political economy model to explain the determinants of the degree 
of investor protection. The model suggests that a political agreement between 
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entrepreneurs and employees to preserve their benefits may cause low shareholders 
protection. Later on, Pagano and Voplin (2005) have extended their analysis to find a 
significant positive relationship between investors' protection and some measures of 
stock market development such as equity issuance, initial public offerings and market 
capitalization. However, this model may be criticized for providing no clear 
explanation for the persistent differences in corporate governance systems or political 
processes across countries (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
Finally, there are an increasing number of researchers who believe that the legal and 
political approaches provide only part of the explanation to cross country differences 
in corporate governance. They have argued that national cultures can be perceived as 
the mother of all path dependencies. That is, national cultures may have an impact on 
both the origin and development of corporate governance systems in these countries, 
which mean that the influence of culture may be more persistent than other legal or 
political aspects (Licht, 2001). Finally, it is time now to turn to the next chapter to 
present the methodology implemented in this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
The main aim of this chapter is to present the detailed methodology implemented in 
order to achieve the study objectives. Consequently, this chapter is divided into three 
main sections. The first section presents the research philosophy. The second section 
presents the methodology for measuring the relationship between cultural values and 
stock market development in the United Kingdom. The third section deals with the 
methodology for measuring the relationship between cultural values and corporate 
governance systems across countries. Each main section is further divided into several 
sub-sections which deal with the identification and measurement of study variables, 
data sources, study hypotheses, and finally statistical techniques. 
(3/1) Research Philosophy 
The research philosophy of this study depends mainly on the principles of positivism, 
which adopt the philosophical stance of the natural scientist. This means that the 
research deals with observable social realities and that the final outcome can be law- 
like generalizations similar to those produced by the physical and natural scientists 
M- kjLx%-. menyi et al., 1998). The research study has a highly structured methodology to 
facilitate replication (Gill and Johnson, 1997) and quantifiable observations have been 
collected to satisfy the statistical analysis (Saunders et al., 2003). However, the 
positivism approacb/philosophy can be criticized for trying to oversimplify the 
complex situation in the social world of business and management, which unlike the 
physical sciences do not have definite 'laws' for practice. Nevertheless, although this 
study falls primarily into the positivism approach, it does not ignore the stance of the 
interpretivist and realism philosophy either, by trying to incorporate some social 
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factors in addition to the economic factors to explain economic situations. The 
proponents of the interpretivist philosophy argue that the real business situations are 
complex and unique and they are a function of a particular set of circumstances and 
individuals. The presence of an individual element necessities understanding of the 
subjective meanings motivating peoples actions in order to be able to understand 
them. Whereas, the realism approach adds the importance of broader social forces, 
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structures or processes that influence, and perhaps constrain, the nature of peoples' 
views and behaviours (Saunders et al., 2003). 
Consequently, this study uses the deductive approach, developing from a theory and 
hypotheses, and designs a research strategy to test the hypotheses. This approach is 
suitable to the research in hand due to the existence of a relative wealth of literature 
on the subject matter which can be easily defined into a theoretical framework and 
hypotheses for rigorous statistical testing. However, this approach can be criticized for 
being too rigid to permit alternative explanations of what is going on in reality. An 
alternative dual-approach implements both the previously mentioned deductive 
approach, in addition to the inductive approach which is used to collect data and 
develop theory. In this case theory will follow data rather than the vice versa as in the 
deductive approach. 
This dual-approach can be justified on the basis that the existing literature on social 
science in general and on cultural values in particular is still premature, and attracts a 
lot of debate among researchers. However, it may be suitable for future research to 
adopt a dual approach to generate data and analyze to reflect on what theoretical 
themes the data is suggesting (Saunders et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the inductive 
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approach has some drawbacks as it usually requires long time periods to collect and 
analyze data and to allow results to emerge gradually. Clearly, the researcher needs to 
choose the research philosophy and approach, which really answers the research 
question within the limited resources available. 
(3/2) The relationship between cultural values and stock market development 
This main section deals with the methodology for measuring the relationship between - 
culture and stock market development. This section is fin-ther divided into four sub- 
sections, which are: identification and measurement of study variables, data sources, 
study hypothesis and statistical techniques. This is as follows: 
(3/2/1) Identification and measurement of study variables 
In general, this study tries to investigate Hofstede's proposition (1980) which states 
that cultural values in a society have institutional consequences, in particular, on the 
stock market development. Consequently, this study focuses on the dynamic 
relationships between cultural values and stock market development indicators on a 
continuous scale in one country: the United Kingdom. 
The previous literature review has revealed that cultural values may have an impact 
on some stock market development indicators (see De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). As 
a result, cultural values are considered as the independent constructs, while stock 
market development indicators are considered as the dependent constructs. 
Cultural values are represented by the cultural value model of Hofstede (1980), which 
consist of five dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, 
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masculinity and time horizon. These dimensions are not directly observable. 
Therefore, a matching process is implemented to provide indirect measures of certain 
cultural values existing in the United Kingdom, whereby some observable proxy 
variables are located based on the prevailing origins of societal norms for each 
cultural value dimension. Then, the notion of "wealth creation" is used to provide 
explanations for the underlying societal nonns/values to the unobservable culture 
dimensions (Hofstede, 1981). 
On the other hand, the literature review on stock market development indicates that 
there is no common agreement between researchers on a single concept or a 
comprehensive model for stock market development (see Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
1995). Therefore, the most commonly used stock market development indicators are 
identified in light of previous theoretical and empirical research, in particular the work 
of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1995). These observed variables are: stock market 
activity, size, liquidity, and concentration. 
(3/2/1/1) Cultural-values' dimensions 
Hofstede (1980,199 1) has suggested that some societal norms are likely to persist in a 
society which has certain accepted societal values among all members. These societal 
norms are defined as (Hofstede, 1980): 
"Levels of each culture value prevailed in a society". 
He has summarized these societal norms along each of his five cultural dimensions. 
Also, he has suggested that some ecological environments can show the origins of 
these societal norms in a society. Thus, these ecological environments are used as 
indicative measures of the relationships within cultural constructs. 
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The cultural-values' dimensions are not directly observable. Tberefore, following the 
methodology of Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996), and Noravesh et al. (2005) a matching 
process is implemented to provide indirect measures of certain cultural values existing 
in the United Kingdom, whereby some observable proxy variables are located based 
on the prevailing origins of societal norms for each cultural value dimension. The 
outcomes of this process are analyzed using social norms as an approximation to 
predict the relationships within each cultural value construct. 
This matching process follows three steps, which are: first, societal origins of each 
cultural value are identified; second, societal origins are matched with some 
observable variables; and third, the resulting relationships between these variables are 
justified based on previous theoretical and empirical research. The notion of "wealth 
creation" Hofstede (1981) is used to provide some explanations for the underlying 
societal norms/values to each cultural value dimension. This is detailed below: 
(A) Power distance 
Hofstede (1980,1991) has argued that national wealth is a detenninate of power- 
distance across countries. People in wealthy countries may have less dependence on 
power to secure a higher position and have fewer tendencies towards creating 
powerful groups. Wealth can be considered as a substitute for power satisfaction. In 
this case, people are less likely to show acceptance for unequal distribution of power 
among levels of a society. Therefore, it can be concluded that national wealth of a 
country has a negative relationship with power distance. 
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Based on previous empirical research, four observable variables are used to proxy for 
the power distance dimension, the first two of which are: the number of telephone 
lines and the ratio of telephone lines to total population. These proxy variables are 
predicted to correlate positively with the national wealth in a country. This is based on 
the assumption that countries that have technological advances in the field of 
information and communication are capable of creating more national wealth than 
others (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
The second two variables are the total number of student enrolment and the ratio of 
total number of student enrolment to total population. Low levels of illiteracy rates 
means that various people of a nation are capable of using modem technology and to 
communicate effectively compared to other nations. This may help them to create 
more wealth and reduce power-distance. Therefore, it can be concluded that these 
four observable proxy variables are expected to correlate negatively with the power- 
distance cultural dimension (Table 3.1) 
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Table 3.1: Origins of societal norms for proxy variables on Power Distance. 
Source: Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996. 
Proxy Variables Relationship Origins of societal norms 
High Low 
Power Distance Power Distance 
Number of telephone Less use of More use of 
lines information and information and 
communication communication 
technology technology 
Ratio of numbcr of 
telephone lines to total 
population 
Less use of 
information and 
More use of 
information and 
communication 
technology 
communication 
technology 
Total number of Less importance of More importance of 
students' enrolment education education 
Ratio of total number Less importance of More importance of 
of students' enrolment education education 
to total population 
(B) Uncertainty avoidance 
Based on previous empirical research, four proxy variables are used to represent the 
uncertainty avoidance cultural value construct. These variables are: volume of 
transactions on the stock market, fluctuations in the foreign currency rate, changing 
rate of GDP and finally change in gross national income. High volume of transactions 
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on the stock market indicates that people are willing to invest in shares despite their 
inherent high risk. While, changes in the foreign currency rate, gross domestic product 
(GDP) and gross national product (GNP) may indicate that people are more likely to 
accept changes in their disposable income and hence changes in their living standards. 
Therefore, these four variables are expected to correlate negatively with uncertainty- 
avoidance (Table: 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Origins of societal proxy variables on uncertainty avoidance. 
Source: Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996. 
Proxy Variables Relationship Origins of societal norms 
High Low 
uncertainty uncertainty 
avoidance avoidance 
Volume of Few transactions on More transaction on 
transactions on stock stock market stock market 
market 
Fluctuations of foreign Less economic More economic 
cuffency rate stability and stability and 
development development 
Gross Domestic Less economic More economic 
Product (GDP) stability and stability and 
development development 
Gross National Income Less economic More economic 
stability and stability and 
development development 
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(C) Individualism 
Individualism is the degree to which people feel responsible for themselves and/or 
their immediate family. Based on previous empirical research, four observable 
variables are used to proxy for this cultural value, which are: ratio of people living in 
cities to total population, number of people living in cities, national income and 
finally income per capita. The first two proxy variables represent the urbanization 
rate, which is predicted to have a positive relationship with individualism. As more 
people live in urban areas greater pressure of competition and struggle for self- 
survival are likely to prevail in such a society (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
In addition, wealthy nations have the ability to build towns and cities that result in an 
increase in independence and competition among members of a society (Hofstede, 
1980). The second two variables represent income available to people in a society. 
People living in wealthy nations can have more disposable income to pursue their 
own interests and objectives apart from other colleagues, which may increase 
individuality. Hofstede (1980) has asserted that people living in wealthy nations tend 
to be more independent from others. They are more likely to follow their own goals 
and objectives in isolation from others. Therefore, the national wealth of a country 
may have a positive relationship with individualism. Consequently, these four 
variables are expected to correlate positively with individualism (Table: 3.3). 
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Table 3.3: Origins of societal norms proxy variables on individualism 
Source: Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996. 
Proxy Variables Relationship Origins of societal norms 
High Low 
individualism individualism 
Ratio of people living (+) 
in cities to total 
population 
More social mobility Less social mobility 
and modemization and m6demization 
Number of people More social mobility Less social mobility 
living in cities and modernization and modernization 
National Income More disposable Less disposable 
income income 
Income per capita More disposable Less disposable 
income income 
(D) Masculinity 
Previous empirical research has shown that the regulatory environment in a more 
masculine society usually facilitates competition in the financial system, whereas in a 
feminine society the regulatory environment is more likely to hinder competition and 
facilitate a comprehensive system of government pension provision. Managers in a 
masculine society are more likely to favor independence, in contrast to managers in a 
feminine society, who are more likely to favour solidarity. In addition, more close 
relationships can be expected between companies and stakeholders in a feminine 
society than in a masculine society (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002, p. 20). 
98 
This study utilizes four underlying proxy variables to represent the masculinity 
cultural dimension, which are: ratio of male employment to total employment, ratio of 
male students to female students in elementary schools, ratio of male students to 
female students in further education, and ratio of male students to female students in 
higher education. The first proxy variable shows the composition of the employment 
force by gender. It is predicted that as more women join the workforce, the more 
modest societal values tend to prevail in a society. On the other hand, the more male 
employment indicates a more masculine society. Therefore, there may be a positive 
relationship between levels of male employment and masculine behaviour in societies 
(Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
The ratios of students at different education levels by gender help to investigate the 
impact of education of males and females on masculinity in a society. In general, as 
higher male to female ratio is exhibited at different education-levels, the more 
masculinity is expected to prevail in a society (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996) (Table 
3.4). 
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Table 3.4: Origins of societal norms of proxy variables on masculinity. 
Source: Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996. 
Proxy Variables Rclationship Origins of societal nonns 
High Low 
masculinity masculinity 
Ratio of male More male to female Less male to female 
employment to total employment employment 
employment 
Ratio of male students More male to female Less male to female 
to total students in education education 
elementary schools 
Ratio of male students 
to total students in 
More male to female Less male-to female 
education education 
ftirther education 
Ratio of male students More male to female Less male to female 
to total students in education education 
higher education 
(E) Time horizon 
Based on previous empirical research, this study depends on four proxy variables to 
represent the time-horizon dimension, of which the first two are: the ratio of total 
spending on education to total budget, and total spending on education. In a long-term 
horizon society the government is expected to show more commitment towards 
spending on education, as part of the Confucian orientation. Confucian societies place 
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great emphasis on education as a main goal to invest in long term human capital. The 
other two proxy variables are: ratio of total gross fixed investment to GDP and total 
gross fixed investment. People in a Confucian society prefer a conservative use of 
resources. They are less reluctant to trade-off current consumption of resources with 
the possibility of earning more returns in the future. People consider saving as an 
important tool for future productive activities. Therefore, it is expected that long term 
horizon societies will spend more money on productive fixed investments. and vice 
versa (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996) (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5: The origins of societal norms of proxy variables on time horizon. 
Source: Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996 
Proxy Variables Relationship Origins of societal norms 
long short 
Time horizon Time horizon 
Ratio of total spending (+) More importance of Less importance of 
on education to total , human resources human resources 
budget 
Total spending on More importance of Less importance of 
education human resources human resources 
Ratio of total gross More tendency to Less tendency to 
fixed investment to spare resources spare resources 
GDP 
Total gross fixed More tendency to Less tendency to 
investment spare resources spare resources 
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The selected proxy variables for cultural value dimensions are listed in Table: 3.6, 
together with their relevant symbols, relationships expected with main cultural- 
dimension and frequency of data observations. It can be noticed that the data 
observations used have different frequencies i. e. monthly, quarterly and annual. To 
overcome this problem and to create a uniform data-set, all variables are transformed 
to the monthly frequency before they are incorporated into the analysis, using the 
linear interpolation of data'option in the SPSS statistical software package. 
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Table 3.6: Summary of proxy variables used in the study for independent cultural values based 
on the Hofstede's model (1980). PR= Predicted relationship between cultural values as depicted 
by Hofstede's model and proxy variables. (+) means positive relationship, and (-) means negative 
relationship. Frequency of data M= monthly, Q= quarterly, A= annual. 
Symbol Variables (Independent) Predicted Frequency 
Relationship 
Power distance 
xi Number of telephone lines Q 
X2 Ratio of number of telephone lines to total population Q 
X3 Total number of students' enrolment Q 
X4 Ratio of total number of students' enrolment to total Q 
population 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
X5 Volume of transactions on stock market -A 
X6 Real Fluctuations of foreign currency rate -M 
X7 Real Gross Domestic Product -Q 
X8 Real Gross National Income -Q 
Individualism 
X9 Ratio of people living in cities to total population + A 
X10 Number of people living in cities + A 
X1, Real Gross National Income + Q 
X12 Real Income per Capita + Q 
Masculinity 
X13 Ratio of male employment to total employment + A 
X14 Ratio of male students to total students in elementary + A 
schools 
Xj, 5 Ratio of male students to total students in further + A 
education 
X16 Ratio of male students to total students in higher + A 
education 
Time Horizon 
X17 Real ratio of total spending on education to total 
budget 
X18 Real total spending on education 
X19 Real ratio of total gross fixed investment to GDP 
X20 Real total gross fixed investment 
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(3/2/1/2) Descriptive statistics for the proxy variables of cultural values 
The detailed descriptive statistics have been calculated for all the proxy variables of 
cultural values used in this study (Table 3.7). The results of the analysis show that the 
majority of variables vary considerably across time; in addition the majority of the 
skewness and kurtosis results are within the acceptable limits. 
Table 3.7: Descriptive statistics for proxy variables of cultural values using SPSS software 
package (Version 14.00). X1 is number of telephone lines, X2 is ratio of number of telephone lines 
to total population, X3 is total number of students' enrolment, X4 is ratio of total number of 
students' enrolment to total population, X5 is volume of transactions on stock market, X6 is real 
Fluctuations of foreign currency rate, X7 is real Gross Domestic Product, X8 is real Gross 
National Income, X9 is ratio of people living in cities to total population, X10 is Number of people 
living in cities, X11 is real Gross National Income, X12 is real Income per Capita, X13 is ratio of 
male employment to total employment, X14 is ratio of male students to total students in 
elementary schools, X15 is ratio of male students to total students in further education, X16 is 
ratio of male students to total students in higher education, X17 is real ratio of total spending on 
education to total budget, X18 is real total spending on education, X19 is real ratio of total gross 
fixed investment to GDP, X20 is real total gross fixed investment 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Skewness Kurtosis 
Variables Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
xi 136 25910 35890 31204.71 3286.00 -. 106 . 208 -1.429 . 
413 
X2 136 45 59 53.03 4.75 -. 257 . 208 -1.412 . 
413 
X3 145 11499 14823 13046-39 1122.25 . 204 . 201 -1.490 . 400 
X4 145 20 25 22.36 1.697 . 184 . 201 -1.544 . 
400 
X5 180 6910.82 53907.46 19541.79 13586.01 1.039 . 181 -. 224 . 360 
X6 180 74.39 102.81 90.55 8.87 -. 552 . 181 -1.226 . 360 
X7 179 775040 1117520 918489.84 110208.48 . 204 . 182 -1.331 . 
361 
X8 178 182153.40 275580.57 221542.95 28589.74 . 259 . 182 -1.210 . 
362 
X9 180 28.30 36.649 31.94 1.15 -. 953 . 181 4.716 . 360 
X10 180 19056753 20510825 19940878.56 294526.00 -. 059 . 181 -. 032 . 360 
x1l. 178 182153.40 275580.57 221542.95 28589.74 . 259 . 182 -1.210 . 362 
X12 167 3 5 3.74 . 408 . 264 . 188 -1.173 . 374 
X13 157 54 56 54.54 . 449 2.084 . 194 
5.254 . 385 
X14 145 49 51 50.49 . 559 -. 042 . 201 -. 902 . 400 
X15 145 40.900 45.000 43.15 1.13 -. 743 . 201 -. 423 . 400 
X16 145 43.600 54.400 48.23 2.99 . 409 . 201 -. 840 . 400 
X17 178 8 15 10.76 1.96 . 607 . 182 -. 896 . 362 
X18 178 8592.56 14819.87 10607.20 1822.17 1.145 . 182 -. 030 . 362 
X19 178 10.41 18.96 14.31 2AO . 113 . 182 -1.462 . 362 
X20 178 30970.78 46683.49 38238.87 3283.58 -. 105 . 182 -. 969 . 362 
Valid N 
["e) 127 
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(3/2/1/3) Stock market development indicators 
T-lus study depends on the most commonly used stock market development indicators 
in light of the previous empirical research, in particular the work by Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (1995). These indicators are: stock market activity, size, liquidity and 
concentration, which are detailed below 
(A) Stock market activity 
Stock market activity is represented by five variables, which are: value of trade, 
volume of trade, number of transactions, value of new issues including capital gains 
as % of trading value, and value of new issues including capital gains as % of GDP 
(gross domestic production at current prices). It is expected that an increase in the 
values of these variables will result in an increase in'overall stock market activity. An 
increase in stock market activity should result in greater development in stock market 
perfonnance. Therefore, a positive relationship is predicted between these variables 
and stock market development (Table: '3.8). 
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Table 3.8: Relationships between the proxy variables and stock market activity 
Variables Predicted Description 
Relationship High Low 
market activity market activity 
Value of trade More value of trading Less value of trading 
in stock market in stock market 
Volume of trade More volume of Less volume of 
trading in stock trading in stock 
market market 
Number of Many transactions in Few transactions in 
transactions stock market stock market 
Value of new issues (+) More value of new Less value of new 
including capital gains issues in stock market issues in stock market 
as % of trading value 
Value of new issues More value of new Less value of new 
including capital gains issues in stock market issues in stock market 
as % of GDP 
(B) Stock market size 
Previous empirical research has shown that market size is on of the most widely used 
proxies for stock market development. In this study five variables are selected to 
represent this indicator, which are: market capitalization (total market value of shares 
listed on London stock exchange), market capitalization as a% of GDP (gross 
domestic production at current prices), volume of shares listed, volume of shares 
listed as % of number of listed companies and number of listed companies. These 
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variables are expected to correlate positively with stock market size. That is, it is 
expected that an increase in these proxy variables will result in an increase in stock 
market size (Table: 3.9). 
Table 3.9: Relationships between proxy variables and stock market size 
Variables Predicted Description 
Relationship High Low 
market size market size 
Market capitalization More investment in Less investment in 
stock market stock market 
Market capitalization More investment in Less investment in 
as a% of GDP 
Volume of share listed M More volume of Less volume of 
shares listed shares listed 
Volume of shares M More volume of Less volume of 
listed as % of listed shares listed shares listed 
companies 
stock market stock market 
Number of listed Many listed Many listed 
compames companies in stock companies in stock 
markct market 
(C) Stock market liquidity 
Based on the previous empirical research, three variables are used to represent stock 
market liquidity. These variables are: total value traded to market capitalization (total 
market value of shares listed on London stock exchange), total value traded to GDP 
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(gross domestic production at current prices) and volume of shares traded as a% of 
volume of shares listed. It is expected that these variables have a positive relationship 
with stock market liquidity. That is, an increase in these proxy variables is likely to 
increase market liquidity (Table: 3.10). Since, an increase in stock market liquidity 
may reduce transaction costs and hence improve stock market performance. 
Table 3.10: Relationships between proxy variables and stock market liquidity 
Variables Predicted Description 
Relationship High Low 
market liquidity market liquidity 
Total value traded to More value of shares Less value of shares 
market capitalization traded traded 
Total value traded to More value of shares Less value of shares 
GDP traded traded 
Volume of shares More volume of ' Less volume of 
traded as a% of shares traded shares traded 
volume of shares listed 
(D) Stock market concentration 
The ownership concentration indicator is commonly used to evaluate the performance 
of a stock market. This study selects three variables to represent this indicator. These 
variables are: % of 10 biggest companies' shares in market capitalization, % of 10 
biggest companies' shares in value traded and value of 10 biggest companies' shares. 
It is expected that these variables will correlate positively with stock market 
concentration (Table 3.11). 
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Table 3.11: Relationships between proxy variables and stock market 
concentration 
Variables Predicted Description 
Relationship High Low 
market 
concentration 
market 
concentration 
% of 10 biggest More value of 10 Less value of 10 
companies' shares in biggest companies biggest companies 
market capitalization 
%of 10 biggest More value of 10 Less value of 10 
companies' shares in biggest companies biggest companies 
value traded 
Value of 10 biggest More value of 10 Less value of 10 
companies' shares biggest companies biggest companies 
A summary of the proxy variables for stock market development indicators are listed 
in Table 3.12, together with their relevant symbols, the predicted relationships with 
main stock market indicators and frequency of the data-observations. As mentioned 
earlier, the data used have different frequencies i. e. monthly, quarterly and annual. To 
create a uniform data-set, all variables are transformed to the monthly frequency 
before they are incorporated into the analysis, using the. linear interpolation of data 
option in the SPSS statistical software package. 
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Table 3.12: Summary of proxy variables of stock market development used in the study based on 
previous empirical research. Predicted relationship between stock market development factors 
and proxy variables: (+) means positive relationship, (-) means negative relationship, (F) 
Frequency of data M= monthly, Q= quarterly, A= annual. 
SYMbol Stock market development variables (dependent) Prediacd 
Relationship 
F 
Market Activity 
Yll Real value of Trade + A 
Y2 Volume of Trade + A 
Y3 Number of Transactions + A 
Y4 Real value of new issues including capital gains as % of + A 
trading value 
Y5 Real value of new issues including capital gains as % of + A 
GDP 
Market Size 
Y6 Real market capitalization + A 
Y7 Real market capitalization as a% of GDP + A 
Y8 Volume of share listed + A 
Y9 Volume of shares listed as % of listed companies + A 
Y10 Number of listed companies + A 
Market Liquidity 
YI, Real total value traded to market capitalization + A 
Y12 Real total value traded to GDP + A 
Y13 Volume of share traded as a% of volume of shares listed + A 
Market concentration 
Y14 Real % of biggest companies' shares in market +M 
capitalization 
YIS Real % of biggest companies' shares in value traded +M 
Y16 Real value of 10 biggest companies' shares +M 
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(3/2/1/4) Descriptive statistics for stock market development indicators 
The detailed descriptive statistics have been calculated for all the stock market 
development indicators used in this study (Table 3.13). The results of the analysis 
show that the majority of variables vary considerably across time; in addition the 
skewness and kurtosis results are within the acceptable limits. 
Table 3.13: Descriptive statistics for stock market development indicators using SPSS software 
package (Version 14.00). Y1 is real value of Trade, Y2 is volume of Trade, Y3 is number of 
Transactions, Y4 is real value of new issues including capital gains as % of trading value, Y5 is 
real value of new issues including capital gains as % of GDP, Y6 is real market capitalization, Y7 
is real market capitalization as a% of GDP, Y8 is volume of share listed, Y9 is volume of shares 
listed as % of listed companies, YIO is number of listed companies, Y11 is real total value traded 
to market capitalization, Y12 is real total value traded to GDP, Y13 is volume of share traded as 
a% of volume of shares listed, Y14 is real % of biggest companies' shares in market 
capitalization, Y15 real % of biggest companies' shares in value traded, Y16 is real value of 10 
bieeest comDanies' shares. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Std. 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Variables Deviation 
Std. Std. 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Error Error 
vi 181 17450.34 173254.85 60847.36 32425.63 . 581 . 181 -%519 . 359 
V2 181 6591.79 64475.26 21377.32 13749.91 1.018 . 181 -. 029 . 359 
Y3 181 2824 146315 53336.51 31352.78 . 902 . 181 
453 . 359 
Y4 180 . 6385 2.77 1.47 . 48017 . 820 . 181 -. 282 . 
360 
ys 178 . 1906 . 511 . 3424 . 0769 . 270 . 182 -. 
881 . 362 
V6 180 352804.26 1620112.42 901612.61 380929.717 . 191 . 181 -1.350 . 360 
Y7 178 2.52 6.737 4.21 1.100 . 598 . 182 -. 
678 . 362- 
Y8 181 1575 2939 2255.39 343.68 . 064 . 181 -1.185 . 
359 
Y9 180 . 998 1.513 1.168 . 112 . 737 . 181 . 581 . 360 
VIO 180 1465 2171 1928.19 181.71 -. 882 . 181 . 131 . 360 
Vil 180 67.21 158.56 91.79 29.83 1.151 . 181 -. 337 . 360 
V12 178 2.22 7.77 4.76 1.871 . 272 . 182 -1.458 . 362 
Y13 180 64.41 559.99 171.79 136.277 1.492 . 181 . 908 . 360 
Y14 180 14.12 25.239 18.60 2.75 . 366 . 181 -. 835 . 360 
Y15 180 8.91 36.171 22.55 7.871 257 . 181 -1.170 . 360 
V16 180 97244698 318934661 195670723.06 63481944.86 . 313 . 181 -1.053 . 360 
Valid N 
178 
(listwise) 
III 
(3/2/2) Data sources 
The data set for this study is collected from different sources, itemized below: 
a) Annual, quarterly and monthly data on the proxy variables for cultural values 
in the United Kingdom have been collected from several published secondary 
data sources, such as the DataStream database, Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) and Office of Communications (Ofcom) for the period 1990-2004 
(fifteen years). The sources of information for each proxy variable for cultural 
values are listed in Table 3.14 below. 
b) Annual, quarterly and monthly data on stock market development indicators in 
the United Kingdom have been collected from several published secondary 
data sources, such as the DataStream database and the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) for the period 1990-2004 (fifteen years). The sources of information for 
each stock market development indicator are listed in Table 3.15 below. 
112 
Table 3.14: The sources of information for each proxy variable of cultural values. 
Symbol Proxy variables Source 
Power distance 
Xi Number of telephone lines Office of Communications 
X2 Ratio of number of telephone lines to Office of Communications 
total population DataStrearn database 
X3 Total number of students' enrolment Office for National Statistics 
X4 Ratio of total number of students' Office for National Statistics 
enrolment to total population 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
X5 Volume of transactions on stock market London Stock Exchange 
X6 Real Fluctuations of foreign currency DataStream database 
rate 
X7 Real Gross Domestic Product DataStream database 
X8 Real Gross National Income DataStream database 
Individualism 
X9 Ratio of people living in cities to total Office for National Statistics 
population 
X10 Number of people living in cities Office for National Statistics 
Xii Real Gross National Income DataStream database 
X12 Real Income per Capita DataStream. database 
Masculinity 
X13 Ratio of male employment to total Office for National Statistics 
employment 
X14 Ratio of male students to total students Office for National Statistics 
in elementary schools 
X15 Ratio of male students to total students Office for National Statistics 
in fin-ther education 
X16 Ratio of male students to total students Office for National Statistics 
in higher education 
Time Horizon 
X17 Real ratio of total spending on Office for National Statistics 
education to total budget 
X18 Real total spending on education Office for National Statistics 
X19 Real ratio of total gross fixed Office for National Statistics 
investment to GDP 
X20 Real total gross fixed investment Office for National Statistics 
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Table 3.15: The sources of information for each stock market development 
indicator. 
Symbol Stock market development indicators Source 
Market Activity 
Y1 Real value of Trade London Stock Exchange 
Y2 Volume of Trade London Stock Exchange 
Y3 Number of Transactions London Stock Exchange 
Y4 Real value of new issues including capital gains as % London Stock Exchange 
of trading value 
Y's Real value of new issues including capital gains as % London Stock Exchange 
of GDP 
Market Size 
Y6 Real market capitalizatioli London Stock Exchange 
Y7 Real market capitalization as a% of GDP London Stock Exchange 
DataStrearn database 
YS Volume of share listed London Stock Exchange 
Y9 Volume of shares listed as % of listed companies London Stock Exchange 
Y10 Number of listed companies London Stock Exchange 
Market Liquidity 
Y11 Real total value traded to market capitalization London Stock Exchange 
Y12 Real total value traded to GDP London Stock Exchange 
DataStream, database 
Y13 Volume of share traded as a% of volume of shares London Stock Exchange 
listed 
Market concentration 
Y14 Real % of biggest companies' shares in market DataStream database 
capitalization London Stock Exchange 
Y15 Real % of biggest companies' shares in value traded DataStream database 
London Stock Exchange 
Y16 Real value of 10 biggest companies' shares DataStrearn database 
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(3/2/3) Study hypotheses 
This study depends on some underlying ecological and societal norms in the United 
Kingdom to proxy for the unobservable cultural variables, as depicted by Hofstede 
(1980). In light of the methodology of Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996), it is assumed 
that twenty indirect proxy variables can provide an estimation of these cultural values 
0 in the United Kingdom (Table 3.6). This assumption provides the basis for the first 
main null hypothesis, which is formulated as follows: 
"Power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, individuality and time 
horizon do not provide distinct dimensions for cultural values" 
The previous literature review, as explained in chapter two, has highlighted several 
indicators which are used to measure stock market development in a country. This 
study depends on several of these indicators such as: stock market activity, size, 
liquidity and concentration. These indicators are measured using sixteen empirical 
proxy variables. This study assumes that these indicators and their underlying proxy 
variables can provide estimation for the stock market development model in the 
United Kingdom. Consequently, the second main null hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
"Activity, size, liquidity and concentration do not provide distinct 
dimensions of stock market development". 
The third main null hypothesis is formulated to test the relationship between these 
cultural values (independent variables) and stock market development indicators 
(dependent variables), it states that: 
"There is no relationship between cultural values and stock market 
development indicators in the United Kingdom ". 
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To examine the third null hypothesis more effectively, thirteen alternative sub- 
hypotheses are formulated in light of previous empirical research, as follows (Table 
3.16): 
Table 3.16: The predicted relationships between cultural values and stock 
market development indicators based on previous empirical research. MA: 
market activity, MZ: market size, ML: market liquidity, MC: market 
concentration. Source: Gray, 1988, and Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996 
Stock market development indicators 
Cultural values MA Mz ML MC 
Power distance N/A N/A N/A +H(a) 
Uncertainty avoidance -H(b) -H(c) -H(d) +H(e) 
Individualism +H(f) +H(g) +H(h) -H(i) 
Masculinity + HO) + H(k) + H(1) - H(m) 
Time horizon N/A N/A N/A N/A 
a. Tbere is a positive relationship between power distance and stock market 
concentration. 
b. There is a negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance and stock 
market activity. 
c. There is a negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance and stock 
market size. 
d. There is a negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance and stock 
market liquidity. 
e. There is a positive relationship between uncertainty avoidance and stock 
market concentration. 
116 
f There is a positive relationship between individualism and stock market 
activity. 
g. There is a positive relationship between individualism and stock market size. 
h. There is a positive relationship between individualism and stock market 
liquidity. 
i. There is a negative relationship between individualism and stock market 
concentration. 
There is a positive relationship between masculinity and stock market activity. 
k. There is a positive relationship between masculinity and stock market size. 
1. There is a positive relationship between masculinity and stock market 
liquidity. 
m. There is a negative relationship between masculinity and stock market 
concentration. 
(3/2/4) Statistical techniques 
The linear structural relation (LISREL) software package (Version 8.72) by Joreskog 
and Sorbom (1993) is used to analyze the relationship between cultural values and 
stock market development. The general form of the LISREL model consists of two 
models: the measurement model and the structural equation model (SEM). This 
statistical analysis technique is the most suitable method to achieve the study 
objectives compared with other methods, such as the regression analysis and path 
analysis. The regression analysis technique allows only a small number of variables to 
be analyzed statistically at a time, which may be unhelpful when exploring unknown 
situations. By contrast, the path analysis technique allows for data analysis in one 
117 
direction only, this may ignore the importance of interrelationships among data 
variables. 
By contrast, the linear structure relation (LISREL) technique has several advantages 
which include: it helps to select the observed variables that make up latent constructs, 
it examines the relationships between constructs using structural equation modelling 
(SEM), and it has the advantages that it allows for testing all variables and constructs 
under consideration simultaneously in all directions (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
This section is ftirther divided into five sub-sections which are: data analysis strategy, 
measurement models, structural equation model, measures of models' overall fit, and 
finally detailed assessment of fit. This is as follows: 
(3/2/4/1)Data analysis strategy 
The statistical data analysis strategy in this study follows the "model generating 
approach" as suggested by Joreskog and Sorbom (1993, p. 128), and in light of the 
methodology of Suclarwan and Fogarty (1996). This is as follows: first, two initial 
theoretical models are identified; and each of them consists of several constructs or 
variables. The first model is based on Hofstede's cultural values (1980); while the 
other model is based on previous empirical research studies, concerning the stock 
market development indicators, in particular the work of Demirguc-kunt and Levine 
(1995). 
Second, a measurement model is estimated separately for each construct, then for 
each pair of constructs, combining them two by two. Then, two measurement models 
are estimated for all the constructs without constraining the covariance matrix of the 
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constructs. Finally, a structural equation model is estimated for the constructs jointly 
with the measurement models. This implies that the relationships in the theoretical 
model are translated into a statistical model for a set of stochastic equations among 
random observable indicators, and latent variables (theoretical constructs). Then, the 
model is estimated and tested using the maximum likelihood (ML) statistical method. 
ML estimates are computed through an iterative procedure that minimizes a particular 
fit function by successively improving the parameter. Several models are modified 
and tested to see if the initial model does not fit the empirical data well (Joreskog and 
Sorbom,. l 993, p. 116). 
Finally, an assessment and evaluation for every model estimated in step two are 
undertaken. The results of the structural equation analysis pass through three steps of 
assessment and valuation. First, output: parameter estimates are examined for any 
unreasonable value and/or anomalies. Second, several overall fit statistics are used to 
assess and evaluate the reliability and validity of the models. These statistics include: 
chi-square, standard errors, and t-values. Third, a detailed assessment of fit: statistics 
are implemented, such as standardized residuals and modification indices are used. 
The squared multiple correlation W) is used to measure the strength of each linear 
relationship in the model, the higher the value of Rý the stronger the relationships in 
the model and vice versa. Note that before starting the analysis, all the data-set has 
been reformulated to decimal numbers in order to create a uniform data-scale to 
facilitate comparisons and analysis (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993, p. 121). 
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(3/2/4/2)The measurement model 
The main purpose of the measurement model is to describe how well the observed 
variables serve as a measurement instrument for the latent variables. It measures the 
reliability and validity of the observed variables to represent the latent variables in the 
model (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993). nie measurement model represents the 
relationships between observable variables and the latent constructs of the model. 
Since these theoretical latent constructs are not directly observable; a number of 
observable variables are used to proxy for each dimension of each construct. 
A confirmatory factor analysis is used to test the measurement models in LISREL. In 
fact, there are two types of factor analysis: exploratory and confinnatory. The 
exploratory factor analysis helps to identify the most important characteristics and 
relationships in the data without imposing any exact model as a priori. The 
confirmatory analysis uses a similar statistical technique but it requires a specified 
initial model in advance based on some form of theoretical and/or empirical studies. 
This study depends on confirmatory factor analysis to explore the reliability and 
validity of the measurement models under consideration. These measurement models 
include constructs for culture-values based on a priori Hofstede's (1980) cultural 
dimension model, and for stock market development indicators in light of previous 
empirical research, in particular the work of Demirguc-kunt and Levine (1995). 
Confirmatory factor analysis computes measurement error through estimating 
regression loadings of a set of observed variables on latent variables. It starts with 
calculating a covariance matrix between the observed variables in the model. Then, 
this covariance matrix is used as an input to estimate the measurement models. The 
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hypothetical constrained models are compared to other unconstrained models for the 
inter-relationships between latent variables (constructs). The unconstrained models 
are used as a benchmark to measure the hypothetical constrained models. The 
& unconstrained models allow all relationships between variables in the model to be 
taken into consideration (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993). There are two measurement 
models in this study: the measurement model for cultural values and the measurement 
model for stock market development indicators. 
(A)Measurement model for cultural values 
A confirmatory factor analysis technique is used to identify the most'suitable culture- 
values model following Hofstede's culture-dimensions (1980,1982) (Figure: 3.1). 
This statistical analysis is based on the following equation (Joreskog and Sorborn, 
1993): 
X=Ax* 4+8 
Where: 
x: is aqxI vector of observed independent cultural variables 
Ax : is aqxn matrix of coefficients of the regression of X on 4 
Ksi (4) : is an nxI random vector of latent independent cultural variables 
Delta (8) : is aqxI vector of random measurement errors in X 
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Figure 3.1: Hypothesized model for the independent cultural variables, using Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA). (X) Observed variables, (4) is a vector of latent independent cultural 
variables, and (8) is a vector of random measurement errors in X. X1 is number of telephone 
lines, X2 is ratio of number of telephone lines to total population, X3 is total number of students' 
enrolment, X4 is ratio of total number of students' enrolment to total population, X5 is volume of 
transactions on stock market, X6 is real Fluctuations of foreign currency rate, X7 is real Gross 
Domestic Product, X8 is real Gross National Income, X9 is ratio of people living in cities to total 
population, X10 is Number of people living in cities, X11 is real Gross National Income, X12 is 
real Income per Capita, X13 is ratio of male employment to total employment, X14 is ratio of 
male students to total students in elementary schools, X15 is ratio of male students to total 
students in further education, X16 is ratio of male students to total students in higher education, 
X17 is real ratio of total spending on education to total budget, X18 is real total spending on 
education, X19 is real ratio of total gross fixed investment to GDP, X20 is real total gross fixed 
investment. Source: Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996 
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(B) Measurement model for stock market development indicators 
A confirmatory factor analysis technique is also used to identify the most suitable 
stock market development indicators model in the context of previous empirical 
research (Figure 3.2). This statistical analysis is based on the following equation 
(Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993): 
Y=Ay* n+e 
Where: 
y: is apxI vector of dependent observed stock market development 
variables. 
Ay : is apxm matrix of coefficients of the regression of Y on il 
Eta : is an m xI random vector of latent dependent stock market development 
indicators. 
Epsilon (e) : is apxI vector of random measurement errors in Y 
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Figure 3.2: Hypothesized model for the dependent stock market development indicators, using 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA): (Y) is observed stock market variables. (TI) is a random 
vector of latent dependent stock market development indicators, and (S) is a vector of random 
measurement errors in (Y). Y1 is real value of Trade, Y2 is volume of Trade, Y3 is number of 
Transactions, Y4 is real value of new issues including capital gains as % of trading value, Y5 is 
real value of new issues including capital gains as % of GDP, Y6 is real market capitalization, Y7 
is real market capitalization as a% of GDP, Y8 is volume of share listed, Y9 is volume of shares 
listed as % of listed companies, Y10 is number of listed companies, Y1 1 is real total value traded 
to market capitalization, Y12 is real total value traded to GDP, Y13 is volume of share traded as 
a% of volume of shares listed, Y14 is real % of biggest companies' shares in market 
capitalization, Y15 real % of biggest companies' shares in value traded, Y16 is real value of 10 
biggest companies' shares. 
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(3/2/4/3)The structural equation model 
The structure equation model (SEM) helps to show the causal relationships between 
the latent constructs, describe the causal effects, and assign the explained and 
unexplained variable. It is also used to examine the theoretical relationships between 
constructs. Two hypothetical constructs are formulated based on Hofstede's (1980) 
cultural values model, and previous empirical research on stock market development 
indicators. Then, a structural equation model is used to test the relationships between 
these constructs. Joreskog and Sorbom, (1993, p. 112) has mentioned that: "It is not 
expected that the relationships in the model are exact deterministic relationships". 
This means that in many situations the independent constructs will explain only a part 
of the co-variation in the dependent constructs, this may be due to several reasons 
such as missing observable variables unaccounted for in the model (Joreskog and 
Sorbom, 1993). 
A structural equation modeling (SEM) technique is used to construct a suitable causal 
model that links culture values and stock market development indicators, using 
LISREL software (Figure: 3.3). This statistical analysis is based on the following 
structural equation model (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993): 
'n =+ 
Where: 
il (Eta) : is an rn xI random vector of dependent latent stock market 
development indicators 
B (Gamma) : is an mxm matrix of coefficients of the il-variables in the structural 
relationship. 
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is an rn xn matrix of coefficients of the 4-variables in the structural 
relationship. 
4 (Ksi) : is an nxI random vector of independent latent cultural variables 
ý (Zeta) : is an mxI vector of equation errors (random disturbances) in the 
structure relationship between il and 4 
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Figure - 3.3: Hypothesized model for the relationship between cultural values and 
stock market development indicators, using Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM): (q) is a random vector of latent dependent stock market development 
indicators, (4) is a vector of latent independent cultural variables, and Q is a 
vector of equation errors (random disturbances) in the structural relationship 
between Tj and 4. 
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(3/2/4/4)Measures of model's overall fit 
There are several measures of the model's overall fit presented by LISREL output, the 
most popular of which is the chi-square measurement. Other measures are also used, 
all of them are originally functions of chi-square statistics, such as: goodness of fit 
index (GFI), adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), root mean square index (RMSI), 
chi-square/df, and squared multiple correlation (le). The following sub-sections 
present details of these measures (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993). 
(A)Chi-square 
It is a measure of overall fit of the model to the empirical data-set. It measures the 
deviance between the sample covariance matrix and the fitted covariance matrix. That 
is, it measures the deviance between the constrained (hypothesized) and the 
unconstrained model. A small value of chi-square indicates a good fit model and vice 
versa, while a zero chi-square indicates a perfect fit (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993). 
However, there are some disadvantages -of using chi-square alone as a measure of 
overall fit of the models. First, the chi-square measure depends on the number of 
parameters and sample size of the model. That is, it usually decreases by adding more 
parameters to the model. Consequently, the value of chi-square may be intentionally 
reduced by adding more parameters to the model. Therefore, this may lead to models 
which contain unjustified and difficult to interpret parameters. Second, the power of 
chi-square measure is unknown, which may increase the possibility of rejecting the 
null hypothesis. So, in order to overcome these problems other goodness of fit 
measures are used in this study, but note that all of them are still functions of chi- 
square (Joreskog and Sorborn, 1993, p, 124). 
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(B)Chi-square/df 
This measure of overall fit is calculated by dividing'the chi-square value by the 
degrees of freedom of the measurement model. This is a proposed solution which may 
reduce the impact of the number of parameters on the chi-square measure alone. As a 
general rule of thumb, a value of two or less for this measure may be considered 
acceptable (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
(C)Goodness of fit index (GFI) 
This measure is calculated by comparing the fit functions of the constrained and 
unconstrained models. A high GFI index means a high similarity between the 
functions, and a good fit model. However, this measure also depends, although not 
explicitly, on the number of parameters in the model. An adjusted goodness of fit 
index (AGFI) is recommended to overcome this problem (Joreskog and Sorbom, 
1993). 
(D)Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) 
This measure is calculated by adjusting the GFI index by the number of parameters in 
the model. This may help to exclude the impact of the parameters size on the measure. 
The goodness of fit measures GFI and AGFI should have a value between zero and 
one. As a general rule of thumb an AGF equal to or higher than 0.9 shows a good fit 
for the model (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). By contrast, a negative GFI and AGFI index 
means the worst model of all models is under consideration (Joreskog and Sorbom, 
1993). 
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(E)Root mean square residual (RMSR) 
I 
This measure calculates the measurement errors for all relationships in the model per 
degree of freedom. It measures the average of fitted residuals, which is the 
discrepancy between the elements of the original and the reproduced covariance 
matrices. The aggregated residuals are indexed in a statistical scale form, which range 
from zero to 1. Several researchers have suggested benchmarks for this measure. 
Browne and Cudeck (1993) have suggested that a value of 0.05 of errors represent a 
close fit. While, Joreskog and Sorbom (1993, p. 124) have argued that a value equal to 
0.08 or less represent an acceptable error. By contrast, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) 
have suggested that the RMSR value up to 0.1 is considered acceptable. 
(F)Coefficient of determination (CD) 
The coefficient of determination (CD) for the measurement model measures the 
explanatory power for observed variables X and Y for the variation in the latent 
constructs, while the coefficient of determination (CD) for the structure-equations 
model measures the explanatory power of the latent independent variables for the 
variation in the latent dependent variables. A high CD index indicates a high 
explanatory power of the relationships between variables and vice versa. As a general 
rule of thumb, a CD of 0.9 or higher is generally an acceptable explanatory power of 
the variables in the model (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
(3/2/4/5) Detailed assessment of fit 
Finally, the model residuals, standardized residuals, modification indices and 
expected change estimates are used to examine the detailed overall-fit of the model. 
These measures help to identify the reasons of model misspecification and to 
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recommend how to modify the model to fit the data better. Now it is time to turn to 
present the methodology for measuring the relationship between culture and corporate 
governance systems across countries in the next section. 
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(3/3) The relationship between cultural values and corporate governance 
I This study has been extended to investigate the relationship between culture values 
and corporate governance systems across countries. As mentioned earlier, cultural 
values are represented by Hofstede's (1980) cultural model, which consist of five 
dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity and 
time horizon. While, corporate governance systems are represented by eight systems 
which are: board size, separation of chair and CEO, independence per board, 
independent audit committee, remuneration disclosure, women on board, code of 
ethics and ethics systems. Cultural values are considered as the independent variables. 
Correspondingly, corporate governance systems are considered as the dependent 
variables. This section is further divided into four sub-sections, which are: 
identification and measurement of study variables, data sources, study hypothesis and 
statistical analysis. This is as follows: 
(3/3/1)ldentiflcation and measurement of study variables 
The corporate governance systems used in this study consists of eight variables as 
follows (Stephanie, 2005): 
(A)Board size 
Good corporate corporate governance practices in some countries usually provide 
only general guidance for the appropriate board size, and the exact number is left open 
for each company to decide based on for example company size and sector. By 
contrast, in other countries the minimum board size is predetermined by national law 
or listing requirements for stock markets. The Ethical Investment Research Services 
(EIRIS) (LTD) indices across countries show that New Zealand has the smallest 
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average board size of 7.2 directors, while Austria and Germany have the largest board 
I size of 18.1 and 22.1 directors respectively (Stephanie, 2005). 
(B) Separation of chairman and CEO 
Good governance practices usually advice the separation of chairman and CEO 
position. The idea behind this separation is to prevent a single individual to have 
unfettered powers of decision. The chainnan is usually responsibly for running the 
board, while the chief executive is usually responsible for running the company's 
business. In some countries, the corporate law requires the separation between the 
executive and non-executive managing directors such as in Sweden, while in other 
countries such as in Gennany the two-tier board structure ensures the separation of 
roles. The EIRIS indices show that the highest proportions of companies with 
separation chair and CEO, within a unitary board structure, are in Ireland and 
Luxemburg. In Australia, United Kingdom and New Zealand over 95% of companies 
separate the roles. This compares with just fewer than 25% of companies in the U. S. 
and just over 50% of companies in Japan (Stephanie, 2005). 
(C)Board independence 
Recent good corporate governance practices have focused on the proportion of 
independent directors on the corporate board. The existence of independent directors 
on the board usually enhances the decision-making process, maintain accountability 
and transparency. The EIRIS indices show that a high percentage of independent 
directors on the board are found in Switzerland, Canada and U. S., while a low 
percentage is found in Germany and Austria (Stephanie, 2005). 
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(D)Audit committee 
The main responsibilities of an independent audit committee are usually to monitor 
and review the financial statements, the internal financial controls, the external 
auditors' independence and objectivity, and the effectiveness of the audit process. The 
EIRIS indices show that the independence of the audit committee varies considerably 
across countries. For example the percentage of companies with majority independent 
audit committee is approximately 50% in Norway, 56% in Sweden, and 
approximately above 95% in the U. K, Netherlands, Canada, U. S., Ireland and 
Luxemburg, in contrast to only 4% of companies in Japan (Stephanie, 2005). 
(E)Remuneration disclosure 
Remuneration disclosure means the disclosure of the CEO's salary, or the salaries of 
all directors individually or as a whole. Good corporate governance practices advice 
that remuneration should be linked to corporate and individual performance. The 
EIRIS indices show that the lowest remuneration disclosure is found in Greece and 
Japan with only 58% and 44% of companies discloses remuneration to public 
respectively (Stephanie, 2005). 
(F)Women on board 
The presence of more women on corporate board increases the diversity of the 
backgrounds, skills and experience of board members, which may increase the 
effectiveness of decision-making process. The EIRIS indices show that Norway and 
Sweden have the highest percentages of 26% and 20% of board members on average 
respectively. In contrast, Japan has the lowest percentage of women on board of only 
0.4% of board members (Stephanie, 2005). 
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(G)Code of ethics 
Some good corporate governance practices require companies to adopt and disclosure 
a code of business conduct and ethics for directors, officers and employees. The 
EIRIS indices show that the highest percentage of companies with basic ethics 
policies is found in Finland and Netherlands. By contrast, Hong Kong and Singapore 
have the lowest percentages of less than 25% of companies (Stephanie, 2005). 
(H)Ethics systems 
A good corporate governance system demands the existence of management systems 
to support the enforcement of codes of ethics. These systems can improve standards 
of corporate governance, ethics, transparency and integrity. The EIRIS indices show 
that the U. K. has 86.4% of companies have a basic management systems, by contrast 
Luxemburg have 0% of companies with management systems (Stephanie, 2005). 
135 
(3/3/l/1) Descriptive statistics for corporate governance systems indices 
The detailed descriptive statistics have been calculated for all the corporate 
governance systems' indices used in this study (Table 3.17). The results show that the 
majority of variables vary considerably across time; in addition the majority of the 
skewness and kurtosis analysis results are within the acceptable limits. 
Table 3.17: Descriptive statistics for the dependent corporate governance 
systems indices across countries. Yl is board size, Y2 is separation of chair and 
CEO, Y3 is independence per board, Y4 is audit committee, Y5 is remuneration 
disclosure, Y6 is women on board, Y7 is code of ethics and Y8 is ethics systems. 
Source: Study research analysis using SPSS software package (Version 14.00) 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Skewness Kurtosis Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Yl 24 7.20 22.80 13.02 3.45 . 862 . 472 1.50 . 918 
Y2 24 24.90 100.00 81.26 20.80 -1.099 . 472 . 603 . 918 
Y3 24 1.50 81.30 42.58 21.55 -. 319 . 472 -. 428 . 918 
Y4 24 4.10 100.00 68.97 26.71 -. 869 . 472 . 313 . 918 
YS 24 44.10 100.00 90.94 15.21 -1.983 . 472 3.364 . 918 
Y6 24 . 60 26.20 7.96 5.81 1.669 . 472 3.498 . 918 
Y7 24 . 00 100.00 63.43 24.26 -. 859 . 472 . 782 . 918 
Y8 24 . 00 86.40 55.49 21.77 -1.226 . 472 1.314 . 918 
Valid N 24 Oistwise) 
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(3/3/2) Data sources 
As mentioned above, corporate governance indices are collected from the Ethical 
Research Services (EIRIS, LTD., U. K. ). The EIRIS is an independent, non-profit 
organization. Their core business is to conduct research into corporate environmental 
social and governance management and performance. They offer data on more than 
sixty research areas for some 2800 companies in Europe, North America and Asia 
pacific. The indices used in this study are calculated using 1600 medium and large 
size companies on the FTSE all world developed index in twenty four developed 
economies around the world as on year 2005. They provide a global picture of 
corporate governance practice in Western Europe, North America and Asia pacific. 
(3/3/3)Study hypotheses 
t The relationship between cultural values and corporate governance systems is tested 
using the following main fourth null hypothesis, which states that: 
"There is no significant relationship between cultural values and corporate 
governance systems across countries" 
This main fourth null hypothesis is further divided into eight alternative sub- 
hypotheses which states that: 
a. There is a relationship between cultural values and "board size". 
b. There is a relationship between cultural values and "separation of chair and CEO". 
c. There is a relationship between cultural values and "independence per board". 
d. There is a significant relationship between cultural values and "audit committee". 
e. There is a relationship between cultural values and "remuneration disclosure". 
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f There is a relationship between cultural values and "women on board". 
g. There is a relationship between cultural values and "ethics code". 
h. There is a relationship between cultural values and "ethics systems". 
(3/3/4)Statistical techniques 
A variety of regression analysis techniques are implemented to investigate the 
relationship between cultural values and corporate governance systems across 
countries, using the SPSS and E-views statistical software packages. This is as 
follows: first, a preliminary data analysis is conducted. Second, the multiple 
regression analysis for the full model is used to test the study variables. Third, the 
stepwise regression analysis model is implemented to reduce the number of variables 
and to eliminate the impact of any multicollinearity between the independent 
variables. Fourth, the weighted least square (WLS) model is implemented to 
overcome the problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals. Finally, several steps of 
assessment and valuation are undertaken for each regression model to insure 
reliability and validity of results. 
(3/3/4/1)Preliminary data analysis 
At the beginning of the analysis, the data set are screened, using descriptive statistics 
in SPSS software package, to understand the type and distribution of data underhand, 
and to determine the most suitable statistical analysis techniques. This preliminary 
data analysis includes tests of normality distribution and cross-coffelation matrixes. 
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(3/3/4/2) Multiple regression models . 
The multiple regression analysis is used to identify the relationship between the 
independent cultural variables and several dependent corporate governance variables. 
This model describes how well the independent variables serve as a measurement 
instrument for the dependent variables. That is, the model measures the reliability and 
validity of the independent variables to represent the dependent variables in the 
model. The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the values of the 
parameters and to fit the data using SPSS statistical software package. The generic 
I 
form the multiple regression models is as follows (Greene, 2002): 
yi " PI Xil + P2 Xi2 ++ Pk Xik + ei 
Where: 
Y= dependent variable 
independent or explanatory variable 
i= indexes the n sample observations 
P= coefficient for independent variable 
e= random disturbance 
(3/3/4/3) Stepwise multiple regression analysis 
The stepwise multiple regression analysis is used to identify the best group of 
independent variables that explains the variability of dependent variable and to 
overcome the problem of multicollinearity, using the SPSS statistical software 
package. That is, if a strong relationship between some independent variables is 
discovered, this analysis is applied to get ride of some independent variables from the 
regression function without adding value to the coefficient of determination (R2). 
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However, some economists have argued that this technique may result in reducing the 
study model to a great extend and may cancel out some important explanatory 
variables. Further, deleting relevant variables may introduce omitted variable bias, 
since changes in specification may introduce big changes to the results. Therefore, 
this method should be implemented with great caution. 
(3/3/4/4) Weighted least squares regression (WLS) 
The standard linear regression analysis assumes constant variance within the 
population under study. If this assumption is violated, for example, when cases that 
are high on some attributes show more variability than cases that are low on that 
attribute, the linear regression analysis using ordinary least square method (OLS) will 
not provide optimal estimates, because the least squares give equal weight to all 
observations. In this case, the weighted least square method is considered more 
efficient than simply applying least squares method, because this method implies that 
observations with smaller variances receive a larger weight in the computations of the 
sums and therefore have greater influence in the estimates obtained and vice versa. 
(3131415) Testing the study models 
The efficiency of the results of the ordinary least squares regression analysis 
techniques depend to a great extent on the existence of certain assumptions (Gauss- 
Markov conditions and theorem), which are: (1) The data obtained constitute a 
random sample from a well defined population. (2) The population model is linear, 
which means that the relationship between the dependent variables and each 
independent variable are linear. (3) The error term has a zero expected value. (4) The 
independent variables are linearly independent. (5) The error term has constant 
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variance (Abdi, Heive, 2003). Consequently, the ordinary least square multiple 
regression models are subject to an assessment and review process to assess the 
validity of the results. This process involves several statistical methods to test the 
following aspects: 
(A) Normality of the distribution 
The skewness and kurtosis tests are conducted for data distribution using descriptive 
statistics option in SPSS statistical software package. Normal distributions usually 
have kurtosis equal to three. A value more than three indicates a leptokurtic 
distribution, while values lower than three indicates platykurtic distributions. Further, 
nonnally distributed data should have zero skewness. 
(B) Multicollinearity of independent variables 
The multiple regression analysis assumes that the impact of each independent variable 
is separate from the other variables. The multicollinarity problem means that there are 
strong relationships between the independent variables. The overall fit of the equation 
will not be affected by the multicollinearity, and any variables that are not involved in 
the multicollinearity are not affected. Multicollinearity introduces no bias to the 
estimated coefficients, but it causes their standard errors to be inflated and 
consequently decrease their t-statistics. Also, multicollinearity causes the estimated 
coefficients to be more sensitive to the specification of the variables involved. Note 
that the t-statistics are the ratio of the estimated coefficient to its standard error, while 
the standard errors are the estimates of the true standard deviations of the ordinary 
least square (OLS) estimators. Several statistical methods are implemented to test for 
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this problem using the SPSS statistical software such as the cross-correlation matrix 
and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). 
The cross-correlation matrix shows the relationship among the independent variables. 
There are different views about the limit at which this relationship is considered high. 
Some researchers have argued that a strong relationship between two independent 
variables exists if correlation is equal or more than 0.80 (Clark and Schkade, 1974), 
while others show doubts about a strong relationship at 0.70 or more (Gunst and 
Mason, 1980). 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is used to investigate the multicollinearity 
problem between independent variable. The VIF shows the degree of the variables to 
explain variability in one independent variable itself. A VIF coefficient of I means no 
multicollinearity, while a coefficient of more than 5 indicates a multicolinarty 
problem. Other researchers have argued that multicolinarity exists only over the level 
of 10. A tolerance of less than 0.1 indicates a multicollinearity problem. The VIF is 
measured as follows: 
Tolerance = 1-W 
VIF = l/Tolerance 
(C) Autocorrelation of residuals 
The regression analysis model assumes that the resulting residuals (errors) are 
randomly distributed. Autocorrelation refers to a pattern in the model residuals 
whereby the value of a residual is related to its Preceding value. Autocorrelation of the 
residuals may result in invalid tests for statistical significance (i. e. upward bias in 
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estimates of the statistical significance of coefficient estimates such as the t-statistics) 
and unduly high coefficient of determination, W (Silver, 1996). Note that the problem 
of autocorrelation (sometimes called serial correlation) is more common with time- 
series analysis than in cross-section analysis. The Durbin-Watson (D-W) test statistic 
is used to test for the presence of first order autocoffelation using the SPSS statistical 
software package. The D-W test statistics coefficient usually lies between 0 and 4.0. 
As a rule of thumb, a D-W coefficient of 2.00 indicates no serial correlation in a series 
of residuals. Correspondingly, D-W values lower than 2.00 indicate a positive 
correlation between the residuals. By contrast, a D-W coefficient of more than 2.00 
indicates a negative correlation. 
(D) Heteroscedasticity of residuals (errors) 
The multiple regression models assume that the variance of the residuals is constant. 
This means that the variance of the distribution of the dependent variable should be 
constant for all values of the independent variable. The problem of heteroscedasticity 
occurs when the variance is not constant across observations (Silver, 1996). 
Heteroscedasticity is most commonly associated with cross-section data analysis; 
although a time series model can also have a non-constant variance. This problem 
will not affect the coefficient estimates, but it will result in biased standard errors and 
thus f-tests and Wests will be unreliable. 
To test for the existence for this problem scatter plots are first used to explore the 
relationships between the estimated residuals and the predicted values of the 
regression models. Data points should be scattered randomly along the centre of the 
plot without showing any sign of a pattern consistent with a non-constant variance. In 
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addition, the Goldfeld-Quandt test statistic is used to test for the existence of 
heterosccdasticity, using the E-views statistical software package, whereby the data 
set is sorted in descending order according to one of the independent variables and the 
data is split in half Tben, the regression analysis is conducted on each half of the data 
and a formal hypothesis test is conducted to test for existence of heteroscedasticity. 
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CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS FOR 
CULTURAL VALUES AND STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
The main aim of this chapter is to present the detailed statistical analytical procedures 
and results for the relationship between cultural values and stock market development 
indicators in the United Kingdom, during the period 1990-2004. In this context, this 
chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section outlines the general 
statistical analytical procedures of this study. The second section describes the 
preliminary data analysis undertaken to prepare the data-set. The third section 
I presents the measurement models for the independent cultural values and for the 
dependent stock market development indicators. The fourth section presents the 
structural equation models (SEM) for the relationship between cultural values and 
stock market development indicators. Finally, the fifth section concludes with a 
summary of results. 
(411) Statistical Procedures 
The statistical analytical procedures start with a preliminary data analysis using 
descriptive statistics. The purpose of this analysis is to identify the main 
characteristics of the longitudinal data-set under consideration using SPSS statistical 
software package (Version 14.0). This process will help to identify suitable statistical 
analysis techniques to overcome any problems in the data-set. As a result, several 
transformations are undertaken to prepare the data-set for the desired statistical 
analysis. 
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Afterwards, the structure equation modelling (SEM) is implemented using the linear 
structural relations (LISREL) statistical software package (Version 8.72) by Joreskog 
and Sorbom (1993). The general form of the LISREL analysis consists of two models: 
the measurement model and the structural equation model (SEM). The measurement 
model represents the relationships between observable proxy variables and their latent 
constructs. Whereas, the structure-equation model (SEM) shows the relationships 
between the Iatent constructs of different models. 
A model generating approach is undertaken, as suggested by Sudarwan and Fogarty 
(1996), to analyze the empirical longitudinal data-set for the United Kingdom. Two 
measurement models are formulated and tested to represent cultural values and stock 
market development indicators. Then, an assessment and evaluation for every model 
estimated is undertaken to choose the best fit models. Finally, some structural 
equation models are estimated jointly for the measurement models. 
(4/2) Preliminary data analysis 
A preliminary data analysis is undertaken using several descriptive statistics to 
prepare the data for the desired statistical analytical process. As a result, several 
statistical transformations are undertaken on the data-set, which include: first, all 
study variables have been transformed to a uniform scale. That is, all integer numbers 
have been transformed to decimal numbers that range from 0 to 1. This process 
usually facilitates comparisons across variables and increases the reliability of results. 
Second, all monetary variables are deflated using the United Kingdom consumer price 
index (CPI) for the period 1990 to 2004 to avoid spurious results. Third, all the 
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variables have been transformed using square root and first difference to increase the 
linearity of the models and to remove any trends in the data-set respectively. Fourth, 
all study variables have been normalized using the "normal variable" option in the 
LISREL software to satisfy the statistical analysis requirements. 
Finally, the augrnented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test statistic is performed using E-views 
statistical software package (Version 3.1) to test for stationarity in the data set (see 
Omran, M. MA., 1999). On one hand, test results show that most of the independent 
cultural variables are stationary at first difference level (Table 4.1), except for three 
variables. The variable X5 is stationary at the second difference level, while the 
variables X9 and X13 are stationary at level zero (Appendix 1). Consequently, the 
variables which are stationary at first difference level are kept as they are, while the 
variable X5 is re-entered into the data set in first difference. By contrast, the variables 
X9 and X13 are cancelled from the analysis. 
147 
Table 4.1: The augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test statistic (ADF) for the independent 
cultural variables. XI is number of telephone lines, X2 is ratio of number of telephone lines to 
total population, X3 is total number of students' enrolment, X4 is ratio of total number of 
students' enrolment to total population, X5 is volume of transactions on stock market, X6 is real 
Fluctuations of foreign currency rate, X7 is real Gross Domestic Product, X8 is real Gross 
National Income, X9 is ratio of people living in cities to total population, X10 is Number of people 
living in cities, XI I is real Gross National Income, X12 is real Income per Capita, X13 is ratio of 
male employment to total employment, X14 is ratio of male students to total students in 
elementary schools, X15 is ratio of male students to total students in further education, X16 is 
ratio of male students to total students in higher education, X17 is real ratio of total spending on 
education to total budget, X18 is real total spending on education, X19 is real ratio of total gross 
fixed investment to GDP, X20 is real total gross fixed investment 
Source: Study analysis results using E-views software (Version 3.1) 
Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root 
Independent variables test statistics (ADF) 
Zero First Second 
Power Distance (PDI) 
xi Lag 0 
X2 Lag 0,1,2 
X3 Lag 0 
X4 Lag 0,1,2 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAV) 
X5 Lag 0 
X6 Lag 0 
X7 Lag 0 
xg Lag 0 
Individualism (IND) 
X9 Lag 0,1,2 
X10 Lag 0 
X11 Lag 0 
X12 Lag 0 
Masculinity (MAS) 
X13 Lag 0 
X14 Lag 0 
Xis Lag 0 
X16 Lag 0 
Time Orientation (TOI) 
X17 Lag 0 
X18 Lag 0 
X19 Lag 0 
X20 Lag 0 
On the other hand, the augmented Dickey Fuller test results show that some of the 
dependent stock market development indicators are stationary at the first difference 
level, while others are stationary at second difference level (Table 4.2). The variables 
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Yl, Y2, Y6, Y7, Y14, Y15 and Y16, which are stationary at first level, are kept as 
they are. By contrast, the rest of the variables Y3, Y4, YS, Y8, Y9, Y 10, Y 11, Y 12 
and Y13, which are stationary at second difference level, are re-entered into the data 
set after taking their first difference, to achieve stationarity at first level for all 
variables (Appendix 2). 
Table 4.2: The augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test statistic (ADF) for the dependent stock 
market development indicators. Y1 is real value of Trade, Y2 is volume of Trade, Y3 is number of 
Transactions, Y4 is real value of new issues including capital gains as % of trading value, Y5 is 
real value or new issues including capital gains as % of GDP, Y6 is real market capitalization, Y7 
is real market capitalization as a% of GDP, Y8 is volume of share listed, Y9 is volume of shares 
listed as % of listed companies, YIO is number of listed companies, Y11 is real total value traded 
to market capitalization, Y12 is real total value traded to GDP, Y13 is volume of share traded as 
a% of volume of shares listed, Y14 is real % of biggest companies' shares in market 
capitalization, Y15 real % of biggest companies' shares in value traded, Y16 is real value of 10 
biggest companies' shares. Source: Study analysis results using E-views software (Version 3.1) 
Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root 
Dependent Variables test Statistic (ADF) 
Level First Second 
Market Activity 
Yl Lag 0 
Y2 Lag 0 
Y3 Lag 0 
Y4 Lag 0 
Y5 Lag 0 
Market Size 
Y6 Lag 0 
Y7 Lag 0 
Y3 Lag 0 
Y9 Lag 0 
Y10 Lag 0 
Market Liquidity 
Yll Lag 0 
Y12 Lag 0 
Y13 Lag 0 
Market Concentration 
Y14 Lag 0 
Yls Lag 0 
Y16 Lag 0 
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(48) The measurement models 
In this section, two separate measurement models are constructed using the LISREL 
statistical software package (Version 8.72) for the independent cultural values and the 
dependent stock market development indicators, detailed below. 
(41311) The measurement model for cultural values 
The measurement model for cultural values is identified using a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA). The cultural values, as suggested by Hofestede (1980,1983), consist 
of five constructs, which are: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individuality, 
masculinity and time horizon. A model generating approach is conducted following 
the methodology of Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) and Noravesh et al. (2005); 
whereby, the five constructs of cultural values are compared in alternative models. 
That is, the hypothesized one factor measurement model of cultural values is tested 
against the two, three, four and five factor models. The purpose of these comparisons 
is to identify the most suitable model that better fits the data-set (See Appendices 3,4, 
5,6, and 7). 
The five measurement models along with their goodness of fit statistics are shown in 
Table 4.3. Test results reveal that the three factor model is considered the best fit 
model compared to the other alternative models. This model consists of three latent 
independent constructs, which are: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and 
individuality. In general, the model has the lowest score of chi-square/df of 1.16, the 
lowest root mean square residual (RMSR) index of . 036, the best goodness of fit 
index (GFI) and adjusted goodness of fit (AGFI) index of 0.95 and 0.90 respectively. 
The model also has the best normed fit index (NFI) and non-normed fit index (NNFI) 
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of 0.993 and 0.997 respectively. Therefore, the three factor model is considered the 
best fit model for cultural values (Figure 4.1). 
Indeed, the three factor measurement model for cultural values shows good fit 
statistics in comparison with the general acceptable goodness of fit benchmarks. The 
ratio of chi-square/df of 1.16 is lower than the acceptable level of 2.00, as suggested 
by Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996). The root mean square residual (RMSR) of 0.036 is 
lower than the 0.100 level, as suggested by Kalbers and Fogarty (1993). The goodness 
of fit index (GFI) and the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) scores of 0.95 and 
0.90, respectively, are higher than the general acceptable rule of thumb of 0.90 levels, 
as suggested by Bagozzi and Yi (1988). In addition, the normed fit index (NFI) and 
the non-normed fit index (NNFI) of 0.993 and 0.999, respectively, are also higher 
than the general rule of thumb of 0.80. Therefore, this model is considered the best fit 
model for the purpose of this study. 
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Figure 4.1: The three factor measurement model for cultural values. Unidirectional arrows indicate 
parameters' estimates (equivalent to regression coefficients). Bidirectional arrows indicate error 
covariance (equivalent to square multiple correlations). XI is number of telephone lines, X2 is ratio of 
number of telephone lines to total population, X3 is total number of students' enrolment, X4 is ratio of 
total number of students' enrolment to total population, X6 is real Fluctuations of foreign currency 
rate, X7 is real Gross Domestic Product, X8 is real Gross National Income, XIO is Number of people 
liN ing in cities, XI I is real Gross National Income, X12 is real Income per Capita. Sq is square root. 
Pdi is power distance, uae is uncertainty avoidance, ind is individuality. Source: Study analysis results 
using LISREL software package (Version 8.72) 
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However, other test results indicate high correlation coefficients among the 
independent latent cultural values constructs (See Appendix 5). For example there is a 
significant positive relationship between individuality and the proxy variables for 
power distance. Since the proxy variables of power distance are predicted to have a 
negative relationship with the "power distance" cultural value, it can be concluded 
that there is a negative relationship between individuality and power distance. This 
problem of multicollinearity between the independent cultural values is going to be 
dealt with in subsequent sections by using the uni-dimensional structural equation 
models. 
Further analysis of the three factors measurement model of cultural values shows that 
most of the underlying ten observable proxy variables have significant relationships 
with the three latent independent constructs of cultural values (Table 4.4). Most of 
the parameters' estimates (Lambda) have significant t-values of more than the 
benclunark 1.96 at the 0.95 confidence level, but not the independent proxy variable 
sqx6 which has insignificant t-values at the 0.95 confidence level. In addition, the 
measurement errors (Tbeta Delta) for most of the observable proxy independent 
variables have very low values almost near to zero. Therefore, the first null hypothesis 
("b") 0 which states that: "Power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individuality, 
masculinity and time horizon do not represent distinct dimensions of cultural values" 
is not rejected. 
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(4/3/2) The measurement model for stock market development indicators 
The measurement model for stock market development indicators is identified using a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The stock market development indicators, in light 
of the work by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1995), consist of four constructs, which 
are: stock market activity, size, liquidity, and concentration. A model generating 
approach is conducted following the methodology of Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) 
and Noravesh et al. (2005), whereby, the four constructs of stock market development 
indicators are compared in alternative models. That is, the hypothesized one factor 
measurement model of stock market development is tested against the two, three and 
four factor models. The purpose of these comparisons is to identify the most suitable 
model that better represents the data-set (See Appendix 8,9,10,11). The goodness of 
fit statistics of the four measurement models for the stock market development 
indicators are shown in Table (4.5). 
Test results reveal that the two factor model has the best goodness of fit statistics 
compared to the other alternative models. This model consists of two constructs, 
which are: stock market activity and size. In general, this model has the lowest score 
of chi-square/df of 5.73, the lowest root mean square residual (RMSR) of 0.195, the 
best goodness of fit index (GFI) and adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) of 0.85 
and 0.65 respectively, the highest nonned fit index (NFI) and non-normed fit index 
(NNFI) indices of 0.90 and 0.84 respectively. Therefore, the two factor model is 
considered the best fit model for stock market development indicators (Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2: The two factor measurement model for stock market development indicators. Unidirectional 
arrows indicate parameters' estimates (equivalent to regression coefficients). Bidirectional arrows 
indicate error covariance (equivalent to square multiple correlations). VI is real value of Trade, V2 is 
volume of Trade, Y3 is number of Transactions, V5 is real value of new issues including capital gains as 
% of GDP, V6 is real market capitalization, V7 is real market capitalization as a %, of GD11, V8 is 
volume of share listed, Y9 is volume of shares listed as % of listed companies. dsq is first difference and 
square root. Act is market activity, size is market size. Source: Study analysis results using LISREL 
software package (Version 8.72) 
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However, the two factor measurement model of stock market development indicators 
may not be considered a perfect fitting model for the following reasons (Appendix 9): 
first, the chi-square/df score of 5.73 is considerably higher than the acceptable level of 
2.00, as suggested by Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996). Second, the root mean square 
residual (RMSR) score of 0.19 is higher than the acceptable benchmark of 0.100, as 
suggested by Kalbers and Fogarty (1993). Finally, both the goodness of fit statistic 
(GFI) and the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) scores are considerably lower 
than the general accepted rule of thumb of 0.90 level, as suggested by Bagozzi and Yi 
(1988). Nevertheless, the two factor model is still considered the best available fit 
model for the purpose of this study. Therefore, the second null hypothesis (Ho) which 
states that: "Activity, size, liquidity and concentration do not represent distinct 
dimensions of stock market development indicators" is not rejected. 
Further analysis of the two factor measurement model of the stock market 
dcvclopment indicators; show that all the cight. obscrvable proxy variablcs of stock 
market development indicators have significant relationships with the stock market 
activity and size (Table 4.6). All of the t-values are significant at the 0.95 confidence 
level. The measurement errors (Tbeta Epsilon) for all of the proxy variables are 
almost equal to zero. The squared multiple correlations for some proxy variables are 
above or close to the acceptable level of 0.90, as suggested by $udarwan and Fogarty 
(1996). 
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Table 4.6: The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for the two factor measurement model of 
stock market development indictors: Goodness of fit statistics. Lambda is the parameters, 
estimates. T-values are the ratio between the parameter estimate and its standard error. Theta 
Epsilon is an estimate of the measurement error in the Y variables. (**) indicate results are 
significant at 0.95 confidence level. (R 2) means squared multiple correlations. Y1 is real value of 
Trade, Y2 is volume of Trade, Y3 is number of Transactions, Y5 is real value of new issues 
including capital gains as % of GDP, Y6 is real market capitalization, Y7 is real market 
capitalization as a% of GDP, Y8 is volume of share listed, Y9 is volume of shares listed as % of 
listed companies. dsq is first difference and square root. Source: study analysis results using 
LISREL software package (Version 8.72). 
Dependent 
Variables 
Lambda T-value Theta 
Epsilon 
R2 
Market Activity (Act) 
Y1 0.0550 12.85** 0.0006 0.82 
Y2 0.0760 9.88** 0.0042 0.58 
dsqY3 0.0005 9.42** 0.0000 0.54 
dsqY5 0.0015 2.15** 0.0000 0.38 
Market Size (SIZ) 
Y6 0.0190 15.46** 0.0000 0.98 
Y7 0.0270 15.71 ** 0.0000 0.99 
dsqY8 -0.0011 -5.39** 0.0000 0.21 
dsqYg -. 0003 -5.77** 0.0000 0.24 
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(4/4)The structure equation models 
In the previous section two separate measurement models are identified for both 
cultural values and stock market development indicators. This section presents the 
structural equation models for the relationship between the measurement models of 
cultural values and stock market development indicators. This is as follows: 
(4/4/1) The uni-dimensional structural equation models 
The uni-dimensional structural equation models are used to identify the relationship 
between each cultural value and the stock market development indicators. These 
models are undertaken to overcome the problem of multicollinearity among the 
independent variables. The independent cultural values measurement model consists 
of three latent constructs, which are: power distance, uncertainly avoidance, and 
individuality. By contrast, the dependent stock market development indicators 
measurement model consists of two latent constructs, which are: stock market activity 
and size. Consequently, three uni-dimensional models are constructed in the following 
context. 
(4/4/1/1) Power distance and stock market development indicators 
The uni-dimensional structural equation model is implemented to highlight the 
relationships between power distance and stock market development indicators. The 
stock market development indicators measurement model includes two constructs, 
which are: stock market activity and size (Figure 4.3). In general, test results show a 
chi-sq/df of 7.3 1, which is relatively higher than the acceptable level of 2.00, as 
suggested by $udarwan and Fogarty (1996). The root mean square residual (RMSR) 
has a value of 0.225 which is higher than the acceptable benchmark of 0.100, as 
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suggested by Kalbers and Fogarty (1993). The goodness of fit index (GFI) and the 
adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) of 0.6725 and 0.4891 respectively, are 
relatively low compared to the general acceptable rule of thumb of 0.90, as suggested 
0 
by Bagozzi and Yi (1988) (Appendix 12). 
Table 4.7: The uni-dimensional structure equation model for the relationship 
between power distance and stock market development indicators. T-values are 
in parenthesis. (***) indicate results are significant at 0.99 confidence level. 
Source: Study analysis results using LISREL software package (Version 8.72). 
Latent independent Latent dependent 
Variables variables 
Market Market 
Activity (q, ) Size (T,, ) 
Power Distance 0.8301*** 0.8720*** 
(9.8943) (13.0219) 
Errorvar 0.3109 0.2397 
(5.6393) (8.7306) 
Squared multiple correlation (R2) 0.6891 0.7603 
Further analysis of the uni-dimensional structural equation model shows that the 
proxy variables of power distance have a significant positive relationship with stock 
market activity (Table 4.7). The regression coefficient has a value of 0.8301 and t- 
value of 9.8943 at the 0.99 confidence level. However, the proxy variables of power 
distance are predicted to have a negative relationship with the "power distance" 
cultural value. As a result, it can be concluded that there is a significant negative 
relationship between power distance and stock market activity (Table 4.8). This 
means that an increase in power distance is usually associated with a decrease in stock 
market activity and vice versa. 
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Table 4.8: The relationships between stock market activity and proxy variables 
of power distance 
Stock market activity Proxy variables Power distance 
of power distance 
Positive (+) Positive (+) Negative (-) 
Similarly, test results show that the proxy variables of power distance have a 
significant positive relationship with stock market size. The regression coefficient has 
a value of 0.8720 and t-value of 13.021 at the 0.99 confidence level (Table 4.7). 
However, the proxy variables of power distance are predicted to have a negative 
relationship with the "power distance" cultural value. As a result, it can be concluded 
that thdre is a negative relationship between power distance and stock market size 
(Table 4.9). This means that an increase in power distance is usually associated with a 
decrease in stock market size and vice versa. 
Table 4.9: The relationships between stock market size and proxy variables of 
power distance 
Stock Market Size Proxy variables Power Distance 
of power distance 
Positive (+) , Positive (+) Negative (-) 
163 
.2 -Z -M ý- W ý- -19 
6. =- -0 -M -0 L- 
.6MAQm .4 
"0 0 
f-- C: 6 .- -0 
ct r. W) 
1. r- Q. ý om-= 
- 0, $. 1 
. ri E -;; >. 10 10 m=--0'., ý - . - 
04 
F--EI -- 0 -0 ý: m (1) 
= ;G-c0. qý 0 
(31 .Et. - U 
.-W; a t", 
"= ; 0. -0 *7 
= &M - 
Eý=m 
un 
Loý Cj 
I. T. 
cj 4.0 X==-0-, = 0 C. r- M ;ý .j E 
ý4 
0 
rl 
0 
_0 
Lo -4 I. N oM 'd. C) ý OD 0 C) 0 
000 LD 
00 ca) (D 
0000 
0000 
0.00 
Oo (n >1 >1 cr cr 0) (n ID -0 
C) 
V00 
0 (Ij N0 
000 
oo 
() r 
co OD 
Lo 
LD VW 
NN 
000 
o, 
xxx 
EY ZY ZY 
(f) W (0 
-T- --T- --I- -I- 
1000 0000 0000 0.0 0. 
000 
164 
Ln 
CA 
N 
I 0 CD 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-1 
1]W 
I 0 LO 
11 
44 
-0 
Li) 
U-) 
4:: 
U 
(4/4/1/2) Uncertainty avoidance and stock market development indicators 
The uni-dimensional structural equation model is implemented to highlight the 
relationships between uncertainty avoidance and stock market development 
indicators. The stock market development indicators measurement model includes 
two constructs, which are: stock market activity and size (Figure 4.4). In general, test 
results show a chi-sq/df of 7.22, which is relatively higher than the acceptable level of 
2.00, as suggested by Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996). The root mean square residual 
(RMSR) has a value of 0.223, which is higher than the acceptable benchmark of 
0.100, as suggested by Kalbers and Fogarty (1996). The goodness of fit index (GFI) 
and the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) of 0.698 and 0.515 respectively, are 
relatively low compared to the general acceptable rule of thumb of 0.90, as suggested 
by Bagozzi and Yi (1988) (Appendix 13). 
Table 4.10: The uni-dimensional structure equation model for the relationship 
between uncertainty avoidance and stock market development indicators. 
T-values are in parenthesis. (***) indicate results are significant at 0.99 
confidence level. Source: Study analysis results using LISREL software package 
(Version 8.72). 
Latent dependent 
Latent independent variables 
Variables Market Market 
Activity Size 
Uncertainty avoidance 0.2809*** 0.8882*** 
(2.97) (12.9072) 
Market size 0.6131*** 
(6.62) 
Errorvar 0.2393 0.2112 
(6.8187) (7.9313) 
Squared multiple correlation (R2) 0.7607 0.7888 
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Further analysis for the uni-dimensional structural equation model shows that (Table 
4.10) the proxy variables of uncertainty avoidance have a significant positive 
relationship with stock market activity. The regression coefficient has a value of 
0.2809 and t-value of 2.97 at the 0.99 confidence level. However, the proxy variables 
I 
of uncertainty avoidance are predicted to have a negative relationship with the 
"uncertainty avoidance" cultural value. As a result, it can be concluded that there is a 
negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance and stock market activity (Table 
4.11). This means that an increase in uncertainty avoidance is usually associated with 
a decrease in stock market activity and vice versa. 
Table 4.11: The relationships between stock market activity and proxy variables 
of uncertainty avoidance 
Stock Market Activity Proxy Variables for Uncertainty Avoidance 
uncertainty avoidance 
Positive (+) Positive (+) Negative (-) 
Similarly, test results show that the proxy variables of uncertainty avoidance have a 
significant positive relationship with stock market size (Table 4.10). The regression 
coefficient has a value of 0.8882 and t-value of 12.9072 at the 0.99 confidence level. 
The proxy variables of uncertainty avoidance are predicted to have a negative 
relationship with the "uncertainty avoidance" cultural value. As a result, it can be 
concluded that there is a negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance and 
stock market size (Table 4.12). This means that an increase in uncertainty avoidance 
is usually associated with a decrease in stock market size and vice versa. 
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Table 4.12: The relationships between stock market size and proxy variables of 
uncertainty avoidance. 
Stock Market Size Proxy Variables for Uncertainty Avoidance 
uncertainty avoidance 
Positive (+) Positive (+) Negative (-) 
Finally, test results show a significant positive relationship between stock market size 
and stock market activity. The regression coefficient has a value of 0.6131 with a t- 
value of 6.622 at the 0.99 confidence level (Table 4.10). This means that an increase 
in stock market size is usually associated with an increase in stock market activity and 
vice versa. 
167 
Q= 00 W) 
Qý oc ">=Q 
- 'm 
m (W C6 CP ýo 2. a. ) Zn 
-w-ý0: *= a- = 
'o 91 M .-- &. 0M -d 00 r- 
00 6.1- 
0 -0 U 
r- 
C4 0===* : ý, = 
L. M Qj jw 
=00ý -0 CIO ;; 'S 0 ;AwN cd 10 
c, Z 
ar a 
. "o -, 
m 
'A r- - .0, ý- . - 
w0Q. 0 
0 
0: . - I Ell 
0 -4 0 00000000 0N000000 
0000000 
00000 00 001000 1T 
LD 
co CD 
ZY (. 0 r., ZY EY N rr (1) >1 -'l >1 M (0 U) 
mm 
T T, 71- -7 
-4 
U) OD -1 0 00 
I 
00 
W OD 00N00 
000000 
0. cI) 
(Y) 
0 
(U 
N 
0) 
OD OD 
(D 
M U) 0 
N/ 
kýv 
N 
00N 
000 
ý \\4ý 
co N co xxx ZY ZY cr fi) U) 
-T- -T- -T- 
o00 000 000 000 
168 
(Y) 
C\1 
cq 
2 
I 
0 
CD 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Q) 
-1 
124 
H 
ç1 
CA 
ý4 
0 
(4/4/1/3) Individuality and stock market development indicators 
The uni-dimensional structural equation model is implemented to highlight the 
relationships between individuality and stock market development indicators. The 
stock market development indicators model includes two constructs, which are: stock 
market activity and size. In general, test results (Figure 4.5) show a chi-sq/df of 4.65, 
which is relatively higher than the acceptable level of 2.00, as suggested by Sudarwan 
and Fogarty (1996). The root mean square residual (RMSR) has a value of 0.171, 
which is higher than the acceptable benchmark of 0.100, as suggested by Kalbers and 
Fogarty (1996). The goodness of fit (GFI). and the adjusted goodness of fit index 
(AGFI) of 0.763 and 0.6305 respectively, are relatively low compared to the general 
acceptable rule of thumb of 0.90, as suggested by Bagozzi and Yi (1988) (Appendix 
14). 
Table 4.13: The uni-dimensional structure equation model for the relationship 
between individuality and stock market development indicators. T-values are in 
parenthesis. (***) indicate results are significant at 0.99 confidence level. 
Source: Study analysis results using LISREL software package (Version 8.72). 
Latent independent Latent dependent 
Variables variables 
Market Market 
Activity Size 
Individuality 0.3618*** 0.8732*** 
(4.285) (12.895) 
Market size 0.5472*** 
(6895) 
Errorvar 0.2239 0.2376 
(7.199) (8.009) 
Squared multiple correlation (R) 0.7761 0.7624 
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Further analysis of the uni-dimensional structural equation model shows that 
individuality has a significant positive relationship with stock market activity (Table 
4.13). The regession coefficient has a value of 0.3618 and t-value of 4.285 at the 0.99 
confidence level. This means that an increase in individuality is usually associated 
with an increase in stock market activity and vice versa. Similarly, test results show 
that individuality has a significant positive relationship with stock market size. The 
regression coefficient has a value of 0.8732 and t-value of 12.8949 at the 0.99 
confidence level. This means that an increase in individuality is usually associated 
with an increase in stock market size and vice versa. 
Finally, test results show a significant positive relationship between stock market size 
and stock market activity. The regression coefficient has a value of 0.5472 with a t- 
value of 6.895 at the 0.99 confidence level (Table 4.13). This means that an increase 
in stock market size is usually associated with an increase in stock market activity and 
vice versa. 
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(4/4/2) The multi-dimensional structural equation model 
The multi-dimensional structural equation model is implemented to highlight the 
relationships between all cultural values and stock market development indicators 
simultaneously. The cultural values model consists of three latent constructs, which 
are: power distance, uncertainty avoidance and individuality. While, the stock market 
development indicators model include two constructs, which are: stock market 
activity and size (Figure 4.6). In general, test results (Table 4.14) show a chi-sq/df of 
4.26 which is relatively higher than the acceptable level of 2.00, as suggested by 
Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996). The root mean square residual (RMSR) has a value of 
0.161, which is higher than the acceptable benchmark of 0.100, as suggested by 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993). The goodness of fit index (GFI) and the adjusted 
goodness of fit index (AGFI) of 0.68 and 0.55, are relatively lower than the general 
acceptable rule of thumb of 0.90, as suggested by Bagozzi and Yi (1988) (Appendix 
15) 
Nevertheless, this model is still considered as the best available fit model for data set 
under consideration. In addition, the model reveals significant and useful explanatory 
relationships among the constructs. Therefore, the third null hypothesis (Ho) which 
states that: "There is no significant relationship between cultural values and stock 
market development indicators" is rejected. 
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The third main null hypothesis is ftu-ther divided into thirteen alternative hypotheses 
to cover the range of relationships among the study variables. However, since 
masculinity and time horizon are excluded from the measurement model of cultural 
values, and since liquidity and concentration are excluded from the measurement 
model of stock market development indicators. Consequently, nine. alternative 
hypotheses are excluded from the analysis, which are H(a), H(d), H(e), H(h), H(i), 
HO), H(k), H(l), and H(m) (see Chapter 3 Methodology). 
Table 4.15: The multi-dimensional structure equation model statistics for the 
relationship between cultural values and stock market development indicators. 
T-values are in parenthesis. (*) indicate results are significant at 0.90 confidence 
level. (***) indicate results are significant at 0.99 confidence level. Source: Study 
analysis results using LISREL software package (Version 8.72). 
Latent independent 
Variables 
Latent dependent 
variables 
Market Market 
Activity Size 
Power Distance -, 438 0.801 
(-. 854) (1.65) 
Uncertainty Avoidance -. 483 0.457 
(-1.22) (1.26) 
Individuality 1.23* -. 365 
(1.70) (. 539) 
Market size 0.5840*** 
(6.40) 
Errorvar . 233 . 205 (6.81) (8.08) 
Squared multiple correlation (R2) 0.76 0.79 
Test results for the remaining alternative hypothesis show the following (Table 4.15): 
first, the proxy variables of power distance have an insignificant negative relationship 
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with stock market activity. The regression coefficient has a value of -. 438. and t-value 
of -. 854 at the 0.90 confidence level. 
In contrast, the proxy variables of power distance have a significant positive 
relationship with stock market size (Table 4.15). The regression coefficient has a 
value of 0.801 and t-value of 1.65 at the 0.90 confidence level. However, the proxy 
variables of power distance are p redicted to have a negative relationship with the 
"power distance" cultural value. As a result, it can be concluded that there is a 
significant negative relationship between power distance and stock market size (Table 
4.16). This means that an increase in power distance is usually associated with a 
decrease in stock market size and vice versa. 
Table 4.16: The relationships between stock market size and proxy variables of 
power distance 
Stock Market Size Proxy Variables Power Distance 
of power distance 
Positive (+) Positive (+) Negative (-) 
Second, the analysis results show an insignificant negative relationship between the 
proxy variables of uncertainty avoidance and stock market activity (Table 4.15). The 
regression coefficient has a value of -. 483 and t-value of -1.22 at the 0.90 confidence 
level. Therefore, the altemative hypothesis H(b) which states that "There is a 
significant relationship between uncertainty avoidance and market activity" is 
rejected. 
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Similarly, test results show that there is an insignificant positive relationship between 
the proxy variables of uncertainty avoidance and stock market size (Table 4.15). The 
regression coefficient has a value of 0.457 and t-value of 1.26 at the 0.90 confidence 
level. Therefore, the altemative hypothesis H(,, ) which states that "There is a 
significant relationship between uncertainty avoidance and stock market size" is 
rejected. 
Third, test results show that individuality has a significant positive relationship with 
stock market activity (Table 4.15). The regression coefficient has a value of 1.23 and 
a t-value of 1.70 at the 0.90 confidence level. This means that an increase in 
individuality is usually associated with an increase in stock market activity and vice 
versa. Therefore, the altemative hypothesis H 69 which states that "There is a 
relationship between individuality and market activity" is not rejected 
In contrast, the analysis results show that there is an insignificant negative relationship 
between individuality and stock market size. The regression coefficient has a value of 
-. 365 and t-value of . 539 at the 0.90 confidence level. Therefore, the alternative 
hypothesis H(g) which states that "There is a relationship between individuality and 
stock market size" is rejected. Finally, test results indicate a significant positive 
relationship between stock market activity and stock market size. The regression 
coefficient has a value of 0.5840 and t-value of 6.40 at the 0.99 confidence level. This 
means that an increase in stock market size is usually associated with an increase in 
stock market activity and vice versa. 
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(4/5) Summary 
The main aim of this chapter is to present the detailed statistical data analysis results 
for the relationship between cultural values and stock market development indicators 
in the United Kingdom, during the period 1990-2004. The explanatory statistical 
analysis procedures and the data screening process are first outlined. Then, two 
separate measurement models for cultural values and stock market development 
indicators are implemented. This is followed by presenting the uni-dimensional 
structural equation models between each cultural value and stock market development 
indicators to overcome the problem of multicollinarity among the independent 
variables. Finally, the multi-dimensional structural equation models are set out for the 
relationship between all cultural values and stock market development indicators. In 
general, the statistical analysis process has successfully managed to achieve the study 
objectives by highlighting some significant relationships between the independent 
cultural values and the dependent stock market development indicators. This is as 
follows: 
First, the measurement model for the cultural values, using confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA), reveals that the three factor cultural values model is the best model to 
fit the data-set. This three factor model consists of. power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, and individuality. Therefore, the first null hypothesis which states that: 
"power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individuality, masculinity and time horizon 
do not represent distinct dimensions of cultural values" is not rejected. Second, the 
measurement model for the stock market development indicators, using confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA), reveals that the two factor model is the best model to fit the 
data-set. This two fqctors model consists of. stock market activity and size. Therefore, 
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the second null hypothesis which states that: "Activity, size, liquidity and 
concentration do not represent distinct dimensions of stock market development" is 
not rejected. 
Third, the uni-dimensional structure equation models show significant relationships 
between each independent cultural value and the dependent stock market development 
indicators. Test results show that there are significant negative relationships between 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance on the one hand, and stock market activity and 
size on the other hand, at the 0.99 confidence level. By contrast, there is a significant 
positive relationship between individuality and stock market activity and size at the 
0.99 confidence level. 
Fourth, the multi-dimensional structure equation model, for the relationship between 
all the independent cultural values and the dependent stock market development 
indicators, shows that: there is a significant negative relationship between power 
distance and stock market size at the 0.90 confidence level. In addition, there is a 
significant positive relationship between individuality and stock market activity at the 
0.90 confidence level. Therefore, the third null hypothesis which states that: "There is 
no significant relationship between cultural values and stock market development 
indicators" is rejected. Furthermore, test results show a significant positive 
relationship between stock market activity and stock market size at the 0.99 
confidence level. Finally, fin-ther discussions of these results are dealt with in chapter 
siy,. 
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CHAPTER 5 DATA ANALYSIS FOR CULTURAL VALUES AND 
CORPORATE GOVERANANCE 
Some previous theoretical and empirical research studies show that corporate 
governance systems are among the most important issues influencing the stock market 
development worldwide (see De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). As a result, this study is 
extended to explore the impact of cultural values on corporate governance systems 
across twenty four countries around the globe including the United Kingdom. 
Consequently, the main aim of this chapter is to present the detailed statistical data 
analysis procedures and results for the relationships between cultural values and 
corporate governance systems. This statistical analysis is designed to examine the 
main study hypothesis and to explore the relationships predicted. Cultural values are 
represented by the five dimensions of Hofstede (1980) cultural value model, which 
are: power distance, uncertainty-avoidance, individuality, masculinity and time 
horizon. While corporate governance systems are represented by eight elements, 
which are: board size, separation chair and CEO, independence per board, audit 
committee, remuneration disclosure, women on board, code of ethics and ethics 
systems. 
d 
In this context, this chapter consists of four main sections which unfold as follows: 
the first section starts with a preview of the statistical analysis "procedures 
implemented in this study. The second section deals with the preliminary data 
screening process. This is followed by the third section which is divided into eight 
consecutive sub-sections, to explain the analysis-process, results and evaluation for 
180 
each relationship between cultural values and corporate governance systems. The final 
section concludes with a summary of results. 
(5/1)Statistical procedures 
The explanatory statistical procedures implemented in this chapter are in light of the 
methodology of De-Jong and Semenov (2002). As usual, the analysis starts with a 
preliminary screening of the data-set using descriptive statistics, to identify the main 
characteristics of the data-set under consideration. This is extremely helpful to detect 
any data problems and to consequently plan for suitable statistical treatments at an 
early stage. This is followed by the explanatory multiple regression analysis for the 
full data-set to highlight the relationship between cultural values and eight corporate 
governance systems. Subsequently, the stepwise multiple regression analysis models 
are implemented to eliminate the problem of multicolllinearity among the independent 
variables. A weighted least square regression analysis is implemented whenever 
necessary to eliminate the problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals. Finally, an 
evalVation and assessment is conducted for every model to ensure the reliability and 
validity of the results. 
(5/2) Preliminary data screening 
The purpose of the preliminary data screening is to have an insight into the data 
characteristics and to allocate potential problems which may distort the data analysis 
process. This will help to choose the suitable statistical analysis techniques and to 
prepare necessary statistical treatment plans for the data-set in advance. This process 
passes through five consecutive steps as follows: first, six interaction terms are added 
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to the analysis to represent the inter-relationships between the independent cultural 
values. 
Second, a cross-correlation matrix between the independent variables is computed to 
examine the existence of any high correlations between these variables (Table 5.1). 
This analysis shows some significant correlations between the independent variables. 
There is a significant negative relationship between power distance and individuality. 
The correlation coefficient has a value of -. 550 with p-value of . 003 at the 0.99 
confidence level. This means that an increase in power distance is associated with a 
decrease in individuality and vice versa. In addition, there is a significant positive 
relationship between uncertainty-avoidance and power distance. The correlation 
coefficient has a value of 0.349 with p-value of 0.051 at the 0.90 confidence level. 
This means that an increase in uncertainty-avoidance is usually associated with an 
increase in power distance across & sample countries and vice versa. These results 
are interestingly consistent with previous longitudinal study results in the United 
Kingdom during period 1991-2004 (See Chapter 4). 
Furthermore, the cross-correlation matrix shows twenty-six significant correlations 
among the interaction terms of cultural values, as well as other independent variables. 
Overall, these results signal the existence of a multicollinearity problem between 
independent variables, which suggests the use of the stepwise multiple regression 
analysis in a later statistical analysis stage to eliminate this problem. Finally, data 
screening shows that there are 13 missing values for the "time horizon" independent 
cultural value. Therefore, this independent variable is excluded from the analysis to 
avoid reducing the sample size. In addition, one of the observations under 
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consideration for "Luxembourg" is excluded list-wise from the analysis due to the 
existence of missing values. So, the number of observations (N) used in this analysis 
came down to 23 countries. 
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(5/3) Cultural values and board size 
The analysis of the relationship between the independent cultural values and the 
dependent corporate governance system: "Board Size", follows the following 
procedure: the analysis process starts with a multiple regression analysis for the full 
study variables; which is followed by a stepwise multiple regression analysis to 
eliminate the problem of multicollinearity among the independent variables. Note that 
the evaluation and assessment of each statistical model is presented in each sub- 
section. This is as follows: 
(51311) Multiple regression analysis (full model) 
In the previous section the most important data characteristics have been identified. It 
is time now to use the multiple regression analysis technique for the full model to 
highlight the relationships between the cultural values (independent variables) and 
corporate governance systems (dependent variable). Cultural values are represented 
by four variables which are labelled: power distance (PDI), uncertainty avoidance 
(UAV), individualism (IND), and masculinity (MAS). In addition, six interaction 
terms are added to the analysis to represent the interrelationships between the cultural 
values, while corporate governance systems are represented by one main variable 
which is labelled "board size" (Appendix 16). 
In general, the overall results of the full regression model show weak fit statistics 
(Table 5.2). The R-square for the overall model has a low value of 43.8%; F-statistic 
has a value of only . 935 with an insignificant p-value of . 536 at the 0.95 confidence 
level. -This means that the regression coefficients of the model are not significantly 
different from zero. Further analysis shows that there are no significant relationships 
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between cultural values and board size. Test results show that t-values for all 
independent cultural values are below the 1.96 benchmark, with insignificant p-values 
at the 0.95 confidence level. 
Table 5.2: The full multiple regression analysis model for the relationship 
between cultural values and board size. PDI= power distance, UAV= uncertainty 
avoidance, IND= individuality, MAS= masculinity, other variables are 
interaction 'terms. Sig-- significance, level. N= number of observations. Source: 
Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Board Size 
t-Statistics Sig. N 
Constant 47.574 32.325 1.472 
. 
167 23 
PDI -. 395 . 
451 -. 874 . 
399 23 
UAV -. 052 . 292 -. 180 . 860 23 
IND -. 543 . 403 -1.346 . 203 23 
MAS -. 037 . 368 -. 099 . 923 23 
PDI UAV . 000 . 003 . 152 . 882 23 PDI IND . 009 . 006 1.620 . 131 23 
PDI-NIAS -. 003 . 
004 -. 692 . 
502 23 
UAV-IND -. 001 . 002 -. 573 . 577 23 
UAV-MAS . 001 . 003 . 463 . 652 23 IND MAS . 002 . 004 . 424 . 679 23 
Multiple correlation . 
662 
coefficient 
R-square 
. 
438 
2 Adjusted R -. 030 
Regression standard error 3.47253 
F-test . 935 Sig. 
. 
536 
(5131111) Evaluation and assessment 
An assessment and review of the previous full multiple regression model is conducted 
using several tests and measures. First, the analysis of the case-wise diagnostics 
output shows that there are no observations with standard residual value more than the 
rule of thumb benchmark of (±3) standard deviation control limit. Note that the 
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number of observations (N) used in this analysis equal to 23 countries. During the 
analysis process the observation for "Luxembourg" is excluded list-wise from the 
analysis, due to the existence of missing values. 
Table 5.3: The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the relationship between 
independent cultural values and board size. PDI= power distance, UAV= 
uncertainty avoidance, IND= individuality, MAS= masculinity, other variables 
are interaction terms. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software 
(Version 14.00) 
Collinearity Statistics 
Independent Variables Tolerance VIF 
Constant . 009 114.26 
PDI . 009 115.89 
UAV . 009 114.58 
IND . 007 139.92 
MAS . 014 72.64 
PDI-UAV . 015 66.39 
PDI-IND . 017 60.33 
PDI-MAS . 032 31.05 
UAV-IND . 018 56.80 
UAV-MAS . 011 95.18 
Second, test results show that all independent cultural variables have variance 
inflation factors (VIF) greater than the rule of thumb benchmark of 5 degrees (Table 
5.3). This means' that the study model does suffer from the problem of 
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multicollinearity between independent variables. Therefore, the stepwise multiple 
regression analysis technique is going to be used to eliminate this problem in the next 
section. 
Figure 5.1: The full regression standardized predicted and residuals values for 
the relationship between cultural values and board size. Source: Study analysis 
results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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FinallY, the scatter plot for the relationship between the regression standardized 
predicted value (x-axis) and regression standardized residuals (y-axis) shows that data 
points are scattered randomly across the panel with some signs of trend and/or cluster 
(Figure 5.1). As a rule of thumb, this may indicates that the model suffers from 
heteroscedasticity of residuals. Consequently, the full data set is tested for the 
existence of heteroscedasticity of residuals using Goldfeld-Quandt (G-Q) test statistics 
(Table 5.4). Test results show that the G-Q (F) statistic has a value of 0.0053, which is 
lower than the F (critical value) of 0.531 at the 0.95 confidence level. This means that 
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the full regression model does not suffer from the problem of heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity is not rejected. 
Table 5.4: The Goldfeld-Quandt (F) Statistic for the relationship between 
cultural values and board size. Source: Study analysis results using E-views 
statistical software package (Version 3.1) 
Goldfeld-Quandt F Statistic 0.005334 
F(. 95, jo, jo) critical value 0.531523 
The next section takes a step forward in the analysis process by implementing the 
stepwise multiple regression analysis technique on the data-set. 
(5/3/2) Stepwise multiple regression analysis 
In the previous section, the full multiple regression analysis shows no significant 
relationship between cultural values and board size. In this section, the stepwise 
multiple regression analysis technique is used to identify and exclude any independent 
variables which may have significant relationships with other independent variables. 
In general, test results show that none of the independent cultural value manages to 
explain the dependent board size significantly (see Appendix 16). This means that 
there is no significant relationship between cultural values and board size at the 0.95 
confidence level. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis which states that "There is a 
relationship between cultural values and board size" is rejected. 
To sum up, this section has successfully managed to achieve the study objectives by 
highlighting the relationships between cultural values and board size. The successful 
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implementation of this statistical analysis strategy provides an additional incentive to 
extent this process to cover the rest of the study variables. In the next section, a 
similar statistical process is used to shed some light on the relationships between 
cultural values and the remaining seven corporate governance systems. 
0 
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(5/4) Cultural values and separation chair and CEO 
The analysis of the relationship between the independent cultural values and the 
dependent corporate governance system "separation chair and CEO", follows the 
following procedure: The analysis process starts with a multiple regression analysis 
for the full study variables. This is followed by a stepwise multiple regression analysis 
to eliminate the multicollinearity problem. Then, a weighted least squares regression 
analysis (WLS) is implemented whenever necessary to overcome the problem of 
heteroscedasticity of residuals. Note that an evaluation and assessment of each 
statistical model is presented in each sub-section. This is as follows: 
(5/4/1) Multiple regression analysis (full model) 
The multiple regression analysis technique for the full study variables is first used to 
highlight the relationships between the cultural values (independent variables) and 
corporate governance systems (dependent variables). Cultural values are represented 
by four variables labelled power distance (PDI), uncertainty avoidance (UAV), 
individualism (IND), and masculinity (MAS). In addition, six interaction. terms are 
added to the analysis to represent the interrelationships between cultural variables. 
Corporate governance systems are represented by one main variable which is labelled 
"separation chair and CEO" (Appendix 17). 
In general, the overall results of the model show weak fit statistics (Table 5.5). The R- 
square for the overall model has a moderate value of 54.2%; F-statistic has an 
insignificant value of 1.419, with a p-value of . 279 at the . 95 confidence level. The 
detailed analysis of the results shows that there is no significant relationship between 
any cultural value and corporate governance system "separation chair and CEO". Test 
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results show that t-values for all cultural values are below the 1.96 benchmark, with 
insignificant p-values at the 0.95 confidence level. 
Table 5.5: The full multiple regression analysis model for the relationship 
between cultural values and separation chair and CEO. PDI= power distance, 
UAV= uncertainty avoidance, IND= individuality, MAS= masculinity, other 
variables are interaction terms. Sig= significance level. N= number of 
observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Separation chair and CEO 
Standard t-Statistics Sig. 
error 
N 
Constant 255.041 178.080 1.432 . 178 23 
PDI -1.145 2.487 -. 461 . 653 23 UAV -1.838 1.606 -1.144 . 275 23 
IND -1.461 2.220 -. 658 . 523 23 
MAS -1.034 2.027 -. 510 . 619 23 
PDI UAV . 010 . 
017 . 613 . 551 23 
PDI IND -. 007 . 031 -. 237 . 817 23 
PDI MAS -. 002 . 025 -. 086 . 933 23 
UAV-IND . 020 . 014 1.490 . 162 23 UAV-MAS . 004 . 015 . 280 . 784 23 
IND MAS . 011 . 021 . 522 . 611 23 
Multiple correlation . 736 coefficient 
R-square . 542 2 Adjusted R . 160 Regression standard error 19.130 
F-test 1.419 
Sig. . 279 
(5/4/1/1) Evaluation and assessment 
An assessment and review of the full multiple regression model is conducted using 
several tests and measures. First, the analysis of the case-wise diagnostics output of all 
study observations shows that there are no observations with a standard residual value 
more than the rule of thumb benchmark of (±3) standard deviation control limit. Note 
that the number of observations (N) used in this analysis is equal to 23. During the 
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analysis process the observation for "Luxembourg" is excluded list-wise due to the 
existence of missing values. 
Second, test results show that Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all independent 
variables are greater than the rule of thumb benchmark of 5 degrees (see Table 5.3). 
This means that the study model does suffer from the problem of multicollinearity 
between independent variables. Therefore, the stepwise multiple regression analysis 
technique is going to be used to eliminate this problem. 
Figure 5.2: The full regression standardized predicted and residuals values for 
the relationship between cultural values and separation chair and CEO. Source: 
Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Finally, the scatter plot (Figure 5.2) for the relationship between the regression 
standardized predicted value (x-axis) and regression standardized residuals (Y-axis), 
shows that data points are not scattered evenly across the centre of the panel. As a rule 
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of thumb, this may indicate that the model suffers from heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. This is an issue that is going to be further addressed in subsequent analysis. 
The next section takes a step forward in the analysis process by implementing the 
4 
stepwise multiple regression analysis technique on the data-set. 
(5/4/2) Stepwise multiple regression analysis 
In the previous section, the full multiple regression analysis model shows no 
significant relationship between cultural values and "separation chair and CEO". In 
this section, the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique is used to eliminate 
the problem of multicollinearity among the independent variables (Appendix 17). The 
overall fit statistics for the stepwise model shows that the R-square has a value of 37% 
compared to a value of 54.2% for the full model (Table 5.6). The F-statistic has 
increased to a value of 12.320, compared to a value of 1.419 for the full model, with a 
significant p-value, of . 002 at the 0.99% confidence level. This result shows that the 
regression coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
Further results show that only one independent cultural value which is labelled 
"power distance" manages to significantly explain the dependent variable "separation 
chair and CEO". There is a significant negative relationship between power distance 
and separation chair and CEO, since the regression coefficient has a value of -0.724 
and t-value of -3.510 with p-value of 0.002 atthe 0.99 confidence level. This means 
that an increase in power distance is significantly associated with a decrease in 
"separation chair and CEO" and vice versa. 
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Table 5.6: The stepwise multiple regression analysis for the relationship between 
cultural values and "separation chair and CEO". PDI= power distance. Sig= 
significance level. (***) indicates value significant at the 0.99 confidence level. N= 
number of observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software 
(Version 14.00) 
Separation chair and CEO 
Variables Regression Standard t-Statistics Sig. N 
coefficient error 
Constant 111.616 9.557 11.679*** . 000 23 
PDI -. 724 . 206 -3.510*** . 002 23 Multiple correlation . 608 coefficient 
R-square . 370 2 Adjusted R . 340 Regression standard error 16.96 
F-test 12.320*** 
Sig. . 002 
By contrast, several other insignificant cultural values are excluded from the analyses 
which include: uncertainty avoidance, individuality, masculinity, power 
distance/uncertainty avoidance, power distance/individuality, power 
distance/masculinity, uncertainty avoidance/individuality, uncertainty 
avoidance/masculinity, and finally individuality/masculinity. Test results show that t- 
values for all these excluded variables are below the 1.96 benchmark, with larger 
insignificant p-values at the 0.95 confidence level. 
(5/4/2/1) Evaluation and assessment 
A fin-ther assessment and review of the stepwise multiple regression model results is 
conducted using several test statistics. First, a review of the case-wise diagnostics 
output of all study observations shows that there is one observations with standard 
residual value of -3.405 which is more than the rule of thumb benchmark of (±3) 
standard deviation control limit. This observation is checked and it is found to be 
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correct and hence it is kept in the analysis. Note that the number of observations (N) 
which is used in this analysis is 23 observations. During the analysis process the 
observation for "Luxembourg" is excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing 
values. Second, the stepwise regression model does not show any sign of 
multicollinearity due to the exclusion of nine independent cultural values from the 
model. 
Figure 5.3: The stepwise regression standardized predicted and residual values 
for the relationship between cultural values and separation chair and CEO. 
Source: Study analysis results using $PSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Third, the scatter plot (Figure 5.3) for the regression results shows that data-points are 
not scattered evenly across the centre of the panel. As a rule of thumb, this means that 
the model may still suffers from heteroscedasticity of residuals. Consequently, the 
full data-set is tested for the existence of heteroscedasticity of residuals using 
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Goldfeld-Quandt (G-Q) test statistics (Table 5.7). Test results show that the G-Q (F) 
statistic has a value of 9.926, which is higher than the F (critical value) of 0.531 at the 
0.95 confidence level. This means that the stepývise regression model results suffer 
from the problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals. Therefore, the null hypothesis of 
no heteroscedasticity is rejected. As a result, the Weighted Least Square regression 
analysis (WLS) is implemented to overcome this problem in the next section. 
Table 5.7: The Goldfeld-Quandt (F) Statistic for the relationship between 
cultural values and separation of chair and CEO. Source: Study analysis results 
using E-views statistical software package (Version 3.1) 
Goldfeld-Quandt F Statistic 9.926016 
F(. 95,10,10) critical value 
(5/4/3)Weighted least square regression analysis 
0.531523 
In this section the weighted least square regression analysis is used to eliminate the 
problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals (Appendix 17). The overall fit statistics for 
the model shows that the overall R-square has a value of 90.6% compared to a value 
of 37% for the stepwise model (Table 5.8). The F-statistic has increased to a value of 
96.240, compared to a value of 12.320 for the stepwise model, with a significant p- 
value of . 000 at the 0.99% confidence level. This result shows that the regression 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
Further results show that the power distance cultural value has a significant negative 
relationship with "separation chair and CEO", which is consistent with previous 
stepwise model results. The regression coefficient has a value of -. 499, and t-value of 
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-9.8 10, with p-value of . 000 at the 0.99 confidence level. This means that an increase 
in power distance is significantly associated with a decrease in "separation chair and 
CEO" across the sample countries and vice versa. Therefore, the alternative 
hypothesis which states that "There is a relationship between cultural values and 
separation chair and CEO" is not rejected. 
Table 5.8: The Weighted Least Square regression analysis for the relationship 
between cultural values and separation chair and CEO. PDI= power distance. 
Sig-- significance level. (***) indicates value significant at the 0.99 confidence 
level. N= number of observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS 
software (Version 14.00) 
Separation chair and CEO 
Variables Regression Standard t-Statistics Sig. N 
coefficient error 
Constant 114.527 2.532 45.232*** . 000 23 PDI -. 499 . 051 -9.810*** . 000 23 Multiple correlation . 952 coefficient 
R-square . 906 2 Adjusted R . 896 Regression standard error 9.899 
F-test 96.240*** 
Sig. . 000 
Overall, the analysis process in this section has successfully managed to identify a 
significant relationship between power distance and corporate governance system 
"separation of chair and CEO" across the twenty three sample countries worldwide. 
The next section shed some light on the relationship between cultural values and an 
additional corporate governance system, which is the "independence per board". 
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(515) Cultural values and independence per board 
The analysis of the relationship between cultural values and the corporate governance 
system "Independence per Board", starts with a multiple regression analysis for the 
full study variables. This is followed by a stepwise multiple regression analysis to 
eliminate the problem of multicollinearity. Note that an evaluation and assessment of 
each statistical model is presented in each sub-section. This is as follows: 
(51511) Multiple regression analysis (full model) 
The relationships between the independent cultural values and the dependent 
corporate governance systems are identified using the full multiple regression analysis 
model (Appendix 18). Cultural values are represented by four variables which 
include: power distance (PDI), uncertainty avoidance (UAV), individualism (IND), 
and masculinity (MAS). In addition, six interaction terms are added to the analysis to 
represent the interrelationship between the cultural variables. Meanwhile, corporate 
governance system is represented by the dependent variable "Independence per 
Board". 
In general, the overall results of the model show that the R-square has a moderate 
value of 59.4%; the F-statistic has an insignificant value of 1.756, with a p-value of 
. 176 at the 0.95 confidence level (Table 5.9). The detailed analysis of the results 
shows that there is no significant relationship between cultural values and 
independence per board. Test results show that t-values for all cultural values are 
below the 1.96 benchmark, with insignificant p-values at the 0.95 confidence level. 
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Table 5.9: The full multiple regression analysis model for the relationship 
between cultural values and independence per board. PDl= power distance, 
UAV= uncertainty avoidance, IND= individuality, MAS= masculinity, other 
variables are interaction terms. Sig= significance level. N= number Of 
observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Independ nee per Board 
Standard t-Statistics Sig. 
error 
N 
Constant 95.821 175.75 
. 
545 
. 
596 23 
PDI -1.765 2.455 -. 719 . 
486 23 
UAV 1.157 1.585 
. 
730 
. 
480 23 
IND -. 955 2.191 -. 436 . 
671 23 
MAS -. 628 2.001 -. 314 . 
759 23 
PD1 UAV -. 012 . 
017 -. 700 . 
497 23 
PD17IND 
. 
024 
. 
031 
. 
786 
. 
449 23 
PDI MAS 
. 
024 
. 
024 
. 
972 
. 
350 23 
UAIV IND 
- -. 
003 
. 
013 -. 227 . 
824 23 
UAV NIAS -. 018 . 
015 -1.209 . 
250 23 
IND MAS 
. 
009 
. 
021 
. 
454 
. 
658 23 
Multiple correlation . 
771 
coefficient 
R-square 
. 
594 
Adjusted R2 
. 
256 
Regression standard error 18.881 
F-test 1.756 
Sig. 
. 
176 
(5151111) Evaluation and assessment 
The evaluation and assessment of the full regression model shows that: first, the 
analysis of the case-wise diagnostics output of all study observations shows that there 
are no observations with standard residual value more than the rule of thumb 
benchmark of (±3) standard deviation control limit. Note that the number of 
observations (N) used in this analysis is equal to 23. During the analysis process the 
observation for "Luxembourg" is excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing 
values. 
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Second, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all independent variables are greater 
than the rule of thumb benchmark of 5 degrees (See Table 5.3). This means that the 
study model does suffer from the problem of multicollinearity between independent 
variables. Therefore, the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique is going to 
be used to improve the overall fit of the model and to exclude any independent 
variables, which may have some impact on other independent variables. 
Figure 5.4: The full regression standardized predicted and residuals values for 
the relationship between cultural values and independence per board. Source: 
Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Finally, the scatter plot (Figure 5.4) for the relationship between the regression 
standardized predicted value (x-axis) and regression standardized residuals (Y-axis), 
shows that data points are not scattered evenly across the centre of the panel. As a rule 
of thumb, this may indicates that the model suffers from heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. This is an issue that is going to be further addressed in subsequent analysis. 
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The next section takes a step forward in the analysis process by implementing the 
stepwise multiple regression analysis technique on the data set. 
(5/5/2) Stepwise multiple regression analysis 
The multiple regression analysis full model in the previous section shows no 
significant relationship between cultural values and "independence per board". In this 
section, the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique is used to exclude any 
independent variables which have significant relationships with other independent 
variables (Appendix 18). The overall fit statistics for the model shows that the overall 
R-square has a value of 43.3% compared to a value of 59.4% for the full model (Table 
5.10). The F-statistic has increased to a value of 7.628, compared to a value of 1.756 
for the full regression model, with a significant p-value of . 003 at the 0.99 confidence 
level. This means that the predictors' regression coefficients are significantly different 
from zero. 
Further results show that two independent cultural values managed to explain the 
dependent corporate governance system "independence per board" (Table 5.10). The 
individuality cultural variable shows a significant positive relationship with 
"independence per board". Since, the regression coefficient has a value of . 538 and t- 
value of 2.850, with p-value of .0 10 at the 0.95 confidence level. This means that an 
increase in individuality cultural value is usually associated with an increase in 
independence per board. 
In addition, test results show a significant negative relationship between the 
interaction term "uncertainty avoidance/masculinity" (UAV ýMAS) and 
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"independence per board" (Table 5.10), since the regression coefficient is equal to - 
. 005 and t-value of -2.578 with p-value of . 018 at the 0.95 confidence 
level. This 
means that an increase in uncertainty avoidance and/or masculinity cultural values is 
usually associated with a decrease of corporate governance system "independence per 
board" across the sample countries. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis which states 
that "There is a relationship between cultural values and independence per board" is 
not rejected. 
Table 5.10: The Stepwise Multiple regression analysis for the relationship 
between cultural values and independence per board. IND= individuality, 
UAV_MAS= interaction term of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. Sig. = 
significance level. (**) indicates value significant at the 0.95 confidence level. 
(***) indicates value significant at the 0.99 confidence level. N= number of 
observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
Independence per board 
Standard t-Statistics Sig. 
error 
N 
Constant 22.082 13.974 1.580 . 130 23 
IND . 534 . 188 2.850*** . 010 23 UAV MAS -. 005 . 002 -2.578** . 018 23 
Multiple correlation . 658 - coefficient 
R-square . 433 2 Adjusted R . 376 Regression standard error 17.28 
F-test 7.628*** 
Sig. . 003 
In contrast, other eight independent cultural variables are excluded from the analyses. 
These variables are: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, power 
distance/uncertainty avoidance, power distance/individuality, power 
distance/masculinity, uncertainty avoidance/individuality, and finally 
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individuality/masculinity. Test results show that t-values for all these excluded 
variables are below the 1.96 benchmark, with insignificant p-values at the 0.95 
confidence level. 
(5/5/2/1) Evaluation and assessment 
A further assessment and review of the stepwise multiple regression model is 
conducted using several test statistics. First, a review of the case-wise diagnostics 
output of all study observations shows that there are no observations with standard 
residual more than the rule of thumb benchmark of (±3) standard deviation control 
limit. Note that the number of observations (N) which is used in this analysis is 23 
observations. During the analysis process the observation for "Luxembourg" is 
excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing values. 
Table 5.11: The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the relationship between 
independent cultural values and independence per board. IND= individuality, 
UAV_MAS= interaction term of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. Source: 
Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Collinearity Statistics 
Independent Variables Tolerance VIF 
Constant 
IND . 999 1.001 
UAV-MAS . 999 1.001 
Second, test results show that the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for individuality 
and uncertainty avoidance/masculinity has a value of 1.001 for both variables (Table 
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S. 11). This is lower than the rule of thumb benchmark of 5 degrees, which means that 
the study model does not suffer anymore from the problem of multicollinearity 
between independent variables. 
Figure 5.5: The stepwise regression standardized predicted and residuals values 
for the relationship between cultural values and independence per board. 
Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Third, the scatter plot (Figure 5.5) for the relationship between the stepwise regression 
standardized predicted value (x-axis) and regression standardized residuals . 
(Y-axis) 
shows that data points are still not scattered evenly across the centre of the panel. 
Consequently, the full data set is tested for the existence of heteroscedasticity of 
residuals using the Goldfield-Quandt (G-Q) test statistics (Table 5.12). Test results 
show that the G-Q (F) statistic has a value of 0.201, which is lower than the F (critical 
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value) of 0.531 at the 0.95 confidence level. This means that the stepwise regression 
model results do not suffer from the problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity is not rejected. 
Table 5.12: The Goldfeld-Quandt (F) Statistic for the relationship between 
cultural values and independence per board. Source: Study analysis results using 
E-views statistical software package (Version 3.1) 
Goldfeld-Quandt F Statistic 0.201443 
F(. 95, jo, jo) critical value 0.531523 
Finally, the statistical analysis process in this section has successfully managed to 
identify a significant relationship between individuality and uncertainty 
avoidance/masculinity on one side, and "independence per board" on the other side 
across twenty three sample countries. The next section focuses on the relationship 
between cultural values and audit committee. 
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(5/6) Cultural values and audit committee 
The analysis of the relationship between cultural values and the "audit committee" 
corporate governance system starts with a multiple regression analysis for the full 
study variables. This is -followed by a stepwise multiple regression analysis to 
eliminate the multicollinearity problem. Then, a weighted least squares regression 
analysis is implemented to overcome the problem'of heteroscedasticity of residuals. 
Note that an evaluation and assessment of each statistical model implemented is 
presented in each sub-section. This is as follows: 
(5/6/1) Multiple regression analysis (full model) 
The multiple regression analysis technique for the full model is used to explore the 
relationships between the independent cultural values and the dependent corporate 
governance systems (Appendix 19). Cultural values are represented by four variables 
which include: power distance (PDI), uncertainty avoidance (UAV), individualism 
(IND), and masculinity (MAS). Six interaction terms are added to the analysis to 
represent the interrelationships between the cultural values. Corporate governance 
system is represented by the dependent variable "audit committee". 
In general, the overall results of the model show that the R-square has a moderate 
value of 77.7%; the F-statistic has a significant value of 4.172, with a p-value of . 011 
at the 0.95 confidence level (Table 5.13). The detailed analysis of the results shows 
that there is no significant relationship between cultural values and audit committee. 
Test results show that t-values for all cultural values are below the 1.96 benchmark, 
with insignificant p-values at the 0.95 confidence level. 
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Table 5.13: The full multiple regression analysis model for the relationship 
between cultural values and audit committee. PDI= power distance, UAV= 
uncertainty avoidance, IND= individuality, MAS= masculinity, other variables 
are interaction terms. Sig= significance level. (**) indicates significant values at 
the 0.95 confidence level. N= number of observations. Source: Study analysis 
results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Audit Committee 
Standard t-Statistics 
error 
Sig. N 
Constant 134.635 157.661 
. 854 . 
410 23 
PDI -1.879 2.202 -. 854 . 
410 23 
UAV . 439 1.422 . 309 . 
763 23 
IND -1.215 1.966 -. 618 . 548 23 MAS . 000 1.795 . 000 1.00 23 PDI UAV -. 002 . 015 -. 113 . 912 23 PDI IND . 024 . 028 . 877 . 398 23 PDI MAS . 019 . 022 . 889 . 391 23 UAV-IND, . 001 . 012 . 113 . 912 23 
UAV-MAS -. 025 . 013 -1.886 . 084 23 IND MAS . 011 . 019 . 602 . 558 23 Multiple correlation . 881 coefficient 
R-square 
. 777 2 Adjusted R 
. 590 Regression standard error 16.937 
F-test 4.172** 
Sig. 
. 
011 
(5161111) Evaluation and assessment 
The evaluation and assessment of the previous model show that: first, the analysis of 
the case-wise diagnostics output of all study observations shows that there are no 
observations with standard residual value more than the rule of thumb benchmark of 
(±3) standard deviation control limit. Note that the number of observations (N) used 
in this analysis equal to 23. During the analysis process the observation for 
"Luxembourg" is excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing values. 
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Second, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all independent variables are greater 
than the rule of thumb benchmark of 5 degrees (See Table 5.3). This means that the 
study model suffers from the problem of multicollinearity between independent 
variables, Therefore, the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique is used to 
improve the overall fit of the model and to exclude any independent variables, which 
may have some impact on other independent variables. 
Figure 5.6: The full regression standardized predicted and residuals values for 
the relationship between cultural values and audit committee. Source: Study 
analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Finally, the scatter plot (Figure 5.6) for the relationship between the regression 
standardized predicted value (x-axis) and regression standardized residuals (Y-axis) 
shows that data points are not scattered evenly across the centre of the panel. As a rule 
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of thumb, this may indicates that the model suffers from heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. This is an issue that is going to be further addressed in subsequent analysis. 
The next section takes a step forward in the analysis process by implementing the 
stepwise multiple regession analysis technique on the data set. 
(5/6/2) Stepwise multiple regression analysis 
The full multiple regression analysis model in the previous section shows no 
significant relationship between cultural values and audit committee. In this section 
the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique is used to eliminate the 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. In general, the overall fit statistics 
for the model shows that the R-square has a value of 56.5% compared to a value of 
77.7% for the full model. The F-statistic has almost tripled to reach a value of 13.01, 
compared to a value of 4.17 for the full regression model, with a significant p-value of 
. 000 at the 0.99 confidence 
level (Table 5.14). This means that the regression 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
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Table 5.14: The Stepwise Multiple regression analysis for the relationship 
between cultural values and audit committee. UAV= uncertainty avoidance, IND 
PDI_IND= interaction term of power distance and individuality. Sig-- 
significance level. (***) indicates value significant at the 0.99 confidence level. N= 
number of observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software 
(Versioik 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
audit committee 
Standard t-Statistics 
error 
Sig. N 
Constant 73.564 11.361 6.475 . 000 23 UAV -. 770 . 160 -4.822*** . 000 23 PDI IND . 015 . 004 3.648*** . 002 23 Multiple correlation . 752 
coefficient 
R-square 
. 565 2 Adjusted A 
. 
522 
Regression standard error 18.298 
F-test 13.013*** 
Sig. 
. 
000 
The detailed test results show that two independent cultural values managed to 
explain the dependent corporate governance system "audit committee". The 
uncertainty avoidance cultural variable shows a significant negative relationship with 
the "audit committee". Since, it has a regression coefficient of -. 770 and t-value of - 
4.82, with p-value of . 000 at the 0.99 confidence level (Table 5.14). This means that 
an increase in uncertainty avoidance cultural value is usually associated with a 
significant decrease in audit committee across the sample countries. 
In addition, results show a significant positive relationship between the interaction 
term "power distance/individuality" (PDI-IND) and the audit committee, since the 
regression coefficient has a value of .0 15 and t-value of 3.64 
8, with p-value of . 002 at 
the 0.99 confidence level (Table 5.14). This means that an increase in power distance 
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or individuality cultural values is usually associated with an increase of corporate 
governance system "audit committee" across the sample countries. Note that the 
power distance and individuality variables show a high negative correlation 
coefficient at the 0.99 confidence level (Table 5.3). 
In contrast, test results show that t-values for other eight independent variables are 
below the 1.96 benchmark, with insignificant p-values at the 0.95 confidence level. 
These independent variables are excluded from the analysis. These excluded variables 
include: power distance, individuality, and masculinity, power distance/uncertainty 
avoidance, power distance/individuality, power distance/masculinity, and finally 
individuality/masculinity. 
(5/6/2/1) Evaluation and assessment 
A further assessment and review of the stepwise multiple regression model is 
conducted using several test statistics. First, a review of the case-wise diagnostics 
output of all study observations shows that there are no observations with standard. 
residual more than the rule of thumb benchmark of (±-3) standard deviation control 
limit. Note that the number of observations (N) which is used in this analysis is 23 
observations. During the analysis process the observation for "Luxembourg" is 
excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing values. 
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Table 5.15: The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the independent cultural 
values and audit committee. UAV= uncertainty avoidance, PDI-IND= 
interaction term of power distance and individuality. Source: Study analysis 
results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Collinearity Statistics 
Independent Variables Tolerance VIF 
Constant 
UAV . 800 1.251 
PDI-IND . 800 1.251 
Second, test results show that there is no multicollinearity between uncertainty 
avoidance and power distance/individuality, since the Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIF) has a value of 1.251 for both variables (Table 5.15). This result is lower than 
the rule of thumb benchmark of 5 degrees. This means that the study model does not 
suffer anymore from the problem of multicollinearity between independent variables. 
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Figure 5.7: The stepwise regression standardized predicted and residuals values 
for the relationship between cultural values and audit committee. Source: Study 
analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Third, the scatter plot (Figure 5.7) for the stepwise regression model shows that data 
points are still not scattered evenly across the centre of the panel. Consequently, the 
full data set is tested for the existence of heteroscedasticity of residuals using 
Goldfield-Quandt (G-Q) test statistics (Table 5.16). Test results show that the G-Q (F) 
statistic has a value of 1.13 1, which is higher than the F (critical, value) of 0.531 at the 
0.95 confidence level. This means that the full regression model results suffer from 
the problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no 
heteroscedasticity is rejected. As a result, the weighted least square regression 
analysis (WLS) is implemented to overcome this problem in the next section 
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Table 5.16: The Goldfeld-Quandt (F) Statistic for the relationship between 
cultural values and audit committee. Source: Study analysis results using E- 
views statistical software package (Version 3.1) 
Goldfeld-Quandt F Statistic 1.131846 
F(. 95, jo, jo) critical value 
(5/6/3)Weighted least square regression analysis 
0.531523 
In this section the weighted least square regression analysis is used to eliminate the 
problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals (Appendix 19). The overall fit statistics for 
the model shows that the overall R-square has a value of 71.9% compared to a value 
of 56.5% for the stepwise model (Table 5.17). The F-statistic has'increased to a value 
of 25.61, compared to a value of 13.01 for the stepwise model, with a significant p- 
value of . 000 at the 0.99 confidence level. This result shows that the regression 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
Further results show that individuality cultural value has a significant positive 
relationship with the "audit committee", which is inconsistent with previous stepwise 
model results. The regression coefficient has a value of . 917 and t-value of 5.061 with 
p-value of . 000 at the 0.99 confidence level Table (5.17). This means that an increase 
in individuality is significantly associated with an increase in audit committee and 
vice versa. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis which states that "There is a 
relationship between cultural values and audit committee" is not rejected. 
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Table 5.17: The Weighted Least Square regression analysis for the relationship 
between cultural values and audit committee. IND= individuality. Sig= 
significance level. (***) indicates value significant at the 0.99 confidence level. N= 
number of observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software 
(Version 14.00) 
Audit committee 
Variables Regression Standard t-Statistics Sig. N 
coefficient error 
Constant 
IND 
21.694 12.340 1.758 . 109 23 
. 917 . 181 5.061 . 000 23 
Multiple correlation . 848 coefficient 
R-square . 719 2 Adjusted R . 691 Regression standard error 39.26 
F-test 25.61*** 
Sig. . 000 
To sum up, the statistical analysis in this section has successfully managed to identify 
significant positive relationship between individuality and the audit committee across 
twenty three sample countries. The next section concentrates on the relationship 
between cultural values and remuneration disclosure. 
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(5/7) Cultural values and remuneration disclosure 
The relationship between cultural values and the "remuneration disclosure" corporate 
governance system is identified by using multiple regression analysis for the full 
study variables. Afterwards, a stepwise multiple regression analysis is implemented to 
exclude any multicollinearity in the model. Then, a weighted least squares regression 
analysis is implemented to overcome the problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals. 
Note that each model is followed by an evaluation and assessment process. This is as 
follows: 
(5/7/1) Multiple regression analysis (full model) 
The multiple regression analysis technique for the full model is used to explore the 
relationships between the independent cultural values and the dependent corporate 
governance systems across the sample countries (Appendix 20). Cultural values are 
represented by four independent variables which include: power distance (PDI), 
uncertainty avoidance (UAV), individualism (IND), and masculinity (MAS). In 
addition, six interaction terms are added to the analysis to represent the 
interrelationships among these independent variables. Corporate governance system is 
represented by the dependent variable "remuneration disclosure". 
In general, the overall results of the model show that the R-square has a moderate 
value of 59.4%; the F-statistic has an insignificant value of 1.757 with a p-value of 
0.176 at the 0.95 confidence level (Table 5.18). The detailed analysis of the results 
shows that there is no significant relationship between cultural values and 
remuneration disclosure. Test results show that t-values for all cultural values are 
below the 1.96 benchmark, with insignificant p-values at the 0.95 confidence level. 
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Table 5.18: The full multiple regression analysis model for the relationship 
between cultural values and remuneration disclosure. PDI= power distance, 
UAV= uncertainty avoidance, IND= individuality, MAS= masculinity, other 
variables are interaction terms. Sig-- significance level. N= number of 
observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Remuneration disclosure 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
t-Statistics Sig. N 
Constant 244.086 123.940 1.969 . 072 23 
PDI -. 818 1.731 -. 473 . 
645 23 
UAV . 467 1.118 . 417 . 684 23 IND -2.647 1.545 -1.713 . 112 23 MAS -1.748 1.411 -1.239 . 239 23 PDI UAV -. 013 . 012 -1.110 . 239 23 
PDI IND . 033 . 022 1.498 . 160 23 PDI7MAS -. 005 . 017 -. 301 . 769 23 UAVIND 
- -. 
003 . 010 -. 351 . 732 23 UAV MAS . 000 . 010 -. 040 . 968 23 IND MAS . 027 . 015 1.834 . 092 23 Multiple correlation . 771 
coefficient 
R-square 
. 594 2 Adjusted R 
. 
256 
Regression standard error 13.314 
F-test 1.757 
Sig. 
. 
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(5/7/1/1) Evaluation and assessment 
The evaluation and assessment of the previous full regression model shows that: first, 
the analysis of the case-wise diagnostics output of all study observations shows that 
there are no observationý with standard residual value more than the rule of thumb 
benchmark of (±3) standard deviation control limit. Note that the number of 
observations (N) used in this analysis equal to 23. During the analysis process the 
observation for "Luxembourg" is excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing 
values. 
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Second, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all independent variables are greater 
than the rule of thumb benchmark of 5 degrees (See Table 5.3). This means that the 
study model does suffer from the problem of multicollinearity between independent 
variables. Therefore, the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique is used to 
improve the overall fit of the model, and to exclude any independent variables which 
may have some impact on other independent variables. 
Figure 5.8: The full regression standardized predicted and residuals values for 
the relationship between cultural values and remuneration disclosure. Source: 
Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Finally, the scatter plot (Figure 5.8) for the relationship between the regression 
standardized predicted value (x-axis) and regression standardized residuals (Y-axis) 
shows that data points a sign of a trend at the top right of the graph. It seems that this 
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is due to the nature of the data set. It appears that ten countries out of the twenty four 
sample countries happen to have identical remuneration disclosure scores of 100. 
Therefore, this indicates that the model may suffer from heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. This is an issue that is going to be ftuther addressed in subsequent analysis. 
The next section takes a step forward in the analysis process by implementing the 
stepwise multiple regression analysis technique on the data set. 
(5/7/2) Stepwise multiple regression analysis 
The full multiple regression analysis in the previous section shows no significant 
relationship between cultural values and remuneration disclosure. In this section the 
stepwise multiple regression analysis technique is used to reduce the multicollinearity 
among the independent variables (Appendix 20). In general, the overall fit statistics 
for the model shows that the R-square has a value of 18.5% compared to a value of 
59.4% for the full model. The F-statistic has almost tripled to reach a value of 4.78, 
compared to a value of 1.75 for the full regression model, with a significant p-value of 
0.040 at the 0.95 confidence level (Table 5.19). This indicates that the regression 
coefficients for the independent variables are significantly different from zero. 
Further results show that one independent cultural value has managed to explain the 
dependent corporate governance system "remuneration disclosure". The interaction 
term "uncertainty avoidance/masculinity" cultural variable shows a significant 
negative relationship with the remuneration disclosure across the twenty three sample 
countries. The regression coefficient has a value of -. 003 and t-value of -2.18, with p- 
value of . 040 at the 0.95 confidence level. This means that an increase in uncertainty 
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avoidance and/or masculinity cultural values is expected to cause a significant 
decrease in remuneration disclosure across the sample countries. 
Table 5.19: The Stepwise Multiple regression analysis for the relationship 
between cultural values and remuneration disclosure. UAV-MAS= interaction 
term of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. Sig= significance level. (**) 
indicates value significant at the 0.95 confidence level. (***) indicates value 
significant at the 0.99 confidence level N= number of observations. Source: Study 
analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Remuneration disclosure 
Variables Regression Standard t-Statistics Sig. N 
coefficient error 
Constant 100.201 5.321 18.830*** . 000 23 UAV MAS -. 003 . 001 -2.186** . 
040 23 
Multiple correlation . 431 coefficient 
R-square 
2 Adjusted R 
Regression standard error 
. 185 
. 147 14.258 
F-test 4.780** 
Sig. . 040 
In contrast, test results show that there are other nine excluded independent variables 
from this model. The t-values for these variables are below the 1.96 benchmark, with 
insignificant p-values at the 0.95 confidence level. These excluded independent 
variables include: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individuality, masculinity, 
power distance/uncertainty avoidance, power distance/individuality, power 
distance/masculinity, uncertainty avoidance/ individuality and finally 
individuality/masculinity. 
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(5/7/2/1) Evaluation and assessment 
The assessment and review of the stepwise multiple regression model results is 
conducted using several test statistics. First, a review of the case-wise diagnostics 
output of all study observations shows that there are no observations with standard 
residual more than the rule of thumb benchmark of (±3) standard deviation control 
limit. Note that the number of observations (N) which is used in this analysis is 23 
observations. During the analysis process the observation for "Luxembourg" is 
excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing values. Second, the 
multicollinearity problem has disappeared completely due to the exclusion of nine of 
the independent variables. 
Figure 5.9: The stepwise regression standardized predicted and residuals values 
for the relationship between cultural values and remuneration disclosure. 
Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Third, the scatter plot (Figure 5.9) for the dependent remuneration disclosure 
regression results shows that data points are still showing a trend at the top right of the 
graph. Consequently, the full data set is tested for the existence of heteroscedasticity 
of residuals using Goldfield-Quandt (G-Q) test statistics (Table 5.20). Test results 
show that the G-Q (F) statistic has a value of 3.16, which is higher than the F (critical 
value) of 0.531 at the 0.95 confidence level. This means that the full regression model 
results suffer from the problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity is rejected. As a result, the weighted least square 
regression analysis (WLS) is implemented to overcome this problem in the next 
section 
Table 5.20: The Goldfeld-Quandt (F) Statistic for the relationship between 
cultural values and remuneration disclosure. Source: Study analysis results using 
E-views statistical software package (Version 3.1) 
Goldfeld-Quandt F Statistic 3.164345 
F(. 95, jo, jo) critical value 
(5/7/3)Weighted least square regression analysis 
0.531523 
In this section the weighted least square regression analysis is used to eliminate the 
problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals (Appendix 20). The overall fit statistics for 
the model shows that the overall R-square has a value of 24.1% compared to a value 
of 18.5% for the stepwise model (Table 5.21). The F-statistic has decreased to a value 
of 4.77, compared to a value of 4.78 for the stepwise model, with a significant p-value 
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of 0.045 at the 0.95 confidence level. This result shows that the regression coefficients 
are significantly different from zero. 
Further results show that uncertainty avoidance/masculinity cultural value has a 
significant negative relationship with remuneration disclosure which is consistent with 
previous stepwise model results. The regression coefficient has a value of -0.001 and 
t-value of -2.184 with p-value of . 045 at the 0.95 confidence level. This means that an 
increase in uncertainty avoidance and/or masculinity cultural value is significantly 
associated with a decrease in remuneration disclosure and vise versa. Therefore, the 
alternative hypothesis which states that "There is a relationship between cultural 
values and remuneration disclosure" is not rejected. 
Table 5.21: The Weighted Least Square regression analysis for the relationship 
between cultural values and remuneration disclosure. UAV-MAS= interaction 
term of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. Sig= significance level. (**) 
indicates value significant at the 0.95 conridence level. (***) indicates value 
significant at the 0.99 confidence level N= number of observations. Source: Study 
analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
Remuneration disclosure 
Standard t-Statistics Sig. N 
error 
Constant 103.132 2.315 44.552*** . 000 23 
UAV MAS -. 001 . 001 -2.184** . 045 
23 
Multiple correlation . 491 coefficient 
R-square . 241 2 Adjusted R . 191 Regression standard error 8.044 
F-test 4.770* 
Sig. . 045 
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Finally, the statistical analysis in this section 
ýhows a significant negative relationship 
between one cultural value, which is "uncertainty avoidance/masculinity, and 
remuneration disclosure across the twenty three sample ýountries. The next section 
concentrates on the relationship between cultural values and women on board. 
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(5/8) Cultural values and women on board 
The multiple regression analysis is used to explore the relationship between cultural 
values and the corporate govemance system "women on board". This is followed by a 
stepwise multiple regression analysis to exclude any multicollinearity among 
independent variables in the model. Note that each model is followed by an evaluation 
and assessment process. This is as follows: 
(5/8/1) Multiple regression analysis (full model) 
The multiple regression analysis technique for the full model is used to explore the 
relationships between the independent cultural values and the dependent corporate 
governance systems across the sample countries. Cultural values are represented by 
four independent variables which include: power distance (PDI), uncertainty 
avoidance (UAV), individualism (IND), and masculinity (MAS). In addition, six 
interaction terms for cultural values are added to the analysis to represent the 
interrelationships among these independent variables. While, corporate governance 
system is represented by the dependent variable "women on board" (Appendix 2 1). 
The overall results of the model show that the R-square has a moderate value of 
68.5%; the F-statistic has an insignificant value of 2.61 with a p-value of 0.059 at the 
0.95 confidence level (Table 5.22). The detailed analysis of the results shows that 
there is no significant relationship between cultural values and women on board. Test 
results show that t-values for all cultural values are below the 1.96 benchmark, with 
insignificant p-values at the 0.95 confidence level. 
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Table 5.22: The full multiple regression analysis model for the relationship 
between cultural values and women on board. PDI= power distance, UAV= 
uncertainty avoidance, IND= individuality, IMIAS= masculinity, other variables 
are interaction terms. Sig= significance level. N= number of observations. 
Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Women on Board 
Standard t-Statistics 
error 
Sig. N 
Constant 49.863 41.579 1.199 . 254 23 
PDI -. 491 . 581 -. 845 . 414 
23 
UAV . 311 . 375 . 829 . 423 23 IND -. 480 . 518 -. 926 . 373 23 MAS -. 729 . 473 -1.540 . 150 23 
PDI UAV -. 006 . 004 -1.597 . 136 
23 
PDCIND . 006 . 007 . 874 . 399 23 
PD17MAS . 007 . 006 1.209 . 250 23 UAVIND 
- . 
000 . 003 -. 070 . 946 23 UAV MAS . 000 . 004 -. 055 . 957 23 
IND MAS . 005 . 
005 . 940 . 366 
23 
Multiple correlation . 
828 
coefficient 
R-square 
. 685 2 Adjusted R 
. 
423 
Regression standard error 4.466 
F-test 2.613 
Sig. 
. 
059 
(5/8/1/1) Evaluation and assessment 
The evaluation and assessment process for the full multiple regression model shows 
that: first, the analysis of the case-wise diagnostics output of all study observations 
shows that there are no observations with standard residual value more than the rule 
of thumb bcnclunark of (±3) standard deviation control limit. Note that the number of 
observations (N) used in this analysis equal to 23. During the analysis process the 
observation for "Luxembourg" is excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing 
values. 
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Second, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all independent variables are greater 
than the rule of thumb benchmark of 5 degrees (Table 5.3). This means that the study 
model does suffer from the problem of multicollinearity between independent 
variables. Therefore, the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique is used to 
improve the overall fit of the model and to exclude any independent variables which 
may have some impact on other independent variables. 
Figure 5.10: The full regression standardized predicted and residuals values for 
the relationship between cultural values and women on board. Source: Study 
analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Finally, the scatter plot (Figure 5.10) for the relationship between the regression 
standardized predicted value (x-axis) and regression standardized residuals (Y-axis) 
shows that data points are not scattered evenly across the centre of the panel. 
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Therefore, this may indicates that the model suffers from heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. This is an issue that is going to be further addressed in subsequent analysis. 
The next section takes a step forward in the analysis process by implementing the 
stepwise multiple regression analysis technique on the data set. 
(5/8/2) Stepwise multiple regression analysis 
Test results for the full multiple regression analysis in the previous section shows no 
significant relationship between cultural values and corporate governance system 
"women on board". In this section the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique 
is used to reduce the multicollinearity among the independent variables. The overall 
fit statistics for the model shows that the R-square has a value of 3 8.6% compared to a 
value of 68.5% for the full model. The F-statistics has jumped to reach a value of 
13.21, compared to only 2.61 for the full regression model, with a significant p-value 
of 0.002 at the 0.99 confidence level (Table 5.23). This indicates that the regression 
coefficients for the independent variables are significantly different from zero. 
The detailed results show that one independent cultural value has successfully 
managed to explain the dependent corporate governance system "women on board". 
The interaction term "power distance/masculinity" cultural variable shows a 
significant negative relationship with the "women on board" score across the twenty 
three sample countries. The regression coefficient has a value of -0.003 and t-value of 
-3.635, with p-value of 0.002 at the 0.99 confidence level. This means that an increase 
in power distance and/or masculinity cultural values is associated with a significant 
decrease in women on board across the sample countries. Therefore, the alternative 
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hypothesis which states that "There is a relationship between cultural values and 
women on board" is not rejected. 
Table 5.23: The Stepwise Multiple regression analysis for the relationship 
between cultural values and women on board. PDI-MAS= interaction term of 
power distance and masculinity. Sig= significance level. (***) indicates value 
significant at the 0.99 confidence level. N= number of observations. Source: 
Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Women on Board 
Variables Regression Standard t-Statistics Sig. 
coefficient error 
Constant 14.158 1.925 7.356*** . 000 23 
PDI MAS -. 003 . 001 -3.635*** . 002 23 Multiple correlation . 621 coefficient 
R-square . 386 2 Adjusted R . 357 
Regression standard error 4.715 
F-test 13.212*** 
Sig. . 002 
In contrast, test results show that there are other nine excluded independent variables 
from this model. The t-values for these variables are below the 1.96 benchmark, with 
insignificant p-values at the 0.95 confidence level. These excluded independent 
variables include: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individuality, masculinity, 
power distance/uncertainty avoidance, power distance/individuality, uncertainty 
avoidance/individuality and finally individuality/masculinity. 
(5/8/2/1) Evaluation and assessment 
The assessment and review of the stepwise multiple regression model results is 
conducted using several test statistics. First, a review of the case-wise diagnostics 
output of all study observations shows that there are no observations with standard 
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residual more than the rule of thumb benchmark of (±3) standard deviation control 
limit. Note that the number of observations (N) which is used in this analysis is 23 
observations. During the analysis process the observation for "Luxembourg" is 
excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing values. Second, the 
multicollinearity problem has disappeared completely among the independent 
variables due to the exclusion of nine dependent variables in the stepwise regression 
model. 
Figure 5.11: The stepwise regression standardized predicted and residuals values 
for the relationship between cultural values and women on board. Source: Study 
analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Third, the scatter plot (Figure 5.11) for the dependent remuneration disclosure 
regression results shows that data points are still not scattered evenly across the centre 
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of. the panel. Consequently, the full data set is tested for the existence of 
heteroscedasticity of residuals using Goldfield-Quandt (G-Q) test statistics' (Table 
5.22). Test results show that the G-Q (F) statistic has a value of 0.407, which is lower 
than the F (critical value) of 0.531 at the 0.95 confidence level. This means that the 
full regression model results do not suffer from the problem of heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. Tberefore, the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity is not rejected. 
Table 5.24: The Goldfeld-Quandt (F) Statistic for the relationship between 
cultural values and women on board. Source: Study analysis results using E- 
views statistical software package (Version 3.1) 
Goldfeld-Quandt F Statistic 0.407700 
F(. 95, jo, jo) critical value 0.531523 
Finally, the statistical analysis of the data set in this section shows a significant 
negative relationship between one cultural value, which is "power 
distance/masculinity, and "women on board" across the sample twenty three 
countries. The next section concentrates on the relationship between cultural values 
and ethics code. 
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(5/9) Cultural values and code of ethics 
The relationship between cultural values and the corporate governance system "code 
of ethics" is identified by using multiple regression analysis for the full study 
variables. Afterwards, a stepwise multiple regression analysis is implemented to 
exclude any multicollinearity in the model. Then, a weighted least squares regression 
analysis is implemented to overcome the problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals. 
Note that an evaluation and assessment process is conducted for each model. This is 
as follows: 
(5/9/1) Multiple regression analysis (full model) 
The multiple regression analysis technique for the full model is used to explore the 
relationships between the independent cultural values and the dependent corporate 
governance systems across the sample countries. Cultural values are represented by 
four independent variables which include: power distance (PDI), uncertainty 
avoidance (UAV), individualism (IND), and masculinity (MAS). In addition, six 
interaction terms for cultural values are added to the analysis to represent the 
interrelationships among these independent variables. Corporate governance system is - 
represented by the dependent variable "code of ethics" (Appendix 22). f 
In general, the overall results of the model show that the R-square has a moderate 
value of 74.1%; the F-statistic has a significant value of 3.42, with a p-value of 0.024 
at the 0.95 confidence level (Table 5.25). The detailed analysis of the results shows 
that there is a significant negative relationship between uncertainty 
avoidance/individuality and code of ethics. The regression coefficient has a value of - 
023 and a t-value of -2.230, with p-value of . 046 at the 0.95 confidence level. This 
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means that an increase in avoidance/individuality is usually associated with a decrease 
in code of ethics across the 23 sample countries. 
Table 5.25: The full multiple regression analysis model for the relationship 
between cultural values and code of ethics. PDI= power distance, UAV= 
uncertainty avoidance, IND= individuality, MAS= masculinity, other variables 
are interaction terms. Sig= significance level. (**) indicates significant values at 
the 0.95 confidence level. N= number of observations. Source: Study analysis 
results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Code of ethics 
Standard t-Statistics 
error 
Sig. N 
Constant 138.37 132.22 1.046 
. 316 23 PDI -2.180 1.847 -1.181 . 261 
23 
UAV 2.459 1.19 2.062 -062 23 IND -1.053 1.64 -. 638 . 535 23 MAS -2.011 1.50 -1.33 . 206 23 PDI UAV -. 024 . 013 -1.95 . 075 23 PDCIND . 042 . 023 1.81 . 094 23 PDI-MAS . 023 . 018 1.24 . 236 23 
UAV-IND -. 023 . 010 -2.23** . 046 23 UAV-MAS -. 002 . 011 -. 167 . 870 23 
IND MAS 
. 013 . 016 . 822 . 427 23 Multiple correlation . 861 coefficient 
R-square 
. 741 2 Adjusted R . 525 Regression standard error 14.20 
F-test 3.429** 
Sig. . 
024 
(5/9/1/1) Evaluation and assessment 
The evaluation and assessment of the full multiple regression model shows that: first, 
the analysis of the case-wise diagnostics output of all study observations shows that 
there are no observations with standard residual value more than the rule of thumb 
benchmark of (±3) standard deviation control limit. Note that the number of 
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observations (N) used in this analysis equal to 23. During the analysis process the 
observation for "Luxembourg" is excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing 
values. 
Second, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all independent variables are greater 
than the rule of thumb benchmark of 5 degrees (See Table 5.3). This means that the 
study model does suffer from the problem of multicollinearity between independent 
variables. Therefore, the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique is 
implemented to avoid this problem. - 
Figure 5.12: The full regression standardized predicted and residuals values for 
the relationship between cultural values and code of ethics. Source: Study 
analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Finally, the scatter plot (Figure 5.12) for the relationship between the regression 
standardized predicted value (x-axis) and regression standardized residuals (Y-axis) 
shows that data points are scattered are not scattered evenly across the centre of the 
panel. As a rule of thumb, this may indicates that the model suffers from 
heteroscedasticity of residuals. This is an issue that is going to be further addressed in 
subsequent analysis. The next section takes a step forward in the analysis process by 
implementing the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique on the data set. 
(5/9/2) Stepwise multiple regression analysis 
The full multiple regression analysis in the previous section shows a significant 
relationship between uncertainty avoidance/individuality cultural value and code of 
ethics. In this section the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique is used to 
eliminate the multicollinearity problem (Appendix 2 1). In general, the overall fit 
statistics for the stepwise regression model shows that the R-square has a value of 
51.1% compared to a value of 74.1% for the full model. The F-statistic increases 
sharply to a value of 10.460, compared to a value of 3.429 for the full regression 
model, with a significant p-value of 0.001 at the 0.99 confidence level. This indicates 
that the regression coefficients for the independent variables are significantly different 
from zero (Table 5.26). 
Further test results show that two independent cultural values have managed to 
explain the dependent corporate governance system "code of ethics" (Table 5.26). The 
independent individuality cultural variable ý shows a significant positive relationship 
with the code of ethics across the twenty three sample countries, since it has a 
regression coefficient of . 638 and t-value of 3.897 with p-value of 0.001 at the 0.99 
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confidence level. This means that an increase in individuality cultural value is 
significantly associated with an increase in code of ethics across the sample countries. 
In addition, test results show a significant negative relationship between masculinity 
and code of ethics, since the regression coefficient has a value of -0.323 and t-value of 
-2.390, with p-value of . 027 at the 0.95 confidence level. This means that an increase 
in masculinity is significantly associated with a decrease in code of ethics. 
Table 5.26: The Stepwise Multiple regression analysis for the relationship 
between cultural values and code of ethics. IND= individuality, MAS= 
masculinity. Sig= significance level. (**) indicates value significant at the 0.95 
confidence level. (***) indicates value significant at the 0.99 confidence level N= 
number of observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software 
(Version 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
Code of Ethics 
Standard t-Statistics 
error 
Sig. N 
Constant 40.415 12.95 3.120*** 
. 005 23 
IND . 638 . 164 3.897*** . 001 23 MAS -. 323 . 135 -2.390** . 027 23 Multiple correlation . 715 coefficient 
R-square 
. 511 2 Adjusted R 
. 462 Regression standard error 15.10 
F-test 10.460*** 
Sig. 
. 
001 
In, contrast, test results show that eight independent variables have been excluded 
from this model. The t-values for these variables are below the 1.96 benchmark, with 
insignificant p-values at the 0.95 confidence level. These excluded independent 
variables include: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, power distance/uncertainty 
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avoidance, power distance/individuality, power distance/masculinity, uncertainty 
avoidance/ individuality, individuality/masculinity and individuality/masculinity. 
(5/9/2/1) Evaluation and assessment 
The assessment and review of the stepwise multiple regression model results is 
conducted using several test statistics. First, a review of the case-wise diagnostics 
output of all study observations shows that there are no observations with standard 
residual more than the rule of thumb benchmark of (±3) standard deviation control 
limit. Note that the number of observations (N) which is used in this analysis is 23 
observations. During the analysis process the observation for "Luxembourg" is 
excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing values. Second, test results show 
that the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for both individuality and masculinity has a 
value of 1.00, which is below the accepted benchmark of 5.00 (Table 5.27). This 
means that the regression model does not suffer any more from the problem of 
multicollinearity. 
Table 5.27: The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the relationship between 
independent cultural values and code of ethics. IND= individuality, AUS= 
masculinity. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Collinearity Statistics 
Independent Variables Tolerance VIF 
Constant 
IND 1.00 1.00 
MAS 1.00 1.00 
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Figure 5.13: The stepwise regression standardized predicted and residuals values 
for the relationship between cultural values and code of ethics. Source: Study 
analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Third, the scatter plot (Figure 5.13) for the dependent remuneration disclosure 
regression results shows that data points are still not scattered evenly across the centre 
of the panel. Consequently, the full data set is tested for the existence of 
heteroscedasticity of residuals using Goldfield-Quandt (G-Q) test statistics (Table 
5.28). Test results show that the G-Q (F) statistic has a value of 1.374, which is higher 
than the F (critical value) of 0.531 at the 0.95 confidence level. This means that the 
full regression model results suffer from the problem of heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no heteroscedaseicity is rejected. As a 
result, the weighted least square regression analysis (WLS) is implemented to 
overcome this problem in the next section 
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Table 5.28: The Goldfeld-Quandt (F) Statistic for the relationship between 
cultural values and code of ethics. Source: Study analysis results using E-views 
statistical software package (Version 3.1). 
Goldfeld-Quandt F Statistic 1.374917 
F(. 95,10,10) critical value 0.531523 
(5/9/3)Weighted least square regression analysis 
In this section the weighted least square regression analysis is used to eliminate the 
problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals. The overall fit statistics for the model 
shows that the overall R-square has*a value of 68.3% compared to a value of 51.5% 
for the stepwise model (Table 5.29). The F-statistic has increased to a value of 19.40, 
compared to a value of 10.46 for the stepwise model, with a significant p-value of 
0.002 at the 0.99 confidence level. This result shows that the regression coefficients 
are significantly different from zero (Appen ix 
Further results show that uncertainty avoidance/masculinity cultural value has a 
significant negative relationship with code of ethics which is inconsistent with the 
previous stepwise model results. The regression coefficient has a value of -0.005 and 
t-value of -4.40, with p-value of 0.002 at the 0.95 confidence level. This means that an 
increase in uncertainty avoidance and/or masculinity cultural values is significantly 
associated with a decrease in code of ethics and vice versa. Therefore, the alternative 
hypothesis which states that "There is a relationship between cultural values and code 
of ethics" is not rejected. 
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Table 5.29: The Weighted Least Square regression analysis for the relationship 
between cultural values and code of ethics. UAV_MAS= interaction term of 
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. Sig-- significance level. (***) indicates 
value significant at the 0.99 confidence level. N= number of observations. Source: 
Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Code of Ethics 
Variables Regression Standard t-Statistics Sig. N 
coefficient error 
Constant 99.68 4.99 19.96*** . 000 
23 
UAV NUS -. 005 . 001 -4.40*** . 002 
23 
Multiple correlation . 827 
coefficient 
R-square 
Adjusted R2 
Regression standard error 
. 683 
. 648 33.00 
F-test 19.401 *** 
Sig. . 002 
To sum up, the statistical analysis in this section shows an interesting, result 
concerning the relationship between cultural values and code of ethics. Test results 
show a significant negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance/masculinity 
and code of ethics across the sample twenty three sample countries. The next section 
deals with the last relationship between cultural values and ethics systems. 
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(5110) Cultural values and ethics systems 
The multiple regression analysis is used to explore the relationship between cultural 
values and the corporate govemance system "ethics systems". This process is 
followed by a stepwise multiple regression analysis. Tben, a weighted least squares 
regression analysis is implemented to overcome the problem of heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. Note that each model is followed by an evaluation and assessment process. 
This is as follows: 
(511011) Multiple regression analysis (full model) 
The multiple regression analysis technique for the full model is used to explore the 
relationships between the independent cultural values and the dependent corporate 
governance systems across the sample countries. Cultural values are represented by 
four independent variables which include: power distance (PDI), uncertainty 
avoidance (UAV), individualism (IND), and masculinity (MAS). In addition, six 
interaction terms for cultural values are added to the 'analysis to represent the 
interrelationships among the independent variables. Corporate governance system is 
represented by the dependent variable "ethics systems" (Appendix 23). 
The overall results of the model show that the R-square has a high value of 8 1.1%, the 
F-statistic has a significant value of 5.13, with a p-value of . 005 the 0.99 confidence 
level (Table 5.30). The detailed analysis of the results shows that there are some 
significant relationships between cultural values and ethics systems across the sample 
countries. There is a significant positive relationship between uncertainty-avoidance 
and power distance/individuality on one side, and ethics systems on the other. Test 
results show that the uncertainty-avoidance and power distance/individuality have a 
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regression coefficients of 2.317 and 0.048 respectively, and t-values of 2.504 and 
2.637 respectively, with p- values of 0.028 and 0.022 respectively at the 0.55 
confidence level. In contrast, there are significant negative relationship between 
power distance/uncertainty-avoidance and uncertainty-avoidance/individuality on one 
side and ethics systems on the other side (Table 5.30). Test results show that the 
power distance/uncertainty-avoidance and uncertainty-avoidance/individuality 
independent variables have regression coefficients of -0.021 and -0.029 respectively, 
and t-values of -2.187 and -3.692 respectively, with p-values of 0.049 and 0.003 
respectively at the 0.95 and 0.99 confidence levels respectively. 
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Table 5.30: The full multiple regression analysis model for the relationship 
between cultural values and ethics system. PDI= power distance, UAV= 
uncertainty avoidance, IND= individuality, MAS= masculinity, other variables 
are interaction terms. Sig-- significance level. (**) indicates significant values at 
the 0.95 confidence level. (***) indicates significant values at the 0.99 confidence 
level N= number of observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS 
software (Version 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Ethics system 
Standard t-Statistics 
error 
Sig. N 
Constant 24.39 102.56 . 238 . 816 23 PDI -1.130 1.432 -. 789 . 
446 23 
UAV 2.317 . 925 2.504** . 028 23 IND -. 082 1.27 -. 064 . 950 23 MAS 
. 091 
1.16 . 078 . 939 23 PD1-UAV -. 021 . 010 -2.187** . 049 23 PD1-IND, 
. 
048 . 018 2.637** . 
022 23 
PDI-NIAS -. 003 . 014 -. 179 . 861 
23 
UAVIND -. 029 . 008 -3.692*** . 
003 23 
UAV-MAS 
. 002 . 
009 
. 213 . 
835 23 
IND MAS -. 004 . 012 -. 293 . 775 23 Multiple correlation . 900 coefricient 
R-square 
. 811 2 Adjusted R . 
653 
Regression standard error 11.01 
F-test 5.138*** 
Sig. 
. 005 
(51101111) Evaluation and assessment 
The evaluation and assessment process for the full multiple regression model shows 
that: first, the analysis of the case-wise diagnostics output of all study observations 
shows that there are no observations with standard residual value more than the rule 
of thumb benchmark of (+-3) standard deviation control limit. Note that the number of 
observations (N) used in this analysis equal to 23. During the analysis process the 
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observation for "Luxembourg" is excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing 
values. 
Second, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all independent variables are greater 
than the rule of thumb benchmark of 5 degrees (See Table 5.3). This means that the 
study model does suffer from the problem of multicollinearity between independent 
variables. Therefore, the stepwise multiple regression analysis technique is used to 
exclude any independent variables which may have some impact on other independent 
variables. 
Figure 5.14: The full regression standardized predicted and residuals values for 
the relationship between cultural values and ethics system. Source: Study 
analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Finally, the scatter plot (Figure 5.14) for the relationship between the regressions 
standardized predicted value (x-axis) and regression standardized residuals (Y-axis) 
shows that data points are not scattered evenly across the centre, of the panel. 
Iberefore, this may indicates that the model suffers from heteroscedasticity of 
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residuals. This is an issue that is going to be further addressed in subsequent analysis. 
The next section takes a step forward in the analysis process by implementing the 
stepwise multiple regression analysis technique on the data set. 
(5/10/2) Stepwise multiple regression analysis 
Test results for the full multiple regression analysis in the previous section shows 
some significant relationships between cultural values and corporate governance 
system "ethics systems" (Appendix 22). In this section the stepwise multiple 
regression analysis technique is used to eliminate the multicollinearity among the 
independent variables. The overall fit statistics for the stepwise model shows that the 
R-square has a value of 42.4% compared to a value of 8 1.1 % for the full regression 
model (Table 5.3 1). The F-statistic has jumped to reach a value of 15.475, compared 
to only 5.138 for the full regression model, with a significant p-value of 0.001 at the 
0.99 confidence level. This indicates that the regression coefficients for the 
independent variables are significantly different from zero. 
The detailed test results show that one independent cultural value has successfully 
managed to explain the dependent corporate governance system "ethics systems" 
(Table 5.31). The individuality cultural variable shows a significant positive 
relationship with the ethics systems score across the twenty three sample countries. 
The regression coefficient has a value of 0.619 and t-value of 3.934 with p-value of 
0.001 at the 0.99 confidence level. This means that an increase in individuality 
cultural value is associated with a significant increase in ethics systems across the 
sample countries and vice versa. 
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Table 5.31: The Stepwise Multiple regression analysis for the relationship 
between cultural values and ethics system. IND= individuality. Sig-- significance 
level. (***) indicates value significant at the 0.99 confidence level. N= number of 
observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Variables Regression 
coefficient 
Ethics systems 
Standard t-Statistics Sig. N 
error 
Constant 17.533 10.70 1.639 . 116 23 M 
. 
619 . 157 3.93*** . 001 23 
Multiple correlation . 
651 
coefficicnt 
R-square . 424 
Adjusted R2 . 397 Regression standard error 14.52 
F-test. 15.47*** 
-Sig. . 
001 
In contrast, test results show that nine independent variables are excluded from this 
stepwise model. The t-values for these variables are below the 1.96 benchmark, with 
insignificant p-values at the 0.95 confidence level. These excluded independent 
variables include: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, power 
distance/uncertainty avoidance, power distance/individuality, power 
distance/masculinity, uncertainty avoidance/ individuality, uncertainty 
avoidance/masculinity and finally individuality/masculinity. 
(5/10/2/1) Evaluation and assessment 
The assessment and review of the stepwise multiple regression model results is 
conducted using several test statistics. First, a review of the case-wise diagnostics 
output of all study observations shows that there are no observations with standard 
residual more than the rule of thumb benchmark of (±3) standard deviation control 
limit. Note that the number of observations (N) which is used in this analysis is 23 
observations. During the analysis process the observation for "Luxembourg" is 
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excluded list-wise due to the existence of missing values. Second, the 
multicollinearity problem has disappeared completely among the independent 
variables due to the exclusion of nine independent variables using stepwise 
regression. 
Figure 5.15: The stepwise regression standardized predicted and residuals values 
for the relationship between cultural values and ethics system. Source: Study 
analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
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Third, the scatter plot (Figure 5.15) for the stepwise regression results shows that data 
points are still not scattered evenly across the centre of the panel. Consequently, the 
full data set is tested for the existence of heteroscedasticity of residuals using 
Goldfield-Quandt (G-Q) test statistics (Table 5.32). Test results show that the G-Q (F) 
statistic has a value of 2.59, which is higher than the F (critical value) of 0.531 at the 
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0.95 confidence level. This means that the full regression model results suffer from 
the problem of heteroscedasticity of residuals. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no 
heteroscedasticity is rejected. As a result, the weighted least square regression 
analysis (WLS) is implemented to overcome this problem in the next section 
Table 5.32: The Goldfeld-Quandt (F) Statistic for the relationship between 
cultural values and ethics system. Source: Study analysis results using E-views 
statistical software package (Version 3.1) 
Goldfeld-Quandt F Statistic 2.599461 
Fps, jo, jo) critical value 
(5/10/3)Weighted least square regression analysis 
0.531523 
In this section the weighted least square regression analysis is used to eliminate the 
problem of heteroscedasticity (Table 5.33). The overall fit statistics for the model 
shows that the overall R-square has a value of 72.3% compared to a value of 42.4% 
for the stepwise model. The F-statistics has increased to a value of 23.50, compared to 
a value of 15.47 for the stepwise model, with a significant p-value of 0.001 at the 0.99 
confidence level. This result shows that the regression coefficients are significantly 
different from zero (Appendix 22). 
Further results show that individuality cultural value has a significant positive 
relationship with ethics systems, which is inconsistent with previous stepwise model 
results. The regression coefficient has a value of 0.410 and t-value of 4.84 with p- 
value of 0.001 at the 0.99 confidence level. This means that an increase in 
individuality cultural values is significantly associated with a increase in ethics 
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systems and vise versa. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis which states that "There 
is a relationship between cultural values and ethics systems" is not rejected. 
Table 5.33: The Weighted Least Square regression analysis for the relationship 
between cultural values and ethics system. IND= individuality. Sig-- significance 
level. (***) indicates value significant at the 0.99 confldence level. N= number of 
observations. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14-00) 
Ethics systems 
Variables Regression Standard t-Statistics Sig. N 
coefficient error 
Constant 
IND 
46.66 5.40 8.62*** . 000 23 
. 410 . 085 4.84*** . 001 23 Multiple correlation . 850 coefficient 
R-square . 723 Adjusted R2 . 692 Regression standard error 18.71 
F-test 23.50*** 
Sig. . 001 
Finally, the statistical analysis of the data set in this section shows a significant 
positive relationship between one cultural value, which is individuality, and ethics 
systems across the sample twenty three countries. The next section presents the 
overall summary and conclusion for the statistical analysis process implemented in 
this chapter. 
(5111) Summary 
The main aim of this chapter is to present the detailed statistical data analysis 
procedures and results. The explanatory statistical analysis process starts with data 
screening, then the full multiple regression analysis model is implemented. This is 
followed by the stepwise multiple regression analysis to eliminate the problem of 
multicollinearity. The weighted least square regression analysis technique is 
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implemented whenever necessary to overcome the problem of heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. An assessment and review process is implemented for each model. 
In general, the statistical analysis process has successfully managed to achieve the 
study objectives by highlighting the significant relationships between the independent 
cultural values and the independent corporate governance systems. Cultural values are 
represented by four variables which are labeled: power distance (PDI), uncertainty- 
avoidance (UAV), individualism (IND), and masculinity (MAS). In addition, six 
interaction terms are added to the analysis to represent the interrelationships between 
the cultural values. While, corporate governance systems are represented by eight 
main variables which are labeled: board size, separation chair and CEO, independence 
per board, audit committee, remuneration disclosure, women on board, code of ethics 
and ethics systems. 
The details of the analysis show interesting significant relationships between cultural 
values and several corporate governance systems, which is as follows: first, test 
results show a significant negative relationship between power distance and 
separation chair and CEO. Second, there are significant positive relationships between 
individuality and independence per board, audit committee, and ethics systems. Third, 
the power distance/masculinity interaction term shows a significant negative 
relationship with women on board. Finally, the uncertainty- avoidance/masculinity 
interaction term also shows a significant negative relationship with independence per 
board, remuneration disclosure and code of ethics. These findings shed some light on 
the origins of corporate governance systems across the sample countries. Finally, the 
next chapter will present the discussions for these results in detail. 
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION 
The main aim of this chapter is to present a detailed discussion of the research findings, 
in the light of the previous literature review, and their important theoretical and practical 
consequences. Consequently, this chapter is divided into three main sections. The first 
section deals with the impact of cultural values on stock market development in the 
United Kingdom. Correspondingly, the second section presents the impact of cultural 
values on corporate governance systems across twenty four countries. Finally this chapter 
concludes with summary and discussion. 
(6/1) The impact of cultural values on stock market development 
This study has investigated the dynamic relationship between cultural values and stock 
market development indicators in the United Kingdom during the period 1990 - 2004. 
Cultural values are represented by the cultural value model of Hofstede (1980) which 
consists of five dimensions, which are: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, masculinity and time orientation. Stock market development is represented 
by the most commonly used indicators in previous empirical research, which are: stock 
market activity, size, liquidity and concentration. Consequently, the structure equation 
modeling (SEM) is used to analyze the relationship between cultural values and stock 
market development indicators. The linear structural relations (LISREL) software 
package by Joreskog and Sorborn (1993) (Version 8.72) is implemented following the 
methodology of Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) and Noravesh et al. (2005). Two types of 
linear structural relations models are presented: the uni-dimensional and the multi- 
dimensional models. In general, empirical results show that cultural values have a 
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significant impact on stock market development in the United Kingdom over time, which 
have important consequences on both firm and country levels, this is detailed as follows: 
(6/1/1) The uni-dimensional impact of cultural values on stock market development 
The uni-dimensional structural equation models are used to investigate the relationship 
between each cultural value and stock market development indicators. In general, 
empirical results show that cultural values have a significant impact on stock market 
development in the United Kingdom during the period 1991-2004. These results are 
consistent with previous theoretical and empirical research by Hofstede (1980), Gray 
(1988), Amat et al. (1996), Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996), and Noravesh et al. (2005), 
whd have found that cultural values have a significant influence on accounting practice. 
There is also consistency with De-Jong and Semenov (2000,2002) who have found that 
cultural values have a significant impact on stock market development, such as the 
pattern of ownership and market capitalization. 
First of all, the empirical results show that there is a significant negative relationship 
between power distance and stock market activity in the United Kingdom during the 
period 1991 - 2004 (Table 6.1). This means that a decrease in power distance is usually 
associated with more stock market activity and vice versa. 
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Table 6.1: The uni-dimensional relationships between power distance and stock 
market development indicators. (***) indicates significance at 0.99 confidence level. 
Source: Study analysis results using LISREL software package (Version 8.72) 
Stock market development 
indicators 
Market Market 
Activity Size 
00 010 
Cultural values 
Q, 9: 
-d 
Power Distance N/A N/A 
This is consistent with the theoretical and empirical predictions by Hofstede (1980), 
which show a low power-distance score in the United Kingdom (Table 2.1). People in a 
small power distance society usually believe in equal distribution of power. They feel 
that inequality among individuals should be clearly justified (Amat et al., 1996). They 
feel less threatened; and they usually trust and easily cooperate with each other (De Jong 
and Semenov, 2002). In such a society, the relationship between superiors and 
subordinates is characterized by less interdependence, and a consultative communication 
mode (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
As a result, a low power-distance society may be characterized by a low concentration of 
economic power, high independence in decision-making and high self-regulation, which 
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may encourage competition among members of the society (Gray, 1988). The low 
preference for concentration of power may force the regulatory system to provide more 
favourable conditions that facilitate competition, such as to increase minority 
shareholder's rights (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). Furthermore, a low power distance 
society may have a low level of conservatism and secrecy of information in accounting 
practice (Gray, 1988), which may enhance the disclosure of information about 
companies' performance. Moreover, a low power distance society, like the United 
Kingdom, may have a high tendency towards self-regulation, flexibility and 
decentralization, which may force effective regulation in favour of stock market 
development (Gray, 1988). Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the low power 
distance cultural value in the United Kingdom to be associated with more support for 
stock market development. The increase in competition, disclosure of information and 
effective regulations may increase investors' confidence in the stock market, which in 
turn may result in an increase in market activity over time. 
Second, empirical results show that there is a significant negative relationship between 
power distance and stock market size (Table 6.1). This means that a decrease in power 
distance is usually associated with an increase of stock market size in the United 
Kingdom during period 1991 - 2004. This empirical result is also consistent with 
previous theoretical and empirical research as mentioned earlier. The tendency towards 
low power distance in the United Kingdom may support competition, disclosure of 
information and hence may encourage investors to increase their investments in the stock 
market, which in turn may result in an increase in stock market capitalization over time. 
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Third, empirical results show that there is a negative relationship between uncertainty 
avoidance and stock market activity (Table 6.2). This means that a decrease of 
uncertainty avoidance is usually associated with an increase of stock market activity in 
the United Kingdom during the period 1991 - 2004. This is consistent with the 
theoretical and empirical predictions by Hofstede (1980), which show low uncertainty 
avoidance score for the United Kingdom (Table 2.1). Hofstede (1980) has mentioned 
that uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent that people can tolerate the anxiety 
emerging from unknown or ambitious situations in daily life. 
Nevertheless, a low unc6rtainty avoidance society usually feels at ease and relaxes within 
ambiguous situation. People are usually motivated by recognition by others rather than 
by security preferences. They focus on practice more than principles in life and they can 
accept more deviance, conflict and competition and use it to the benefit of their society 
(De Jong and Semenov, 2002). High changes in the levels of foreign currency rate, gross 
domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP) in the United Kingdom, for 
example, may show that people are more likely to accept changes in their disposal 
income and living standards, and hence can accept more uncertainty in their life. 
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Table 6.2: The uni-dimensional relationships between uncertainty avoidance and 
stock market development indicators. (**) indicates significance at 0.95 confidence 
level, *** indicates significance at 0.99 confidence level. Source: Study analysis 
results using LISREL software package (Version 8.72) 
Stock market development 
indicators 
Market Market 
Activity Size 
V PO 
Cultural values 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Stock market size N/A (+)*. ** 
As a result, a low uncertainty avoidance society may be characterized by a high 
independence among people of the society, which may result in more competition among 
members of the nation. Further, high self-regulation, flexibility and decentralization may 
be dominant, which may result in flexible legislations that foster stock market 
development (Gray, 1988). Therefore, low uncertainty avoidance is expected to provide 
more support for stock market development. The increase in competition, flexible 
legislations may encourage more investors to participate in the stock market and hence 
increase market activity over time. 
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Fourth, empirical results show that there is a significant negative relationship between 
uncertainty avoidance and stock market size in the United Kingdom during the period 
1991 - 2004 (Table 6.2). This means that a decrease of uncertainty avoidance is usually 
associated with an increase of stock market size. This is consistent with previous 
theoretical and empirical research. As mentioned earlier, low uncertainty avoidance is 
expected to encourage more investors to participate in the stock market, to increase 
competition among members of a nation and to support flexible regulations, which may 
enhance stock market capitalization over time. More interestingly, empirical results show 
that there is a significant positive association between stock market size and activity. This 
means that an increase in stock market size is usually associated with stock market 
activity, since large stock markets are more able to attract more investments and hence 
can enjoy more stock market activity. 
Fifth, empirical results show that there is a positive relationship between individualism 
and stock market activity in the United Kingdom during the period 1991 - 2004 (Table 
6.3). This means that an increase in individuality is usually associated with an increase of 
stock market activity. Hofstede (1980) has mentioned that the individualism cultural 
dimension reflects high preference for personal freedom and freedom of choice. 
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Table 6.3: The uni-dimensional relationships between individualism and stock 
market development indicators. (***) indicates significance at 0.99 confidence level. 
Source: Study analysis results using LISREL software package (Version 8.72). 
Stock market development 
indicators 
Market Market 
Activity Size 
PO 
Cultural values 
m 
41 
Od 
; 0-1 
Individualism 
Stock market size N/A (+)*** 
This is consistent with the theoretical and empirical predictions by Hofstede (1980) 
which show a high individualism score in the United Kingdom (Table 2.1), whereby, 
people are considered to be responsible only for themselves and their immediate'family. 
They usually prefer loose social ties and they have an I-consciousness in the society (De 
Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
As a result, a high individualism society is characterized by more tendencies towards 
self-independence in decision-making, which may result in more competition among 
members of a society. Competition may be more favourable to an individualistic society 
as people prefer limited government intervention and dispersed concentration of power 
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(De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). Further, a high individualism society may have low 
conservatism and secrecy in financial reporting practices, which may increase the 
disclosure of financial inforination. Moreover, high self-regulation, flexibility and 
decentralization of regulations are expected to prevail, which may result in flexible 
legislations to support stock market development (Gray, 1988). Therefore, high 
individualism may result in more stock market development. The increase in competition, 
financial disclosure and flexible legislations may increase investors' confidence in the 
financial market, and hence may foster stock market activity over time. 
Sixth, empirical results show that there is a positive relationship between individualism 
and stock market size in the United Kingdom during the period 1991 - 2004 (Table 6.3). 
This means that an increase in individuality is usually associated with an increase of 
stock market size. As mentioned earlier, this is consistent with previous theoretical and 
empirical research. The tendency towards high individualism in the United Kingdom can 
support competition, and disclosure of information, which can encourage shareholders 
and investors to increase their investments in the stock market, which in turn may result 
in an increase in stock market capitalization over time. More interestingly, empirical 
results show that there is a significant positive association between stock market size and 
activity. As mentioned earlier, this means that an increase in stock market size is usually 
associated with stock market activity. 
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(6/1/2) The multi-dimensional impact of cultural values on stock market 
development 
The multi-dimensional structural equation model is implemented to highlight the 
relationships between all cultural values and stock market development indicators 
simultaneously. Empirical results show two significant relationships among the variables 
(Table 6.4), which are: first, there is a significant negative relationship between power 
distance and stock market size in the United Kingdom during the period 1991-2004. This 
a 
means that a decrease in power distance is usually associated with an increase in stock 
market size. This is consistent with previous results from the uni-dimensional structure 
equation model. As mentioned earlier, this can be justified on the basis that low power 
distance is usually associated with more competition among members of a society, more 
information disclosures and flexible regulations to secure power equalities in the society 
(Gray, 1988), that can reduce cost of transactions and increase investors' confidence in 
the financial sector, which in turn can provide more support for stock market 
development 
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Table 6.4: The multidimensional relationship between cultural values and stock 
market development indicators. (*) indicates significance at 0.90 confidence level. 
(***) indicates significance at 0.99 confidence level. Source: Study analysis results 
using LISREL software package (Version 8.72) 
Stock market development indicators 
Market Activity Market Size 
Cultural values 
PC 
C9 
Md 
; O-b 
po 
1=0 < 
Power Distance N/A N/A 
Uncertainty avoidance 
Individualism H 
Stock market size N/A 
These results have some important consequences at the country level. People in wealthy 
countries like the United Kingdom usually have less dependence on power to secure a 
higher position and have fewer tendencies towards creating powerful groups. Wealth can 
be considered as a substitute of power satisfaction. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
national wealth of a country has a negative relationship with power distance (Hofstede, 
1980). 
Furthermore, it is assumed that countries which have technological advances in the field 
of information and communication, like the United Kingdom, are capable of creating 
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more national wealth than others and hence reduce power distance (Sudarwan and 
Fogarty, 1996). In addition, a high level of literacy rate in the United Kingdom allows 
various people in the society to use modem technology and to communicate effectively 
with each other. This can help people to create more wealth, reduce power distance and 
have more awareness about the performance of listed companies on the stock market as 
well as the general economic performance. 
Second, empirical results show that there is a significant positive relationship between 
individualism and stock market activity in the United Kingdom during the period, 1991- 
2004 (Table 6.4). Individualism is the degree to which people feel responsible for 
themselves and/or their immediate family. This is consistent with the previous empirical 
results of the uni-dimensional structure equation model (Table 6.3). As mentioned earlier, 
this can be justified on the basis that there is a significant relationship between 
individualism and secrecy of accounting practice. As low secrecy of information in the 
accounting practice is usually dominant in an individualistic society, with more concern 
about a firm's outside stakeholders. Low secrecy may encourage disclosure of 
information, which may in turn enhance stock market activity (Gray, 1988). 
Furthermore, it is assumed that wealthy nations like the United Kingdom have the ability 
to build towns and cities that result in an increase in self-independence and competition 
among members of a society (Hofstede, 1980). As more people live in urban areas greater 
pressure of competition and struggle for self-survival are likely to prevail in such a 
society (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). In addition, people living in wealthy nations can 
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have more disposable income to pursue their own interests and objectives apart from 
other colleagues, which in turn can increase individuality. Hofstede (1980) has asserted 
that people living in wealthy nations tend to be more independent from others. They are 
more likely to follow their own goals and objectives in isolation from others. 
Therefore, the national wealth of a country may have a positive relationship with 
individualism. The increase in individuality may result in more self survival, 
independence and hence competitions among members of the society, which may in turn 
foster stock market activity. However, these empirical results should be taken with some 
caution due to the existence of multicollinarity among the independent cultural variables 
in the multi-dimensional structure equation model. The correlation matrix for the 
independent cultural variables shows that there is a significant negative relationship 
between individuality and both power distance and uncertainty avoidance. This means 
that as more individuality prevail in the society, power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance tend to diminish, which can result in favourable conditions for stock market 
development over time. More interestingly, empirical results show that there is a 
significant positive relationship between stock market size and activity. As mentioned 
earlier, this means that an increase in stock market size fosters stock market activity and 
vice versa. 
The imperfect multicol linearity can be defined as: "A linear functional relationship 
between two or more independent variables that is so strong that it can significantly affect 
the estimation of the coefficients of the variables" (Studenmund, 2001). The existence of 
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multicol linearity among the explanatory variables may be due to the theoretical 
relationships between the variables and/or the particular sample chosen, which means that 
two variables which are only slightly related in one sample may be so sirongly related in 
another (Studenmund, 2001). The existence of multicollinearity among the independent 
variables in the multi-dimensional structural equation model has increased the variances 
and standard errors of the estimated coefficients and therefore it has decreased the 
calculated t-values of those coefficients. 
Nevertheless, multicollinearity will cause no bias in the estimated coefficients, but these 
estimates will become very sensitive to changes in specification. The overall fit of the 
equation and the estimation of non-multicollinearity variables will be largely unaffected. 
This means that the model can still be used in prediction or forecasting purposes, as long 
as the independent variables maintain the same pattern of multicollinearity in the forecast 
period that they demonstrated in the sample (Studenmund, 2001). Finally, the most 
appropriate remedies for multicollinearity in this case are to look for new and innovative 
explanatory proxy variables for cultural values based on previous theoretical and 
empirical evidence, and to attempt to increase the sample size to reduce the degree of 
multicollinearity. 
On another aspect, some researchers have argued that the international culture may have 
an additional influence on the development of the national stock market. Recent stock 
market statistics show that in the rest of the world investors own about 33% of the United 
Kingdom shares listed on the London Stock Exchange at the end of 2004 (Figure 6.1). 
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However, De-Jong and Semenov (2002) have argued that national cultural values may 
have more importance'than international values on stock market development, this is 
because: first, foreign capital usually flows to stock markets with favourable conditions 
and vice versa. Second, there is a strong bias of portfolio holdings towards domestic 
securities (Tesar and Werner, 1995). Third, the international flow of investment remains 
low, despite the decrease of structural barriers across countries (Rowland, 1999, 
mentioned in De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
Figure 6.1: The share ownership percentages in London stock at end of 2004. 
Source: U. K. Office for National Statistics (ONS). 
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More generally, the long term trend shows that the percentages of shares held by rest of 
the world, or foreign, investors continues to increase, while the percentage holdings of 
individuals is decreasing (Figure 6.2 a, b). So, it may be an interesting topic for future 
research to investigate the impact of international culture on the development of national 
stock markets around the world. 
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Figure 6.2a: Total market value for share ownership during period 1989-2004. 
Source: U. K. Office for National Statistics (ONS). 
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Figure 6.2b: Total market value for share ownership during period 1989-2004. 
Source: U. K. Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
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Finally, a comparison of the growth rates of share ownership during period 1989-2004 
shows that the highest growth rate is by the financial institutions, followed by banks, 
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world; investments and insurance companies (Table 6.3). More interestingly, the public 
sector and central government had a negative growth rate, which is consistent with the 
cultural environment in the United Kingdom, which support competition and discourages 
government direct intervention in business activities. 
Figure 6.3: The growth rates of share ownership during period 1989-2004. 
Source: U. K. Office for National Statistics (ONS). 
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(6/2) The impact of cultural values on corporate governance systems 
This study has investigated the relationship between cultural values and corporate 
governance systems across twenty four countries in Western Europe, North America and 
Asia Pacific. Cultural values are represented by the cultural value model of Hofstede 
(1980) which consists of five dimensions, which are: power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism, masculinity and time orientation. Meanwhile, corporate 
governance systems are represented by eight systems, which are: board size, separation of 
chair and CEO, independence per board, independent audit committee, remuneration 
disclosure, women on board, code of ethics and ethics systems. 
Several regression analysis models are implemented to investigate the relationship 
between cultural values and corporate governance systems across countries, such as the 
multiple regression analysis for the full model, the stepwise regression analysis model, 
and the weighted least square regression (WLS) model, using the SPSS and E-views 
statistical software packages. In general, empirical results show that cultural values have 
an impact on seveml corporate govemance systems across countries, which have 
important consequences at both firm and country levels. 
The preliminary analysis results show that there is a significant interrelationship between 
the independent cultural values across countries (Table 6.5). Empirical results show that 
there is a significant negative relationship between individuality and power distance 
cultural values at the 0.99 confidence level. This means that an increase in the 
individuality cultural value in a society is usually associated with a decrease in power 
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distance. This is consistent with previous longitudinal empirical results which show a 
significant negative relationship between individuality and power distance in the United 
Kingdom during the period 1991-2004. As mentioned earlier, this relationship is 
considered favourable for the development of the stock market and to foster good 
corporate governance systems. In addition, it can be noticed that there is almost a 
significant positive relationship between power distance and uncertainty avoidance 
cultural values at the 0.90 confidence level. This means that high power distance societies 
are usually associated with high uncertainty avoidance. This is also consistent with 
previous longitudinal results in the United Kingdom during period 1991-2004. 
Table 6.5: The cross-correlation matrix between the independent cultural values 
across countries. PDI= power distance, UAV= uncertainty avoidance, IND= 
individuality, MAS= masculinity. (*) indicate values are significant at the 0.90 
confidence level. (***) Indicates values are signiricant at 0.99 confidence level. 
Values in brackets are p-values. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software 
package (Version 14.00) 
Cultural PDI UAV IND MAS 
values 
PDI 1.00 
UAV . 349* 1.00 (. 051) 
IND -. 550*** -. 089 1.00 
(. 003) (. 343) 
MAS ois . 135 -. 001 1.00 (. 467) (. 269) (. 498) 
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Furthermore, empirical results show that there are, significant relationships between 
cultural values and several corporate governance systems, which are detailed as follows: 
first, empirical results show that there is no significant relationship between cultural 
values and corporate board size. This means that differences in cultural values across 
countries do not have an impact on the number of corporate board members. It seems that 
board size is influenced by other independent variables rather than the cultural values 
across country societies. There are some previous studies which show a relationship 
between board size and company performance (see Caroline et al., 2002, and Beiner et 
al., 2004). Unfortunately, there are seldom studies that deal with the determinants of 
board size. This is an issue that needs to be further investigated in future research. 
Second, empirical results show that there is a significant relationship between separation 
of chair and CEO and cultural values (Table 6.6). The overall fit statistics for this model 
shows that the overall R-square has a considerably high value of 90.6% (Table 5.8). The 
F-statistics has a value of 96.240, with a significant p-value of . 000 at the 0.99 confidence 
level. Further detailed results show that power distance cultural value has a significant 
negative relationship with "separation chair and CEO". The regression coefficient has a 
value of -. 499, and t-value of -9.810, with p-value of . 000 at the 0.99 confidence level. 
This means that an increase in power distance is significantly associated with a decrease 
in "separation chair and CEO" across the sample countries and vice versa 
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Table 6.6: Summary of the relationships between cultural values, separation chair 
and CEO, and independence per board. PDI= power distance, UAV= uncertainty 
avoidance, IND= individuality, MAS= masculinity. *** Indicates significance at the 
0.99 confidence level. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software package 
(Version 14.00) 
Corporate governance Separation chair Independence per 
systems and CEO board 
Cultural values 
PD1 
IND 
UAV-MAS 
This is consistent with the previous theoretical and empirical research. As Hofstede 
(1980) has mentioned, people in large power distance societies usually accept the 
existence of a hierarchy of inequality, that is perceived to provide the best protection for 
everyone in the society (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). As a result, co-operation among 
people is usually difficult to maintain, as everyone perceives the other as a potential 
threat to his/her power. Also, this implies an automatic or paternalistic relationship 
between subordinates and superiors, whereby the latter are usually dependent on the 
former, and they seldom contradict each other and neither would a subordinate normally 
approach a superior directly (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
By contrast, people in small power distance societies usually believe in equal distribution 
of power. They usually feel less threatened, trust each other and feel more at ease to 
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cooperate with others (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). The relationship between superiors 
and subordinates may be characterized by less interdependence, and a consultative 
communication mode, whereby subordinates feel free to approach and contradict 
superiors (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). 
Consequently, a high power-distance society may be characterized by a high 
concentration of economic power, low independence in decision-making and low self- 
regulation, which may discourage competition among members of the society (Gray, 
1988). The high preference for concentration of power may force the regulatory system to 
provide conditions that encourage companies to combine the Chair and CEO positions. A 
high power-distance society with high level of conservatism and secrecy in accounting 
practices may discourage disclosure of information about companies' performance (Gray, 
1988). As high self-regulation, flexibility and decentralization deteriorates in a high 
power distance society, more regulation that discourages stock market development and 
good corporate governance will prevail (Gray, 1988). Though, it is not iurprising to find 
that companies in large power distance societies tend to combine the chair and CEO 
positions to secure power inequalities and concentration of economic power. 
Good governance systems usually entail that the chair and CEO position should be 
separated. The idea behind the separation of chairman and CEO is to prevent a single 
individual to have unfettered powers of decision. The chairman is usually responsibly for 
running the board, while the chief executive is usually responsible for running the 
company's business. In some countries, the, corporate law requires the separation between 
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the executive and non-executive managing directors such as in Sweden, while in other 
countries, such as in Germany, the two-tier board structure ensures the separation of 
roles. The EIRIS indices show that the highest proportions of companies with separation 
chair and CEO, within a unitary board structure, are in Ireland and Luxemburg, whereas 
Australia, United Kingdom and New Zealand have over 95% of companies separating the 
roles (Stephanie, 2005). However, it can be noticed that in the U. S. A. only about 25% of 
companies separate the two roles despite its low score on power distance (Table 2.1). 
This may be due to the relatively small number of large and medium capital companies 
listed on the EIRIS index (Stephanie, 2005), or perhaps due to the existence of other 
forces that influence the separation of CEO and chair in the U. S., an issue that need to be 
further investigated in future research. 
Third, empirical results show that there is a significant relationship between 
independence per board and cultural values (Table 6.6). The "independence per board" 
corporate governance system refers to the proportion of independent directors on the 
corporate board. Good corporate governance systems usually suggest that the existence of 
independent directors on the board usually enhances the decision-making process, 
maintains accountability and transparency. The overall fit statistics for the model shows 
that the overall R-square has a relatively low value of 43.3% (Table 5.10). The F- 
statistics have a value of 7.628, with a significant p-value of . 003 at the 0.99 confidence 
level. Further results show that the individuality cultural value has a significant positive 
relationship with "independence per board". The regression coefficient has a value of 
. 538 and t-value of 2.850, with p-value of . 010 at the 0.99 confidence 
level. This means 
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that an increase in individuality cultural value is usually associated with an increase in 
independence per board. 
This is consistent with the previous theoretical and empirical research. As mentioned by 
Hofstede (1980), people in an individualistic society are usually considered to be 
responsible only for themselves and their immediate family. They usually prefer loose 
social ties in the society. On the other hand, collectivistic societies accept responsibility 
for family, tribal or in-groups in exchange for loyalty (Amat et al., 1996). People in 
collectivist societies have a We-consciousness versus an I-consciousness in individualist 
societies (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). A high individualism society may have more 
tendencies towards self-independence in decision-making, limited government 
intervention and dispersed concentration of power (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). A 
highly individualistic society usually prefers low conservatism and secrecy in financial 
reporting practices, which may increase the disclosure of financial information. The 
society is expected to have high self-regulation, flexibility and decentralization, which 
may result in flexible legislations to improve stock market development (Grayj 1988). 
Therefore, these characteristics are expected to support more the inclusion of independent 
directors to the corporate boards. 
Further test results show a significant negative relationship between the interaction term 
"uncertainty avoidance/masculinity" (UANý_MAS) and the "independence per board" 
(Table 6.6). The regression coefficient has a t-value of -. 005 and t-value of -2.578 with p- 
value of . 018 at the 0.95 confidence level. This means that an increase in uncertainty 
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avoidance and masculinity cultural values is usually associated with a decrease in the 
"independence per board" across the sample countries. 
This is consistent with previous theoretical and empirical results. As mentioned by 
Hofstede (1980) the uncertainty avoidance cultural value refers to the extent that people 
can tolerate the anxiety emerging from unknown or ambitious situations in daily life. 
People usually try to avoid and/or reduce these situations by using technology, rules and 
rituals. High uncertainty-avoidance societies feel that uncertainty inherent in life is a 
continuous threat that must be fought. These societies are motivated by security 
preference, which is considered as an achievement in itself. By contrast, low uncertainty- 
avoidance societies are more at ease and relax within ambiguous situations. Motivation 
is perceived as recognition by others rather than security. People focus more on practice 
rather than principles in life. They can accept more deviance, conflict and competition 
and use it to the benefit of their society (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
Consequently, a high uncertainty-avoidance society may be characterized by dependence 
among people and managers of the society, which may result in less competition between 
members of the. nation. Low self-regulation, inflexibility and centralization are expected 
to prevail, which may result in inflexible legislations to support stock market 
development and good corporate govemance systems (Gray, 1988). Therefore, it is 
natural to expect that the existence of high uncertainty-avoidance among the members of 
the society can result in less preference for more independent directors on corporate 
boards across countries. 
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In addition, people in a masculine society usually emphasize material achievement, 
assertiveness, material success and competition. They feel that the strong should be 
supported, conflicts are resolved by fighting them out, and managers prefer to have more 
independence in decision-making. By contrast, a feminine society usually tends to focus 
on feminine nurturance, care for others, the living environment and the quality of life. As 
more preference is given to modest behavior, equality and solidarity against competition, 
and managers usually look for consensus-decisions (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
Consequently, a high masculinity society may be characterized by a high preference for 
independence in decision-making among members of the society, which may result in 
more competition among members of a society. Further, high self-regulation, regulation 
flexibility and decentralization in a masculine society may lead to positive legislations 
towards good corporate governance systems. Some intermediary channels support these 
relationships through managers' high independence (arm's length relationships with 
- stakeholders); dominant private pension funds, and low preference for ownership 
concentration (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
Moreover, a masculine society may be characterized by low conservatism and secrecy in 
financial reporting practices, which may increase information content of company reports 
(Gray, 1988). Therefore, the existence of a high masculinity in a society may result in 
more preference to independence per board. The existence of both uncertainty-avoidance 
and masculinity in a society seems to create a suspicious environment that can hinder the 
inclusion of more independent directors on corporate board of directors. The EIRIS 
277 
indices show that a high percentage of independent directors on the board are found in 
Switzerland, Canada and U. S. By contrast, a low percentage is found in Germany and 
Austria (Stephanie, 2005). 
Fourth, empirical results show that there is a significant relationship between audit 
committee corporate governance system and cultural values. In fact, the main 
responsibilities of an independent audit committee are usually to monitor and review the 
financial statements, the internal financial controls, the external auditors' independence 
and objectivity, and the effectiveness of the audit process. The overall fit statistics for this 
model shows that the overall R-square has a relatively high value of 71.9%. The F- 
statistic has a value of 25.61, with a significant p-value of . 000 at the 0.99 confidence 
level (Table 5.17). Further results show that the individuality cultural value has a 
significant positive relationship with the "audit committee". The regression coefficient 
has a value of . 917 and t-value of 5.061 with p-value of . 000 at the 0.99 confidence 
level 
(Table 6.7). This means that an increase in individuality is significantly associated with 
an increase in audit committee across countries and vice versa. 
This is consistent with the previous theoretical and empirical research. As mentioned by 
Hofstede (1980) people in an individualistic society usually prefer loose social ties. A 
high individualism society may have more tendencies towards self-independence in 
decision-making, low conservatism and secrecy in financial reporting practices, high self- 
regulation, flexibility and de6entralization of regulations (Gray, 1988). Therefore, these 
characteristics are expected to support the formation of independent audit committee. 
278 
The EIRIS indices show that the independence of the audit committee varies considerably 
across countries. For example the percentage of companies with majority independent 
audit committee is approximately 50% in Norway, 56% in Sweden, while it is 
approximately above 95% in the U. K, Netherlands, Canada, U. S., Ireland and 
Luxemburg. By contrast, 'Japan has only 4% of companies with majority independent 
audit committee (Stephanie, 2005). 
Table 6.7: Summary of the relationships between cultural values, audit committee, 
remuneration disclosure and women on board. PDI= power distance, UAV= 
uncertainty avoidance, IND= individuality, MAS= masculinity. *** Indicates 
significance at the 0.99 confidence level. Source: Study analysis results using SPSS 
software (Version 14.00) 
Corporate governance Audit Remuneration Women 
systems Committee disclosure on board 
Cultural valuý 
IND 
PDI-MAS 
UAV-MAS 
Fifth, test results show that there is a significant relationship between remuneration 
disclosure and cultural values. Remuneration disclosure refers to the disclosure of the 
CEO's salary, or the salaries of all directors individually or as a whole. Good corporate 
governance practices advise that remuneration should be linked to corporate and 
individual performance. The overall fit statistics for this model shows that the overall R- 
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square has a considerably low value of 24.1%; the F-statistic has a value of 4.77, with a 
significant p-value of . 045 at the 0.95 confidence level (Table 5.2 1). Further results show 
that the interaction term "uncertainty avoidance/masculinity" cultural value has a 
significant negative relationship with remuneration disclosure, The regression coefficient 
has a value of -. 001 and t-value of -2.184 with p-value of . 045 at the 0.95 confidence 
level (Table 6.7). This means that an increase in uncertainty avoidance and masculinity 
cultural value is significantly associated with a decrease in remuneration disclosure and 
vice versa. 
This is consistent with previous theoretical and empirical results. As mentioned by 
Hofstede (1980) the uncertainty avoidance cultural value refers to the extent that people 
can tolerate the anxiety emerging from unknown or ambiguous situations in daily life. 
People usually try to avoid and/or reduce these situations by using technology, rules and 
rituals. High uncertainty avoidance societies usually feel that uncertainty inherent in life 
is a continuous threat that must be fought. These societies can be motivated by security 
preference, which is considered as an achievement in itself (De Jong and Semenov, 
2002). Consequently, a high uncertainty avoidance society may be characterized by 
dependence among people and managers of the society, which may result in less 
competition between members of the nation. Low self-regulation, inflexibility and 
centralization in regulations are expected to prevail, which may result in inflexible 
legislations that hinder stock market development and good corporate governance 
systems (Gray, 1988). Therefore, these characteristics are expected to make managers 
less reluctant to disclosure of their remuneration packages. 
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In addition, Hofstede (1980) has mentioned that People in a masculine society emphasize 
material achievement, assertiveness, material success and competition. They feel that the 
strong should be supported, conflicts are resolved by fighting them out, and managers 
prefer to have more independence in decision-making (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
Consequently, a high masculinity society may be characterized by a high preference for 
independence in decision-making among members of the society, which may result in 
more competition among members of a society. Further, high self-regulation, regulation 
flexibility and decentralization in a masculine society may lead to positive legislations 
towards good corporate governance systems. Moreover, a masculine society may be 
characterized by low conservatism and secrecy in financial reporting practices, which 
may increase information content of company reports (Gray, 1988). Therefore, the 
existence of a high masculinity in a society may result in more preference to 
remuneration disclosure. However, the existence of both uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity in a society can create a suspicious environment about the future and hence 
may create resistance by mangers towards remuneration disclosure. The EIRIS indices 
show that Greece and Japan have the lowest remuneration disclosure with only 58% and 
44% of companies discloses remuneration to public respectively (Stephanie, 2005). 
Sixth, empirical results show that there is a significant relationship between women on 
board and cultural values. The overall fit statistics for this model shows that the R-square 
has a considerably low value of 38.6%. The F-statistic has a value of 13.21, with a 
significant p-value of . 002 at the 0.99 confidence level (Table 5.23). The detailed results 
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show that one independent cultural value has successfully managed to explain the 
dependent corporate governance system "women on board". The interaction term "power 
distance/masculinity" cultural variable shows a significant negative relationship with the 
"women on board" score across the twenty three sample countries. The regression 
coefficient has a value of -. 003 and t-value of -3.635, with p-value of . 002 at the 0.99 
confidence level. This means that an increase in power distance and masculinity cultural 
values is associated with a significant decrease in women on board across the sample 
countries. - 
This is consistent with the previous theoretical and empirical research. As Hofstede 
(1980) has mentioned that people in large power distance societies may accept the 
existence of a hierarchy of inequality, which is perceived to provide the best protection 
for everyone (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). As a result, co-operation among people may 
be diff icult to maintain, as everyone may perceive the other as- a potential threat to his/her 
power. 
In the light -of Gray's (1988) predictions, a high power-distance society may be 
characterized by a high concentration of economic power, low independence in decision- 
making and low self-regulation, which may discourage competition among members of 
the society. The high preference for concentration of power may support informal 
regulatory systems that prevent the inclusion of more women on corporate boards. Low 
self-regulation and centralization in a high power distance society may discourage 
regulations that foster good corporate governance systems. So, it can be expected that 
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companies in large power distance societies tend to have low women on board to secure 
power inequalities and concentration of economic power. 
Furthermore, people in a masculine society usually emphasize material achievement, 
assertiveness, material success and competition. They usually feel that the strong should 
be supported, conflicts are resolved by fighting them out, and managers prefer to have 
more independence in decision-making. By contrast, a feminine society usually tends to 
focus on feminine nurturance, care for others, the living environment and the quality of 
life. As more preference is given to modest behaviour, equality and solidarity against 
competition, managers usually look for consensus-decisions (De Jong and Semenov, 
2002). Therefore, it seems natural that the existence of a high masculinity in a society 
may result in fewer women on corporate boards. Moreover, the existence of both high 
power distance and masculinity in a society can further create an environment that 
discourage women participation on corporate boards, to support competition and power 
inequalities among members of a society. 
The presence of more women on corporate board usually increases the diversity of the 
backgrounds, skills and experience of board members, which may increase the 
effectiveness of decision-making process. The EIRIS indices show that Norway and 
Sweden have the highest percentages of 26% and 20% of board members on average 
respectively. In contrast, Japan has the lowest percentage of women on board of only 
0.4% of board members (Stephanie, 2005). 
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Seventh, test results show that there is a significant relationship between code of ethics 
and cultural values. The overall fit statistics for this model shows that the overall R- 
square has a moderate value of 68.3%. The F-statistic has a value of 19.40, with a 
significant p-value of . 002 at the 0.99 confidence 
level (Table 5.29). Further results show 
that the interaction term "uncertainty avoidance/masculinity" cultural value has a 
significant negative relationship with code of ethics. The regression coefficient has a 
value of -. 005 and t-value of -4.40, with p-value of . 002 at the 0.99 confidence level 
(Table 6.8). This means that an increase in uncertainty avoidance and masculinity cultural 
values is significantly associated with a decrease inpode of ethics and vice versa. 
Table 6.8: Summary of the relationships between cultural values, code of ethics and 
ethics systems. UAV= uncertainty avoidance, IND= individuality, MAS= 
masculinity. *** Indicates significance at the 0.99 confidence level. 
Source: Study analysis results using SPSS software (Version 14.00) 
Corporate governance Code Ethics 
systems of ethics systems 
Cultural values 
UAWMAS 
IND (+)*** 
This is consistent with previous theoretical and empirical results. As mentioned by 
Hofstede (1980) the uncertainty avoidance cultural value refers to the extent that people 
can tolerate the anxiety emerging from unknown or ambiguous situations in daily life. 
High uncertainty avoidance societies usually feel that uncertainty inherent in life is a 
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continuous threat that must be fought. People usually try to avoid and/or reduce these 
situations by using technology, rules and rituals (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). 
Therefore, it is expect that the existence of high uncertainty avoidance among the 
members of the society can result in less preference for code of ethics, perhaps to avoid 
the ambiguous consequences of its implementation. 
In addition, People in a masculine society usually emphasize material achievement, 
assertiveness, material success and competition. They feel that the strong should be 
supported, conflicts are resolved by fighting them out, and managers prefer to have more 
independence in decision-making (De Jong and Semenov, 2002). Therefore, it can be 
expected that the existence of high masculinity in a society may result in less preference 
for the adoption of corporate code of ethics, perhaps to secure competition and material 
achievement. Furthermore, the existence of both uncertainty-avoidance and masculinity 
in a society can create more resistance to the adoption of such corporate codes. Note that 
some good corporate governance practices require companies to adopt and disclose a 
code of business conduct and ethics for directors, officers and employees. The EIRIS 
indices show that the highest percentage of companies with basic ethics policies is found 
in Finland and the Netherlands. By contrast, Hong Kong and Singapore have the lowest 
percentages Of less than 25% of companies (Stephanie, 2005). 
Finally, empirical results show that there is a significant relationship between ethics 
system and cultural values. The overall fit statistics for this model shows that the overall 
R-square has a relatively high value of 72.3%. The regression coefficient has a t-value of 
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4.84, with a significant p-value of . 00 1 at the 0.99 confidence level (Table 5.33). Further 
results show that individuality cultural value has a significant positive relationship with 
ethics systems (Table 6.8). The regression coefficient has a value of .4 10 and t-value of 
4.84 with p-value of . 001 at the 0.99 confidence level. This means that an increase in 
individuality cultural values is significantly associated with an increase in ethics systems 
and vice versa. 
This is consistent with the previous theoretical and empirical research. As mentioned by 
Hofstede (1980) people in an individualistic society are usually responsible only for 
themselves and their immediate family. They usually prefer loose social ties in the 
society. On the other hand, collectivist societies accept responsibility for family, tribal or 
in-groups in exchange for loyalty (Amat et al., 1996). Consequently, a high 
individualism society may have more tendencies towards self-independence in decision- 
making, limited government intervention and dispersed concentration of power (De-Jong 
and Semenov, 2002). A high individualistic society usually prefers low conservatism and 
secrecy in financial reporting practices, which may increase the disclosure of financial 
information. The society is expected to have high self-regulation, flexibility and 
decentralization of regulations, which may result in flexible legislations to improve stock 
market development (Gray, 1988). Therefore, these characteristics are expected to 
support more ethics systems in corporate practices. 
Good corporate governance systems usually have management systems to support the 
enforcement of codes of ethics. These systems can improve standards of corporate 
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governance, ethics, transparency and integrity. The EIRIS indices show that 86.4% of 
companies in the United Kingdom have basic management systems. By contrast 
Luxemburg has 0% of companies with management systems (Stephanie, 2005). 
(6/3) Summary 
Overall, empirical results have highlighted the influence of culture values on corporate 
governance systems across countries. Individuality is the most important cultural value in 
terms of its impact on corporate governance systems. The individuality cultural value has 
significant positive relationships with three corporate governance systems, which are: 
independence per board, audit committee, and ethics systems. This means that an increase 
in the individuality cultural value is associated with an increase in independent directors 
on corporate board, audit committee and ethics systems across counties. This is consistent 
with Grief (1994) who has noted that the individualistic cultural value may be more 
efficient than the collectivism-values in the long run. He has explained that the formal 
enforcement institutions in an individualistic society may provide more support for 
anonymous exchange, which is useful for the economic development. He has concluded 
that cultural values influence coordination processes which may create different paths of 
development 
In addition, the power distance cultural value is ranked in the second place in terms of its 
impact on corporate governance systems, with only one significant positive impact on 
separation chair and CEO. Similarly, the uncertainty avoidancelmasculinity is the most 
important interaction term among cultural values, since it has significant negative impact 
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on three corporate governance systems, which are: independence per board, remuneration 
disclosure, and code of ethics. In addition, the interaction tenn power 
distance/masculinity comes in the second place with only one significant negative impact 
on women on board. 
These results are consistent with Gorga (2003) who has suggested that the introduction of 
culture may shed some light on corporate governance systems across countries. He has 
explained that the core cultural values and basic assumptions of certain stakeholders may 
have an impact on the relationships between the CEO, directors, officers and employees, 
press and public opinion. Consequently, he has suggested that a strong ideology or belief 
system should be in place to build trust and good governance practices in the capital 
markets across countries. 
This study has shown that several cultural values play an important role in the formation 
and behaviour of stock market development over time, and on corporate governance 
systems across countries. These relationships may have important consequences at both 
firm and country levels. At the country level, it can be suggested that the imposition of 
hard stock market development policies based on imposing only strict legal reforms may 
not yield the expected results. Conversely, soft stock market development policies based 
on cultural values improvements can be more reliable and sustainable overtime. For 
example, countries may pursue development programs to reduce the power distance 
cultural value among members of the society to improve stock market and corporate 
governance systems. This can be done through more emphasis on developing the 
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education system to raise public awareness, and to support more technological 
developments to encourage information disclosure and to create more wealth to members 
of the society. This means that continuous improvements in the education systems, 
information technology and standard of living should be a basic component of any stock 
market development policy to ensure successful results. At the firm level, multinational 
companies, which operate in an unfavourable business environment to stock market 
development, can create more value for their shareholders and potential investors by 
developing their own good corporate governance systems. Finally, it is time now to turn 
to the final chapter which deals with the study's conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this chapter is to present the conclusions and recommendations of 
the research findings in the light of the main aims and objectives of the study. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents the summary of the 
research study findings, while the second section presents the study scope and 
limitations. Finally, this chapter concludes with recommendations for future research. 
(7/1) The research study findings 
The main objective of this study is to explore the impact of culture values on stock 
market development and on corporate governance systems. Consequently, Ihis section 
is divided into two sub-sections to highlight the findings on these relationships, which 
are detailed as follows: 
(7/1/1) Cultural values and stock market development 
One of the main objectives of this study is to explore the impact of cultural values on 
stock market development in the United Kingdom during period 1991-2004. Cultural 
values are represented by the five dimensions cultural value model of Hofstede (1980) 
which consists of. power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity 
and time orientation, while stock market development is represented by four 
indicators, which are: stock market activity, size, liquidity and concentration. In 
general, empirical results, using structural equation modeling (SEM), show that 
cultural values have a significant impact on stock market development. These results 
are consistent with previous theoretical and empirical research by Hofstede (1980), 
Gray (1988), Amat et al. (1996), Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996), and Noravesh et al. 
(2005), who have found that cultural values have a significant influence on accounting 
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practice, and consistent with De-Jong and Semenov (2000,2002), who have found 
that cultural values have a significant impact on stock market development, such as 
the pattern of ownership and market capitalization. This is detailed as follows: 
The uni-dimensional structural equation models have shown that: first, there is a 
significant negative relationship between power distance and both stock market 
activity and size. This means that a decrease in power distance is usually associated 
with more stock market activity/size and vice versa. Second, there is a negative 
relationship between uncertainty avoidance and stock market activity and size. This 
means that a decrease of uncertainty avoidance is usually associated with an increase 
in stock market activity/size and vice versa. Third, there is a-positive relationship 
between individualism and both stock market activity and size. This means that an 
increase in individuality is usually associated with an increase in stock market 
activity/size and vice versa. Fourth, there is a significant positive association between 
stock market size and stock market activity. This means that an increase in stock 
market size is usually associated with an increase in stock market activity and vice 
versa. 
Furthermore, empirical results using the multi-dimensional structural equation model 
show two significant relationships between cultural values and stock market 
development indicators. First, there is a significant negative relationship between 
power distance and stock market size in the United Kingdom during period 1991- 
2004. This means that a decrease in power distance is usually associated with an 
increase in stock market size and vice versa. This is consistent with previous results 
from the uni-dimensional structure equation model. As mentioned earlier, this can be 
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justified on the basis that low power distance is usually associated with more 
competition among members of a society, more information disclosures and flexible 
regulations to secure power equalities in the society (Gray, 1988), that can reduce the 
cost of transactions and increase investors' confidence in the financial sector, which in 
turn can provide more support for stock market development. These results have 
some important consequences on the country level. People in wealthy countries, like 
the United Kingdom, consider wealth as a substitute for power satisfaction. They 
usually have less dependence on power to secure a higher position and have fewer 
tendencies towards creating powerful groups. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
national wealth of a country has a negative relationship with power distance 
(Hofstede, 1980). 
Furthermore, it is assumed that countries that can develop technological advances in 
the field of information and communication, like the United Kingdom, are capable of 
creating more national wealth than others and hence can reduce power distance 
(Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). In addition, the high level of literacy rate in the 
United Kingdom allows many people in the society to use modem technology and to 
communicate effectively with each other. This allows people to develop more 
awareness about the performance of listed companies on the stock market as well as 
the general economic performance. Therefore, it can be concluded that the reduction 
of power distance can be done through the creation of more wealth, technological 
advances, and improvement in the education system and awareness among members 
of the society, which can result in favorable conditions for stock market development. 
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Second, empirical results show that there is a significant positive relationship between 
individualism and stock market activity in the United Kingdom during the period 
1991-2004. This can be justified on the basis that there is a suggested significant 
negative relationship between individualism and secrecy of accounting practice. Low 
secrecy may encourage disclosure of information which may in turn enhance stock 
market activity (Gray, 1988). Furthermore, it is assumed that wealthy nations, like the 
United Kingdom, have the ability to build towns and cities that result in an increase in 
self-independence and competition among members of a society (Hofstede, 1980). As 
more people live in urban areas, greater pressure of competition and struggle for self- 
survival are likely to prevail in such a society (Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996). In 
addition, people living in wealthy nations can have more disposable income to pursue 
their own interests and objectives apart from other colleagues, which in turn can 
increase individuality. Hofstede (1980) has asserted that People living in wealthy 
nations tend to be more independent from others. They are more likely to follow their 
own goals and objectives in isolation from others. 
Therefore, the national wealth of a country may have a positive relationship with 
individualism. The increase in individuality may result in more self survival, 
independence and hence competitions among members of the society, which may in 
turn foster stock market activity. More interestingly, results show that there is a 
significant positive relationship between stock market size and activity. As mentioned 
earlier, this means that an increase in stock market size fosters stock market activity 
and vice versa. 
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However, these empirical results should be taken with some cautions due to the 
existence of unavoidable multicollinarity among the independent cultural variables in 
the multi-dimensional structure equation model. The correlation matrix for the 
independent cultural variables shows that there is a significant negative relationship 
between individuality and both power distance and uncertainty avoidance. This means 
that as more individuality prevails in the society, power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance tend to diminish, which can result in favorable conditions for stock market 
development over time. 
(7/1/2) Cultural values and corporate governance systems 
Some researchers have argued that the existence of good corporate governance 
systems is an important component of stock market development across countries. 
Consequently, this study has been extended to explore the impact of cultural values on 
corporate governance differences across twenty four countries in Western Europe, 
North America and Asia Pacific. Cultural values are represented by the cultural value 
model of Hofstede (1980) as mentioned earlier in this chapter. Correspondingly, 
corporate governance systems are represented by eight systems, which are: board size, 
separation of chair and CEO, independence per board, independent audit committee, 
remuneration disclosure, women on board, code of ethics and ethics systems. 
The preliminary analysis results show that there are significant relationships between 
the independent cultural values across countries. Empirical results show that there is a 
significant negative relationship between individuality and power distance cultural 
values at the 0.99 confidence level. This means that an increase in the individuality 
cultural value in a society is usually associated with a decrease in power distance. 
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This is consistent with previous longitudinal empirical results which show similar 
relationships in the United Kingdom during the period 1991-2004. This relationship is 
considered favourable for the development of the stock market and to support good 
corporate governance systems. In addition, there is a significant positive relationship 
between power distance and the uncertainty avoidance cultural values at the 0.90 
confidence level. This means that high power distance societies are usually associated 
with high uncertainty avoidance. This is also consistent with previous longitudinal 
results in the United Kingdom during period 1991-2004. 
Furthermore, empirical results have highlighted the influence of culture values on 
corporate governance systems across countries. Test results show that the 
"Individuality" is the most important cultural value in terms of its impact on corporate 
governance systems. The individuality cultural value has significant positive 
relationships with three corporate governance systems, which are: independence per 
board, audit committee, and ethics systems. This means that an increase -in the 
individuality cultural value is associated with an (increase) in independent directors 
on the corporate board, audit committee and ethics systems across counties. This is 
consistent with Grief (1994), who has 'highlighted the importance of the 
individualistic cultural value in the long run., He has explained that the formal 
enforcement institutions in an individualistic society may provide more support for 
anonymous exchange which is useful for economic develoPment. 
In addition, the power distance cultural value is ranked in the second place in terms of 
its impact on corporate governance systems, with only one significant negative impact 
on separation chair and CEO. This means that an increase in power distance is usually 
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associated with a decrease in the "separation chair and CEO". Similarly, the 
uncertainty avoidance/masculinity is the most important interaction term among 
cultural values. This is because it has significant negative impact on three corporate 
governance systems, which are: independence per board, remuneration disclosure, and 
code of ethics. This means than an increase in the uncertainty avoidance/masculinity 
cultural value is usually associated with a decrease in the number of independent 
directors on corporate boards, remuneration disclosure and code of ethics across 
countries. Moreover, the interaction term power distance/masculinity comes in the 
second place with only one significant negative impact on women on board. This 
means that an increase in power distance/masculinity cultural value is usually 
associated with a decrease in women on corporate boards. 
Overall, this study has shown that several cultural values play an important role in the 
formation and behaviour of stock market development over time, and on corporate 
governance systems across countries. These results have important implications for 
the businesses, politicians, investors and regulators. Multinational companies 
investing aboard may not recognize the national cultural values at first sight. 
However, these collective values are manifested at least partly in the form of 
legislations, ways of enforcement of legislations, press reactions, government 
decisions, labor unions and other stakeholders' such as consumers and 
envirorunentalists. 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) have mentioned that organizations moving to 
unfamiliar cultural environments are often badly surprised by unexpected reactions of 
the public or the authorities to what they do or want to do. The failure to recognize 
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and adapt to national culture may have devastating effects on the operations and 
success of the business activities in foreign countries. Tbus, organizations who intend 
to go aboard should provide appropriate cross-cultural training to their managers to 
develop more understanding of the national limits before exporting any management 
or organization ideas. The design of the organizational structure, as a tool to 
coordinate activities, should adapt continuously to the variety of cultural 
environments in which the company operates. Cultural aspects should be incorporated 
as part of strategic planning to ensure efficient allocation of activities in countries that 
have suitable cultural characteristics to achieve business objectives (Hofstede and 
Hofstede, 2005). 
In addition, multinational corporations and investors should take into consideration 
the cultural as well as the financial aspects in the case of international mergers, 
acquisitions, joint ventures, and alliances. Previous business practice can tell many 
stories in which some cross-national ventures did not manage to succeed, due to 
operation problems inside the newly formed hybrid organizations such as Leyland- 
Innocenti, Renault-Volvo, and Daimler-Chrysler. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) have 
argued that successful management and operations of the new cooperative structure 
depends on successful cultural integration. However, cultural integration is not a 
straight forward process as it requires a large amount of time, energy and money that 
the company should be prepared for (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). 
Politicians usually take decisions that are likely to be backed up by the majority of the 
population to ensure their re-election. In this context, they are likely to evaluate the 
financial system in terms of economic efficiency, certainty of income and stability, 
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and normative considerations for evaluating outcomes and characteristics of economic 
organizations (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). Also, they are likely to attach some 
values to these considerations, and they will start to trade-off between efficiency and 
stability to achieve their goals (Black, 1987, Altman, 1995), Quinn and Wooley, 
200 1). De-Jong and Semenov (2002) have argued that "'politicians arc likely to put 
more emphasis on theoretical explanations which correspond to their basic values and 
beliefs, which are largely shaped by their cultural values". For example, politicians in 
a society which prefers stability and certainty are more likely to implement regulatory 
provisions that hinder the development of stock market, on the basis that stock 
markets usually increase competition which increases the unfavorable level of 
instability and uncertainty among the population (De-Jung and Semenov, 2002). 
Therefore, it is important that politicians strike an adequate balance between policies 
that promote stability as well as efficiency to ensure sustainable economic prosperity 
and living standards for their people. 
Several previous empirical research studies have emphasized the impact of the 
regulatory environment of the financial system on stock market development across 
countries (see, for example, La Porta et al., 1997). By contrast other researchers have 
suggested that these legal provisions are influenced by more fundamental aspects such 
as cultural values (see, for example, De-Jong and Semenov, 2002, Licht, A., 2001). 
However, De-Jong and Semenov (2002) have claimed that "Cultural values may not 
be the only and perhaps not the major channel through which values influence 
financial development". Nevertheless, regulators should be fully aware of the cultural 
background of the legal provisions, and that copying foreign laws may not result in 
much improvement in the local business environment, unless those laws are in line 
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with the national cultural values and are accompanied by suitable enforcement 
procedures. Consequently, careful consideration should be taken to allow for gradual 
evolution of efficiency and development measures in the society without deeply 
distorting the stability of the local cultural environment. Fundamental social 
development aspects should accompany, or perhaps, lead economic development 
programs, such as education and training, to set the scene for more economic 
development. 
Finally, the study results have important consequences at both firm and country 
levels. At the country level, it can be suggested that the imposition of hard stock 
market development policies based on imposing only strict legal reforms may not 
yield the expected results. Alternatively, the implementation of soft stock market 
development policies based on cultural value-improvements can be more reliable and 
sustainable over-time. For example, high power distance countries can pursue some 
development programs to reduce power distance cultural value among members of the 
society, and hence can provide more support for improvements in the stock market 
and in corporate governance systems. This can be done through placing more 
emphasis on developing the education system to raise public awareness, and to 
support the creation of technological developments to create more wealth to members 
of the society. 
This entails that continuous improvements in the education systems, information 
technology and the standard of living should be a basic component of any stock 
market development policy to ensure successful results. At the firm level, the 
relationship between cultural values and both stock market development and 
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corporate governance systems necessities that multinational companies, which operate 
in an unfavorable business environment to stock market development, can create more 
value for their shareholders and potential investors, by developing their own 
organizational culture which supports a good corporate governance system. 
(7/2) Scope and limitations of the research study 
This study has presented two different types of relationships, which are: First, this 
study has investigated the impact of cultural values on stock market development in 
the United Kingdom during period 1991-2004, though; these findings are confined to 
only one country during a period of fifteen years. Furthennore, the cultural values are 
represented by the five dimensions in the cultural value model of Hofstede (1980), 
which consists of. power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity 
and time orientation. Correspondingly, stock market development is represented by 
four indicators, which are: stock market activity, size, liquidity and concentration. 
The study's empirical results, using the multi-dimensional structural equation model, 
should be taken with some cautions due to the existence of multicollinearity among 
the independent cultural variables. Similar to some econometric models, this 
multicollinearity problem is unavoidable due to the strong interrelationship between 
cultural values by nature. The correlation matrix for the independent cultural variables 
shows that there is a significant negative relationship between individuality and both 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance. This means that as more individuality 
prevails in the society, power distance and uncertainty avoidance tend to diminish, 
which can result in favourable conditions for stock market development over time. 
The data for cultural values and stock market development indicators are obtained 
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forrn several sources, such as Datastrearn database and the U. K. Office for National 
Statistics (ONS). However, the data set had different frequency distributions, though a 
uniform scale has been created on a monthly basis to ensure comparability of results. 
This study has presented a time-series datzi analysis for the relationship between 
cultural values and stock market development in the United Kingdom. Time series 
data analysis is for the same economic entity (observation) from different time 
periods. The main strength of this type of analysis is that it allows for the study of 
change and development in the variables (Saunders et al., 2003). However, the 
problem with time series analysis is that it may not be helpful when the variables are 
moving very slowly over time, which may be the case for cultural values as suggested 
by Hofstede (1980). In this case, it may be advisable to increase the time span of the 
analysis in future research to allow for more causal relationships to appear. 
Second, this study has been extended to explore the impact of cultural values on 
corporate governance differences across countries. The study is confined to cover 
twenty four countries in Western Europe, North America and Asia Pacific. Cultural 
values are also represented by the cultural value model of Hofstede (1980) as 
mentioned earlier in this*chapter. The corporate governance systems are confined to 
only eight aspects, which are: board size, separation of chair and CEO, independence 
per board, independent audit committee, remuneration disclosure, women on board, 
code of ethics and ethics systems. Corporate 'governance systems indices are obtained 
from the Ethical Research Services (EIRIS) as at the year 2005. 
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It can be noticed that the study of the relationship between cultural values and 
corporate govemance system depends on a relatively small sample size of 23 
countries. Although this may be sufficient for the purposes of this analysis, it may 
have some unfavorable consequences in terms of the degree of reliability of the 
results. This is because the sample size is directly related -to the degrees of freedom 
(df) of the regression equation. The degrees of freedom (df) are the excess number of 
observations over the number of coefficients to be estimated (Studerunund, 2001). If 
the degrees of freedom (df) are low, due to the small sample size and/or large number 
of independent variables, the less reliable the estimates are likely to be. The high 
degrees of freedom ensure that the error term is less likely to affect inference about 
the deterministic portion of the regression equation and vice versa. This is because 
when the number of degrees of freedom is large, every positive error is likely to be 
balanced by a large negative error, with only few points; the random element is likely 
to fail to provide such offsetting observations (Studemnund, 2001). Therefore, it is 
advisable to try to increase the number of observations in future research by 
' incorporating more countries in the analysis to ensure the reliability of the results. 
This study has implemented a cross-section data analysis technique to investigate the 
relationship between cultural values and corporate governance systems. This analysis 
represents a 'snap shot' for a number of individual economic entities (observations) at 
the same point in time. This type of analysis allows for a deep investigation of 
particular phenomena at a particular time, however, the problem with cross-section 
analysis is that it is restricted to one point in time without showing the impact of 
change or development of the variables over time (Saunders et al., 2003). - Therefore, 
to overcome this problem in future research it may be suggested to create a panel data 
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set for the cross-scctional data over a number of time periods, which will allow for 
more insights into the impact of change in the variables, increase the number of 
observations, and increase the degree of precision and reliability of results at the same 
time. 
In general, there are three main requirements for establishing a causal relationship 
between two or more variables (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002). First, there should be a 
statistical relationship between the variables. The regression analysis usually attempts 
to explain movements in one variable, the dependent variable, as a function of 
movements in a set of other variables, the independent variables, through the 
quantification of a single equation. The regression technique attempts to test whether 
a significant quantitative relationship exists between the variables, but it can not prove 
economic causality even if the results bear high statistical significance. Instead, the 
establishment of a causal relationship needs support from economic theory and 
common sense, rather than on the results of an estimated regression equation 
(Studemnund, 2001). 
Second, the cause must temporally precede the effect. In this study the independent 
cultural values are based on data collected in the late 1960s by Hofstede (1980), while 
the data on the independent variables are much more recent than that; the stock 
market development in the United Kingdom refers to the period 1991-2004, while 
corporate governance indices refer to the year 2005. Thus, it is obvious that the time 
order required for establishing causality has been violated. However, Punch (1998) 
has suggested that the validity of causal relationships in these situations can be 
established on the basis on relative fixity or alterability of the variables, that is the 
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expected cause should be less alterable than the expected effect (De-Jong and 
Semenov, 2002). Hofstede (2001) has shown that his cultural dimensions have not 
changed much significantly during the past decades (except individualism), which 
may indicate the validity of the established causality in this respect. 
Third, the relationship between the variables should not be due to a third variable. 
This highlights the importance of investigating all possible transmission mechanisms 
between cultural values and stock market development and/or corporate governance 
system based on economic theory. In addition, the single equation regression models 
used in this study to investigate the relationship between cultural values and corporate 
governance systems ignore much of the possible interdependence or simultaneity 
among the variables. Nevertheless, the implementation of the structural equation 
modelling to investigate the relationship between culture and stock market 
development has managed to highlight a great deal of the simultaneity and feedback 
loops among the variables. However, this model still lacks the feedback loop between 
culture and institutions. As mentioned by Hofstede (1980) there is a two-way 
causation between culture and institutions. That is, culture has an impact on the 
performance of institutions, and at the same time institutions' performance can have a 
feedback loop, which can modify predominant culture in a society. These kinds of 
possible feedback loops and dual causality, as well as transmission mechanisms 
between culture and institutions and the economic performance in general, provide 
ample research opportunities for future research. 
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(7/3) Recommendations for future research 
This study has successfully managed to highlight the importance of cultural values on 
both the stock market development in the United Kingdom, and on the corporate 
governance systems across, countries. Therefore, this study represents a building block 
to the efforts of some researchers to incorporate human preferences in empirical 
econometric models in Accounting and Finance studies. Nevertheless, there are plenty 
of potential future research opportunities which can add value to the existing research. 
As for the relationship between cultural values and stock market development, at first 
this study depends on one cultural value model by Hofstede (1980), though it may be 
useful to explore the applicability of other cultural models, such as Schwartz (1999) 
and/or Trompenaar and Turner (1997), to represent cultural values in a society. 
Similarly, stock market development indicators in this study are limited by only four 
indicators in the light of work by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1995), which are 
widely open to incorporate further indicators in future research. Second, the study 
covers a period of fifteen years which extends form 1991 up to 2004. Since some 
researchers have argued that cultural values usually change slowly over time, it may 
be worth trying to extend the research to a longer time period to explore whether or 
not the same results will hold. 
Third, both the cultural values and the stock market development indicators in the 
United Kingdom are represented by thirty six empirical proxy variables based on 
previous empirical and theoretical research. It seems that an extended effort is still 
needed to continue to explore new and innovative proxy variables that better represent 
these constructs to improve the outcomes of the econometric models. Fourth, this 
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study can be finiher extended to cover countries other than the United Kingdom to 
check the comparability of results on the relationship between cultural values and 
stock market development over time. Finally, some researchers have argued that the 
international culture may have an additional influence on the development of national 
stock market. So, it may be an interesting topic for future research to investigate the 
impact of international culture on the development of national stock markets around 
the world. 
As for the relationship between cultural values and corporate governance systems, the 
recommendations for future research include: first, this study has depended on only 
eight corporate governance systems which are: board size, separation of chair and 
CEO, independence per board, independent audit committee, remuneration disclosure, 
women on board, code of ethics and ethics systems. Therefore, it may be worth 
investigating the impact of cultural values on other corporate governance systems, 
such as the level of benefits and rewards, in future research. Second, empirical results 
show that there is no significant relationship between cultural values and corporate 
board size. This means that differences in cultural values across countries do not have 
an impact on the number of corporate board members. It seems that board size is 
influenced by other independent variables rather than the cultural values across 
countries. There are several previous studies which show a relationship between board 
size and company performance. Unfortunately, there are seldom studies that deal 
with the determinants of corporate board size. This is an issue that needs to be further 
- investigated in future research. 
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Third, the empirical results show that there is a significant negative relationship 
between power distance and separation chair and CEO. The idea behind the separation 
of chairman and CEO is to prevent a single individual to have unfettered powers of 
decision. However, it can be noticed that the EIRIS indices on this aspect show that in 
the U. S. A. only about 25% of compames separate the two roles, despite its low score 
on power distance according to the cultural value by Hofstede (1980). This may be 
due to the composition of the indices which contains a relatively small number of 
large and medium capital companies (Stephanie, 2005), and/or perhaps due to the 
existence of other forces that influence the separation of CEO and chair in the U. S. 
This is an issue that needs to be further investigated in future research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: The Dickey Fuller test statistic (ADF) for the independent cultural 
values. 
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-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
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Dependent Variable: D(SQX1.2) 
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8.75E-05 S. D. dependentvar 0.606228 Adjusted R-squared 
-16.76624 Akaike info criterion 5.49E-05 S. E. of regression 
-16.72076 Schwarz criterion 3.68E-07 Sum squared resid 
190.3632 F-statistic 1041.507 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.933295 Durbin-Watson stat 
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-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -4-761455 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQX1 1,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10122/06 Time: 19: 47 
Sample(adjusted): 3 126 
Included observations: 124 after adjusting endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -4.761455 0.068452 -0.325932 D(SQX11(-l)) 
0.0001 4.181311 7.49E-05 0.000313 C 
1.05E-05 Mean dependent var 0.156710 R-squared 
0.000478 S. D. dependentvar 0.149798 Adjusted R-squared 
-12.59833 Akaike info criterion 0.000441 S. E. of regression 
-12.55284 Schwarz criterion 2.37E-05 Sum squared resid 
22.67145 F-statistic 783.0963 Log likelihood 
0.000005_ Prob(F-statistic) 1.713298 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -14.80998 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% CriticalValue 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQX1 2,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/22/06 Time: 19: 48 
Sample(adjusted): 3 126 
Included observations: 124 after adiustinq endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-14.80998 0.087369 
7.814476 3.67E-05 
-1.293938 D(SQX12(-I)) 
0.000287 C 
6.43E-06 Mean dependent var 0.642580 R-squared 
0.000584 S. D. dependent var 0.639651 Adjusted R-squared 
-13.05853 Akaike info criterion 0.000350 S. E. of regression 
-13.01304 Schwarz criterion 1.5012-05 Sum squared resid 
219.3354 F-statistic 811.6289 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 2.180064 Durbin-Watson stat 
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-3.4835 1% Critical Value* -8.383266 ADF Test Statistic 
-2 . 8845 5% Critical Value 
-2.5789 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQX1 3) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/28/06 Time: 18: 21 
Sample(adjusted): 2 126 
Included observations: 125 after adjusting endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -8.383266 0.007575 -0.063505 SOX1 3(-1) 
0.0000 8.361095 0.005600 0.046821 C 
-0.000124 Mean dependent var 0.363615 R-squared 
0.000313 S. D. dependentvar 0.358441 Adjusted R-squared 
-13.72972 Akaike info criterion 0.000251 S. E. of regression 
-13.68447 Schwarz criterion 7.72E-06 Sum squared resid 
70.27916 F-statistic 860.1076 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 
- 
1.943598 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -11.20941 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQX1 4,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/28/06 Time: 18: 22 
Sample(adjusted): 3 126 
Included observations: 124 after aýjusting endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -11.20941 0.090526 -1.014742 D(SQX14(-l)) 0.1792 -1.351071 1.27E-05 -1.72E-05 C 
0.000000 Mean dependent var 0.507371 R-squared 
0.000200 S. D. dependentvar 0.503333 Adjusted R-squared 
-14.88382 Akaike info criterion 0.000141 S. E. of regression 
-14.83833 Schwarz criterion 2.42E-06 Sum squared resid 
125.6508 F-statistic 924.7969 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.994401 Durbin-Watson stat 
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-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -5.024139 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQX1 5,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/28/06 Time: 18: 23 
Sample(adjusted): 3 126 
Included observations: 124 after a! ýusting endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.2098 
-5.024139 0.068243 
-1.260890 4.72E-05 
-0.342864 D(SQX1 5(-l)) 
-5.95E-05 C 
0.000000 Mean dependent var 0.171432 R-squared 
0.000556 S. D. dependentvar 0.164640 Adjusted R-squared 
-12.31504 Akaike info criterion 0.000508 S. E. of regression 
-12.26955 Schwarz criterion 3.15E-05 Sum squared resid 
25.24198 F-statistic 765.5326 Log likelihood 
0.000002_ Prob(F-statistic) 2.604960 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -10.42709 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% CriticalValue 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQX1 6,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/28/06 Time: 18: 24 
Sample(adjusted): 3 126 
Included observations: 124 after adiustina endDOints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -10.42709 0.091186 . -0.950800 D(SQX16(-l)) 0.0000 -8.614439 5.82E-05 -0.000502 c 
5.54E-06 Mean dependent var 0.471230 R-squared 
0.000488 S. D. dependent var 0.466896 Adjusted R-squared 
-13.02482 Akaike info criterion 0.000356 S. E. of regression 
-12.97933 Schwarz criterion 1.55E-05 Sum squared resid 
108.7241 F-statistic 809.5390 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 2.011553 Durbin-Watson stat 
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-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -10.57907 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQX1 7,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/28/06 Time: 18: 24 
Sample(adjusted): 3 126 
Included observations: 124 after a iusting endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.2220 
-10.57907 0.090444 
1.227394 0.000445 
-0.956817 D(SQX17(-l)) 
0.000546 C 
5.05E-06 Mean dependent var 0.478447 R-squared 
0.006792 S. D. dependentvar 0.474172 Adjusted R-squared 
-7.772932 Akaike info criterion 0.004925 S. E. of regression 
-7.727443 Schwarz criterion 0.002959 Sum squared resid 
111.9168 F-statistic 483.9218 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.996427 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -5-553401 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQX1 8,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/28/06 Time: 18: 25 
Sample(adjusted): 3 126 
Included observations: 124 after adiustina endDOints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.0820 
-5.553401 
1.753544 
0.085441 
4.95E-05 
-0.474490 
8.68E-05 
D(SQX1 8(-l)) 
C 
1.73E-05 Mean dependent var 0.201781 R-squared 
0.000595 S. D. dependentvar 0.195238 Adjusted R-squared 
-12.21880 Akaike info criterion 0.000533 S. E. of regression 
-12.17331 Schwarz criterion 3.47E-05 Sum squared resid 
30.84026 F-statistic 759.5653 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.746491 Durbin-Watson stat 
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-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -11.20075 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQX1 9,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/28/06 Time: 18: 26 
Sample(adjusted): 3 126 
Included observations: 124 after adjusting endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.3842 
-11.20075 0.091895 
0.873361 0.000586 
-1.029289 D(SQXI 9(-1)) 
0.000511 C 
-9.52E-05 Mean dependent var 0.506985 R-squared 
0.009208 S. D. dependentvar 0.502944 Adjusted R-squared 
-7.220489 Akaike info criterion 0.006492 S. E. of regression 
-7.175000 Schwarz criterion 0.005142 Sum squared resid 
125.4569 F-statistic 449.6703 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.974241 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -5-865094 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
--2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SOX20,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/28/06 Time: 18: 26 
Sample(adjusted): 3 126 
Included observations: 124 after adiustina endDOints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -5.865094 0.075505 -0.442841 D(SQX20(-l)) 
0.9355 0.081152 0.000180 1.46E-05 C 
-2.84E-05 Mean dependent var 0.219945 R-squared 
0.002261 S. D. dependent var 0.213552 Adjusted R-squared 
-9.570629 Akaike info criterion 0.002005 S. E. of regression 
-9.525140 Schwarz criterion 0.000490 Sum squared resid 
34.39932 F-statistic 595.3790 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.809448 Durbin-Watson stat 
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Appendix 2: The Dickey Fuller test statistic (ADF) for the dependent stock 
market development indicators. 
-3.4682 1% Critical Value* -14.06543 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8777 5% Critical Value 
-2.5753 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(Y1,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 07: 15 
Sample(adjusted): 3 180 
Included observations: 178 after adjusting endpoints; 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -14.06543 0.075250 -1.058425 D(Y1 (-1)) 
0.5483 -0.601411 0.001493 -0.000898 C 
4.49E-06 Mean dependent var 0.529206 R-squared 
0.028929 S. D. dependent var 0.526531 Adjusted R-squared 
-4.984433 Akaike info criterion 0.019906 S. E. of regression 
-4.948683 Schwarz criterion 0.069739 Sum squared resid 
197.8364 F-statistic 445.6145 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 2.000503 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4682 1% Critical Value* -16.36598 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8777 5% CriticalValue 
-2.5753 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(Y2,2ý 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 07,18 
Sample(adjusted): 3 180 
Included observations: 178 after adiustinq endDOints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.7004 
-16.36598 
-0.385353 
0.073745 
0.006488 
-1.206913 
-0.002500 
D(Y2(-l)) 
C 
6.97E-05 Mean dependent var 0.603465 R-squared 
0.137029 S. D. dependent var 0.601212 Adjusted R-squared 
-2.045402 Akaike info criterion 0.086533 S. E. of regression 
-2.009652 Schwarz criterion 1.317891 Sum squared resid 
267.8452 F-statistic 184.0408 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 2.029600 Durbin-Watson stat 
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-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -11.11303 ADF Test Statistic 
-2 . 8847 5% CriticalValue 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY3,3) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 08: 06 
Sample(adjusted): 4 127 
Included observations: 124 after a! ýusting endpoints. 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -11.11303 0.090536 -1.006123 D(SQY3(-1), 2ý 
0.6603 0.440639 2.03E-05 8.93E-06 C 
-6.26E-08, Mean dependent var 0.503054 R-squared 
0.000319 S. D. dependent var 0.498980 Adjusted R-squared 
-13.94033 Akaike info criterion 0.000226 S. E. of regression 
-13.89484 Schwarz criterion 6.20E-06 Sum squared resid 
123.4993 F-statistic 866.3005 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 2.000038 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -11.51184 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY4,3) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 08: 07 
Sample(adjusted): 4 127 
Included observations: 124 after adjustinq endDoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -11.51184 0.090466 -1.041428 D(SQY4(-l), 2) 
0.7384 0.334706 0.000181 6.05E-05 C 
9.92E-07 Mean dependent var 0.520671 R-squared 
0.002897 S. D. dependent var 0.516742 Adjusted R-squared 
-9.561772 Akaike info criterion 0.002014 S. E. of regression 
-9.516283 Schwarz criterion 0.000495 Sum squared resid 
132.5224 F-statistic 594.8298 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 2.000832 Durbin-Watson stat 
331 
-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -11.87008 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY5,3) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 08: 08 
Sample(adjusted): 4 127 
Included observations: 124 after adjusting endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -11.87008 0.090361 -1.072592 D(SQY5(-l), 2) 
0.8929 0.134939 0.000355 4.79E-05 C 
1.10E-05 Mean dependent var 0.535943 R-squared 
0.005773 S. D. dependent var 0.532139 Adjusted R-squared 
-8.214666 Akaike info criterion 0.003949 S. E. of regression 
-8.169178 Schwarz criterion 0.001903 Sum squared resid 
140.8988 F-statistic 511.3093 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 2.001842 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4835 1% Critical Value* -11.17681 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8845 5% Critical Value 
-2.5789 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(Y6,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 08: 09 
Sample(adjusted): 3 127 
Included observations: 125 after adiustinq endr)oints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -11.17681 0.092739 -1.036528 D(Y6(-l)) 
0.0380 2.096932 0.000179 0.000376 C 
. 59E-05 Mean dependent var 0.503874 R-squared 0.002774 S. D. dependentvar 0.499841 Adjusted R-squared 
-9.614164 Akaike info criterion 0.001962 S. E. of regression 
-9.568911 Schwarz criterion 0.000473 Sum squared resid 
124.9210 F-statistic 602.8852 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.948412 Durbin-Watson stat 
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-3.4835 1% Critical Value* -11.27352 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8845 5% Critical Value 
-2.5789 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(Y7,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 08: 11 
Sample(adjusted): 3 127 
Included observations: 125 after adjusting endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -11.27352 0.092369 -1.041320 D(Y7(-l)) 
0.3081 1.023519 0.000383 0.000392 C 
-9.64E-05 Mean dependent var 0.508181 R-squared 
0.006049 S. D. dependent var 0.504183 Adjusted R-squared 
-8.063499 Akaike info criterion 0.004259 S. E. of regression 
-8.018246 Schwarz criterion 0.002232 Sum squared resid 
127.0923 F-statistic 505.9687 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.955208 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -11-13010 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% CriticalValue 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY8,3) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 08: 15 
Sample(adjusted): 4 127 
Included observations: 124 after adiustinq endDOints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.9142 
-11.13010 0.090366 
-0.107962 9.05E-05 
-1.005779 D(SQY8(-l), 2) 
-9.77E-06 C 
-5.46E-06 Mean dependent var 0.503821 R-squared 
0.001424 S. D. dependent var 0.499754 Adjusted R-squared 
-10.94704 Akaike info criterion 0.001007 S. E. of regression 
-10.90155 Schwarz criterion 0.000124 Sum squared resid 
123.8790 F-statistic 680.7164 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 2.000092 Durbin-Watson stat 
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-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -11.65534 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY9,3) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 08: 17 
Sample(adjusted): 4 127 
Included observations: 124 after aýjustinq endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -11.65534 0.090405 -1.053701 D(SQY9(-l), 2) 
0.7752 -0.286235 2.17E-05 -6.20E-06 C 
-1.99E-08 Mean dependent var 0.526851 R-squared 
0.000349 S. D. dependentvar 0.522973 Adjusted R-squared 
-13.80681 Akaike info criterion 0.000241 S. E. bf regression 
-13.76133 Schwarz criterion 7.09E-06 Sum squared resid 
135.8471 F-statistic 858.0225 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 2.003003 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4684 1% Critical Value* -13.49099 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8778 5% CriticalValue 
-2.5754 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY1 0,3) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/24/07 Time: 17: 48 
Sample(adjusted): 4 180 
Included observations: 177 after adiustina endooints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.7697 
-13.49099 0.075578 
0.293264 5.74E-05 
-1.019628 D(SQY1 0(-l), 2) 
1.68E-05 C 
-4.12E-08 Mean dependent var 0.509813 R-squared 
0.001088 S. D. dependentvar 0.507012 Adjusted R-squared 
-11.50516 Akaike info criterion 0.000764 S. E. of regression 
-11.46928 Schwarz criterion 0.000102 Sum squared resid 
182.0067 F-statistic 1020.207 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 2.000386 Durbin-Watson stat 
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-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -11.38052 ADF Test Statistic 
-2 . 8847 5% 
Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY1 1,3) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 08: 21 
Sample(adjusted): 4 127 
Included observations: 124 after aýjusting endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -11.38052 0.090550 -1.030503 D(SQY1 1(-l), 2) 
0.5801 0.554668 4.86E-05 2.69E-05 C 
1.92E-06 Mean dependent var 0.514942 R-squared 
0.000773 S. D. dependent var 0.510966 Adjusted R-squared 
-12.19220 Akaike info criterion 0.000540 S. E. of regression 
-12.14671 Schwarz criterion 3.56E-05 Sum squared resid 
129.5162 F-statistic 757.9165 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.998370 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -11.21603 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% Critical Value 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY12,3) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 08: 21 
Sample(adjusted): 4 127 
Included observations: 124 after adiustina endDOints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.7216 
-11.21603 0.090604 
-0.357143 0.000145 
-1.016216 D(SQYI 2(-1), 2) 
-5.16E-05 C 
5.75E-06 Mean dependent var 0.507666 R-squared 
0.002283 S. D. dependentvar 0.503631 Adjusted R-squared 
-10.01070 Akaike info criterion 0.001609 S. E. of regression 
-9.965210 Schwarz criterion 0.000316 Sum squared resid 
125.7994 F-statistic 622.6633 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.998606 Durbin-Watson stat 
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-3.4839 1% Critical Value* -11.16686 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8847 5% CriticalValue 
-2.5790 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY1 3,3) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 09: 04 
Sample(adjusted): 4 127 
Included observations: 124 after adjusting endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 -11.16686 0.090539 -1.011034 D(SQY1 3(-l), 2) 
0.7418 0.330231 8.80E-05 2.91 E-05 C 
-9.09E-07 Mean dependent var 0.505470 R-squared 
0.001388 S. D. dependentvar 0.501416 Adjusted R-squared 
-11.00203 Akaike info criterion 0.000980 S. E. of regression 
-10.95654 Schwarz criterion 0.000117 Sum squared resid 
124.6988 F-statistic 684.1256 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.999775 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4835 1% Critical Value* -11.88732 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8845 5% Critical Value 
-2.5789 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY1 4,2ý 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 09: 05 
Sample(adjusted): 3 127 
Included observations: 125 after adiustina endooints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.3568 
-11.88732 0.089159 
-0.925008 0.000710 
-1.059858 D(SQY14(-l)) 
-0.000657 C 
-6.18E-05 Mean dependent var 0.534634 R-squared 
0.011562 S. D. dependent var 0.530851 Adjusted R-squared 
-6.823207 Akaike info criterion 0.007919 S. E. of regression 
-6.777954 Schwarz criterion 0.007714 Sum squared resid 
141.3083 F-statistic 428.4505 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 2.001139 Durbin-Watson stat 
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-3.4835 1% CriticalValue* -11.27047 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8845 5% Critical Value 
-2.5789 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY1 5,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 09: 06 
Sample(adjusted): 3 127 
Included observations: 125 after adjusting endpoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.0222 
-11.27047 0.089221 
-2.316863 0.000839 
-1.005566 D(SQY1 5(-l)) 
-0.001944 C 
-0.000105 Mean dependent var 0.508046 R-squared 
0.013069 S. D. dependent var 0.504046 Adjusted R-squared 
-6.522561 Akaike info criterion 0.009204 S. E. of regression 
-6.477308 Schwarz criterion 0.010419 Sum squared resid 
127.0234 F-statistic 409.6601 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.992576 Durbin-Watson stat 
-3.4835 1% Critical Value* -11-25323 ADF Test Statistic 
-2.8845 5% CriticalValue 
-2.5789 10% Critical Value 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(SQY1 6,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/07 Time: 09: 07 
Sample(adjusted): 3 127 
Included observations: 125 after adiustinci endDoints 
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable 
0.0000 
0.2927 
-11.25323 0.089734 
1.056709 0.000835 
-1.009795 D(SQY1 6(-l)) 
0.000882 C 
-8.83E-05 Mean dependent var 0.507281 R-squared 
0.013176 S. D. dependentvar 0.503275 Adjusted R-squared 
-6.504739 Akaike info criterion 0.009286 S. E. of regression 
-6.459486 Schwarz criterion 0.010606 Sum squared resid 
126.6352 F-statistic 408.5462 Log likelihood 
0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 1.998583 Durbin-Watson stat 
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Appendix 3: The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for cultural values, one 
factor model: power distance. 
DATE: 11/18/2006 
TIME: 16: 39 
ISREL8.72 
BY 
Karl G. Jipeskog and Dag Sipbom 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
2005 
the 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file' C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\lisral file\New Folder\norl5. spj: 
I 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables pdi 
Relationships 
sqxl = pdi 
sqx2 = pdi 
, sqx3 = pdi 
sqx4 = pdi 
Set the Variance of pdi to 1.00 
Set the Error Covariance of sqx2 and sqxl Free 
Path Diagram 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
Covariance Matrix 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
- 
sqxl 
------- 
sqx2 sqx3 sqx4 
-------- -------- -------- 
sqxl 0.00 
sqx2 0.00 0.00 
sqx3 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sqx4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Number of Iterations = 11 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
sqxl = 0.026*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.90 
(0.0018) (0.00) 
14.27 7.77 
sqx2 = 0.030*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.95 
(0.0020) (0.00) 
15.08 7.57 
sqx3 = 0.014*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=1.00 
(0.00090) (0.00) 
15.77 1.82 
sqx4 = 0.016*pdi, Errorvar. - 0.00 ,R-0.99 
(0.0010) (0.00) 
15.70 4.22 
Error Covariance for sqx2 and sqxl = 0.00 
(0.00) 
-3.33 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
pdi 
1.00 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
Degrees of Freedom =1 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 1.75 (P = 0.19) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 1.74 (P 
0.19) 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 0.74 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (0.0 ; 8.78) 
Minimum Fit Function Value = 0.014 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) - 0.0059 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO = (0.0 ; 0.070) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.077 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.0 0.27) 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) 0.25 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 0.16 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (0.15 ; 0.22) 
ECVI for Saturated Model = 0.16 
ECVI for Independence Model = 5.55 
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686.14 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 6 Degrees of Freedom = 
Independence AIC = 694.14 
Model AIC = 19.74 
Saturated AIC = 20.00 
Independence CAIC = 709.48 
Model CAIC = 54.27 
Saturated CAIC = 58.36 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) - 1.00 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.99 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.17 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.00 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) - 0.98 
Critical N (CN) = 474.51 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) - 0.00 
Standardized RMR = 0.00093 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) - 0.99 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) - 0.93 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) - 0.099 
Time used: 0.070 Seconds 
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Appendix 4: The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for cultural values, two 
factors model: power distance, and uncertainty avoidance. 
DATE: 11/18/2006 
TIME: 16: 43 
ISREL8.72 
BY 
Karl G. Jreskog and Dag S.; bom 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
2005 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
the 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\lisral file\New Folder\norl6. spj: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables pdi uav 
Relationships 
sqxl - pdi 
sqx2 = pdi 
sqx3 = pdi 
sqx4 = pdi uav 
sqx6 = uav 
sqx7 = uav 
sqx8 = uav 
Set the Variance of pdi to 1.00 
Set the Variance of uav to 1.00 
Path Diagram 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
Covariance Matrix 
sqxl sqx2 sqx3 sqx4 sqx6 
sqx7 
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sqxl 0.00 
sqx2 0.00 0.00 
sqx3 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sqx4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sqx6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sqx7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
sqx8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
Covariance Matrix 
sqxB 
sqx8 0.00 
Number of Iterations = 30 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
sqxl - 0.026*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R-0.89 
(0.0018) (0.00) 
14.22 7.83 
sqx2 = 0.030*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.95 
(0.0020) (0.00) 
15.06 7.65 
sqx3 = 0.014*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R-1.00 
(0.00090) (0.00) 
15.80 0.39 
sqx4 = 0.012*pdi + 0.0048*uav, Errorvar. - 0.00 R 0.99 
(0.0014) (0.0012) (0.00) 
8.43 3.93 5.86 
sqx6 = 0.0029*uav, Errorvar. = 0.00 R 0.32 
(0.00042) (0.00) 
6.96 7.92 
sqx7 = 0.0045*uav, Errorvar. = -0.00 R 1.00 
(0.00028) (0.00) 
15.85 -1.76 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
sqx8 = 0.022*uav, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.98 
(0.0014) (0.00) 
15.55 6.71 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
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pdi uav 
-------- -------- 
pdi 1.00 
uav 0.99 1.00 
(0.00) 
432.83 
Goodness of Fit Statistics' 
Degrees of Freedom = 12 
. 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 36.99 (P - 0.00022) 
Normal Theory WeightedýLeast Squares Chi-Square - 33.28 (P, = 
0.00087) 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) - 21.28 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP - (7.78 ; 42.42) 
Minimum Fit Function Value - 0.30 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) - 0.17 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO - (0.062 0.34) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.12 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA - (0.072 0.17) 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) - 0.011 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) - 0.52 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (0.41 ; 0.69) 
ECVI for Saturated Model 0.45 
ECVI for Independence Model 16.05 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 21 Degrees of Freedom 
1992.52 
Independence AIC - 2006.52 
Model AIC = 65.28 
Saturated AIC - 56.00 
Independence CAIC - 2033.37 
Model CAIC = 126.66 
Saturated CAIC = 163.42 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.98 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) - 0.98 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) - 0.56 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) - 0.99 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.99 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.97 
Critical N (CN) - 89.59 
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Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.00 
Standardized RMR = 0.014 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.93 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.84 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.40 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add an Error Covariance 
Between and Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
sqx2 sqxl 10.2 0.00 
sqx4 sqx3 9.3 0.00 
sqx7 sqx3 10.5 0.00 
Time used: 0.070 Seconds 
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Appendix 5: The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for cultural values, three 
factors model: power distance, uncertainty avoidance and individualism. 
DATE: 11/15/2006 
TIME: 17: 35 
ISRELB. 72 
BY 
2005 
the 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\lisral file\New Folder\norl7. spj: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables pdi uav ind 
Relationships 
sqxl = pdi 
sqx2 = pdi 
sqx3 = pdi 
sqx4 = pdi uav 
sqx6 = uav ind 
sqx7 = uav 
sqx8 = uav ind 
sqxlO = ind 
sqxll = ind uav 
sqxl2 = ind 
Set the Variance of pdi to 1.00 
Set the Variance of uav to 1.00 
Set the Variance of ind to 1.00 
set covariance of sqlO and sqx4 free 
set covariance of sqx4 and sqxl free 
number of decimals 4 
admissibility check off 
Path Diagram 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
Karl G. Jipeskog and Dag S; bom 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
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Covariance Matrix 
sqxl sqx2 sqx3 sqx4 sqx6 
sqx7 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sqxl 0.0008 
sqx2 0.0008 0.0009 
sqx3 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 
sqx4 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 
sqx6 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
sqx7 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqx8 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 
0.0001 
sqlO 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqxll 0.0009 0.0010 0.0005 0.0006 0.0001 
0.0002 
sqxl2 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
0.0000 
Covariance Matrix 
sqxB 
-------- 
sqxlO 
-------- 
sqxll 
-------- 
sqxl2 
-------- 
sqx8 0.0005 
sqlO 0.0000 0.0000 
sqxll 0.0008 0.0001 0.0012 
sqxl2 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 
Number of Iterations = 36 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
sqxl = 0.02595*pdi, Errorvar. - 0.0001 ,R=0.8908 (0.001831) (0.0000) 
14.1738 8.0919 
sqx2 = 0.02947*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9495 
(0.001961) (0.0000) 
15.0327 8.1896 
sqx3 = 0.01429*pdi, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R=1.0021 
(0.0009017) (0.0000) 
15.8437 -3.1694 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
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sqx4 = 0.009688*pdi + 0.006827*uav, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9921 
(0.001082) (0.0009901) (0.0000) 
8.9511 6.8954 8.0319 
sqx6 = 0.0002654*uav + 0.002684*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R 
0.3335 
(0.003247) (0.003251) (0.0000) 
0.08173 0.8255 7.9050 
sqx7 = 0.004462*uav, Errorvar. = 0.00 R = 0.9998 
(0.0002823) (0.0000) 
15.8070 0.1731 
sqx8 = 0.02856*uav - 0.006626*ind, Errorvar. - 0.0000 R 
0.9873 
(0.003537) (0.003068) (0.0000) 
8.0736 -2.1593 4.9166 
sqxlO = 0.001957*ind , Errorvar. = 0.0000, R = 0.9949 
(0.0001244) (0.00) 
15.7304 7.5071 
sqxll - 0.005967*uav + 0.04086*ind, Errorvar. - 0.0000 R 
0.9996 
(0.001476) (0.002948) (0.0000) 
-4.0431 13.8566 1.6749 
sqxl2 0.007577*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R - 0.9981 
(0.0004802) (0.0000) 
15.7808 6.5323 
Error Covariance for sqx4 and sqxl = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
2.9199 
Error Covariance for sqlO and sqx4 = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
3.5230 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
pdi uav ind 
pdi 1.0000 
-------- -------- -------- 
uav 0.9882 1.0000 
(0.0021) 
466.5047 
ind 0.9971 0.9932 1.0000 
(0.0006) (0.0014) 
1697.9933 698.4306 
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Goodness of Fit Statistics 
Degrees of Freedom = 26 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 31.7689 (P = 0.2009) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 30.2443 (P 
0.2576) 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 4.2443 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (0.0 ; 22.1352) 
0.08253) 
0.8491) 
Minimum Fit Function Value = 0.2542 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) 0.03395 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO = (0.0 0.1771) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.03614 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.0 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.6370 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 0.7060 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI - (0.6720 ; 
ECVI for Saturated Model 0.8800 
ECVI for Independence Model 37.3418 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 45 Degrees of Freedom - 
4647.7282 
Independence AIC - 4667.7282 
Model AIC = 88.2443 
Saturated AIC 110.0000 
Independence CAIC 4706.0910 
Model CAIC = 199.4965 
Saturated CAIC = 320.9955 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.9932 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.9978 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.5738 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.9987 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.9988 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.9882 
Critical N (CN) = 180.5856 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.0000 
Standardized RMR - 0.007852 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.9538 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.9024 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.4509 
The Modification Indices SVggest to Add an Error Covariance 
Between and Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
sqx2 sqxl 9.5 0.00 
Time used: 0.090 Seconds 
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Appendix 6: The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for cultural values, four 
factors model: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and 
masculinity. 
DATE: 11/18/2006 
TIME: 16: 47 
ISREL8.72 
BY 
Karl G. J. ýeskog and Dag S: rbom 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
2005 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
the 
Universal Copyright Convention- 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\lisral file\New Folder\norl8. spj: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables pdi uav ind mas 
Relationships 
sqxl = pdi 
sqx2 = pdi 
sqx3 = pdi 
sqx4 = pdi uav 
sqx6 = uav 
sqx7 = uav 
sqx8 = uav ind 
sqxlO = ind 
sqxll = uav ind 
sqxl2 = ind 
sqxl4 = mas 
sqxl5 = mas 
sqxl6 = mas 
Set the Variance of pdi to 1.0000 
Set the Variance of uav to 1.0000 
Set the Variance of ind to 1.0000 
Set the Variance of mas to 1.0000 
Set the Error Covariance of sqx2 and sqxl Free 
Set the Error Covariance of sqx4 and sqxl Free 
Set the Error Covariance of sqx7 and sqx3 Free 
Set the Error Covariance of sqxlO and sqx4 Free 
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Path Diagram - 
Number of Decimals 4 
Admissibility Check Off 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
Covariance Matrix 
sqxl sqx2 
sqx7 
-------- -------- 
sqxl 0.0008 
sqx2 0.0008 0.0009 
sqx3 0.0004 0.0004 
sqx4 0.0004 0.0005 
sqx6 0.0001 0.0001 
sqx7 0.0001 0.0001 
0.0000 
sqx8 0.0006 0.0006 
0.0001 
sqlO 0.0001 0.0001 
0.0000 
sqxll 0.0009 0.0010 
0.0002 
sqxl2 0.0002 0.0002 
0.0000 
sqxl4 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqxl5 -0.0001 -0.0001 
0.0000 
sqxl6 -0.0005 -0.0005 
0.0001 
sqxl5 
sqx8 
sqxlO 
sqxll 
sqxl2 
sqxl4 
sqxl5 
0.0001 
sqxl6 
0.0001 
sqx3 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0000 
0.0005 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-0.0003 
sqx4 
0.0003 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0004 
0.0000 
0.0006 
0.0001 
0.0000 
-0.0001 
-0.0003 
sqx6 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-0.0001 
sqxll sqxl2 sqxl4 
-------- -------- -------- 
0.0005 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0008 0.0001 0.0012 
0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
-0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
-0.0004 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0000 
Covariance Matrix 
sqxl6 
sqxl6 0.0003 
Covariance Matrix 
sqx8 sqxlO 
-------- -------- 
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Number of Iterations = 84 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
sqxl = 0.02597*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.0001 ,R=0.8900 
(0.001834) (0.0000) 
14.1588 7.9872 
sqx2 = 0.02949*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9504 
(0.001960) (0.0000) 
15.0467 7.9870 
sqx3 = 0.01428*pdi, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R=1.0005 
(0.0009024) (0.0000) 
1ý. 8198 -1.3078 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
sqx4 = 0.01028*pdi + 0.006234*uav, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R 0.9924 
(0.001127) (0.001001) 
9.1172 6.2289 
(0.0000) 
7.9517 
sqx6 = 0.002930*uav, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R-0.3294 
(0.0004173) (0.0000) 
7.0207 7.9048 
sqx7 = 0.004462*uav, Errorvar. = 0.00 R=0.9995 
(0.0002824) - (0.0000) 
15.8026 0.3613 
sqx8 = 0.02922*uav - 0.007288*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R 0.9878 
(0.003740) (0.003282) 
7.8134 -2.2205 
(0.0000) 
4.4928 
sqxlO = 0.001957*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000, R=0.9949 
(0.0001244) (0.00) 
15.7304 7.5643 
sqxll 0.006077*uav + 0.04097*ind, Errorvar. - 0.0000 
0.9997 
(0.001503) (0.002967) 
-4.0442 13.8067 
(0.0000) 
1.5457 
sqxl2 = 0.007577*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9980 (0.0004802) (0.0000) 
15.7803 6.7234 
sqxl4 = 0.0003142*mas, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.4722 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
8.7923 7.9101 
sqxl5 = 0.003207*mas, Errorvar. = 0.0001 ,R=0.1482 (0.0007155) (0.0000) 
4.4819 7.9118 
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sqxl6 = 0.01774*mas, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R=1.0020 
(0.001120) (0.0000) 
15.8386 -0.6686 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
Error Covariance for sqx2 and sqxl = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-3.2048 
Error Covariance for sqx4 and sqxl = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
3.2287 
Error Covariance for sqx7 and sqx3 = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-2.1708 
Error Covariance for sqlO and sqx4 - 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
3.5938 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
pdi uav ind mas 
------- -------- -------- -------- 
pdi 1.0000 
- 
uav 0.9896 1.0000 
(0.0021) 
480.4365 
ind 0.9979 0.9933 1.0000 
(0.0004) (0.0014) 
2327.4533 693.9870 
mas -0.9979 -0.9888 -0.9976 1.0000 
(0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0015) 
-650.3786 -391.9389 -650.1454 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
Degrees of Freedom 52 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square 227.5060 (P = 0.0) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 180.8590 (P 
0.00) 
173.6556) 
0.1635) 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 128.8590 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (91.6587 ; 
Minimum Fit Function Value = 1.8200 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) = 1.0309 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO = (0.7333 1.3892) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.1408 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.1187 ; 
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P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.0000 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 2.0709 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (1.7733 ; 
2.4292) 
ECVI for Saturated Model 1.4560 
ECVI for Independence Model 52.7953 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 78 Degrees of Freedom 
6573.4176 
Independence AIC = 6599.4176 
Model AIC = 258.8590 
Saturated AIC 182.0000 
Independence CAIC 6649.2893 
Model CAIC = 408.4740 
Saturated CAIC = 531.1017 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.9654 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.9595 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) - 0.6436 
Comparative Fit Index (CF. I) = 0.9730 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.9731 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.9481 
Critical N (CN) = 44.1945 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.0000 
Standardized RMR = 0.05125 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.8179 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.6814 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.4674 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add an Error Covariance 
Between and Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
sqxl4 sqxl 14.2 0.00 
sqxl4 sqx2 20.4 0.00 
sqxl4 sqx6 12.3 0.00 
sqxl5 sqx2 32.2 0.00 
sqxl5 sqx6 12.2 0.00 
sqxl5 sqxl4 31.1 0.00 
sqxl6 sqx8 7.9 0.00 
Time used: 0.180 Seconds 
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Appendix 7: The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for cultural values, five 
factors model: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity 
and time horizon. 
DATE: 11/18/2006 
TIME: 16: 48 
ISREL8.72 
BY 
Karl G. Jipeskog and Dag S: pbom 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 10D 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
2005 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
the 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\1isra1 file\New Folder\norl9. spj: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables pdi uav ind mas toi 
Relationships 
sqxl = pdi 
sqx2 = pdi 
sqx3 = pdi 
sqx4 = pdi uav 
sqx6 = uav 
sqx7 = uav 
sqx8 = uav ind 
sqxlO = ind 
sqxll = uav ind 
sqxl2 = ind 
sqxl4 = mas 
sqxl5 = mas 
sqxl6 = mas 
sqxl7 = toi 
sqxl8 = toi 
sqxl9 = toi 
sqx20 = ind toi 
Set the Variance of pdi to 1.0000 
Set the Variance of uav to 1.0000 
Set the Variance of ind to 1.0000 
Set the Variance of mas to 1.0000 
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Set the Variance of toi to 1.0000 
Set the Error Covariance of sqx2 and sqxl Free 
Set the Error Covariance of sqx4 and sqxl Free 
Set the Error Covariance of sqx7 and sqx3 Free 
Set the Error Covariance of sqlO and sqx4 Free 
Set the Error Covariance of sqx20 and sqxl9 Free 
Path Diagram 
Number of Decimals 4 
Admissibility Check Off 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
Covariance Matrix 
sqxl sqx2 
sqx7 
-------- -------- 
sqxl 0.0008 
sqx2 0.0008 0.0009 
sqx3 0.0004 0.0004 
sqx4 0.0004 0.0005 
sqx6 0.0001 0.0001 
sqx7 0.0001 0.0001 
0.0000 
sqx8 0.0006 0.0006 
0.0001 
sqlO 0.0001 0.0001 
0.0000 
sqxll 0.0009 0.0010 
0.0002 
sqxl2 0.0002 0.0002 
0.0000 
sqxl4 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqxl5 -0.0001 -0.0001 
0.0000 
sqxl6 -0.0005 -0.0005 
0.0001 
sqxl7 0.0005 0.0005 
0.0001 
sqxl8 0.0001 0.0001 
0.0000 
sqxl9 0.0007 0.0007 
0.0001 
sqx20 0.0002 0.0002 
0.0000 
Covariance Matrix 
sqx8 sqxlO 
sqxl5 
-------- -------- 
sqxB 0.0005 
sqxlO 0.0000 0.0000 
sqxll 0.0008 0.0001 
sqxl2 0.0002 0.0000 
sqx3 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0000 
0.0005 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-0.0003 
0.0003 
0.0001 
0.0004 
0.0001 
sqx4 sqx6 
0.0003 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0004 
0.0000 
0.0006 
0.0001 
0.0000 
-0.0001 
-0.0003 
0.0003 
0.0001 
0.0004 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0000 
Q. 0001 
0.0000 
0. OGOO 
0.0000 
-0.0001 
0.0001 
0. ODOO 
0.0001 
0.0000 
sqxll sqxl2 sqxl4 
-------- -------- -------- 
0.0012 
0.0003 0.0001 
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sqxl4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
sqxl5 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0001 
sqxl6 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0000 
0.0001 
sqxl7 0.0004 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 
0.0001 
sqxl8 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqxl9 0.0006 0.0000 0.0009 0.0002 0.0000 
0.0001 
sqx20 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
Covariance Matrix 
sqxl6 sqxl7 sqxl8 sqxl9 sqx20 
sqxl6 0.0003 
sqxl7 -0.0003 0.0004 
sqxl8 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
sqxl9 -0.0004 0.0005 0.0001 0.0008 
sqx20 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 
Number of Iterations = 94 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
sqxl = 0.02597*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.0001 ,R= 0.8901 
(0.001834) (0.0000) 
14.1610 7.9854 
sqx2 = 0.02949*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R- 0.9504 
(0.001960) (0.0000) 
15.0458 7.9893 
sqx3 = 0.01428*pdi, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R = 1.0005 
(0.0009024) (0.0000) 
15.8197 -1.2894 
W-A_R_N_I 
_N_G 
: Error variance is negative. 
sqx4 = 0.01006*pdi + 0.006450*uav, Errorvar .=0.0000 R 
0.9925 
(0.001128) (0.001016) (0.0000) 
8.9170 6.3470 7.9146 
sqx6 = 0.002945*uav, Errorvar. = 0.0000 .R = 
0.3328 
(0.0004170) (0.0000) 
7.0617 7.9014 
sqx7 = 0.004459*uav, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R = 0.9980 
(0.0002826) (0.0000) 
15.7795 1.6681 
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sqx8 = 0.03227*uav - 0.01033*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9906 
(0.003887) (0.003373) (0.0000) 
8.3012 -3.0638 3.6929 
sqxlO = 0.001957*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000, R=0.9949 
(0.0001244) (0.00) 
15.7310 7.5110 
sqxll =-0.006149*uav + 0.04104*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R 
0.9996 
(0.001574) (0.003008) (0.0000) 
-3.9052 13.6455 1.8730 
sqxl2 = 0.007577*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R0.9981 
(0.0004802) (0.0000) 
15.7807 6.6341 
sqxl4 = 0.0003141*mas, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R-0.4721 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
8.7912 7.9107 
sqxl5 = 0.003208*mas, Errorvar. - 0.0001 ,R-0.1483 
(0.0007153) (0.0000) 
4.4848 7.9124 
sqxl6 = 0.01774*mas, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R-1.0021 
(0.001120) (0.0000) 
15.8402 -0.7066 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
sqxl7 = 0.01872*toi, Errorvar. = 0.0001 ,R=0.8334 
(0.001405) (0.0000) 
. 13.3310 7.2969 
sqxl8 = 0.004204*toi, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R-0.9291 
(0.0002861) (0.0000) 
14.6951 5.8119 
sqxl9 = 0.02506*toi, Errorvar. = 0.0001571, R=0.7999 
(0.001947) (0.0000) 
12.8726 7.4175 
sqx20 - 0.008731*ind + 0.01482*toi, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R 
0.5752 
(0.003938) (0.004037) (0.0000) 
-2.2186 3.6711 6.7175 
Error Covariance for sqx2 and sqxl = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-3.1471 
Error Covariance for sqx4 and sqxl = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
3.1490 
Error Covariance for sqx7 and sqx3 = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-2.6286 
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Error Covariance for sqlO and sqx4 = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
3.4921 
Error Covariance for sqx20 and sqxl9 = 0.0001 
(0.0000) 
6.0996 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
pdi uav ind mas toi 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
pdi 1.0000 
uav 0.9903 1.0000 
(0.0020) 
507.5037 
ind 0.9980 0.9939 1.0000 
(0.0004) (0.0013) 
2350.6864 744.3579 
mas -0.9978 -0.9893 -0.9976 1.0000 
(0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0015) 
-653.8463 -401.9051 -653.7873 
toi 0.9866 0.9900 0.9890 -0.9864 1.0000 
(0.0053) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0054) 
187.7792 210.2962 199.0337 -182.4829 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
Degrees of Freedom = 100 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 393.2481 (P - 0.0) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square - 327.3249 (P 
0.0) 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) - 227.3249 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (176.2991 
285.9595) 
0.1513) 
Minimum Fit Function Value = 3.1460 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) - 1.8186 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO = (1.4104 2.2877) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.1349 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA - (0.1188 ; 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.0000 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 3.4666 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (3.0584 
3.9357) 
ECVI for Saturated Model 2.4480 
ECVI for Independence Model 89.8149 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 136 Degrees of Freedom 
11192.8615 
Independence AIC = 11226.8615 
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Model AIC = 433.3249 
Saturated AIC 306.0000 
Independence CAIC 11292.0783 
Model CAIC = 636.6478 
Saturated CAIC = 892.9511 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.9649 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.9639 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.7095 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.9735 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.9736 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.9522 
Critical N (CN) = 44.1698 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.0000 
Standardized RMR = 0.05063 
Goodneýss of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.7645 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.6397 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.4997 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add the 
Path to from Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
sqx3 ind 8.0 0.01 
sqx6 toi 14.4 0.02 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add an Error Covariance 
Between and Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
sqxll sqx8 8.6 0.00 
sqxl4 sqxl 14.2 0.00 
sqxl4 sqx2 20.5 0.00 
sqxl4 sqx6 12.4 0.00 
sqxl5 sqx2 32.1 0.00 
sqxl5 sqx6 12.1 O. OD 
sqxl5 sqxl4 31.1 0.00 
sqxl7 sqx6 15.6 0.00 
sqx20 sqxl 12.1 0.00 
sqx20 sqx6 8.8 0.00 
sqx20 sqxl5 12.4 0.00 
Time used: 0.290 Seconds 
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Appendix 8: The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for stock market 
development indicators, one factor model: stock market activity. 
DATE: 11/23/2006 
TIME: 15: 15 
ISREL8.72 
BY 
2005 
the 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\lisral file\New Folder\nor20. SPJ: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables act 
Relationships 
yl = act 
y2 = act 
dsqy3 = act 
dsqy5 = act 
Set the Variance of act to 1.00 
Path Diagram 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
Karl G. Jreskog and Dag Srbom 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
Covariance Matrix 
yl 
-------- - 
y2 dsqy3 dsqy5 
------- -------- -------- 
yl 0.00 
y2 0.01 0.01 
dsqy3 0.00 0.00 0.00 
dsqy5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Number of Iterations = 12 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
yl = 0.064*act, Errorvar. = -0.00045 ,R=1.12 
(0.0040) (0.00024) 
16.00 -1.89 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
Y2 = 0.085*act, Errorvar. = 0.0028 R=0.72 
(0.0075) (0.00053) 
11.28 5.23 
dsqy3 = O. OOG43*act, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.39 
(0.00) (0.00) 
7.59 7.63 
dsqy5 = 0.00087*act, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.013 
(0.00062) (0.00) 
1.40 7.92 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
act 
1.00 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
Degrees of Freedom 2 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square 19.82 (P = 0.00) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 18.41 (P 
0.00010) 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 16.41 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (6.21 ; 34.05) 
Minimum Fit Function Value = 0.16 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) = 0.13 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO = (0.050 0.27) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.26 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.16 0.37) 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.00058 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 0.28 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (0.19 ; 0.42) 
ECVI for Saturated Model = 0.16 
ECVI for Independence Model = 1.74 
209.37 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 6 Degrees of Freedom = 
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Independence AIC = 217.37 
Model AIC = 34.41 
Saturated AIC = 20.00 
Independence CAIC = 232.71 
Model CAIC = 65.10 
Saturated CAIC = 58.36 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.91 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.74 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.30 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) - 0.91 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.91 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) - 0.72 
Critical N (CN) = 59.08 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.00 
Standardized RMR = 0.095 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.93 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.66 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) - 0.19 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add an Error Covariance 
Between and Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
y2 yl 16.7 0.02 
dsqy5 dsqy3 16.7 0.00 
Time used: 0.060 Seconds 
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Appendix 9: The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for stock market 
development indicators, two factor model: stock market activity and size. 
DATE: 10/28/2006 
TIME: 18: 00 
ISREL8.72 
BY 
Karl G. Jpeskog and Dag Srbom 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
2005 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
the 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\1isra1 file\New Folder\nor2l. spj: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables act size 
Relationships 
yl = act 
y2 = act 
y6 - size 
Y7 = size 
dsqyB = size 
dsqy9 = size 
dsqy3 = act 
dsqy5 = act 
Set the Variance of act to 1.00 
Set the Variance of size to 1.00 
Set the Error Covariance of y2 and yl Free 
Set the Error Covariance of dsqy3 and dsqy9 Free 
Set the Error Covariance of dsqy5 and y6 Free 
Path Diagram 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
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Covariance Matrix 
yl y2 y6 y7 dsqy8 
dsqy9 
- ------- - ------- - ------- - ------- -------- 
yl 0.00 
y2 0., 01 0.01 
Yý 0.00 0.00 0.00 
y7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
dsqy8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
dsqy9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
dsqy3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
dsqy5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
Covariance Matrix 
dsqy3 dsqy5 
-------- -------- 
dsqy3 0.00 
dsqy5 0.00 0.00 
Number of Iterations = 22 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
A=0.055*act, Errorvar. = 0.00065 ,R=0.82 
(0.0043) (0.00014) 
12.85 4.60 
y2 = 0.076*act, Errorvar. = 0.0042 ,R=0.58 
(0.0077) (0.00059) 
9.88 7.05 
Y6 = 0.019*size, Errorvar. = o. oo-, R=0.98 
(0.0013) (0.00) 
15.46 3.50 
Y7 = 0.027*size, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.99 
(0.0017) (0.00) 
15.71 1.00 
dsqy8 =-0.0011*size, Errorvar. = 0.00 R 0.21 
(0.00020) (0.00) 
-5.39 7.90 
dsqy9 =-0.00038*size, Errorvar. = 0.00 R 0.24 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-5.77 7.90 
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dsqy3 0.00051*act, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.54 
(0.00) (0.00) 
9.42 7.43 
4dsqy5 = 0.0015*act, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.038 
(0.00068) (0.00) 
2.15 7.89 
Error Covariance for y2 and yl = 0.0012 
(0.00025) 
4.94 
Error Covariance for dsqy3 and dsqy9 = 0.00 
(0.00) 
-4.15 
Error Covariance for dsqy5 and y6 = 0.00 
(0.00) 
-5.46 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
act size 
-------- -------- 
act 1.00 
size 0.98 1.00 
(0.02) 
51.78 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
Degrees of Freedom 16 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square 114.06 (P = 0.00) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 91.70 (P - 
0.00) 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) - 75.70 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP - (49.28 ; 109.64) 
Minimum Fit Function Value = 0.91 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) - 0.61 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO - (0.39 ; 0.88) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.19 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.16 0.23) 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.00 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) - 1.05 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (0.84 ; 1.33) 
ECVI for Saturated Model = 0.58 
ECVI for Independence Model - 9.03 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 28 Degrees of Freedom 
1112.37 
Independence AIC - 1128.37 
Model AIC - 131.70 
§aturated AIC 72.00 
Independence CAIC 1159.06 
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Model CAIC = 208.43 
Saturated CAIC = 210.11 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.90 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.84 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.51 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.91 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.91 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) 0.82 
Critical N (CN) = 36.07 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.00 
Standardized RMR = 0.089 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.85 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.65 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.38 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add an Error Covariance 
Between and Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
dsqy8 y7 7.9 0.00 
dsqy5 dsqy3 8.6 0.00 
Time used: 0.070 Seconds 
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Appendix 10: The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for stock market 
development indicators, three factor model: stock market activity, size and 
liquidity. 
DATE: 11/16/2006 
TIME: 18: 12 
ISREL8.72 
BY 
Karl G. J. ýeskog and Dag S; bom 
2005 
the 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\lisral file\New Folder\nor22. spj: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables act size iiq 
Relationships 
yl = act 
y2 = act 
Y6 = size 
y7 = size 
sqy8 = size liq 
sqy9 = size 
sqyll = liq 
sqyl2 = liq 
sqyl3 = liq 
sqy3 = act 
sqy5 = act 
Set the Variance of act to 1.0000 
Set the Variance of size to 1.0000 
Set the Variance of liq to 1.0000 
Set the Error Covariance of y2 and 
Set the Error Covariance of dsqy3 
Set the Error Covariance of dsqy5 
Path Diagram 
Number of Decimals =4 
End of Problem 
yl Free 
and dsqy9 Free 
and y6 Free 
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Sample Size = 126 
Covariance Matrix 
yl y2 y6 y7 sqyB 
sqy9 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
yl 0.0037 
y2 0.0055 0.0100 
y6 0.0011 0.0015 0.0004 
y7 0.0015 0.0020 0.0005 0.0007 
sqy8 0.0009 0.0009 0.0003 0.0005 0.0009 
sqy9 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
0.0002 
dsqy9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqyll 0.0013 0.0021 0.0005 0.0006 0.0003 
0.0001 
sqyl2 0.0062 0.0090 0.0022 0.0029 0.0017 
0.0002 
sqyl3 0.0036 0.0058 0.0012 0.0016 0.0005 
0.0004 
sqy3 0.0016 0.0025 0.0005 0.0007 0.0004 
0.0001 
dsqy3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqy5 0.0030 0.0044 0.0011 0.0015 0.0008 
0.0002 
dsqy5 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
Covariance Matrix 
dsqy9 sqyll sqyl2 sqyl3 sqy3 
dsqy3 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
dsqy9 0.0000 
sqyll 0.0000 0.0008 
sqyl2 0.0000 0.003D 0.0142 
sqyl3 0.0000 0.0017 0.0073 0.0057 
sqy3 0.0000 0.0008 0.0033 0.0022 0.0009 
dsqy3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqy5 0.0000 0.0014 0.0063 0.0034 0.0015 
0.0000 
dsqy5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
0.0000 
Covariance Matrix 
sqy5 dsqy5 
-------- -------- 
sqy5 0.0047 
dsqy5 0.0000 0.0001 
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Number of Iterations = 31 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
yl = 0.05281*act, Errorvar. -ý 0.0009179 ,R=0.7523 
(0.004313) (0.0001210) 
12.2439 7.5876 
y2 = 0.08053*act, Errorvar. = 0.003489 ,R=. 0.6502 
(0.007361) (0.0004508) 
10.9410 7.7400 
y6 = 0.01956*size, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R=1.0089 
(0.001245) (0.0000) 
16.0314 -1.6526 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
Y7 = 0.02644*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9675 
(0.001728) (0.0000) 
15.2959 5.2915 
sqy8 = 0.01784*size - 0.002877*liq, Errorvar. = 0.0006523, R- 
0.2605 
(0.006372) (0.006309) (0.0001) 
2.7998 -0.4561 7.9894 
sqy9 0.001128*size, Errorvar. = 0.0001693, R=0.007454 
(0.001149) (0.0000) 
-0.9815 7.9074 
dsqy9 Errorvar. = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
7.9057 
sqyll = 0.02514*liq, Errorvar. = 0.0001960, R-0.7633 
(0.002025) (0.0000) 
12.4180 7.8684 
sqyl2 = 0.1129*liq, Errorvar. = 0.001448 ,R=0.8979 
(0.007921) (0.0002103) 
14.2481 6.8860 
sqyl3 = 0.06853*liq, Errorvar. = 0.001026 ,R=0.8208 
(0.005200) (0.0001334) 
13.1786 7.6852 
sqy3 = 0.02964*act, Errorvar. = 0.0001 ,R=0.9423 
(0.001993) (0.0000) 
14.8734 4.5198 
dsqy3 Errorvar. = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
7.9057 
sqy5 = 0.05306*act, Errorvar. = 0.001922 ,R=0.5942 
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(0.005177) (0.0002469) 
10.2488 7.7861 
dsqy5 Errorvar. = 0.0001 
(0.0000) 
7.9057 
Error Covariance for y2 and yl = 0.001205 
(0.0002001) 
6.0220 
Error Covariance for dsqy3 and dsqy9 = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-5.7142 
Error Covariance for dsqy5 and y6 = 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-5.3575 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
act 
act 1.0000 
size 0.9251 
(0.0155) 
59.6569 
liq 1.0243 
(0.0073) 
140.4760 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G: 
size liq 
-------- -------- 
1.0000 
0.9432 1.0000 
(0.0132) 
71.7196 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
= 0.0) 
736.5030) 
0.2841) 
6.9880) 
Degrees of Freedom 73 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square 854.3803 (P - 0.0) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 719.7486 (P 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 646.7486 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP - (564.4472 ; 
Minimum Fit Function Value - 6.8350 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) - 5.1740 
90'Percent Confidence Interval for FO = (4.5156 5.8920) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.2662 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.2487 ; 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.0000 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) - 6.2700 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI - (5.6116 ; 
ECVI for Saturated Model - 1.6800 
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ECVI for Independence Model = 33.1072 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 91 Degrees of Freedom 
4110.4059 
Independence AIC = 4138.4059 
Model AIC - 783.7486 
Saturated AIC 210.0000 
Independence CAIC 4192.1138 
Model CAIC = 906.5096 
Saturated CAIC = 612.8096 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) - 0.7921 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.7577 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) - 0.6355 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.8056 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.8065 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.7409 
Critical N (CN) = 16.2173 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) - 0.0001166 
Standardized RMR = 0.2554 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.5487 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) - 0.3508 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) - 0.3815 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add the 
Path to from Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
yl size 31.0 0.03 
yl liq 10.9 0.04 
y2 size 10.5 -0.03 
y6 act 29.2 0.01 
y7 act 25.2 -0.01 
sqy9 act . 19.6 -0.01 
sqy9 liq 15.0 _O. Dl 
sqyll act 18.3 0.04 
sqyl2 size 55.0 0.10 
sqyl3 act 22.4 -0.14 
sqyl3 size 37.4 -0.06 
sqy3 size 32.9 -0.02 
sqy3 liq 35.5 -0.07 
dsqy3 act 17.2 0.00 
dsqy3 size 29.6 0.00 
dsqy3 liq 23.1 0.00 
sqy5 size 11.9 0.03 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add an Error Covariance 
Between and Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
y7 yl 10.0 0.00 
sqy8 yl 18.3 0.00 
sqy8 y2 12.1 0.00 
sqy8 y6 22.4 0.00 
sqy8 y7 28.9 0.00 
sqy9 yl 33.2 0.00 
sqy9 y2 48.3 0.00 
sqy9 sqy8 58.5 0.00 
dsqy9 sqy9 17.0 0.00 
sqyll yl 18.2 0.00 
sqyl2 y6 22.8 0.00 
sqyl2 y7 11.1 0.00 
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sqyl2 sqyll 17.7 0.00 
sqyl3 yl 15.4 0.00 
sqyl3 y2 9.3 0.00 
sqyl3 sqy8 20.7 0.00 
sqyl3 sqy9 36.9 0.00 
sqyl3 sqyl2 22.3 0.00 
sqy3 sqyl2 18.7 0.00 
sqy3 sqyl3 85.0 0.00 
dsqy3 yl 18.5 0.00 
dsqy3 y2 8.2 0.00 
dsqy3 sqy8 8.2 0.00 
dsqy3 sqy9 8.1 0.00 
dsqy3 sqyll 9.1 0.00 
sqy5 sqy3 12.0 0.00 
dsqy5 y7 8.6 0.00 
dsqy5 dsqy9 12.4 0.00 
dsqy5 sqyll 17.6 0.00 
dsqy5 dsqy3 17.6 0.00 
Time used: 0.130 Seconds 
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Appendix 11: The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for stock market 
development indicators, four factor model: stock market activity, size, liquidity 
and concentration. 
DATE: 10/28/2006 
TIME: 12: 36 
ISREL8.72 
BY 
Karl G. J: ýeskog and Dag Srbom 
2005 
the 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\lisral file\New Folder\nor23. spj: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables act size liq conc 
Relationships 
yl = act 
y2 = act 
y6 = size 
y7 = size 
dsqy8 = size 
dsqy9 = size 
dsqyll = liq 
dsqyl2 = liq 
dsqyl3 = liq 
sqyl4 = conc 
sqyl5 = conc 
sqyl6 = size conc 
dsqy3 = act 
dsqy5 = act 
Set the Variance of act to 1.00 
Set the Variance of size to 1.00 
Set the Variance of liq to 1.00 
Set the Variance of conc to 1.00 
Set the Error Covariance of y2 and yl Free 
Set the Error Covariance of dsqy3 and dsqy9 Free 
Set the Error Covariance of dsqy5 and y6 Free 
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Path Diagram 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
Covariance Matrix 
yl y2 y6 y7 dsqyB 
dsqy9 
-------- --- ----- -------- -------- -------- 
yl 0.00 
y2 0.01 0.01 
y6 0.00 0.00 0.00 
y7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
dsqyB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
dsqy9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
dsqyll 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
dsqyl2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
dsqyl3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
sqyl4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
sqyl5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
sqyl6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
dsqy3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
dsqy5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
Covariance Matrix 
dsqyll dsqyl2 dsqyl3 sqyl4 sqyl5 
sqyl6 
-------- ---- ---- -------- -------- -------- 
dsqyll 0.00 
dsqyl2 0.00 0.00 
dsqyl3 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sqyl4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sqyl5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sqyl6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
dsqy3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
dsqy5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
Covariance Matrix 
dsqy3 dsqy5 
-------- -------- 
dsqy3 0.00 
dsqyS 0.00 . 0.00 
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Number of Iterations = 41 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
yl = 0.055*act, Errorvar. = 0.00070 ,R=0.81 
(0.0043) (0.00014) 
12.72 4.99 
y2 = 0.076*act, Errorvar. = 0.0042 ,R=0.58 
(0.0077) (0.00058) 
9.92 7.25 
y6 = 0.019*size, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R-0.98 
(0.0013) (0.00) 
15.56 3.74 
y7 = 0.027*size, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R-0.99 
(0.0017) (D. 00) 
15.63 3.14 
dsqyB 0.0011*size, Errorvar. - 0.00 ,R-0.21 
(0.00020) (0.00) 
-5.47 7.90 
dsqy9 0.00038*size, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.24 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-5.82 7.90 
dsqyll = 0.0015*liq, Errorvar. = -0.00 ,R=1.02 
(0.00014) (0.00ý 
11.17 -0.18 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
dsqyl2 - 0.00099*liq, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.070 (0.00033) (0.00) 
2.99 7.89 
dsqyl3 = 0.0020*liq, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R-0.35 
(0.00030) (0.00) 
6.56 6.95 
sqyl4 - 0.027*conc, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R-0.95 
(0.0019) (0.00) 
14.83 1.97 
sqyl5 = 0.061*conc, Errorvar. - 0.00067 ,R=0.85 (0.0046) (0-00012) 
13.37 5.36 
sqyl6 = 0.085*size + 0.037*conc, Errorvar. = 0.00096 ,R=0.80 (0.0070) (0.0052) (0.00013) 
12.09 7.19 7.21 
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dsqy3 = 0.00051*act, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R0.55 
(0.00) (0.00) 
9.56 7.46 
dsqy5 = 0.0014*act, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R0.032 
(0.00068) (0.00) 
2.01 7.90 
Error Covariance for y2 and yl - 0.0013 
(0.00025) 
5.20 
Error Covariance for dsqy3 and dsqy9 - 0.00 
(0.00) 
-4.04 
Error Covariance for dsqy5 and y6 = 0.00 
(0.00) 
-5.58 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
act size liq conc 
-------- -------- -------- -------- 
act 1.00 
size 0.99 1.00 
(0.02) 
52.80 
liq 0.51 0.46 1.00 
(0.08) (0.08) 
6.44 6.12 
conc -0.70 -0.75 -0.63 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) 
-12.56 -17.92 -9.04 
0.0) 
599.39) 
1.00 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
Degrees of Freedom = 67 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 741.26 (P - 0.0) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 585.34 (P - 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 518.34 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (444.75 ; 
Minimum Fit Function Value - 5.93 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) = 4.15 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO - (3.56 ; 4.80) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.25 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.23 0.27) 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.00 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) - 5.29 
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90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (4.70 ; 5.94) 
ECVI for Saturated Model = 1.68 
ECVI for Independence Model -, 23.13 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 91 Degrees of Freedom 
2862.97 
Independence AIC = 2890.97 
Model AIC = 661.34 
Saturated AIC 210.00 
Independence CAIC 2944.68 
Model CAIC - 807.12 
Saturated CAIC - 612.81 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) - 0.74 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) - 0.67 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) - 0.55 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.76 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.76 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.65 
Critical N (CN) = 17.33 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) - 0.00015 
Standardized RMR = 0.14 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) - 0.60 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.37 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) - 0.38 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add the 
Path to from Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
y6 act 11.5 -0.01 
y6 conc 9.7 0.00 
y7 act 13.5 0.01 
y7 conc 8.3 0.00 
dsqy9 conc 11.8 0.00 
dsqyll act 12.5 0.00 
dsqyll size 9.6 0.00 
dsqyll conc 8.8 0.00 
dsqyl2 conc 16.6 0.00 
dsqyl3 act 13.2 0.00 
dsqyl3 size 11.8 0.00 
dsqy3 conc 15.7 0.00 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add an Error Covariance 
Between and Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
y7 y6 14.8 0.00 
dsqy8 y6 8.7 0.00 
dsqyl2 y2 23.0 0.00 
, dsqyl2 y6 34.4 0.00 
dsqyl2 y7 27.4 0.00 
dsqyl3 dsqyB 49.4 0.00 
dsqyl3 dsqy9 19.2 0.00 
sqyl4 yl 8.2 0.00 
sqyl4 dsqy9 29.6 0.00 
sqyl4 dsqyl2 12.1 0.00 
sqyl5 y2 13.7 0.00 
sqyl5 y6 8.9 0.00 
sqyl5 y7 16.2 0.00 
sqyl5 dsqy9 17.8 0.00 
sqyl5 dsqyl2 39.7 0.00 
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sqyl5 sqyl4 20.8 0.00 
sqyl6 dsqy8 12.2 0.00 
sqyl6 dsqyll 8.1 0.00 
sqyl6 sqyl5 15.3 0.00 
dsqy3 y6 9.0 0.00 
dsqy3 dsqyll 8.0 0.00 
dsqy3 dsqyl2 41.8 0.00 
dsqy3 dsqyl3 11.1 0.00 
dsqy3 sqyl6 15.3 0.00 
Time used: 0.120 Seconds 
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Appendix 12: The uni-dimensional structure equation model for the relationship 
between power distance and stock market development indicators. 
DATE: 11/18/2006 
TIME: 14: 43 
ISREL8.72 
BY 
2005 
the 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\lisral file\New Folder\norl2. spj: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables act size pdi 
Relationships 
yl = act size 
y2 = act 
y6 = size 
Y7 = size act 
dsqyB = size 
dsqy9 = size 
dsqy3 = act 
dsqy5 = act 
sqxl = pdi 
sqx2 = pdi 
sqx3 = pdi 
sqx4 = pdi 
act = pdi 
size = pdi 
Set the Variance of pdi to 1.00 
Path Diagram 
Number of Decimals 4 
Admissibility Check Off 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
Karl G. J: reskog and Dag Srbom 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
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Covariance Matrix 
yl y2 y6 y7 dsqy8 
dsqy9 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
yl 0.0037 
y2 0.0055 0.0100 
y6 0.0011 0.0015 0.0004 
y7 0.0015 0.0020 0.0005 0.0007 
dsqy8 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
dsqy9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
dsqy3 0.0000 0.0000 6. oooo 0.0000 O. OOOD 
0.0000 
dsqy5 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqxl 0.0015 0.0021 0.0005 0.0007 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqx2 0.0015 0.0024 0.0005 0.0007 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqx3 0.0007 0.0011 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqx4 0.0008 0.0013 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 
0.0000 
Covariance Matrix 
dsqy3 dsqy5 sqxl sqx2 sqx3 
sqx4 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
dsqy3 0.0000 
dsqy5 060000 0.0001 
sqxl 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 
sqx2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0009 
sqx3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 
sqx4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 
0.0003 
Number of Iterations = 60 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
yj = 0.04657*act + 0.01561*size, Errorvar. - 0.0001159, R- 
0.9676 
(0.003168) (0.002356) (0.0001) 
14.7007 6,6272 1.8571 
y2 = 0.08913*act, Errorvar. = 0.002031 ,R=0.7964 
(0.0003103) 
6.5445 
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y6 = 0.02020*size, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R=1.0588 
(0.0000) 
-5.1793 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
0.9323 
y7 = 0.004411*act + 0.02227*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R= 
(0.0007550) (0.0008257) (0.0000) 
5.8428 26.9704 7.1580 
dsqy8 =-0.001263*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 R 0.2790 
(0.0001684) (0.0000) 
-7.5036 8.3659 
dsqy9 =-0.0002650*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 R 0.1154 
(0.0001) (0.0000) 
-4.4927 8.1111 
dsqy3 = 0.0004825*act, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R0.4869 
(0.0000 (0.0000) 
9.7223 7.7594 
dsqy5 = 0.001485*act, Errorvar. = 0.0001 ,R0.03833 
(0.0006717) (0.0000) 
2.2103 7.9026 
sqxl = 0.02606*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.0001 ,R=0.8983 
(0.001826) (0.0000) 
14.2747 7.7681 
sqx2 = 0.02950*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9513 
(0.001959) (0.0000) 
15.0581 7.5825 
sqx3 = 0.01425*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9972 
(0.0009040) (0.0000) 
15.7656 1.8312 
sqx4 = 0.01648*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9932 
(0.001049) (0.0000) 
15.7027 3.9326 
Structural Equations 
act = 0.8301*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.3109 ,R-0.6891 
(0.08390) (0.05513) 
9.8943 5.6393 
size = 0.8720*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.2397 ,R=0.7603 
(0.06696) (0.02745) 
13.0219 8.7306 
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Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
pdi 
1.0000 
Covariance Matrix of Latent Variables 
act size pdi 
-------- -------- -------- 
act 1.0000 
size 0.7238 1.0000 
pdi 0.8301 0.8720 1.0000 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
= 0) 
379.7205) 
0.2465) 
3.8858) 
Degrees of Freedom 50 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square 426.5585 (P = 0.0) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 365.2503 (P 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) - 315.2503 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (258.2661 ; 
Minimum Fit Function Value - 3.4125 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) - 2.5220 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO - (2.0661 3.0378) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.2246 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA - (0.2033 ; 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) - 0.0000 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) - 3.3700 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI - (2.9141 ; 
ECVI for Saturated Model 1.2480 
ECVI for Independence Model 29.6266 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 66 Degrees of Freedom - 
3679.3280 
Independence AIC - 3703.3280 
Model AIC = 421.2503 
Saturated AIC - 156.0000 
Independence CAIC - 3749.3634 
Model CAIC = 528.6662 
Saturated CAIC - 455.2300 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) - 0.8841 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.8624 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.6697 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.8958 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.8962 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) - 0.8470 
Critical N (CN) - 23.3175 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) - 0.0001 
Standardized RMR - 0.1228 
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Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.6725 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.4891 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.4311 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add the 
Path to from Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
y2 size 16.7 0.03 
dsqy9 act 15.1 0.00 
act size 13.4 0.39 
size act 13.4 0.30 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add an Error Covariance 
-Between and Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
size act 13.4 0.09 
y2 yl 23.3 0.00 
y6 y2 26.6 0.00 
y7 y2 35.8 0.00 
dsqy9 y6 18.8 0.00 
dsqy9 y7 10.3 0.00 
dsqy9 dsqy8 9.7 0.00 
dsqy3 y2 15.7 0.00 
dsqy3 y6 30.7 0.00 
dsqy3 y7 39.7 0.00 
dsqy3 dsqyB 11.0 0.00 
dsqy3 dsqy9 15.3 0.00 
dsqy5 y2 8.6 0.00 
dsqy5 y6 10.6 0.00 
dsqy5 y7 19.1 0.00 
dsqy5 dsqy8 8.9 0.00 
dsqy5 dsqy3 13.8 O. OD 
sqxl yl 8.8 0.00 
sqxl y6 12.2 0.00 
sqx2 y6 14.3 0.00 
sqx2 y7 11.4 0.00 
sqx2 dsqy8 10.2 0.00 
sqx2 dsqy9 15.1 0.00 
sqx2 sqxl 12.9 0.00 
sqx3 sqx2 11.2 0.00 
Time used: 0.130 Seconds 
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Appendix 13: The uni-dimensional structure equation model for the relationship 
between uncertainty avoidance and stock market development indicators. 
DATE: 11/18/2006 
TIME: 15: 06 
ISRELB. 72 
BY 
2005 
the 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\lisral file\New Folder\norl3. spj: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables act size uav 
Relationships 
yl = act 
y2 = act 
y6 = size 
y7 = size 
dsqy8 = size 
dsqy9 = size 
dsqy3 = act 
dsqy5 = act 
sqx6 = uav 
sqx7 = uav 
sqx8 = uav 
act = uav 
size = uav 
Set the Variance of uav to 1.00 
act = size 
Path Diagram 
Number of Decimals 4 
Admissibility Check Off 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
Karl G. Jreskog and Dag Srbom 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
384 
dsqy9 
yl 
y2 
y6 
y7 
dsqy8 
dsqy9 
0.0000 
dsqy3 
0.0000 
dsqy5 
0.0000 
sqx6 
0.0000 
sqx7 
0.0000 
sqx8 
0.0000 
Covariance Matrix 
yl y2 
-------- -------- 
0.0037 
y6 y7 dsqy8 
-------- -------- -------- 
0.0055 0.0100 
0.0011 0.0015 0.0004 
0.0015 0.0020 0.0005 0.0007 
-0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
0.0011 0.0017 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000 
Covariance Matrix 
dsqy3 
-------- 
dsqy5 
-------- 
sqx6 sqx7 sqxB 
-------- -------- -------- 
dsqy3 0.0000 
dsqy5 0.0000 0.0001 
sqx6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
sqx7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
sqx8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 
Number of Iterations = 46 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
yl = 0.06128*act, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R=1.0132, 
(0.0001) 
-0.6742 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
y2 = 0.08915*act, Errorvar. = 0.002028 ,R0.7967 
(0.004301) (0.0002971) 
20.7256 6.8239 
Y6 = 0.01976*size, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R1.0140 
(0.0000) 
-2.4201 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
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y7 = 0.02634*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9605 
(0.0004181) (0.0000) 
63.0001 5.5015 
dsqy8 = --0.001253*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.2744 
(0.0001800) (0.0000) 
-6.9590 7.9692 
dsqy9 0.0003653*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.2193 
(0.0001) (0.0000) 
-5.9978 7.9543 
dsqy3 = 0.0004540*act, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.4309 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
9.6368 7.9131 
dsqy5 = 0.001114*act, Errorvar. = 0.0001 ,R=0.02156 
(0.0006663) (0.0000) 
1.6711 7.9082 
sqx6 = D. 002949*uav, Errorvar. = 0.0000 R-0.3338 
(0.0004172) (0.0000) 
7.0688 7.8942 
sqx7 = 0.004454*uav, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R-0.9961 
(0.0002830) (0.0000) 
15.7377 0.8056 
sqx8 = 0.02202*uav, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9897 
(0.001408) (0.0000) 
15.6386 2.0521 
Structural Equations 
act = 0.6131*size +. 0.2809*uav, Errorvar. = 0.2393 ,R-0.7607 
(0.09258) (0.09457) (0.03509) 
6.6229 2.9700 6.8187 
size = 0.8882*uav, Errorvar. - 0.2112 ,R-0.7888 (G. 06881) (0.02662) 
12.9072 7.9313 
Reduced Form Equations 
act = 0.8254*uav, Errorvar. = 0.3187, R=0.6813 
(0.07195) 
11.4722 
size = 0.8882*uav, Errorvar. = 0.2112, R=0.7888 
(0.06881) 
12.9072 
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Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
uav 
1.0000 
Covariance Matrix of Latent Variables 
act size uav 
-------- -------- -------- 
act 1.0000 
size 0.8626 1.0000 
uav 0.8254 0.8882 1.0000 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
= 0.0) 
313.6333) 
0.2474) 
Degrees of Freedom = 41 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square - 328.8727 (P - 0.0) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 296.2151 (P 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) - 255.2151 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP - (204.2846 ; 
Minimum Fit Function Value - 2.6310 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) - 2.0417 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO = (1.6343 2.5091) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.2232 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.1997 ; 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.0000 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 2.7697 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (2.3623 ; 
3.2371) 
ECVI for Saturated Model 1.0560 
ECVI for Independence Model 20.6874 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 55 Degrees of Freedom 
2563.9222 
Independence AIC - 2585.9222 
Model AIC = 346.2151 
Saturated AIC 132.0000 
Independence CAIC 2628.1213 
Model CAIC = 442.1221 
Saturated CAIC = 385.1946 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.8717 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.8461 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.6498 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.8853 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.8859 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.8279 
Critical N (CN) = 25.6869 
Root Mean Sqdare Residual (RMR) = 0.0000 
Standardized RMR = 0.1162 
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Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.6989 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.5153 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.4342 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add the 
Path to from Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
y6 act 23.7 0.00 
y7 act 23.1 0.00 
The Modificatýon Indices Suggest to Add an Error Covariance 
Between and Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
y7 yl 8.7 0.00 
dsqy8 y6 10.0 O. OG 
dsqyB y7 13.4 0.00 
dsqy3 y6 12.7 0.00 
dsqy3 y7 17.6 0.00 
dsqy3 dsqy9 17.0 0.00 
dsqyS y6 23.4 0.00 
dsqy5 y7 35.7 0.00 
dsqy5 dsqy8 13.9 O. OG 
dsqy5 dsqy3 16.5 0.00 
sqx6 y6 13.0 0.00 
sqx6 y7 17.9 0.00 
sqx6 dsqy9 16.3 0.00 
sqx6 dsqy3 16.0 0.00 
sqx8 sqx7 10.2 0.00 
Time used: 0.140 Seconds 
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Appendix 14: The uni-dimensional structure equation model for the relationship 
between individuality and stock market development indicators. 
DATE: 11/18/2006 
TIME: 14: 59 
ISRELB. 72 
BY 
2005 
the 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Documents and 
Settings\A\Desktop\lisral file\New Folder\norl4. SPJ: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables act size ind 
Relationships 
yl = act 
y2 = act 
y6 = size 
Y7 = act size 
dsqy8 = size 
dsqy9 - size 
dsqy3 = act 
dsqyS = act 
sqxlO = ind 
sqxll = ind 
x12 = ind 
act = size 
act = ind 
size = ind 
Set the Variance of ind to 1.0000 
admissibility check off 
Path Diagram 
Number of Decimals 4 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
Karl G. Jreskog and Dag Srbom 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
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dsqy9 
yl 
y2 
y6 
y7 
dsqyB 
dsqy9 
0.0000 
dsqy3 
0.0000 
dsqy5 
0.0000 
sqxlO 
0.0000 
sqxll 
0.0000 
x12 
0.0000 
0.0037 
0.0055 
0.0011 
0.0015 
-0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0018 
0.0004 
0.0100 
0.0015 
0.0020 
-0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0002 
0.0028 
0.0007 
y6 
0.0004 
0.0005 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0006 
0.0001 
y7 
0.0007 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0008 
0.0002 
dsqyB 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
Covariance Matrix 
dsqy3 
-------- 
dsqy5 
-------- 
sqxlO sqxll x12 
-------- -------- ------- 
dsqy3 0.0000 
- 
dsqy5 0.0000 0.0001 
sqxlO 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
sqxll 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0012 
x12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 
Number of Iterations - 45 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
yl = 0.06112*act, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R=1.0079 
(0.000-1) 
-0.4434 
W_A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
y2 = 0.08941*act, Errorvar. = 0.001980 ,R0.8015 
(0.004231) (0.0002862) 
21.1328 6.9191 
y6 = 0.02007*size, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R1.0450 
(0.0000) 
-3.9122 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
Covariance Matrix 
yl y2 
-------- -------- 
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y7 = 0.005354*act + 0.02135*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R 0.9439 
(0.001241) (0.001309) (0.0000) 
4.3152 16.3133 6.3248 
dsqy8 0.001249*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.2727 
(0.0001740) (0.0000) 
-7.1807 8.1908 
dsqy9 0.0002906*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.1388 
(0.000ý) (0.0000) 
-4.7821 8.0625 
dsqy3 = 0.0004534*act, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R-0.4299 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
9.6158 7.8986 
dsqy5 = 0.001078*act, Errorvar. = 0.0001 ,R-0., 02020 
(0.0006688) (0.0000) 
1.6116 7.9070 
sqxlO = 0.001960*ind, Errorvar. = 0.00 ,R=0.9977 
(0.0001242) (0.00) 
15.7742 1.7295 
sqxll = 0.03488*ind, Errorvar. - 0.0000 ,R-0.9966 
(0.002214) (0.0000) 
15.7570 2.4834 
x12 = 0.008129*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9581 
(0.0005362) (0.0000) 
15.1609 7.6560 
Structural Equations 
act = 0.5472*size + 0.3618*ind, Errorvar. = 0.2239 ,R-0.7761 (0.07936) (0.08443) (0.03110) 
6.8958 4.2857 7.1991 
size = 0.8732*ind, Errorvar. = 0.2376 ,R=0.7624 (0.06771) (0.02966) 
12.8949 8.0099 
Reduced Form Equations 
act = 0.8396*ind, Errorvar. = 0.2950, R-0.7050 
(0.07156) 
11.7339 
size = 0.8732*ind, Errorvar. = 0.2376, R=0.7624 
(0.06771) 
12.8949 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
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ind 
1.0000 
Covariance Matrix of Latent Variables 
act size ind 
-------- -------- -------- 
act 1.0000 
size 0.8631 1.0000 
ind 0.8396 0.8732 1.0000 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
= 0.0) 
224.4876) 
0.2119) 
2.5319) 
Degrees of Freedom 40 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square 240.8094 (P = 0.0) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 214.7599 (P 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) - 174.7599 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP - (132.5530 ; 
Minimum Fit Function Value - 1.9265 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) = 1.3981 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO - (1.0604 1.7959) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.1870 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.1628 ; 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) - 0.0000 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 2.1341 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (1.7964 ; 
ECVI for Saturated Model 1.0560 
ECVI for Independence Model 23.1821 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 55 Degrees of Freedom 
2875.7612 
Independence AIC 2897.7612 
Model AIC - 266.7599 
Saturated AIC - 132.0000 
Independence CAIC - 2939.9603 
Model CAIC - 366.5032 
Saturated CAIC - 385.1946 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.9163 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.9021 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) - 0.6664 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.9288 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) - 0.9292 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) - 0.8849 
Critical N (CN) = 34.0611 
Rooý Mean Square Residual (RMR) - 0.0000 
Standardized RMR = 0.1084 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.7620 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) - 0.6073 
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Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.4618 
The Modification Indices Suggest to Add the 
Path to from Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
dsqy9 act 10.5 0.00 
dsqy5 size 8.4 0.00 
The Modif ication Indices Suggest to Add an Error Covariance 
Between and Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
y2 yl 17.4 0.00 
y7 y6 10.1 0.00 
dsqy9 y6 20.4 0.00 
dsqy9 y7 9.6 0.00 
dsqy9 dsqy8 8.9 0.00 
dsqy3 y6 29.0 0.00 
dsqy3 y7 38.9 0.00 
dsqy3 dsqy8 8.9 0.00 
dsqy3 dsqy9 21.2 0.00 
dsqy5 y6 17.2 D 00 
dsqy5 y7 27.1 0: 00 
dsqy5 dsqy8 9.4 0.00 
dsqy5 dsqy3 16.. 9 0.00 
Time used: 0.120 Seconds 
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Appendix 15: The multi-dimensional structure equation model for the 
relationship between cultural values and stock market development indicators. 
DATE: 11/15/2006 
TIME: 18: 03 
ISRELB. 72 
BY 
Karl G. J.; 7eskog and Dag Srbom 
This program is published exclusively by 
Scientific Software International, Inc. 
7383 N. Lincoln Avenue, Suite 100 
Lincolnwood, IL 60712, U. S. A. 
Phone: (800)247-6113, (847)675-0720, Fax: (847)675-2140 
Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981- 
2005 
Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in 
the 
Universal Copyright Convention. 
Website: www. ssicentral. com 
The following lines were read from file C: \Document; s and 
Settings\A\Desktop\1isra1 file\New Folder\norll. SPJ: 
Sample Size = 126 
Latent Variables act size pdi uav ind 
Relationships 
yl = act 
y2 = act 
y6 = size 
y7 = size 
dsqy8 = size 
dsqy9 = size 
dsqy3 = act 
dsqy5 = act 
sqxl = pdi 
sqx2 = pdi 
sqx3 = pdi 
sqx4 = pdi uav 
sqx6 = uav 
sqx7 = uav 
sqx8 = uav ind 
sqxlO = ind 
sqxll= ind uav 
sqxl2 = ind 
act = size 
act = pdi uav ind 
size = pdi uav ind 
act = size 
Set the Variance of pdi to 1.00 
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Set the Variance of uav to 1.00 
Set the Variance of ind to 1.00 
admissibility check = off 
number of decimals =4 
Path Diagram 
End of Problem 
Sample Size = 126 
dsqy9 
yl 
y2 
y6 
y7 
dsqy8 
dsqy9 
0.0000 
dsqy3 
0.0000 
dsqy5 
0.0000 
sqxl 
0.0000 
sqx2 
0.0000 
sqx3 
0.0000 
sqx4 
0.0000 
sqx6 
0.0000 
sqx7 
0.0000 
sqx8 
0.0000 
sqxlO 
0.0000 
sqxll 
0.0000 
sqxl2 
0.0000 
Covariance Matrix 
YI y2 
-------- -------- 
0.0037 
y6 y7 
-------- -------- 
0.0055 0.0100 
0.0011 0.0015 0.0004 
0.0015 0.0020 0.0005 0.0007 
-0.0001 O. OOOD 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0015 0.0021 0.0005 0.0007 
0.0015 0.0024 0.0005 0.0007 
0.0007 0.0011 0.0002 0.0003 
0.0008 0.0013 0.0003 0.0004 
D. 0002 0.0003 0.0001 O. OoDl 
0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 
0.0011 0.0017 0.0004 0.0005 
0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0018 0.0028 0.0006 0.0008 
0.0004 0.0006 0.0001 0.0002 
dsqyB 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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Covariance Matrix 
dsqy3 dsqy5 sqxl sqx2 sqx3 
sqx4 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
dsqy3 0.0000 
dsqy5 0.0000 0.0001 
sqxl 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 
sqx2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0009 
sqx3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 
sqx4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 
0.0003 
sqx6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
0.0000 
sqx7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
0.0001 
sqx8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 
0.0004 
sqxlO 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 O. OOOQ 
0.0000 
sqxll 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0010 0.0005 
0.0006 
sqxl2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
0.0001 
sqxl2 
sqx6 
sqx7 
sqxB 
sqxlO 
sqxll 
sqxl2 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0001 0.0001 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0001 0.0002 
0.0000 0.0000 
sqx8 sqxlO sqxll 
-------- -------- -------- 
0.0005 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0008 0.0001 0.0012 
0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 
Number of Iterations = 73 
LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood) 
Measurement Equations 
yl = 0.06130*act, 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error v 
Y2 = 0.08911*act, 
(0.004292) 
20.7615 
Covariance Matrix 
sqx6 sqx7' 
-------- -------- 
Errorvar. = -0.0001 ,R=1.0139 
(0.0001) 
-0.7205 
ariance is negative. 
Errorvar. = 0.002034 ,R=0.7961 
(0.0002964) 
6.8630 
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y6 = 0.01977*size, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R=1.0150 
(0.0000) 
-2.6170 
W-A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
y7 = 0.02633*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9596 
(0.0004173) (0.0000) 
63.0881 5.6258 
dsqyB 0.001256*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.2756 
(0.0001796) (0.0000) 
-6.9904 7.9770 
dsqy9 0.0003631*size, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.2167 
(0.0001) (0.0000) 
-5.9598 7.9591 
dsqy3 = 0.0004540*act, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.4310- 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
9.6485 7.9186 
dsqy5 = 0.001121*act, Errorvar. = 0.0001 ,R-0.02185 
(0.0006659) (0.0000) 
1.6831 7.9084 
sqxl = 0.02591*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.0001 ,R=0.8878 
(0.001834) (0.0000) 
14.1288 8.0324 
sqx2 = 0.02951*pdi, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9517 
(0.001959) (0.0000) 
15.0668 8.1067 
sqx3 = 0.01428*pdi, Errorvar. = -0.0000 ,R=1.0015 
(0.0009019) (0.0000) 
15.8352 -2.5278 
W_A_R_N_I_N_G : Error variance is negative. 
sqx4 = 0.009645*pdi + 0.006870*uav, Errorvar. - 0.0000 ,R- 0.9924 
(0.001141) (0.001058) 
8.4512 6.4950 
(0.0000) 
7.8571 
sqx6 = 0.002938*uav, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.3314 
(0.0004171) (0.0000) 
7.0440 7.9026 
sqx7 = 0.004461*uav, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R=0.9990 
(0.0002824) (0.0000) 
15.7955 0.8098 
sqxB = 0.02995*uav - 0.008018*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R 0.9885 
(0.003628) (0.003135) (0.0000) 
8.2548 -2.5574 4.5943 
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sqxlO = 0.001957*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000, R= 0.9949 
(0.0001244) (0.00) 
15.7302 7.4712 
sqxll =-0.006150*uav + 0.04104*ind, Errorv ar. = 0.0000 ,R 0.9996 
(0.001541) (0.002990) (0.0000) 
-3.9901 13.7238 1.8096 
sqxl2 = 0.007577*ind, Errorvar. = 0.0000 ,R = 0.9981 
(0.0004801) (0.0000) 
15.7817 6.3513 
Structural Equations 
act = 0.5840*size 0.4388*pdi - 0.4834*uav + 1.2329*ind, 
Errorvar. = 0.2339 ,R0.7661 
(0.09120) (0.5134) (0.3950) (0.7240) 
(0.03431) 
6.4030 -0.8548 -1.2237 1.7028 
6.8182 
size = 0.8015*pdi + 0.4579*uav - 0.3657*ind, Errorvar. - 0.2058 
R=0.7942 
(0.4872) (0.3635) (0.6779) (0.02546) 
1.6450 1.2596 -0.5394 8.0833 
Reduced Fom Equations 
act = 0.02919*pdi - 0.2160*uav + 1.0193*ind, Errorvar. = 0.3041, 
R=0.69.59 
(0.5918) (0.4561) (0.8388) 
0.04933 -0.4735 1.2152 
size = 0.8015*pdi + G. 4579*uav - 0.3657*ind, Errorvar. - 0.2058, 
R=0.7942 
(0.4872) (0.3635) (0.6779) 
1.6450 1.2596 -0.5394 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variablqs 
pdi uav, ind 
-------- -------- 
pdi 1.0000 
-------- 
uav 0.9888 1.0000 
(0.0020) 
482.9101 
ind 0.9974 0.9936 1.0000 
(0.0005) (0.0014) 
1848.2523 725.2856 
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Covariance Matrix of Latent Variables 
act 
act 1.0000 
size 0.8604 
pdi 0.8323 
uav 0.8256 
ind 0.8338 
= 0.0) 
471.8957) 
0.1759) 
5.5352) 
ECVI for Saturated Model 2.7360 
ECVI for Independence Model 82.6813 
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 153 Degrees of Freedom - 
10299.1578 
Independence AIC - 10335.1578 
Model AIC = 617.6294 
Saturated AIC 342.0000 
Independence CAIC 10404.2109 
Model CAIC = 805.6072 
Saturated CAIC = 998.0042 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) - 0.9424 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) - 0.9418 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) - 0.7515 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) - 0.9536 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.9537 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.9278 
Critical N (CN) = 34.9846 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.0000 
Standardized RMR = 0.08629 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.6840 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.5571 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) - 0.4880 
size pdi uav ind 
-------- -------- -------- -------- 
1.0000 
0.8895 1.0000 
0.8871 0.9888 1.0000 
0.8887 0.9974 0.9936 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
1.0000 
Degrees of Freedom 122 
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square 593.0977 (P - 0.0) 
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square - 519.6294 (P 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 397.6294 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (330.9132 ; 
Minimum Fit Function Value - 4.7448 
Population Discrepancy Function Value (FO) - 3.1810 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for FO = (2.6473 3.7752) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.1615 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA - (0.1473 ; 
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) - 0.0000 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 4.9410 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (4.4073 ; 
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The Modification Indices Suggest to Add the 
Path to from Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate 
y6 act 24.5 0.00 
y7 act 23.9 0.00 
The Modification Indices 
Between and Decr 
y7 
dsqy8 
dsqy8 
dsqy3 
dsqy3 
dsqy3 
dsqy5 
dsqy5 
dsqy5 
dsqy5 
sqxl 
sqxl 
sqxl 
sqx2 
sqx2 
sqx2 
sqx2 
sqx4 
sqx6 
sqx6 
sqx6 
sqx6 
sqxlO 
yl 
y6 
y7 
y6 
y7 
dsqy9 
y6 
y7 
dsqy8 
dsqy3 
yl 
y2 
y6 
y6 
y7 
dsqy8 
dsqy9 
sqxl 
y6 
y7 
dsqy9 
dsqy3 
sqx4 
Suggest to Add an 
ease in Chi-Square 
9.5 
9.7 
13.1 
12.5 
17.4 
17.2 
22.8 
35.3 
13.7 
16.4 
8.3 
11.2 
9.2 
24.9 
19.0 
19.3 
16.1 
8.6 
12.9 
17.9 
16.1 
16.1 
13.1 
Error Covariance 
New Estimate 
0.00 
O. OG 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Time used: 0.391 Second 
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Appendix 16: The regression analysis models for the relationship between 
cultural values and board size. 
Regression 
Notes 
Output Create; 
Comments 
Input 
Missing Value Handling 
Syntax 
Data 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Resources Elapsed 1-ime 
Memory Required 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 
Plots 
04-NOV-2006 06: 59: 59 
CADocuments and Seftings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance paper\corporate governance 
paper. sav 
<none> 
<none> 
<none> 
24 
User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=P[N(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT xl 
/METHOD=ENTER xl 0 xl 1 xl 2 xl 3 xl 5 xl 6 
xl7xl8xl9x20 /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID 
, ZPRED) /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
0: 00: 00.17 
4508 bytes 
168 bytes 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Std. Deviation Mean 
23 3.42117 12.8478 board size 
23 17.53044 43.0435 PDI 
23 27.33629 59.0000 UAV 
23 19.66458 65.1739 IND 
23 23.80014 48.9130 MASC 
23 2064.93094 2699.3913 PDI-UAV 
23 1058.06523 2623.8696 PDI-IND 
23 1283.72251 2112.6957 PDI-MAS 
23 1664.82027 3799.4348 UAV-IND 
23 2045.86661 2970.0870 UAV-MAS 
123 1 1878.11431 13187.4783 1 IND_MAS I 
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r_ 
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a) C 0 
. 0 
0 
C14 
C) 
IRT 
Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
Variables 
Variables Entered Removed Method 
IND 
- 
MAS. PDI-UAV, IND, PDI, UAV-MAS. UAV-IND, PDI-MAS, Enter PDI-IND, UAV, MASC(a) 
a All requested variables entered. 
b Dependent Variable: board size 
Model Summary(b) 
Model R- 
[-R-Square I 
Adjusted R Square 
I 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 
. 662(a) -1 . 438 
1 
-. 030 
1 3.47253 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI, UAV-MAS, UAV-IND, PDI-MAS, PDI-IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: board size 
ANOVA(b) 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 112.796 10 11.280 . 935 . 536(a) 
Residual 144.702 12 12.058 
Total 1 257.497 1 22 1 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI, UAV_MAS, UAV_IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: board size 
Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. 
B Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 47.574 32.325 1.472 . 167 
PDI -. 395 . 451 -2.022 -. 874 . 399 . 009 114.269 UAV -. 052 . 292 -. 419 -. 180 . 860 . 009 115.896 IND -. 543 . 403 -3.118 -1.346 . 203 . 009 114.588 MASC -. 037 . 368 -. 254 -. 099 . 923 . 007 139.921 PDI-UAV 
. 000 . 003 . 280 . 152 . 882 . 014 72.649 PDI-IND 
. 009 . 006 2.857 1.620 . 131 . 015 66.399 PDI-MAS -. 003 . 004 -1.163 -. 692 . 502 . 017 60.331 
UAV-IND .. 001 . 002 -. 691 -. 573 . 577 . 032 31.058 UAV-MAS 
. 001 . 003 . 755 . 463 . 652 . 018 56.805 
INDý_MAS 1 . 002 1 . 004 1 . 895 1 . 424 1 . 679 1 . 011 95.181 
a Dependent Variable: board size 
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0 Ch 0 0 CD 4: ) 
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r- 
0 
cýi (D LO C) Co r4 0) (0 C» 0 C, 4 (D C) 0 0 C) ý i i i 4-: 1. i CC 4 1. i ui (6 ci c 1- 
a 
C, 4 
c 
40 
c 
0 v- v- 
(U le (0 r- r- U) v- (9 (D > r4 r- (0 C) C*4 0 0 0 0 c Lil V) N 0 0 0 0 CD cý 9 
1- N V) le to (0 r- Co (3) a) %- le- 
0 
c 
(D 
CL 
IV 
0 
le 
C: ) 
le 
Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 9.5111 18.6917 12.8478 2.26430 23 
Residual -4.1520 9.1563 . 0000 2.56464 23 
Std. Predicted Value -1.474 2.581 . 000 1.000 23 
Std. Residual -1.196 1 2.637 1 . 000 1 . 739 1 23 
a Dependent Variable: board size 
Charts 
3 
T] 
(0 
Co 
c 
0 
. cn 
CY- -Z 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: board size 
13 11 
13 00 0 
0 EP 
0 
0 0 
0 
0 
0 
-2 -1 0 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
23 
405 
Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 04-NOV-2006 07: 00: 35 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and Seftings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance paper\corporate governance 
paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 24 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x1 
/METHOD=STEPWISE x1 0 x1 I x1 2 x1 3 x1 5 
x16 x17 x18 x19 x2O 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.09 
Memory Required 5108 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 168 bytes 
Plots 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
board size 12.8478 3.42117 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV-IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV-MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
1 INDý_MAS 1 3187.4783 1 1878.11431 123 
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Appendix 17: The regression analysis models for the relationship between 
cultural values and separation of chair and CEO. 
Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 04-NOV-2006 07: 05: 22 
Comments 
Input Data 
C: \Documents and Settings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance paper\corporate governance paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in 
Working Data File 24 
Missing Value Definition of 
Handling Missing User-defined missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for 
any variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR 
SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
R ANOVA COLLIN TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(A 0) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x2 /METHOD=ENTERx10 
x1l x12 x13 x15 x16 x17 x18 x1g x2O 
ISCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) /CASEWISE 
PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.10 
Memory Required 4508 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for 168 bytes 
Residual Plots 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Separation chair & CEO 80.4522 20.87292 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV-IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV-MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
1 INDý_MAS 1 3187.4783 1878.11431 23 
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Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
UAV, IND, PDI, UAV MAS, MAS, PDI IND 
_ - UAV IND, PDIMAS, PDI_IND, UAV, MASC(a) - Enter 
a All requested variables entered. 
b Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
Model Summary(b) , 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
I 
. 736(a) . 542 . 160 19.13066 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI, UAV_MAS, UAV_IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
ANOVA(b) 
Model -T Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 
I Regression 5193.149 10 519.315 1.419 . 279(a) Residual 4391.788 12 365.982 
Total 1 9584.937 1 22 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI, UAV_MAS, UAV_IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
Coefficients(a) 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t 8ig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. 
B Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 255.041 178.080 1.432 . 178 PDI -1.145 2.487 -. 962 -. 461 . 653 . 009 114.269 UAV -1.838 1.606 -2.407 -1.144 . 275 . 009 115.896 IND -1.461 2.220 -1.376 -. 658 . 523 . 009 114.588 MASC -1.034 2.027 -1.179 -. 510 . 619 . 007 139.921 PD1-UAV 
. 010 . 017 1.021 . 613 . 551 . 014 72.649 PDI-IND -. 007 . 031 -. 377 -. 237 . 817 . 015 66.399 PDI-MAS -. 002 . 025 -. 131 -. 086 . 933 . 017 60.331 UAV IND 
. 020 . 014 1.623 1.490 . 162 . 032 . 
31.058 
UAV-MAS 
. 004 . 015 . 413 . 280 . 784 . 018 56.805 IND_MAS 
. ()11 . 021 . 995 . 522 . 611 . 011 95.181 
a Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
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Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 51.8424 110.2243 80.4522 15.36399 23 
Residual -48.9673 21.1976 . 0000 14.12893 23 
Std. Predicted Value -1.862 1.938 . 000 1.000 23 
Std. Residual -2.560 1.108 1 . 000 1 . 739 1 23 
a Dependent Variable: lieparation cnair & L; tu 
Charts 
2 
- 
U) 
a) 
cl) N 
C 
C, ) 
C 
0 
a) 
Q:: -3 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Separation chair &. CEO 
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Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 04-NOV-2006 07: 05: 46 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and Seffings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance papeAcorporate governance 
paper. sav 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Elapsed Time 
Memory Required 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 
Plots 
<none> 
<none> 
<none> 
24 
User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
REGRESSION IDESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x2 
/METHOD=STEPWISE x1 0 x1 I x1l 2 x1 3 x1 5 
x16 x17 x18 x19 x20 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
0: 00: 00.09 
5108 bytes 
168 bytes 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Separation chair & CEO 80.4522 20.87292 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV-IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV-MAS 2970.0870 2045.866611 23 
INDý_MAS 13187.4783 1 1878.11431 1 23 
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Variables Entered/Removed(a) 
Variables Variables 
Model Entered Removed Method 
I Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= . 050, Probability- PDI 
of-F-to-remove >= . 100). 
a Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
Model Summary(b) 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
II 
. 608(a) 
1 
. 370 
1 
. 340 16.96071 
a Predictors: (Constant), PDI 
b Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
ANOVA(b) 
Model 
I 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 
Regression 3543.960 1 3543.960 12.320 . 002(a) 
Residual 6040.978 21 287.666 
Total 1 9584.937 1 22 1 
a Predictors: (Constant), PDI 
b Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardzed 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. I 
B Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 111.616 9.557 11.679 . 000 
PDI 
ý 
-. 724 . 206 -. 608 -3.510 , . 
002 
, 
1.000 1.000 
a Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
Excluded Variables(b) 
Model Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation Collinearity Statistics 
Minimum 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
UAV -. 222(a) -1.216 . 238 -. 262 . 878 1.138 . 878 
IND -. 100(a) -. 471 . 643 -. 105 . 697 1.434 . 697 
MASC -. 183(a) -1.056 . 303 -. 230 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PDI-UAV -. 277(a) -1.193 . 247 -. 258 . 544 1.837 . 544 PDI-IND -. 123(a) -. 620 . 542 -. 137 . 788 1.270 . 788 
PDI-MAS -. 231 (a) -. 960 . 348 -. 210 . 522 1.917 . 522 
UAV 
- 
IND -. 138(a) -. 780 . 445 -. 172 . 983 1.017 . 983 UAV 
- 
MAS -. 245(a) -1.433 . 167 -. 305 . 976 1.025 . 976 IND_MAS 1 -. 201 (a) 1 -1.134 1 . 270 1 -. 246 1 . 940 1 1.064 1 . 940 
a Predictors in the Model: (Constant), PDI 
b Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
415 
Collinearity Diagnostics(a) 
Variance Proportions 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index jConstant) PDI 
11 
2 
1.929 
. 071 
1.000 
5.213 
. 04 
. 96 
. 04 
. 96 
a Dependent Variable: Separation Chair & uLu 
Casewise Diagnostics(a) 
Case Number Std. Residual 
Separation chair & 
CEO 
I 
Predicted Value Residual 
24 -3.405 24.90 
1 82.6557 -57.7557 
a Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 58.0396 103.6517 80.4522 12.69209 23 
Residual 
-57.7557 20.0444 . 0000 16.57075 23 Std. Predicted Value -1.766 1.828 . 000 1.000 23 Std. Residual 1 -3.405 1 1.182 1 . 000 1 . 977 1 23 
a wepenuent vanaDie: , jeparation cnair & utu 
Charts 
z 
(D 
(D 
N 
'2 
cu 
U) -2 
c 
0 
-3 
-4 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
E313 
0 
-2 .10 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
1 2 
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Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 10-NOV-2006 09: 48: 26 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and 
Seffings\A\Desktop\corporate governance 
papeAcorporate governance paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 24 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax 
_ 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIGN /MISSING LISTWISE 
/REGWGT=res-I /STATISTICS COEFF 
OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL 
/CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) /NOORIGIN 
/DEPENDENT x2 /METHOD=STEPWISE 
xl0xll xl2xl3xl5xl6xi7xl8xl9x2O 
/SCATrERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3) 
/SAVE RESID. 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.10 
Memory Required 5132 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 168 bytes 
Plots 
Variables Created or RES -2 Residual Modified 
Warnings 
No plots are produced for Weighted Least Squares regression. You can SAVE the 
appropriate variables and use other procedures (e. g., EXAMINE and PLOT) to produce 
the requested plots. To plot weighted versions of the residuals and predicted values, 
use COMPUTE before plotting: COMPUTE RESID = SQRT(REGWGTvar) * RESID 
COMPUTE PRED = SQRT(REGWGTvar) * PRED. 
417 
Descriptive Statistics(a) 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Separation chair & CEO 91.1735 30.76560 12 
PDI 46.7867 58.66292 12 
UAV 49.7156 93.45125 12 
IND 66.5436 77.46047 12 
MASC 46.7779 80.30511 12 
PDI-UAV 2320.2719 6313.98055 12 
PDI-IND 2856.3436 3834.97707 12 
PDI-MAS 2285.9258 4508.84491 12 
UAV-IND 3673.2872 7543.65382 12 
UAV MAS 2473.9377 6825.24218 12 
INDý_MAS 3131.1342 7217.83553 12 
a Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
418 
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Variables Entered/Removed(a, b) 
Model Variabfe s Entered Variables Removed Method 
_ Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to- 
PDI enter <= . 050, Probability-of-F-to- remove >=. 100). 
a Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Model Summary(b, c) 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
I 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 
. 952(a) . 906 . 896 
1 9.89960 
a Predictors: (Constant), PDI 
b Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
ANOVA(b, c) 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 
-Sig. 1 Regression 9431.721 1 9431.721 96.240 . 000(a) Residual 980-021 10 98.002 
Total 10411.741 11 1 1 1 
a Predictors: (Constant), PDI 
b Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Coefficients(a, b) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 114.527 2.532 45.232 . 000 PDI 
. -. 
499 . 051 -. 952 -9.810 . 000 , 
1.000 1.000 
a uepenclent variable: Separation Chair & CEO 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
420 
Excluded Variables(b, c) 
M d l B I Si Partial 
Collinearity Statistics 
o e eta n t g. Correlation Minimum Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
UAV . 087(a) . 885 . 399 . 283 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IND . 131 (a) . 993 . 347 . 314 . 541 1.848 . 541 
MASC -. 037(a) -. 357 . 729 -. 118 . 939 1.065 . 939 
PDI_UAV . 091 (a) . 877 . 403 . 281 . 886 1.128 . 886 
PDI-IND . 101(a) 1.038 . 326 . 327 . 979 1.021 . 979 
PDUMAS -. 080(a) -. 477 . 645 -. 157 . 365 2.743 . 365 
Uffiý_IND .1 05(a) 1.091 . 304 . 342 . 993 1.007 . 993 
UA\ý_MAS . 047(a) . 457 . 659 . 151 . 983 1.017 . 983 
INDý_MAS . 01 8(a) . 177 . 864 1 . 059 . 973 1.028 1 . 973 
a Predictors in the Model: (Constant), PDI 
b Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Collinearity Diagnostics(a, b) 
Variance Proportions 
Model Dimension Eigenvalu Condition Index (Constant) PDI 
11 
2 
1.940 
. 060 
1.000 
5.695 
. 03 
. 97 
. 03 
. 97 
a Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Residuals Statistics(b, c) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 77.5898 105.5425 93.3548 8.84622 12 
Residual -14.8847 2.5178 -1.4715 4.66190 12 
Std. Predicted Value(a) 0 
I Std. Residual(a) 0 
a Not computed for Weighted Least Squares regression. 
b Dependent Variable: Separation chair & CEO 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
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Appendix 18: The regression analysis models for the relationship between 
cultural values and independence per board. 
Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working Data File 
Missing Value Definition of Missing 
Handling 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Elapsed Time 
Memory Required 
Additional Memory Required 
for Residual Plots 
04-NOV-2006 07: 08: 03 
CADocuments and Seffings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance papeAcorporate governance 
paper. sav 
<none> 
<none> 
<none> 
24 
User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x4 
/METHOD=ENTER xl 0 x1l I xl 2 xl 3 xl 5 xl 6 
xl7xl8xlgx2O /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID 
, ZPRED) /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
0: 00: 00.13 
4508 bytes 
168 bytes 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Independence per board 43.1087 21.88478 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV-IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV-MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
INQ_MAS 3187.4783 1 1878.11431 123 
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Co 
r0 
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-a CL 
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cu mm 000 
.0 A2 
j2 
CL CL CL 
(U 
> Co c< Co >0 CO (3 < CO >Z CI) 
< c3 ý05 
«n 
c <Z><C <Z<z> c Z- < n ý Z I CL 03 1 0. >> i 
<< 92 <B rz Z Z - Z Z 2 0- CL EL Z) -2 - 2 0.0- CL Z3 CL Z CL CL £L Z CL Z CL Z) 
c 0 
ý 
(10 
0 
0 
(0 ch G) 
CL 65 
ef) 
cq 
It 
Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
Variables 
Model Variables Entered Removed Method 
I 
IND MAS, PDI UAV. IND, PDI, UAV MAS, UAV IND, 
- - - PD1-MAS, PDI_IND, UAV, MASC(a) Enter 
a cul requested variables entered. 
b Dependent Variable: Independence per board 
Model Summary(b) 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
- VStd. 
Error of the Estimate 
1 
. 771 (a) . 594 . 256 
1 18.88130 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS. PD1_UAV, IND, PDI. UAV-MAS, UAV-IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Independence per board 
ANOVA(b) 
[Model 
- T Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6258.716 10 625.872 1.756 
.1 76(a) Residual 4278.043 12 356.504 
Total 10536.758 22 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI, UAV-MAS, UAV-IND, PDI-MAS, PDI-IND, 
UAV. MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Independence per board 
Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sia. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 95.821 175.759 . 545 . 596 PDI -1.765 2.455 -1.414 -. 719 . 486 . 009 114.269 UAV 1.157 1.585 1.445 . 730 . 480 . 009 115.896 IND -. 955 2.191 -. 858 -. 436 . 671 . 009 114.588 MASC -. 628 2.001 -. 683 -. 314 . 759 . 007 139.921 PDI_UAV -. 012 . 017 -1.098 -. 700 . 497 . 014 72.649 PDI-IND 
. 024 . 031 1.178 . 786 . 447 . 015 66.399 PDI-MAS 
. 024 . 024 1.389 . 972 . 350 . 017 60.331 UAV 
- 
IND -. 003 . 013 -. 232 -. 227 . 824 . 032 31.058 UA\ý_MAS -. 018 . 015 -1.676 -1.209 . 250 . 018 56.805 IND_MAS 
. . 
009 
' . 
021 
' . 
815 . 454 658 . Oil 1 
95.181 
a Uependent Variable: Independence per board 
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23 
(0) 
e 
CO 
2 0 C) M 0 0 C) N LO cý cý cý cý cý cý 9 ri 
Z 
2 C) C) 0 C) C> LO N (0 to 0 
> 9 cý cý cý cý cý c4 cý 
Z 
> C) C: ) 0 
2 0 0 0 0 C: ) Co r4 v- r- 
cý 9 ce cý Ilý 9 
cl 
0 rli N 193 
r_ 1 C: ) Q 0 0 CD C: ) Q CY 0 (n le 
't 13 0 . 
> 
< 
CD C: ) C) 0 V) 8 - 3 cý cý cý cý cý cý cý Ei 
(V 
U) CD C) C) C> 0 CD N Co Co 
< cý cý cý cý cý lq: 
2 
in 0 C) C) C: ) T- T- Z C) C: ) 0 0 CD 0 CD (7) 
C) CD C: ) C) 0 C: ) (D LO 
cý cý cý cý 
CD C> ci 0 0 
Ici 9 11: ý 9 9 cý 9 C:! Iri c4 c. CL 
m C) CD C) C> CD C) Co 
to C cý cý cý cý Icý cý c i 
0 
(0 C) CY 
. Co ty C» 
CC 
Q V) C) C) (D 
c3i c3i a; 6 le Lfi (6 ai C, 4 0 a) Ir- CY 
(0 
C, 4 r- Co (» C%j C) C: ) C: ) 
LO ri CY C) 0 0 8 0 0 C: ) 
V) le W) (C) r- Co C) 0 - 0 1 v- 
E 
2 
tu 0 
CL 
V 
tn 
C14 
It 
Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 5995 69.2751 43.1087 16.86674 23 
Residual -39.1088 37.1964 . 0000 13.94477 23 Std. Predicted Value -2.591 1.551 . 000 1.000 23 Std. Residual -2.071 1.970 1 . 000 1 . 739 1 23 
a Dependent Variable: Independence per board 
Charts 
j 
.0 a) - 
(a 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Independence per board 
93 
13 0 13 
0aa 
D 
C' 1313 13 a 
13 a 
93 
13 
13 
-3 -2 -1 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
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Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 04-NOV-2006 07: 08: 15 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and Settings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance papeAcorporate governance 
paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 24 Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x4 
/METHOD=STEPWISE xl 0 xl I xl 2 xl 3 xl 5 
x16 W x18 xl9 x2O 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.72 
Memory Required 5108 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 168 bytes 
Plots 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Independence per board 43.1087 21.88478 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV-IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV-MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
1 INDý_MAS 1 3187.4783 1 1878.11431 1 23 
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Variables Entered/Removed(a) 
Variables Variables 
Model Entered Removed Method 
1 Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= . 050, Probability- IND of-F-to-remove >=. 100). 
2 Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= . 050, Probability- 
II 
UAV-MAS of-F-to-remove >= . 100). 
a Dependent Variable: Independence per board 
Model Summary(c) 
Std. Error of the 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Estimate 
I 
. 494(a) . 
244 . 208 19.47325 
2 
. 658(b) . 
433 . 376 17.28784 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND 
b Predictors: (Constant), IND, UANý_MAS 
c Dependent Variable: Independence per board 
ANOVA(c) 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
. 1 Regression 2573.402 1 2573.402 6.786 . 01 7(a) 
Residual 7963.356 21 379.207 
Total 10536.758 22 
2 Regression 4559.372 2 2279.686 7.628 . 003(b) 
Residual 5977.386 20 298.869 
Total 1 10536.758 1 22 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND 
b Predictors: (Constant), IND, UAV MAS 
c Dependent Variable: Independence per board 
429 
Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Siq. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 7.263 14.347 . 506 . 618 
IND 
. 550 . 
211 . 494 2.605 . 017 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant) 22.082 13-974 1.580 . 130 
IND 
. 534 . 
188 . 480 2.850 . 010 . 
999 1.001 
UAV-MAS -. 005 . 002 -. 434 -2.578 . 
018 . 999 1.001 
a Dependent Variable: Indepencience per Doaro 
Excluded Varlables(c) 
Model Beta In t Siq. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Toleranc 
e VIF 
Minimum 
Toleranc( 
1 PDI 
.1 37(a) . 592 . 
561 . 131 . 697 1.434 . 697 
UAV -. 387(a) -2.213 . 039 -. 444 . 992 
1.008 . 992 
MASC -. 176(a) -. 923 . 367 -. 202 1.000 
1.000 1.000 
PDI_U 
-. 261 (a) -1.369 . 186 -. 293 . 949 
1.053 . 949 AV 
PDI 
-IN . 006(a) . 028 . 
978 . 006 . 791 1.264 . 791 D 
PDI_M 
-. 052(a) -. 254 . 802 -. 
057 . 884 1.131 . 884 AS 
UAV-1 358(a) -1.766 . 093 -. 
367 . 798 1.254 . 798 ND 
UAV-M 
-. 434(a) -2.578 . 018 -. 499 . 999 
1.001 . 999 AS 
IND_M 
-. 152(a) -. 666 . 513 -. 147 . 708 1.412 . 708 AS 
2 PDI 
. 228(b) 1.123 . 
275 . 249 . 678 1.474 . 678 
UAV -. 168(b) -. 720 . 480 -. 163 . 
532 1.879 . 532 
MASC 
. 372(b) 1.470 . 
158 . 320 . 418 2.394 . 417 
PDI_U 
-. 034(b) -. 164 . 871 -. 038 . 
682 1.466 . 682 AV 
PDI 
- 
IN 
. 184(b) . 917 . 371 . 
206 . 708 1.413 . 708 D 
PDI_M 
. 432(b) 1.956 . 
065 . 409 . 508 1.967 . 508 AS 
UAV-1 050(b) -. 190 . 851 -. 
044 . 429 2.332 . 429 ND 
IND_M 
. 451 (b) 1.633 . 
119 . 351 . 343 2.917 . 343 AS I 
a Predictors in the M odel: (Cons tant), IND 
b Predictors in the M odel: (Cons tant), IND, UANý_MAS 
c Dependent Variab le: Independ ence per b oard 
430 
Collinearity Diagnostics(a) 
Model Dimension Eiqenvalue 
Condition 
Index Variance Pro rtions 
Constant IND UAV MAS 
11 1.959 1.000 . 02 . 02 
2 
. 041 
6.922 . 98 . 98 
21 2.721 1.000 . 01 . 01 . 04 2 
. 241 3.363 . 
03 . 07 . 89 
3 
. 038 8.445 . 
97 . 92 . 08 
a Dependent Variable: Indepencience per waro 
Residuals Statistics(a) 
Unimurn Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 6.0527 61.3842 43.1087 14.39598 23 
Residual -36.1495 41.7454 . 0000 16.48331 23 
Std. Predicted Value -2.574 1.269 . 000 1.000 23 Std. Residual -2.091 1 2.415 1 . 000 1 . 953 1 23 
a Dependent Variable: Independence per Doara 
Charts 
J 
"D 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Independence per board 
13 
13 
a 
a 
13 13 
C3 a 
13 0 
0 
-3 -2 -1 0 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
431 
Appendix 19: The regression analysis models for the relationship between 
cultural values and audit committee. 
Regression 
Notes 
Output Cre 
Comments 
Input Data 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Elapsed Time 
Memory Required 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 
Plots 
04-NOV-2006 07: 19: 32 
CADocuments and SeftingsWDesktop\corporate 
governance papeAcorporate governance 
paper. sav 
<none> 
<none> 
<none> 
24 
User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x5 
/METHOD=ENTER xl 0 xl I xl 2 xl 3 xl 5 xl 6 
xl7xl8xl9x2O /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID 
, ZPRED) /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
0: 00: 00.10 
4508 bytes 
168 bytes 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
audit committee 67.6261 26.46671 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV-IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
INCk_MAS 1 3187.4783 1878.11431 1 23 
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Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
UAV, IND, PDI, UAV MAS, IND MAS, PDI 
- =7 IND, PDI-MAS, PDI_IND, UAV, -MASC(a) Enter 
a All requested variables entered. 
b Dependent Variable: audit committee 
Model Summary(b) 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 
. 
881 (a) . 
777 
. 590 16.93702 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI-UAV, IND, PDI, UAV-MAS, UAV-IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: audit committee 
ANOVA(b) 
Model 
I 
Sum of Squares df 
_Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Regression 11968.351 10 1196.835 4.172 . 011 (a) Residual 3442.353 12 286.863 
Total 15410.704 22 1 1 1 
-1 a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI, UAV_MAS, UAV-IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b- Dependent Variable: audit committee 
Coefficlents(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t SjQ. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(constant) 134.635 157.661 . 854 . 410 PDI -1.879 2.202 -1.245 -. 854 . 410 . 009 114.269 UAV 
. 439 1.422 . 454 . 309 . 763 . 009 115.896 IND -1.215 1.966 -. 903 -. 618 . 548 . 009 114.588 MASC 
. 000 1.795 . 000 . 000 1.000 . 007 139.921 PDI-UAV -. 002 . 015 -. 132 -. 113 . 912 . 014 72.649 PDI-IND 
. 024 . 028 . 975 . 877 . 398 '. 015 66.399 PDI-MAS 
. 019 . 022 . 942 . 889 . 391 . 017 60.331 UAV IND 
. 001 . 012 . 086 . 113 . 912 . 032 31.058 UAV_MAS -. 025 . 013 -1.939 -1.886 . 084 . 018 56.805 IND-MAS 
. 011 . 019 . 801 . 602 . 558 , . 
011 95.181 
a Dependent Variable: audit committee 
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Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 5.3694 107.5132 67.6261 23.32415 23 
Residual -20.4606 24.7748 . 0000 12.50882 
23 
Std. Predicted Value -2.669 1.710 . 000 1.000 23 
Std. Residual -1.208 1.463 1 . 000 1 . 739 123 
a Uependent Variable: aucia comminee 
Charts 
1.0 
.5 
0.0 
-1.0 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: audit Committee 
1.5 ,U 
13 
13 
cl 
-3 -2 -1 0 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
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Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 04-NOV-2006 07: 19: 40 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and Settings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance paper\corporate governance 
paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 24 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x5 
/METHOD=STEPWISE xl 0 xl I xl 2 xl 3 xl 5 
x16 x17 x18 x19 x2O 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.11 
Memory Required 5108 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 168 bytes 
Plots 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
audit committee 67.6261 26.46671 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV-IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV-MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
IND_MAS 1 3187.4783 1 1878.11431 1 23 
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Variables Entered/Removed(a) 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
Stepwise (Criteria: 
UAV Probability-of-F-to-enter <= . 050, Probability-of- F-to-remove >= A 00). 
2 Stepwise (Criteria: 
PDI IND 
Probability-of-Fto-enter 
<= . 050, Probability-of- F-to-remove >=. 100). 
a Dependent Variable: audit committee 
Model Summary(c) 
Std. Error of the 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Estimate 
I 
. 526(a) . 276 . 
242 23.04435 
-2 . 
752(b) . 565 . 522 18.29818 
Predictors: (Constant), UAV 
Predictors: (Constant), UAV, PDI-IND 
Dependent Variable: audit committee 
ANOVA(c) 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4258.823 1 4258.823 8.020 . 010(a) 
Residual 11151.881 21 531.042 
Total 15410.704 22 
2 Regression 8714.237 2 4357.118 13.013 . 000(b) 
Residual 6696.467 20 334.823 
Total 1 15410.704 1 22 
-1 Predictors, (Constant), UAV 
Predictors: (Constant), UAV, PDI IND 
Dependent Variable: audit commFftee 
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Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 97.655 11.642 8.388 . 000 
UAV -. 509 . 180 -. 526 -2.832 . 010 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant) 73.564 11.361 6.475 . 000 
UAV -. 770 . 160 -. 795 -4.822 . 000 . 800 1.251 
PDI-IND 
. 015 . 004 . 601 3.648 . 002 . 800 1.251 
a Uependent Variable: audit committee 
Model II Beta 
Excluded Varlables(c) 
Partial I Collinearity 
Minimum 
I Tolerance VIF Tole 
PDI 
. 
137(a) . 
682 . 503 . 151 . 878 1.138 . 
878 
IND 
. 
387(a) 2.275 . 
034 
. 453 . 992 1.008 . 992 
MASC 
-. 004(a) -. 022 . 983 -. 005 . 
982 1.019 
. 
982 
PDI-UAV 
. 473(a) 
1.110 . 
280 
. 
241 
. 188 5.319 . 188 
PDI-IND 
. 
601 (a) 3.648 . 002 . 632 . 800 1.251 . 800 
PDI-MAS 
. 052(a) . 
266 
. 793 . 
059 
. 936 1.069 . 936 
UAV-IND 
. 
707(a) 2.630 . 
016 . 507 . 372 2.687 . 372 
UAV-MAS 
-. 240(a) -. 945 . 
356 -. 207 . 537 
1.864 
. 
537 
IND 
- 
MAS 
. 278(a) 
1.538 
. 
140 . 
325 
. 
992 1.008 
. 
992 
2 PDI 
-. 083(b) -. 481 . 
636 -. 110 . 762 1.312 . 
694 
IND 
. 125(b) . 
693 
. 497 . 
157 
. 
684 1.463 
. 
551 
MASC 
. 
004(b) . 025 . 980 . 006 . 
981 1.019 
. 787 
PDI-UAV 
-. 176(b) -. 442 . 
664 -. 101 . 143 6.991 . 143 
PDI MAS -. 122(b) -. 758 . 
458 -. 171 . 855 1.170 . 730 UA9 IND 
.1 35(b) . 
374 . 713 . 
085 
. 174 5.764 . 174 
UAV-MAS 
-. 207(b) -1.027 . 
317 -. 229 . 535 1.868 . 463 
IND_MAS 
. 123(b) . 782 . 444 . 
177 
. 
898 1.114 
. 723 
a Predictors in the Model: (Constant), UAV 
b Predictors in the Model: (Constant), UAV, PDI_IND 
c Dependent Variable: audit committee 
Collinearity Diagnostics(a) 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
111.911 
2 
. 089 212.838 
2 
. 093 
3 
. 069 
a Dependent Variable: audit committee 
Condition 
Index (Constant) UAV PD 
1.000 . 04 . 04 
4.630 . 96 . 96 
1.000 . 01 . 02 . 01 5.523 . 28 . 97 . 13 
6.391 . 71 . 01 . 86 
ND 
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Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 22.9060 93.4823 67.6261 19.90230 23 
Residual -36.0272 27.0940 . 0000 17.44663 23 
Std. Predicted Value -2.247 1.299 . 000 1.000 23 
Std. Residual -1.969 1.481 1 . 000 1 . 953 1 23' 
a Dependent Variable: audit committee 
Charts 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: audit committee 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
.5 
0.0 
ca 
. 1-- -. 
5 
co 
c 
o -1.0 
-2.0 
13 13 
13 
a 0 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 13 
El 
-3 -2 0 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
1 
441 
Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Elapsed Time 
Memory Required 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 
Plots 
Variables Created or RES-4 
Modified 
1 O-NOV-2006 09: 52: 27 
CADocuments and 
Seffings\A\Desktop\corporate governance 
papeAcorporate governance paper. sav 
<none> 
<none> 
<none> 
24 
User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/REGWGT=res 3 /STATISTICS COEFF 
OUTS R ANOVK COLLIN TOL 
/CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) /NOORIGIN 
/DEPENDENT x5 /METHOD=STEPWISE 
x10 xl 1 x12 x13 x15 x16 W x18 xlg x2O 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3) 
/SAVE RESID. 
0: 00: 00.10 
5172 bytes 
168 bytes 
Residual 
Wamings 
No plots are produced for Weighted Least Squares regression. You can SAVE the 
appropriate variables and use other procedures (e. g., EXAMINE and PLOT) to produce 
the requested plots. To plot weighted versions of the residuals and predicted values, 
use COMPUTE before plotting: COMPUTE RESID = SQRT(REGWGTvar) * RESID 
COMPUTE PRED = SQRT(REGWGTvar) * PRED. 
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Descriptive Statistics(a) 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
audit committee 82.2199 70.64478 12 
PDI 40.6389 47.62329 12 
UAV 63.1923 87.90701 12 
IND 66.0075 65.33532 12 
MASC 50.2095 82.98148 12 
PDI-UAV 2822.6378 7429.86688 12 
PDI-IND 2538.3167 2586.80376 12 
PDI-MAS 1934.7145 3185.88792 12 
UAV IND 3868.0483 3717.41718 12 
UAV-MAS 2973.8395 5063.40877 12 
1 INCk_MAS 1 3465.4615 7062.29176 12 
a Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstanclardized Residual 
443 
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0J 
0 
0 CL 0 
V 
,a 
3: 
:3 It 
Variables Entered/Removed(a, b) 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
Stepwise (Criteria: 
IND Probability-of-F-to-enter 
-c=. 050, Probability-of- 
F-to-remove >=. 100). 
a Dependent Variable: audit committee 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Model Summary(b, c) 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Sq are 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 
. 848(a) . 
719 
__ 
1 
. 691 39.26363 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND 
b Dependent Variable: audit committee 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
ANOVA(b, c) 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Si 
1 Regression 39481.208 1 39481.208 25.610 . 000(a) 
Residual 15416.329 10 1541.633 
Total 54897.537 1 11 1 1 1 
-1 a Predictors: (Constant), IND 
b Dependent Variable: audit committee 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Coefficients(a, b) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 21.694 12.340 1.758 . 109 
IND 
. 917 . 181 . 848 5.061 . 000 1.000 1.000 
a Dependent Variable: audit committee 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
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Excluded Varlables(b, c) 
Model Beta In t siq. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Minimum 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
PDI 1 20(a) -. 489 . 636 -. 161 . 504 1.983 . 504 UAV -. 469(a) -1.870 . 094 -. 529 . 357 2.803 . 357, MASC 
. 151 (a) . 801 . 444 . 258 . 820 1.219 . 820 PD! -UAV -. 323(a) -1.121 . 291 -. 350 . 331 3.021 . 331 PDI-IND -. 075(a) -. 354 . 731 -. 117 . 693 1.444 . 693 PDI - MAS . 074(a) . 421 . 684 . 139 . 981 1.020 . 981 UAV_IND -. 266(a) -1.630 . 137 -. 478 . 906 1.104 . 906 UA\ý_MAS -. 038(a) -. 218 . 832 -. 072 1.000 1.000 1.000 INDý_IVAS 
. 157(a) 1 . 699 . 502 1 . 227 . 590 1.694 1 . 590 
a Predictors in the Model: (Constant), IND 
b Dependent Variable: audit committee 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Collineaeity Diagnostics(a, b) 
Model Dimension Condition Index Variance Propo ions 
I 
jConstant) IND 
11 
2. 
1.969 
. 031 
1.000 
8.002 
. 02 
. 98 
. 02 
. 98 
a Dependent Variable: audit committee 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Residuals Statistics(b, c) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 50.1193 105.1370 86.7214 14.78792 12 
Residual 
-32.2603 14.1192 -5.8547 13.12400 12 
Std. Predicted Value(a) 0 
I Std. Residual(a) 0 
a Not computed for Weighted Least Squares regression. 
b Dependent Variable: audit committee 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
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Appendix 20: The regression analysis models for the relationship between 
cultural values and remuneration disclosure. 
Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 04-NOV-2006 07: 24: 48 
Comments 
Input Data CADocuments and Seftings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance paper\corporate governance 
paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 24 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT X6 
/METHOD=ENTER xl 0 xl I xl 2 xl 3 xl 5 xl 6 
xl7xl8xl9x20 /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID 
, ZPRED) /CASEWISE 
PLOT(ZRESID) 
OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.13 
Memory Required 4508 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 168 bytes 
Plots 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Rem Disclosure 90.5522 15.43514 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV-IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
IJAV-MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
INDý_MAS 1 3187.4783 1 1878.11431 123 
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C 
0 
0 
0 
2i 
(0 C) (y) r- 0 cm le r) r- r- 0 Co 0 r- le 0 (1 clq (0 C) C%4 r14 Co 03 C) Co 0 ei le C) C> Co r- cli ce) 0 c) ri (V) ce CV) e) ce «) ce) m (V) rý cý cý ci cý 9 cý 9 c4 CD Co cý m ci V) U-) :4 c 4 , E . : ý r4 (N 4 C, 4 r-4 ri NNr NNC 
(D r- 0 c> 0 ri 0 U) m 0M e), n M (1 ce) v) cl in V) ci 
Z: ce .. A: vý c4 le u? : wý 9 C, 4 9. cý cý : c? 9. cý NNMN ci Cq ri ri ri N cy 
1 
c4 C) ý- r- (n m0 V) f- le (0 (3 (0 rý 00 Co ý C) 
V) 0) La r- CD vi (D 0 C» C) r. - r- C) ýýC: ) 0 (4 C) in v) , z) ý -: rý q: -7 kq rý --: ýj Zq ci ci c4 c! c! ei cý R ri cý 
cý 
................. 
C, 4 C, 4 C»4 C, 4 C, 4 C, 4 r-4 C, 4 r4 r-A r14 
(0 
1 
Ei 
(D " V) r- A Co 0 V) lqr (Y) cq 0 clq CD (D (3) cq CO T., (D ci C) LO X Co (D 0w C-4 Co (0 0N to c> CY C) tn ci ri (V) (n ce m (1 ce Ce) mm Ctl CL. 1. . -w -: cec19cý-: C! 999 (Q N... n 2 
in 
Z 
- 0 
CO f- CO (Y) (D Co C) ;t le Co V) (0 le LO T- N0m r4 
r- CD e U) q. (y) 0 (0 to - (D ---- C> a c3 c3 1, - ce in ei C-2 m ci mmm cn m 
9q,: cl P: c4 ci vý ci 9 ci q: 9NC, 4 NN cq N r4 rg C, 4 NN 
Z) 
1 25 Co 
tn c3 (0 0 tt) V) (0 u2 v- Cýq Icr 0MX r-, e (0 CO (3 0ý r- ý (Y) (D CD) C) W) Ln C> " C: ) Ch CO c4 C: ) C) (0 N r- C) 
CL 
c) N m v) mm ce eg ce el «) mm N c: ý cý cý ce ci NNN ry c9 NNC, 4 N r-4 c4 '. ID (D 1- ID liý liý IC! cý 
C) 
U) 
< 
(0 -0 Co Ln Go -t Co r- ý- mN CD r- (y) Co r- tn 0 r- 0 (D r4 0 , ce) (D (N 't Co r- (D N U') (D (0 C» 10 -0- cý 0 2 C) -? -: 999 rý 
f,: cq -: ', t c4 ', 't . 
lý e cý c4 cý 9N r4 NN r4 NNN CN N c4 
£D 
ir- 
C> (3) c2 ý0 r_ o0 r4 CD Co v) r2 
)3n lt U. ) Co In U-) 
«) C, 4 0 C» LO 9- 90 4 
10 -, e <l> 10 IN 
) 0 - 4ý cý 
cý c2 IN r4 cq C, 4 c9 C, ý ,C 45 Zý 0q vi 
CY) Lo Co cl rq r- (D VI 00 CO N Ch (D f- r-- x 
C: ) CO 
ri (D C) el 0 l; r 0 (D CO CO 0 tr) x (0 0- IN 0 c); g ei r2 ce mmm ei ce ce mm (D 0ý0 IN ID 0- C2 0 r ý Z 0! v............ -N cq ri NNN ei iN r. 4 ei c. 4 
25 
c0 
1 
c? 
) c> C» c> CO to v- C, 4 ý Ln 
Ln (1 ý- V) r, - C) M CD (D 0 C) 52, LO (D ID 0-0-Z 
e c: .. c c c r ?9 ý ý e ý cý ce 4. l cy N 
Ea 
0 Lo ' 
In 0 (D Co 0 C) in r_ r-- le c3) m (0 00 0 Co Co cq ;ý (D Co c:! ,N le IN 
(0 r- V) r- ty) cli r_ (D N to 0 (D (0 N ýt mm ci mm ce) ce m in (n M c c: re cl cý `ý (D CY ,, ý r4 N C ` w 0 :: i ! 0 . ? ý r. 4 ei NNN cy N cq N r-4 N Ir- e* i* .10-888.... 
(4 to U) 0 00 
. Co Co Co 0 c3 m 013<W 0<<0 >< 0< r2 ý3 Z<Z>< La =2-<Z ý cl a :D c2 > -, 12 11 CO 
21:: 1 l> > c21 E-> tz (0 -1-1 U) 
111 E> tz 0 
Sa 
aaa> 
> 
25> 
> > 92 < < < < < <00F2«, oo< <oc2 025 < 
CL :2 :23X CL :3Z9 CL a Z2 CL a CL :5 Z) Z Z - - > a- CL CL DZe Er- CL Z_ W CL Z_ 
c a) 
0 
00 CL C) 
00 mt 
Rt 
Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
Variables 
Model Variables Entered Removed Method 
1 IND 
- 
MAS, PDI 
- 
UAV, IND, PDI, UAN/ý_MAS, UAV-IND, Enter PDI MAS, PDI IND, UAV, MASC(a) 
a All requested variables entered. 
b Dependent Variable: Rem DiscJosure 
Model Summary(b) 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
I Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 
. 771 (a) . 594 . 
256 113.31448 
a Predictors: (Constant). IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI, UAV_MAS, UAV-IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
ANOVA(b) 
I Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3114.054 10 311.405 1.757 .1 76(a) 
Residual 2127.304 12 177.275 
Total 1 5241.357 1 22 11 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI, UA\ý_MAS, UAV IN-D, PDL. MAS, PDI_IND' 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
- 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. 
B Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 244.086 123.940 1.969 . 072 
PDI -. 818 1.731 -. 929 -. 473 . 645 . 009 114.269 
UAV 
. 467 1.118 . 826 . 
417 . 684 . 009 115.896 
IND -2.647 1.545 -3.373 -1.713 . 112 . 009 114.588 
MASC -1.748 1.411 -2.695 -1.239 . 239 . 007 139.921 PDI-UAV 
-. 013 . 012 -1.740 -1.110 . 289 . 014 72.649 
PDI-IND 
. 033 . 
022 2.244 1.498 . 160 . 015 66.399 
Pl)ý-MAS -. 005 . 017 -. 430 -. 
301 . 769 . 017 60.331 
UAV-IND -. 003 . 010 -. 359 -. 351 . 732 . 032 31.058 
UAV_MAS 
. 000 . 010 -. 
056 -. 040 . 968 . 018 56.805 
INP-MAS 1 . 027 1 . 015 1 3.290 1 1.834 1 . 092 1 . 011 95.181_j 
a Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
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21% 
2 
1 
0 
cý 
0 
cý 
0 
cý 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ri 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0) r4 vi 
C: ) 
Z 
(0 
2 0 0 0 0 (D Lii r4 
(0 Lil) 0 
CD 0 C: ) cý Ci 1:: ý cý 
Z 
> cý 
0 0 0 0 C: ) 
Co CD (0 ei 
CI) 
< Co (14 
0 CL Z C) (D C) 0 C) 0 v- CM r4 LO 2 1 cý cý cý cý ce 9 C, 4 cý Ci le 
Z 0 0 C: ) 0 ci (0 n- m 1- 
1 cý cý cý cý cý cý cý (i cý 
U) 
< 
0 cý 
0 cý 
0 0 cý 0 cý 0 cý 
r4 
cý 
Co Co 
Z cý cý cý cý cý cý cý cý 
0 C> 0 C: ) C) (3 ;2 cý 9 cý cý cý c c4 
cý cý cý c4 
C) 0 cý ce C) cý 0 cý q cý 9 cý 
0 
0x 0 
ci 0 (0 N 
(0 c» 
2 = 0) 0 0 Co 8 Ci 
C) Ce) (D 0 cý li 0- 
(D 
:3 
0 
c m 
Co 0) (14 w- 
c: ý C! a) 
Am ci 
w 
c 0 . U) 
(0 r_ Co C» 0 %- 
E 
1 
. «. 2 1 1 
h; 
.0 m 
CL 
(V 
c2 
C) 
kn 
, Wt 
Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 45.6253 103.4129 90.5522 11.89739 23 
Residual -29.7856 12.0766 . 0000 9.83339 23 
Std. Predicted Value -3.776 1.081 . 000 1.000 23 
Std. Residual -2.237 . 907 1 . 000 1 . 739 1 23 
a Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
Charts 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
1.01 
0.0 
1.0 
(0 
a 
0 
(D -2.0- 
CD 
-2.5 
-4 -3 -2 2 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
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Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 04-NOV-2006 07: 24: 57 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and SettingMATesktopýcorporat6 
governance papeAcorporate governance 
paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 24 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x6 
/METHOD=STEPWISE xl 0 xi I xl 2 xl 3 xl 5 
x16 W x18 x19 x2O 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.11 
Memory Required 5108 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 168 bytes 
Plots 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Rem Disclosure 90.5522 15.43514 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 
. 
23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV-MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
IND_MAS 3187.4783 1 1878.11431 1 23 
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Co 
0 
I 
ci) 
< 
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cr14 
CM r4 
CC4 
C, 4 (0 a) r4 00 4c), e (0 W) Q v- 0 CD ýeQ000 V) 
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NýV)OOCY ;3 Co r_ (0 C, 4 Q') (0 (0 CY) LO X- 0-00N C'4 N c4 N C, 4 N C, 4 C, 4 C, 4 N , (n 
4 C) 0 CN 0ý (D CDO CDC. (0 %- r- CO r- le rJ e Ict le C: ) C 
.............. 
0 
le LO Co 00N Ul) x KC) ci 2)r r4 0Xm0- Lf) -40C, 41 ýN r4 C. 4 cq ýN r, 1 CN CM N CN 
Nq cý cý cý c4 "I: "I: cý cý . q: V,: cý cý cý Z 81081 
(D C) C: ) 0) Ln T- 00 r3 C, 4 " r- (0 ", M (» C) CD r4 00 r- Cl M CY2 M (n er) (v) M cy) m cvl pl- 't C: ) CD ci c> e to (» Co Co 0 Ln lqt (0 0"N00xNN ci CY NN r4 N NN r4 
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- 0 CV) e0 (0, e (D ý 1- NNQ Q'e 000 CN C'4 1- 
C) CI) r- 1-t cli (0 r- ce r- ci IN r-- 0 c"4 Lo (2 (D C. 4 r4 N cm c4 r4 r4 r4 N C. 4 r4 CN 4 - - (ý) 
8 
cl 04 , 
E co 
ýv 4 ý e C: ) r 0 CM CM CM rq 0M0 
.......... 0 
T 
00 
)> (n ( CO > c3 U) c3 - 0 c3 <Z< 2 <.! 2 <<Z< 20 a :3Z2- 0 Z) « 1 1 E1E U) 1:: 1 l> Co 111 E- >>> >> e3 in 0 > m < Ei << c2 << (1) c2 < <<Z < 
ZZ2 12 3: 3 ZX CL Z) ZC a ZD 0 C a Z . - 0.0- a. ZZw CL . - L L . X CL Z) 
C*0j om 
lýL f2 g tu i 
1 
c ) 00 0-0 U) 
ff) 
Variables Entered/Removed(a) 
Variables Variables 
Model Entered Removed Method 
1 Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= . 050, Probability- UAV MAS 
of-F-to-remove >= A 00). 
a Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
Model Summary(b) 
Model 
1 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 
- 431 (a) . 
185 1.147 14.25865 
a Predictors: (Constant), UAV MAS 
b Dependent Variable: Rem b7isclosure 
ANOVA(b) 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F 
Regression 971.866 1 971.866 4.780 . 040(a) 
Residual 4269.492 21 203.309 
Total 1 5241.357 22 1 1 1 1 
Predictors: (Constant), UAV MAS 
Dependent Variable: Rem ETisclosure 
Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. 
BI Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 100.201 5.321 18.830 . 000 
Uffiý_MAS -. 003 
1 
. 001 1 -. 431 1 . 
2.186 1 . 040 1 1.000 1.000 
a Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
454 
Excluded Variables(b) 
Model Beta In t Sig. 
_ 
Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Minimum 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
I PDI -. 068(a) -. 333 . 742 -. 074 . 976 1.025 . 976 UAV 
. 042(a) . 154 . 879 . 
034 . 537 1.864 . 537 
IND 
. 234(a) 1.198 . 245 . 
259 . 999 1.001 . 999 
MASC 
. 246(a) . 800 . 433 . 
176 . 418 2.390 . 418 
PDI-UA 
v -. 058(a) -. 245 . 809 -. 055 . 725 1.379 . 725 
PDI-IND 
. 208(a) 1.018 . 321 . 222 . 925 1.081 . 925 
PDI-MA 
-. 1 00(a) -. 390 . 701 -. 087 . 611 1.638 . 611 S 
UAV IN 
. 284(a) 1.171 . 
255 . 253 . 649 1.541 . 649 D 
IND_MA 
. 430(a) 1.868 . 076 . 385 . 656 1.525 . 656 SI I I --- I I --- I I I Predictors in the Model: (Constant), UAV-MAS 
Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
Collinearity Diagnostics(a) 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue__ ConditionInclex VariancePropo ions . 
(Constant) UAV MAS 
11 
2 
1.829 
. 171 
1.000 
3.274 
. 09 
. 91 
. 09 
. 91 
a Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
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Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 71.8073 99.7301 90.5522 6.64648 23 
Residual -29.1662 14.4547 . 0000 13.93082 23 
Std. Predicted Value -2.820 1.381 . 000 1.000 23 
Std. Residual -2.046 1.014 1 . 000 1 . 977 1 23 
a Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
Charts 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
1.5 , 
1.0 
0.0 
5 
-1.0 
c 
cn in 2 -2.0 0) 
(D 
W -2.5 
a 1313 
-3 -V -1 012 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
456 
Regression 
Notes 
Output Created I O-NOV-2006 09: 54: 59 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and 
Seftings\A\Desktop\corporate governance 
paper\corporate governance paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 24 Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/REGWGT=res-5 /STATISTICS COEFF 
OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL 
/CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) /NOORIGIN 
/DEPENDENT x6 /METHOD=STEPWISE 
x10 xl 1 x12 x13 x15 x16 xl 7 x18 xig x20 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3) 
/SAVE RESID. 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.11 
Memory Required 5212 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 168 bytes 
Plots 
Variables Created or RES-6 Residual Modified 
Warnings 
No plots are produced for Weighted Least Squares regression. You can SAVE the 
appropriate variables and use other procedures (e. g., EXAMINE and PLOT) to produce 
the requested plots. To plot weighted versions of the residuals and predicted values, 
use COMPUTE before plotting: COMPUTE RESID = SQR. T(REGWGTvar) * RESID 
COMPUTE PRED = SQRT(REGWGTvar) * PRED. 
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Descriptive Statistics(a) 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Rem Disclosure 98.3304 8.94184 17 
PDI, 43.3064 41.34072 17 
UAV 65.7037 55.99717 17 
IND 71.2917 41.58103 17 
MASC 56.9067 45.26529 17 
PD1-UAV 3085.9406 5329.62517 17 
PDI-IND 3027.1948 3016.05064 . 17 PDI-MAS 2351.0499 2195.80594 17 
UAV IND 4490.7522 3371.63966 17 
UAV-MAS 3599.8419 3292.94888 17 
1 INDý_MAS 1 4166.0100 4208.28604 17 
a Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstanclardized Residual 
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Variables Entered/Removed(a, b) 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
Stepwise (Criteda: 
UAV MAS Probability-of-F-to-enter 
=. 050, Probability-of- 
F-to-remove >= A 00). 
a uependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Model Summary(b, c) 
Model 
] 1 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
1 Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 
1 
. 491 (a) 
1.241 1 
. 191 8.04429 
a Predictors: (Constant), UAV MAS 
b Dependent Variable: Rem E Fisclosure 
C Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
ANOVA(b, c) 
Sum of Model Square df Mean Square F Sim 
Regression 308.644 1 308.644 4.770 . 045(a) Residual 970.660 
1 
15 64.711 
tal 1 1279.303 16 1 1 1 
Predictors: (Constant), UAV MAS 
Dependent Variable: Rem EWsclosure 
Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Coefficients(a, b) 
Modi el 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity I 
Statistics 
I 
Std. I I 
B Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(ConstanQ 
103.132 
1 
2.315 
1 
. 000 
UNý_MAS 
. _. 
001 . 001 -. 491 . 045 1.000 1.000 
a UePendent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
460 
Excluded Variables(b, c) 
Parbal 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Model Beta In t Sig. Correlafion Minimum Tolerance VIF 
olerance 
PDI . 130(a) . 550 . 591 . 146 . 947 1.056 . 
947 
UAV -. 105(a) -. 403 . 693 -. 107 . 784 1.276 . 784 
IND . 084(a) . 360 . 724 . 
096 . 998 1.002 . 998 
MASC . 181 (a) . 651 . 526 . 
171 . 677 1A77 . 677 
1 Pl)ý_UAV . 012(a) . 047 . 963 . 013 . 
907 1.102 . 907 
PDI-IND . 148(a) . 619 . 546 . 163 . 919 1.088 . 919 
PD! 
-MAS . 
548(a) 1.874 . 082 . 448 . 507 1.972 . 507 
UA%QNO ý. 048(a) -. 160 . 875 -. 043 . 592 1.690 . 592 
INQ_MAS 1 . 184(a) 1 . 754 1 . 463 1 . 
198 1 . 877 1 1.140 ý *877 __j a Predictors in the Model: (Constant), UAV-MAS 
b Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
C Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Collinearity Diagnosties(a, b) 
Model Dimension Eiqenvalue Conclitionlndex VariancePropo ions 
I 
fConstant) UAV MAS 
11 
2 
1.950 
. 
050 
1 1.000 
6.228 1 
_ 
. 03 
. 97 
. 03 
. 97 
a wependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Residuals Statistics(b, c) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 95.7560 102.9384 99.1536 2.17902 17 
Residual 
-10.0560 2.6768 -1.3948 3.38038 17 Std. Predicted Value(a) 0 
I 
Std. Residual a) I . I .I .1 
01 
a Not computed for Weighted Least Squares regression. 
b Dependent Variable: Rem Disclosure 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
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Appendix 21: The regression analysis models for the relationship between 
cultural values and women on board. 
Regression 
Notes 
04-NOV-2006 07: 31: 57 
Comments 
Input Data 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definibon of Missing 
Cases Used 
CADocuments and Settings\A\Desktopýcorporate 
governance papeAcorporate governance 
paper. sav 
<none> 
<none> 
<none> 
24 
User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax 
Resources Elapsed Time 
Memory Required 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 
Plots 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLUN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN MEPENDENTx7 . 
/METHOD=ENTERxlOxll xl2xl3xl5xl6 
xl7xl8xl9x2O /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID 
, ZPRED) 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) 
OUTLIERS(3). 
0: 00: 00.12 
4508 bytes 
168 bytes 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Women on board 8.1435 5.88054 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PD! 
_UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 PDUIND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDj_MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV IND 3799.4348 1664-82027 23 
UANý_MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
INDLMAS 
1 3187.4783 1 1878.11431 1 23 1 
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Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
IND 
- 
MAS, PDI UAV, IND, 
' PDI. UA\ý MA§ , UAV IND, - PDI MAS. PDI-IND, UAV, Enter 
MA9C(a) 
a All requested variables entered. 
b Dependent Variable: Women on board 
Model Summary(b) 
Model 
I 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
I 
. 828(a) 
1 
. 685 
1 
. 423 4.46676 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV. IND, PDI, UAV_MAS, UAV_IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Women on board 
ANOVA(b) 
- 
Sum of 
Mode I Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 
1 
521.354 10 52.135 2.613 . 059(a) Residual 239.423 12 19.952 
Total 760.777 1 22 1 1 1 
a Freclictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV. IND, PDI, UAV_MAS, UAV_IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Women on board 
Coefficlents(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Siq. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. 
B Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 49.863 41.579 1.199 . 254 PDI -. 491 . 581 -1.463 -. 845 . 414 . 009 114.269 UAV 
. 311 . 375 1.445 . 829 . 423 . 009 115.896 IND -. 480 . 518 -1.605 -. 926 . 373 . 009 114.588 MASC -. 729 . 473 -2.950 -1-540 . 150 . 007 139.921 PDý_UAV 
-. 006 . 004 -2.204 -1.597 . 136 . 014 72.649 PDI-IND 
. 006 . 007 1.154 . 874 . 399 . 015 66.399 PDI_MAS 
. 007 . 006 1.520 1.209 . 250 . 017 60.331 UAV-IND 
. 000 . 003 -. 063 -. 070 . 946 . 032 31.058 UA\ý_MAS 
. 000 . 004 -. 067 -. 055 . 957 . 018 56.805 IND-MAS 
. . 
005 . 005 1.485 . 940 . 366 . 011 95.181 
a Dependent Variable: Women on board 
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Residuals Statistics(a) 
I 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.1899 18.6722 8.1435 4.86805 23 
Residual -7.8581 7.5278 . 0000 3.29892 
23 
Std. Predicted Value -1.917 2.163 . 000 1.000 23 
Std. Residual -1.759 1.685 1 . 000 1 . 739 1 23 
a Dependent Vanable: Women on boara 
Charts 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Women on board 
2.0 , 
co 1.5 
(D 1.0 
M 
.5 N 
16 
L- CU 0.0 
-. 5 CO 
a-a 
0 1.0- 
in- 
-2.0 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
N 
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, f) 
Regression 
Notes 
I 
Output Created 04-NOV-2006 07: 32: 05 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and Seftings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance paper\corporate governance 
paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 24 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWSE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x7 
/METHOD=STEPWISE xl 0 xl I xl 2 xi 3 xl 5 
x16 W x18 x19 x2O 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.10 
Memory Required 5108 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 168 bytes 
Plots 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Women on board 8.1435 5.88054 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV-IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV-MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
IND_MAS 3187.4783 1878.11431 23 
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Variables Entered/Removed(a) 
Variables Variables 
Model Entered Removed Method 
Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <=. 050. PDI MAS Probability-of-F-to-remove >= . 100). 
a Dependent Variable: Women on board 
Model Summary(b) 
Model R 
JR 
Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
I 
Estimate 
1 
1 
. 621 (a) 
1 
. 
386 . 357 
1 4.71560 
a Predictors: (Constant), PDI-MAS 
b Dependent Variable: Women on board 
ANOVA(b) 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 293.803 1 293.803 13.212 . 002(a) 
Residual 466.974 21 22.237 
Total 1 760.777 122 1 1 1 
a Predictors: (Constant), PDI-MAS 
b Dependent Variable: Women on board 
Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
__ Std. 
B Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 14.158 1.925 7.356 . 000 
PDl_MAS -. 003 . 001 -. 621 1 -3.635 , . 
002 
, 
1.000 1.000 
a Dependent Variable: Women on board 
Excluded Variables(b) 
Model Beta In It Siq. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Minimum 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
1 PDI 
. 025(a) . 103 . 919 . 
023 . 522 1.917 . 522 
UAV -. 229(a) -1.320 . 202 ý -. 283 . 936 1.069 .. 
936 
IND. 
.1 64(a) . 896 . 
381 . 196 . 884 1.131 . 884 
MASC -. 275(a) -1.179 . 252 -. 255 . 527 
1.896 . 527 
PDL. UAV -. 198(a) -1.043 . 309 -. 227 . 812 1.232 . 812 
PDI-IND 
. 156(a) . 844 . 409 . 
185 . 864 1.157 . 864 
UANQND -. 039(a) -. 218 . 829 -. 049 . 973 1.027 . 973 
UANý_MAS -. 288(a) -1.340 . 195 -. 287 . 611 1.638 . 611 
INDý-MAS I -. 072(a) 1 -. 378 1 . 709 1 -. 
084 1 . 853 1 1.172 1 . 853 
a Predictors in the Model: (Constant), PDI-MAS 
b Dependent Variable: Women on board 
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Collinearity Diagnostics(a) 
Variance Proportions 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index (Constant) PDI-MAS 
11 
2 
1.860 
. 140 
1.000 
3.640 
. 07 
. 93 
. 07 
. 93 
a uepenaent vaname: women on Doara 
Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 4460 13.7165 8.1435 3.65440 23 
Residual -8.6155 12.7482 . 0000 4.60718 23 Std. Predicted Value -2.350 1.525 . 000 1.000 23 Std. Residual -1.827 1 2.703 1 . 000 1 . 977 1 23 
a Dependent Variable: Women on board 
Charts 
_0 
c 
cu 
4- CO 
c 
0 
U) 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Women on board 
13 
cl 
13 
-3 -2 -1 0 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
470 
Appendix 22: The regression analysis models for the relationship between 
cultural values and code of ethics. 
Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Elapsed Time 
Memory Required 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 
Plots 
04-NOV-2006 07: 35: 20 
CADocuments and Seftings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance paper\corporate governance 
paper. sav 
<none> 
<none> 
<none> 
24 
User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x8 
/METHOD=ENTER xl 0 xl I xl 2 xl 3 xl 5 xi 6 
xl7xi8xlgx2O /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID 
, ZPRED) /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID)' OUTLIERS(3). 
0: 00: 00.10 
4508 bytes 
168 bytes 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Code of Ethics 66.1957 20.60356 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 2ý 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV-MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
1 INP_MAS 1 3187.4783 1 1878.11431 1 23 
471 
ZP 
Z 
ul r- (D r4 Co in r- r- 0 Co (D r- ci 0 ci CY Co 
C) rY e Co ýý c4 Co OD 0) 00 0 Co el A0 CO r, - (Y) (1 C) Cl V) Ce (n M 
NN cy cy NN c4 cý e) V) LO C) C) C*') c2 0 CD a , 0 Co ei cý . cq NMNc 4 
ý Co 
c4 0 
r_ rn ri 0 r- 
C: ) 0N0 «3 M CY 
T- LD Co 
rý rq CY> C) 00 %- ir C) :$00 CD 0 C: ) 0 Cl «) M «) M (1 v) M tn MM 
: Liý CM N99 cý -: c: ý 99N cq cy N cy c4 cy cy c ý (ro cliý r4 (0 e ". l z 
Z 
C) 
Co ý r4 0 ý- r- CIP) C) CD CV) r- CO (0 (D (D t'- CD C) CO "0 Co C) 0) LO rý Co LO Co C> CY) C) 0 r- 0ý T- CD C: ) rY CD V) ce m ce cv) m cv) m c41 m ce) ce) 
Z) c4 -: :: q: -ý (Q r. ý 'rý : uý ci eý c4 1: ý c: ý c4 R cý ri . c: ý cý MN cy C-4 NN Cq N ri c4 N 
Co 
> 
r, - r4 ce CD 
0 
r, x Co 0 CW3 em f- 0 IN (0 0 C) r4 CO - (0 c2 
(A to `*" Co cocý (D r4 CO 0QN LO 
0N CD el pl (V) M V) MM el MM Cl (n N C) 0 r4 N CN NN CY CY NN c4 N (0 C, 2 00ý000 LO (0 N 11 (0 -e cl . 
Z 
C) 
ri Co r- Co ci C: ) Co ce) le N LO X- C'4 0M r4 0 
cl 
00 r1. MM re M «) M 
00 CD le 00Q 14 C, 4 r4 C, 4 N C, 4 , 4 C v ( r" r C 4 r-i r-i r r i 7 1 : 4 
Ei (0 
M CD C) r- r0 LO e C) V) 0 Ln Ce 
0 r- 0N (» to N0"0 C) cý w) (0 1,3 9 r- (D C> LO LO C, c3 S C, 
Co mmm cy) v) m C#) CV3 CV) mm 
. 
Ci N r4 CN ei C, 4 N CY N C, 4 r14 r14 cl cý 9,7 lý .... 
(n 
< ;ý co tn cl) cD -e co rý , ce r4 a) r- a) co r- ti3 0 r- CD 
C) 
Necor-coNcncococ» cý cý o0 (D %- r- CO 0, e Ne c4 cý Cý ri c4 ei Cq c4 cy NN ry C, 4 CY 
0a (D 
c:, ý U. ) r- C) 0 r4 (3 ý V) V) 00 w-e (0 (0 N 0 C: ) " to <" cý 
gme) 
min mrilntnm mm cý 0 C. 4 cl, c:, 9 l» 10 - ll, -4 e r, r, NNC, 4 N C, 4 r. 4 r, r, 4 c4 ........... 
ý (D c2 Co Ul) ý Co MNý :-aý CV) (» 
0 (0 C'4 00 r-, IX 
(» Co Co LO ;g (0 Qý C'4 C) 0X (V) ce ce pl M V) «) v) Cl pl M c cy 0o, C) 0 
CD c a cý 0) Do........ ei r4 NNN r4 NN ty NN 
25 
t C) C: ) rý 0 v) 0 (0 00 N C) (3) Co u) N U'). e N x U) ý r- (0 C) Cl to ('4 Ln (D (0 0ý0 r- e Cl ce c, ) e3 (1 0 (0 e (D .-, cý cý 192 - Q (D 'e c> 00N c4 - CL .......... , N r, 4 NN r4 c4 c 4N ci ei ei ...... 
a) 
.0 
0 
0, e e0 1- CY) (0 CY r- CO ý (0 0 c:, r-- r-- ' C) C, r, - r4 c), e 
mý)-. 90 ei r- r 0 (D , (0 c19mu)(£ T (De 00 m'" 0"N eN (N (N c4, NN CN NN CNN - c4 . i ti 50w ............ . ý . 
:s (D - (0 Co w fA < CO w >OV)im U)W > in ýC3<Z><4- <. gý 5 515 0 Z5Zýg Z) Z 0 ,Z -, 1 C) - Z) ->-> 3) 1 0) 
011111 10 U) 111111 
aýý, C3 ar > > > z << <aa 25 os < gl CL ii Z Z) Z ci a :2Z Z 2 Z Z . . - . - CL 0- IL Z) - ->a. 0- CL Z) Z) IL :D (-) a. Z) c 0 
A 
0 
0 
Co Ci) 9) 
CL 
- 
u5 
N 
Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
Variables 
Model Variables Entered Removed Method 
IND MAS, PDI UAV IND, PDI. UAV MAS, 
- - Enter MASC(a)_ MAS: PDI_IND, UA\i, UA)7 IND, PDI ' 
a All requested variables entered. 
b Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
Model Summary(b) 
Model 
1 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 
. 861 (a) 
1 
. 741 . 525 14.20464 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI, UAV_MAS, UAV-IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
ANOVA(b) 
Model 
I 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6917.889 10 691.789 3.429 . 024(a) 
Residual 2421.261 12 201.772 
Total 1 9339.150 1 22 1 1 1 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI-UAV, IND, PDI, UAV_MAS, UAV-IND, PDI_MAS, PDI-IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. 
8 Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 138.374 132.226 1.046 . 316 
PDI -2.180 1.847 -1.855 -1.181 . 261 . 009 114.269 
UAV 2.459 1.193 3.263 2.062 . 062 . 009 115.896 
IND -1.053 1.649 -1.005 -. 638 . 535 . 009 114.588 
MASC -2.011 1.505 -2.323 -1.336 . 206 . 007 139.921 
PDI-UAV -. 024 . 013 -2.444 -1.951 . 075 . 014 72.649 
PDI-IND 
. 042 . 023 
2.178 1.819 . 094 . 015 66.399 
PDI-MA 023 . 018 1.424 
1.247 . 236 . 017 60.331 S 
UAV-IN 
- 023 . 010 -1.827 -2.230 . 046 . 032 31 058 D . I- . UAV 
- 
MAS -. 002 . 011 -. 185 -. 167 . 870 . 018 56.805 
IND-MAS 
. 013 . 016 1 
1.179 1 . 822 1 . 427 1 . 011 95.181 
a Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
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(5 
to 
Ei 
2 0 C) 0 0 0 v) C> C) C» r4 
U) 
cý cý cý 0 C) N 
Z 
> 
C) 0 cý 0 cý ce cý cý r4 
CD Ln 
q cý 
Z 
C) 0 0 0 0 1- Co (0 le (D m 1 
> 
CD N 0 
2 (D 0 C: ) C> 0 v- 1- Co r4 r- 
cý cý cý cý cý cý cý cý Ci 
CO) 
c 
0 
0 
CL Z (D C) 0 CD 0 Q Q N 0 pl le 
0- 2i 
0 CL 
> 
to < > (D C> T. - 3 V) 1- 
c:! cý cý cý 9 
tz 
0 
U) 0 0 0 0 C) 0 C, 4 Ir- 
Co Co 
< cý 0 Q 0 cý 
C> 
Z cý cý cý cý ce 
>< 0 CD C: ) 0 0 0 0 c CD c 0 c Le) c: cý cý ce cý cý ý ý 4 ý 
25 0 0 0, 0 0 0 T- 
ci 9- 
cý c: ý cý cý cý cý Ci CL 
. 
iz- 
m 0 0 C) C> 0 0 0 0 9- 
Co 
0 
c 9 cý cý cý cý cý e 
0 x 0 ;e 0 N cq C) - c» 0 C) Co N 0) (2 CD 0 t) 0 0 ci CY) cy; ci - ui (6 T-- cli ir) 0) 1 
m U) le (0 r- r-- LO v- ei 9- 
0 
> C) C, 4 r- (0 C) r4 N- 
0 C) 0 0 
(0 
c:! c:! q ce ce q q c6 LM 
w 
c 0 . 0 
c r-i CW) le in (D rl_ Co (» 
0 1- 
0 
E 
0 2 
4- 
0 
a) 
13 
0 
L) 
CD 
a 
CD 
CL 
(D 
0 
N 
Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 16.7129 92.0119 66.1957 17.73272 23 
Residual -26.0236 15.1709 . 0000 10.49082 23 Std. Predicted Value -2.790 1.456 . 000 1.000 23 Std. Residual -1.832 1 1.068 1 . 000 . 739 1 23 
a Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
Charts 
1.5 
1.0 
(D 
It .5 
'D 
(D 
0.0 
M 
CO 
a -1.0 0 
in 
-2.0 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
13 cl 
13 93 
El 
13 
-3 -2 -1 012 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
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Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 04-NOV-2006 07: 35: 28 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and Seffings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance papeAcorporate governance paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in 24 Working Data File 
Missing Value Definition of User-defined missing values are treated as missing. Handling Missing 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for 
any variable used. 
Syntax REGRESSION IDESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR 
SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
R ANOVA COLLIN TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x8 /METHOD=STEPWISE 
x10 AI x12 x1 3 x1 5 x16 x17 x18 x19 x2O 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID. *ZPRED) /CASEWISE 
PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.12 
Memory Required 5108 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for 168 bytes 
Residual Plots 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Code of Ethics 66.1957 20.60356 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV-IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV-MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
1 INQ_MAS 1 3187.4783 1 1878.11431 1 23 
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:p 
(3) LO r- 0 CY (0 't C) r_ r- 0 (D 0 r- le 0m cli Co C) (14 *m «) CV) ci re CV) CV2 ce ce) ci r) 
Co ý -t CO CM (0 ý CO C) CO 0 (0 Cl CD 0 -0 r-- g) C, g ri N C-4 ci (N CN C. 4 NNN r4 cý 9 ci cý cý cý cý c I e li c c c c < 9 ý : l rý i ý q ý r4 ý 
Z 
r- ti')cOcncoc14 , C, 4 M0 CO ýe04C: ) C) C) C: ) CD 0NNr. 4 C4 N r4 CY CY r4 C, 4 C, 4 c c C 1: c ý ý ! ý. ý ýq 9 r*ý q c4 aý uý 9q c4 N 
c2 CO (0 0 C, 2 r. 4 cli r14 r. 4 N c9 N r-i C, 4 C, 4 r4 
Z r,: (R r*-: -: cý 9 cl -: c4 ci (: ý c4 cý 9 c4 cý 9 
> 
0 (Y)ti3Itconcoo(DNCDC)0"ýOCDCý3 " C: ) cl V4 N IN C4 C4 N ri C-4 C, 4 IN N c - < 
2 
Lq 
4 
000 c4 ý cý re r4 In CDqt ci 0 %- (0 cl) 00v 
0» ***Z'*'**, ''* 
1 
c3 C, 3 (0 LO le C) C) (0 LO rý - lqr %- "-"c: b cl 
0 CD NNr, 4 C, 4 C, 4 r-4 C, 4 CNI C, 4 r4 C, 4 
114 c c c c l r C - Z c4 : ý ý ý ý 9 Wi 9 ee r ý 4 i :9 
90 ý KO q» (D ri X e-, e (0 (0 00ý r- * %- C) 00 Pl MM v) V) (1 ce v) v) mm «) r- C: ) N r-i C) C) (0 N (0 N0 CD) 0 KO (D - C: ) 0 00 C, 4 N C, 4 N IN IN CY C, 4 C, 4 N C, 4 
(0 0) C, 4 C) le cý CC! liý cý Ci q cý 97 Illý 9 ce ce cý Ci 
CO LO 0e Co r- 1- r) r4 0) r- (3) CO * r- In CD r- C> (D cl M Pl (n r3 tn v) m ce mm 
" ce) C: ) 0 r4 le Co r- (0 r4 ce (0 (0 C) LO -0-00 r*A NNNC, 4 C, 4 NN CN N C, 4 
(n (n 0, r- 0000 (Dw- r- CO 0 't N le 11q: 114: cý r4 9 cý 
< 
2 
u2 00 C> 0 CY W) 4-) V) 0 0A (D LO LO a 
cq C. 4 r4 cm C, 4 rýI r4 N rýI C, 1 C, 4 
c r c c - c '14 ' Z uý 
ý : ý e n: 9 ý : vý 9 cý cý C 4 e: 
> 
le 
to 
(D C> In Co ce r4 r, - v) m (D (0 No 0 r, mm ci mm cn m g) mmm 
;r0 co r) o in 0) co co in X <O 0-00NN r4 r-i v4 N cy N cy 2,4 r-4 
< 0 
r, 4 
0) 0 Co tc') ri u) LO r. 4 V) r- 0 C, 2 C) (0 00MM ce) rl CV) M (n M ri v) CV3 
0 Lo r- (0 C) CV) 40 le N tin 0 (0 (D ý0 11- le v) N CM NN c14 r. 4 NN ry N C, 4 
'lý cý (R q: (£! c4 c: ý 9 cý 'lý cý cý cý r4 ri 
0 euýc>eCDV)rýCC)CDC) 
Aýr, r- ce o cD r- " ri o c-) r- je o 25 , co KKNWNr. 4 2,4 r4 N r4 ri 
'14: cý (iý ci 9N w) N T- 00 le Q0 V) ýQýr, 1, q, .............. 
w 
4- 0 
(D 
cl 
Co CO ill Co C Co Co w Co >CO 92 << -- Co im ý 
CO 
<> Zg3 < 
<Z> 
-0<'0 
ý 
25z 
g 
g 
- 
0 M C) 
Z) 
-l C. ): 2E2 1 l> 1 (D 
C) . i l 
11 ý iz 
cn -1-1-1> > MI. (, 1) tz 
11 l> 1>0 M ý' ' , > 
0 F2 in 0 <czc2i3« , ozi < 25 25 a<< < 25 aý in 25 25 
ý< 
Z Z Z Z Z Z ci IL :D 2 CL a. CL =) z 0 a. Z) -2 0- CL CL zm_ -2 CL CL CL :2Z CL 
0 
0 
(1) 0 CL 0 
N 
Variables Entered/Removed(a) 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
Stepwise, (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to- 
IND enter <= . 050, Probability-of-F-to- 
remove >=. 100). 
2 Stepwise, (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to- 
MASC enter <= . 050, Probability-of-F-to- 
remove >=. 100). 
a Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
Model Summary(c) 
Model R R Square Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 
2 . 
61 O(a) 
. 715(b) 
. 372 
. 511 
. 342 
. 462 
16.71729 
15.10741 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND 
b Predictors: (Constant). IND, MASC 
c Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
ANOVA(c) 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3470.325 1 3470.325 12.418 . 002(a) 
Residual 5868.825 21 279.468 
Total 9339.150 22 
2 Regression 4774.472 2 2387.236 10.460 . 001(b) 
Residual 4564.677 20 228.234 
Total 1 9339.150 1 22 1 1 
Predictors: (Constant), IND 
Predictors: (Constant), IND, MASC 
Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sim 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. 
B Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 24.570 12.316 1.995 . 059 
IND 
. 639 . 181 -610 
3.524 . 002 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant) 40.415 12.954 3.120 . 005 IND 
. 638 . 164 . 609 
3.897 . 001 1.000 1.000 
MASC -. 323 . 135 -. 374 -2.390 . 027 1.000 1.000 
a Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
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Excluded Varlables(c) 
Model Beta In t sia. 
Partial 
Correlation Collinearity Statistics 
Minimum 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
PDI -. 128(a) -. 607 . 551 -. 134 . 697 1.434 . 697 
UAV 
.1 09(a) . 617 . 
544 . 137 . 992 1.008 . 992 
MASC -. 374(a) -2.390 . 027 -. 471 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PDI 
- 
UAV 
. 071 (a) . 391 . 
700 . 087 . 949 1.053 . 949 
PDIjND -. 057(a) -. 288 . 776 -. 064 . 791 1.264 . 791 
PDI-MAS -. 339(a) -1.968 . 063 -. 403 . 884 1.131 . 884 
UAV-IND -. 008(a) -. 041 . 968 -. 009 . 798 1.254 . 798 
UAK_MAS -. 156(a) -. 899 . 379 -. 197 . 999 1.001 . 999 
IND_MAS -. 438(a) -2.349 . 029 -. 465 . 708 1.412 . 708 
2 PDI -. 1 18(b) -. 621 . 542 -. 
141 . 697 . 
1.435 . 697 
UAV 
.1 63(b) 1.028 . 
317 . 230 . 974 1.027 . 974 
PDI-UAV . 080(b) . 491 . 629 . 
112 . 949 1.054 . 949 PDI_IND -. 035(b) -. 193 . 849 -. 044 . 789 1.267 . 789 
PDI 
- 
MAS -. 106(b) -. 424 . 676 -. 097 . 412 2.425 . 412 
UANý_IND 
. 075(b) . 412 . 
685 . 094 . 768 1.302 . 768 
UAV_MAS 
. 309(b) 1.297 . 210 . 
285 . 417 2.396 . 417 
IND_MAS -. 087(b) -. 095 . 925 -. 022 . 031 32.345 . 031 
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), IND 
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), IND. MASC 
Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
Collinearity Diagnostics(a) 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index Variance Prop rtions 
I 
- 
(Constant) 
. 
, 
-IND 
MASC 
11 1.959 1.000 . 02 . 02 
_ 
2 
. 041 
6.922 . 98 . 98 
21 2.819 1.000 . 01 . 01 . 02 2 
. 144 4.418 . 03 . 16 . 83 
3 
. 036 8.810 . 97 . 83 . 15 
a Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
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Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 37.6538 86.9544 66.1957 14.73165 23 
Residual -26.5820 27.7797 . 0000 14.40435 23 Std. Predicted Value -1.937 1.409 . 000 1.000 23 Std. Residual 1 -1.760 1 1.839 1 . 000 1 . 953 23 
a Liepenaent variaDie: L; oae OT tinics 
Charts 
z 
co 
(D 
N 
M 
. I- U) 
c 
o 
co 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
D 
D 
a 
a 
D D D 
0 
0 
-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -. 5 0.0 .51.0 1.5 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
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Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 10-NOV-2006 09: 55: 52 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and 
Seftings\A\Desktop\corporate governance 
papeAcorporate governance paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 24 Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEVCORR SIGN /MISSING LISTWISE 
/REGWGT=res-7 /STATISTICS COEFF 
OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL 
ICRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) /NOORIGIN 
/DEPENDENT x8 /METHOD=STEPWISExIO 
x1l x12 x113 x15 x16 x17 x18 xig x2O 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) 
ICASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3) 
/SAVE RESID. 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.10 
Memory Required 5252 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 168 bytes 
Plots 
Variables Created or RES-8 Residual 
Modified 
Warnings 
No plots are produced for Weighted Least Squares regression. You can SAVE the 
appropriate variables and use other procedures (e. g., EXAMINE and PLOT) to produce 
the requested plots. To plot weighted versions of the residuals and predicted values, 
use COMPUTE before plotting: COMPUTE RESID = SQRT(REGWGTvar) * RESID 
COMPUTE PRED = SQRT(REGWGTvar) * PRED. 
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Descriptive Statistics(a) 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Code of Ethics 81.7074 55.61501 11 
PDI 43.0684 50.74276 1 
UAV 70.4066 81.77942 1 
IND 61.2967 68.47741 1 
MASC 50.0206 102.30325 1 
PDý_UAV 3274.9664 7224.92418 11 
PDI-IND 2489.6261 2867.81086 11 
PDI-MAS 2164.7258 5440.94858 
UAV-IND 3933.4769 2943.41333 
UAV MAS 3573.9974 9136.14961 
IND_MAS 1 3124.8478 7218.63382 
a Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstanclarclized Residual 
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Variables Entered/Removed(a, b) 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
I Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of- 
UAV MAS F-to-enter <= . 050, Probability- of-F-to-remove >= A 00). 
a Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Model Summary(b, c) 
Model R R Square 
[Adiusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 
. 827(a) 
1 
. 683 
1 
. 648 33.00078 
a Predictors: (Constant), UAV MAS 
b Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression -Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
ANOVA(b, c) 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
I Regression 21128.823 1 21128.823 19.401 
. 002(a) Residual 9801.466 9 1089.052 
Total 1 30930.289 1 10 1 1 
-1 a vreclictors: (Gonstant), UAV-MA5 
b Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Coefficients(a, b) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. 
Model B Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 99.689 4.993 19.965 . 000 UAV MAS 
. -. 
005 . 001 -. 827 -4.405 , . 
002 
, 
1.000 1.000 
a Uependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Excluded Variables(b, c) 
CollinearitvS atistics 
Partial Minimum 
Model Beta In t Sig. Correlation Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
I PDI -. 076(a) -. 365 . 725 -. 128 . 900 1.111 . 900 UAV -. 305(a) -1.513 . 169 -. 472 . 756 1.323 . 756 IND 
. 341 (a) 2.011 . 079 . 579 . 917 1.091 . 917 MASC 
. 343(a) . 868 . 411 . 293 . 231 4.322 . 231 PDI 
- 
UAV -. 211 (a) -1.040 . 329 -. 345 . 852 1.174 . 852 PDL. IND 
. 329(a) 2.029 . 077 . 583 . 992 1.008 . 992 PDI-MAS 
. 635(a) 1.614 . 145 . 496 . 193 5.173 . 193 UAV IND 
. 291 (a) 1.469 . 180 . 461 . 794 1.259 . 794 INQ_MAS 
. 280(a) . 
1.304 
. . 
228 
. . 
419 . 709 1.410 . 709 
a Predictors in the Model: (Constant). UAV-MAS 
b Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
484 
Collinearity Diagnosties(a, b) 
Variance Proport ons 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index (Constant) UAV MAS 
11 
2 
1.818 
. 182 
1.000 
3.157 
. 09 
. 91 
. 09 
. 91 
a Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Residuals Statistics(b, c) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 55.7160 97.6765 82.5060 12.21041 11 
Residual -14.7663 10.0250 -4.0423 8.99817 
Std. Predicted Value(a) 0 
I Std. Residual(a) 01 
a Not computed for Weighted Least Squares regression. 
b Dependent Variable: Code of Ethics 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
485 
Appendix 23: The regression analysis models for the relationship between 
cultural values and ethics systems. 
Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 07-NOV-2006 15: 05: 40 
CommentS 
Input Data 
CADocuments and Seftings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance papeAcorporate governance 
paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 24 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) 
INOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x9 
/METHO-D=ENTER x10 x1 I x12 x13 x15 x16 
x17x18x19x20 /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID 
, ZPRED) /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.59 
Memory Required 4508 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 168 bytes 
Plots 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Ethics Systems 57.9048 18.70099 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
INDý_MAS 1 3187.4783 1 1878.11431 1 23 
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Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI. UAV-MAS, UAV-IND, 
PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, UAV, MASC(a) Enter 
a All requested variables entered. 
b Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
Model Summary(b) 
Model R- 
[R 
Square Adjusted R Square 
- [Std. 
Error of the Estimate 
1 
. 900(a) . 811 . 653 11.01809 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI, UAV_MAS, UAV-IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
ANOVA(b) 
Model 
I 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6237.213 10 623.721 5.138 . 005(a) Residual 1456.779 12 121.398 
Total 1 7693.992 1 22 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND_MAS, PDI_UAV, IND, PDI, UAV_MAS, UAV_IND, PDI_MAS, PDI_IND, 
UAV, MASC 
b Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. 
8 Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 24.399 102.563 . 238 . 816 PDI -1.130 1.432 -1.059 -. 789 . 446 . 009 114.269 UAV 2.317 . 925 3.386 2.504 . 028 . 009 115.896 IND -. 082 1.279 ý.. 086 -. 064 . 950 . 009 114.588 MASC 
. 091 1.167 . 116 . 078 . 939 . 007 139.921 PDI 
- 
UAV -. 021 . 010 -2.342 -2-187 . 049 . 014 72.649 PD! 
_IND . 048 . 018 
2.700 2.637 
. 022 . 015 66.399 PDI 
- 
MAS -. 003 . 014 -. 175 -. 179 . 861 . 017 60.331 UAV_IND -. 029 . 008 -2.585 -3.692 . 003 . 032 31.058 UAV MAS 
. 002 . 009 . 202 . 213 . 835 . 018 56.805 INDý_MAS 1 -. 004 1 . 012 1 -. 359 1 -. 293 . 775 1 . 011 95.181 
a Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
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Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 3.6914 75.9807 57.9048 16.83775 23 
Residual -16.5716 12.1417 . 0000 8.13740 23 
Std. Predicted Value -3.220 1.074 . 000 1.000 23 
Std. Residual -1.504 1.102 . 000 . 739 231 
a Dependent Variable: L: tnics tiystems 
Charts 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
1.5 1 
1.0 
cr- .5 
0.0 
5 
-1.0 
-2.0 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
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Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 07-NOV-2006 15: 06: 35 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and Seffings\A\Desktop\corporate 
governance papeAcorporate governance paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in 
Working Data File 24 
Missing Value Definition of Missing 
Handling User-defined missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for 
any variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR 
SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
R ANOVA COLLIN TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(l 0) 
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT x9 /METHOD=STEPWISE 
x10 x1l x12 x13 x15 x16 W x18 xl9 x2O 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) /CASEWISE 
PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.10 
Memory Required 5108 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for 168 bytes 
Residual Plots 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Ethics Systems 57.9048 18.70099 23 
PDI 43.0435 17.53044 23 
UAV 59.0000 27.33629 23 
IND 65.1739 19.66458 23 
MASC 48.9130 23.80014 23 
PDI-UAV 2699.3913 2064.93094 23 
PDI-IND 2623.8696 1058.06523 23 
PDI-MAS 2112.6957 1283.72251 23 
UAV-IND 3799.4348 1664.82027 23 
UAV MAS 2970.0870 2045.86661 23 
1 IND. _MAS 1 
3187.4783 1 1878.11431 1 23 
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Variables Entered/Removed(a) 
Variables Variables 
Model Entered Removed Method 
1 Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= . 050, IND Probability-of-F4o-remove >=. 100). 
a Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
Model Summary(b) 
Model 
1 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 
. 651 (a) . 424 . 
397 14.52368 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND 
b Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
ANOVA(b) 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
I Regression 3264.311 1 3264.311 15.475 . 001 (a) 
Residual 4429.681 21 210.937 
Total 1 7693.992 1 22 1 1 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND 
b Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
Coefficients(a) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Siq. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. 
B Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 17.533 . 10.700 
1.639 . 116 
IND 
L- I . 
619 . 157 . 651 yI 
3.934 . 001 1.000 1.000 I 
a Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
Excluded Varlables(b) 
Model Beta In t siq. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Minimum 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
1 PDI -. 211 (a) -1.066 . 299 -. 232 . 697 
1.434 . 697 
UAV 
. 212(a) 1.295 . 
210 . 278 . 992 
1.008 . 992 
MASC -. 076(a) -. 450 . 657 -. 100 1.000 
1.000 1.000 
PDI-UAV 
. 098(a) . 565 . 
578 . 125 . 949 1.053 . 949 
PDI-IND -. 077(a) -. 407 . 688 -. 091 . 791 
1.264 . 791 
PDI-MAS -. 1 97(a) -1.126 . 274 -. 244 . 884 
1.131 . 884 
UAV IND 
. 084(a) . 446 . 
660 . 099 . 798 1.254 . 798 
UA\ý_MAS 
.1 17(a) . 698 . 493 . 
154 . 999 1.001 . 999 
INQ_MAS 1 -. 1 17(a) 1 -. 585 1 . 565 1 -. 130 1 . 708 1 1.412 . 708 
a Predictors in the Model: (Constant), IND 
b Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
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Collinearity Diagnostics(a) 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index Vadance Proportions 
I 
(Constant IND 
11 
2 
1.959 
. 041 
1.000 
6.922 
. 02 
. 98 
. 02 
. 98 
a Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
Residuals Statistics(a) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 29.9222 73.9025 57.9048 12.18104 23 
Residual -25.5692 25.7639 . 0000 14.18975 23 
Std. Predicted Value -2.297 1.313 . 000 1.000 23 
Std. Residual 1 -1.761 1 1.774 1 . 000 1 . 977 1 23 
a Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
Charts 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
2.0 1 
co 1.5 
1.0 
.5 
TZ» 
0.0 
m -. 5 CO 
a 
o 
-2.0 
-3 2 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
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Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 10-NOV-2006 10: 02: 55 
Comments 
Input Data 
CADocuments and 
Settings\A\Desktop\corporate governance 
papeAcorporate governance paper. sav 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 24 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as' 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STIDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE 
/REGWGT=res-9 /STATISTICS COEFF 
OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL 
/CRITERIA=PIN(. 05) POUT(. 10) /NOORIGIN 
/DEPENDENTx9 /METHOD=STEPWISExIO 
x1l x12 x13 x15 x16 W x118 x19 x2O 
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID, *ZPRED) 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3) 
/SAVE RESID. 
Resources Elapsed Time 0: 00: 00.12 
Memory Required 5292 bytes 
Additional Memory 
Required for Residual 168 bytes 
Plots 
Variables Created or RESýj 0 Residual 
Modified 
Wamings 
No plots are produced for Weighted Least Squares regression. You can SAVE the 
appropriate variables and use other procedures (e. g., EXAMINE and PLOT) to produce 
the requested plots. To plot weighted versions of the residuals and predicted values, 
use COMPUTE before plotting: COMPUTE RESID = SQRT(REGWGTvar) * RESID 
COMPUTE PRED = SQRT(REGWGTvar) * PRED. 
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Descriptive Statistics(a) 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Ethics Systems 71.6529 33.74869 11 
PDI 39.2256 60.22473 11 
UAV 67.6525 86.05399 11 
IND 60.9564 70.00221 11 
MASC 45.9607 109.95924 11 
PDI-UAV 2901.9158 7835.76095 11 
PDI-IND 2227.7477 3042.62308 11 
PDI-MAS 1687.6953 5070.06139 11 
UAV-IND 3684.4244 1877.58047 11 
UAV-MAS 3202.7795 9111.91155 11 
1 INQ_MAS 1 2752.1106 7080.48699 I ll I 
a Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
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Variables Entered/Removed(a, b) 
Vadables Vadables 
Model Entered Removed Method 
IND Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter - . 050, Probability- 
of-F-to-remove >=. 100). 
a Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Model Summary(b, c) 
Model 
I 
R R Square 
I 
Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
I 
- 
850(a) 
. 
723 1 . 
692 18.71839 
a Predictors: (Constant). IND 
b Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
ANOVA(b, c) 
Model 
r, 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 8236.338 1 8236.338 23.507 . 001 (a) Residual 3153.404 9 350.378 
Total 1 11389.743 10 
a Predictors: (Constant), IND 
b Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Coefficients(a, b) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
I 
Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 46 , 662 5.407 8.629 . 000 IND 
. 410 . 085 . 850 4.848 , . 
001 
, 
1.000 1.000 
a Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
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Excluded Varlables(b, c) 
Model Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation Collinearity Sta istics 
Minimum 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
I PDI 
. 018(a) -. 085 . 934 -. 030 . 742 1.347 . 742 UAV 
. 332(a) . 532 . 609 . 185 . 086 11.660 . 086 MASC -. 141 (a) -. 785 . 455 -. 267 . 993 1.007 . 993 PDI-UAV 
. 038(a) . 126 . 903 . 045 . 372 2.691 . 372 PDI-IND -. 077(a) -. 356 . 731 -. 125 . 718 1.393 . 718 PDI_MAS -. 223(a) -1.272 . 239 -. 410 . 934 1.071 . 934 UAV IND -. 086(a) -. 462 . 656 -. 161 . 979 1.021 . 979 UAV MAS -. 193(a) -. 985 . 354 -. 329 . 805 1.243 . 805 IND_MAS 1 -. 1 20(a) 1 -. 628 1 . 547 1 -. 217 . 898 1.114 1 . 898 
a Predictors in the Model: (Constant), IND 
b Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Collinearity Diagnostics(a, b) 
Variance Proportions 
Model Dimension Eiqenvalue Condition Index (Constant) IND 
11 
2 
1.953 
. 047 
1.000 
6.460 
. 02 
. 98 
. 02 
. 98 
a Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
b Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
Residuals Statistics(b, c) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 59.3716 83.1501 73.6089 6.78401 11 
Residual -13.0705 5.5397 -3.4452 6.63884 11 
Std. Predicted Value(a) 0 
I Std. Residual(a) I -I -I - 0 
a Not computed for Weighted Least Squares regression. 
b Dependent Variable: Ethics Systems 
c Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Unstandardized Residual 
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